[Goose]

I currently have no reason to doubt that the coaching staff is still doing a "good job" on the recruiting trail. As Shaw has stated, however, they are using the same approach that has worked for them in the past. This approach stresses the "40 year decision" and challenges the recruits to do what they have to do on the academic front to get admitted. They are looking for a certain type of person.
Unfortunately, there just aren't as many of those people available in any given year as one might wish. As has been discussed before, that is why we can't "miss" very often on the ones that are there. That situation is bad enough. However, the early signing period makes it much worse. Imagine you are a four star athlete that has good but maybe not stellar academics going into your junior year. A coach from Stanford tells them "If you work your tail off, you might be able to get in to Stanford and play football. So we want you to commit with us. If you do, maybe you will get in. But we possibly can't tell you that for sure until after the first signing day goes by. You will have to say no to your other offers". This is a smart kid. They like to be challenged, as Shaw prefers. BUT, would it be smart to do so? Put all your eggs in the Stanford basket when you possibly won't get in? I am not sure that is a good strategy if the downside is that you have scramble for a place at Indiana if you want to play football because the class at ND (or FSU or UCLA, fill in the blank) is full.
This is a bigger problem than it appears, because recruits will decide early on that they aren't going this route, period. If, best case, they have to work lots harder and risk their football future, many will say it's not prudent. The work lots harder you can sell. Saying no to other schools with no corresponding assurance that you will eventually be admitted is asking too much.
Before the early signing day was adopted, you would pretty much know where you were with Stanford admissions and could accept your backup offer (because if you hadn't been admitted, you have no Stanford offer). Some very few guys would hold on, hoping to get a better test score, etc. But not many. Now, you are possibly going to be asked to hang on past the first signing day and hope you get in. That may not happen, you may already have a firm offer because you are admitted. But it may happen. Hard to ask somebody to agree to this in advance.

[Goose]

I currently have no reason to doubt that the coaching staff is still doing a "good job" on the recruiting trail. As Shaw has stated, however, they are using the same approach that has worked for them in the past. This approach stresses the "40 year decision" and challenges the recruits to do what they have to do on the academic front to get admitted. They are looking for a certain type of person.
Unfortunately, there just aren't as many of those people available in any given year as one might wish. As has been discussed before, that is why we can't "miss" very often on the ones that are there. That situation is bad enough. However, the early signing period makes it much worse. Imagine you are a four star athlete that has good but maybe not stellar academics going into your junior year. A coach from Stanford tells them "If you work your tail off, you might be able to get in to Stanford and play football. So we want you to commit with us. If you do, maybe you will get in. But we possibly can't tell you that for sure until after the first signing day goes by. You will have to say no to your other offers". This is a smart kid. They like to be challenged, as Shaw prefers. BUT, would it be smart to do so? Put all your eggs in the Stanford basket when you possibly won't get in? I am not sure that is a good strategy if the downside is that you have scramble for a place at Indiana if you want to play football because the class at ND (or FSU or UCLA, fill in the blank) is full.
This is a bigger problem than it appears, because recruits will decide early on that they aren't going this route, period. If, best case, they have to work lots harder and risk their football future, many will say it's not prudent. The work lots harder you can sell. Saying no to other schools with no corresponding assurance that you will eventually be admitted is asking too much.
Before the early signing day was adopted, you would pretty much know where you were with Stanford admissions and could accept your backup offer (because if you hadn't been admitted, you have no Stanford offer). Some very few guys would hold on, hoping to get a better test score, etc. But not many. Now, you are possibly going to be asked to hang on past the first signing day and hope you get in. That may not happen, you may already have a firm offer because you are admitted. But it may happen. Hard to ask somebody to agree to this in advance.

[Goose]

I currently have no reason to doubt that the coaching staff is still doing a "good job" on the recruiting trail. As Shaw has stated, however, they are using the same approach that has worked for them in the past. This approach stresses the "40 year decision" and challenges the recruits to do what they have to do on the academic front to get admitted. They are looking for a certain type of person.
Unfortunately, there just aren't as many of those people available in any given year as one might wish. As has been discussed before, that is why we can't "miss" very often on the ones that are there. That situation is bad enough. However, the early signing period makes it much worse. Imagine you are a four star athlete that has good but maybe not stellar academics going into your junior year. A coach from Stanford tells them "If you work your tail off, you might be able to get in to Stanford and play football. So we want you to commit with us. If you do, maybe you will get in. But we possibly can't tell you that for sure until after the first signing day goes by. You will have to say no to your other offers". This is a smart kid. They like to be challenged, as Shaw prefers. BUT, would it be smart to do so? Put all your eggs in the Stanford basket when you possibly won't get in? I am not sure that is a good strategy if the downside is that you have scramble for a place at Indiana if you want to play football because the class at ND (or FSU or UCLA, fill in the blank) is full.
This is a bigger problem than it appears, because recruits will decide early on that they aren't going this route, period. If, best case, they have to work lots harder and risk their football future, many will say it's not prudent. The work lots harder you can sell. Saying no to other schools with no corresponding assurance that you will eventually be admitted is asking too much.
Before the early signing day was adopted, you would pretty much know where you were with Stanford admissions and could accept your backup offer (because if you hadn't been admitted, you have no Stanford offer). Some very few guys would hold on, hoping to get a better test score, etc. But not many. Now, you are possibly going to be asked to hang on past the first signing day and hope you get in. That may not happen, you may already have a firm offer because you are admitted. But it may happen. Hard to ask somebody to agree to this in advance.

[Goose]

I currently have no reason to doubt that the coaching staff is still doing a "good job" on the recruiting trail. As Shaw has stated, however, they are using the same approach that has worked for them in the past. This approach stresses the "40 year decision" and challenges the recruits to do what they have to do on the academic front to get admitted. They are looking for a certain type of person.
Unfortunately, there just aren't as many of those people available in any given year as one might wish. As has been discussed before, that is why we can't "miss" very often on the ones that are there. That situation is bad enough. However, the early signing period makes it much worse. Imagine you are a four star athlete that has good but maybe not stellar academics going into your junior year. A coach from Stanford tells them "If you work your tail off, you might be able to get in to Stanford and play football. So we want you to commit with us. If you do, maybe you will get in. But we possibly can't tell you that for sure until after the first signing day goes by. You will have to say no to your other offers". This is a smart kid. They like to be challenged, as Shaw prefers. BUT, would it be smart to do so? Put all your eggs in the Stanford basket when you possibly won't get in? I am not sure that is a good strategy if the downside is that you have scramble for a place at Indiana if you want to play football because the class at ND (or FSU or UCLA, fill in the blank) is full.
This is a bigger problem than it appears, because recruits will decide early on that they aren't going this route, period. If, best case, they have to work lots harder and risk their football future, many will say it's not prudent. The work lots harder you can sell. Saying no to other schools with no corresponding assurance that you will eventually be admitted is asking too much.
Before the early signing day was adopted, you would pretty much know where you were with Stanford admissions and could accept your backup offer (because if you hadn't been admitted, you have no Stanford offer). Some very few guys would hold on, hoping to get a better test score, etc. But not many. Now, you are possibly going to be asked to hang on past the first signing day and hope you get in. That may not happen, you may already have a firm offer because you are admitted. But it may happen. Hard to ask somebody to agree to this in advance.

[SamuelMcF]

Ok cool everyone, the sky is falling and we're all gonna die.

That out of the way, anyone know what's going on with an offer out today to a 2018 two-way guy (Nasty football player who loves to hit and THE #1 LACROSSE RECRUIT IN THE COUNTRY)?
https://twitter.com/rickymiezan/status/9...1783305217

[SamuelMcF]

Ok cool everyone, the sky is falling and we're all gonna die.

That out of the way, anyone know what's going on with an offer out today to a 2018 two-way guy (Nasty football player who loves to hit and THE #1 LACROSSE RECRUIT IN THE COUNTRY)?
https://twitter.com/rickymiezan/status/9...1783305217

[SamuelMcF]

Ok cool everyone, the sky is falling and we're all gonna die.

That out of the way, anyone know what's going on with an offer out today to a 2018 two-way guy (Nasty football player who loves to hit and THE #1 LACROSSE RECRUIT IN THE COUNTRY)?
https://twitter.com/rickymiezan/status/9...1783305217

[SamuelMcF]

Ok cool everyone, the sky is falling and we're all gonna die.

That out of the way, anyone know what's going on with an offer out today to a 2018 two-way guy (Nasty football player who loves to hit and THE #1 LACROSSE RECRUIT IN THE COUNTRY)?
https://twitter.com/rickymiezan/status/9...1783305217

[washingtonismoney]

The sentiment on this board would be a lot different if we picked up two players of high positional need, Dax Hollifield and Chris Murray. Both of those were late signees that we didn't convert. Murray didn't apply and may not have been admissible. 

Well, yes, if they did better then people would be happier. If the steak from the restaurant was medium rare, as I ordered, instead of medium well, I'd be happier with the cooking. "People are happier when results are good rather than bad" is not terribly meaningful.

The question is, "Did the staff reasonably maximize its chances at a good class or was it victimized by luck and circumstance?"

Here the answer is "they did not maximize their chances, not even close." They offered several players too late. For example, waiting on offering Nicolas Petit-Frere and Tyreke Smith was high-grade lunacy. These were high-level prospects who had received tons and tons of interest. You either recruit them seriously, by offering in the spring, or don't bother at all. Waiting until September was wasting everyone's time.

Targeting a one-OL class, as they did throughout most of the year, was an error for literally anyone who can do math and can think through the basics of offensive line play. While there are some exceptions, old experienced OL perform way better than young ones. Just look at how much better AT Hall performed in 2017 versus 2016. Or look at the way Khalil Wilkes went from being bossed in the 2012 Pac-12 Championship Game to performing as an above-average starter the next year.

If experience matters, you need to keep a constant fill of offensive linemen in the pipeline -- about 3.5 per year -- to give yourself a fighting chance of having a sufficient number of experienced offensive linemen to form the foundation of a good unit. The coaches only targeted one OL through most of the year, belatedly offering Trey Stratford (who's coming, thank god) and Nicolas Petit-Frere (who turned out to be the #11 player in the nation, and didn't come). Salyer was never that interested and Murray an admissions casualty. If they had anticipated this issue earlier, they would've offered slightly-lower rated offensive linemen and filled the class.

In general, the class was marked by an error to anticipate that not all offered players would come, and that more players would depart than anticipated. Both of these are predictable dynamics; the coaches simply failed to see the obvious. Because of that, there are dire voids in the ILB and OL pipeline. There were obvious targets who could've been offered, but weren't.

Now, I suppose the obvious thing is to say "there weren't academically qualified guys" and other forms of difficult-to-refute counterfactuals. I'll just say that these issues were predicted through basically all of 2017 by close observers, who proposed several alternatives that were ignored. While there are many good players in the 2018 class, there should be many more, and the team will suffer in 2020 as a result of the blunders in this class.

[washingtonismoney]

The sentiment on this board would be a lot different if we picked up two players of high positional need, Dax Hollifield and Chris Murray. Both of those were late signees that we didn't convert. Murray didn't apply and may not have been admissible. 

Well, yes, if they did better then people would be happier. If the steak from the restaurant was medium rare, as I ordered, instead of medium well, I'd be happier with the cooking. "People are happier when results are good rather than bad" is not terribly meaningful.

The question is, "Did the staff reasonably maximize its chances at a good class or was it victimized by luck and circumstance?"

Here the answer is "they did not maximize their chances, not even close." They offered several players too late. For example, waiting on offering Nicolas Petit-Frere and Tyreke Smith was high-grade lunacy. These were high-level prospects who had received tons and tons of interest. You either recruit them seriously, by offering in the spring, or don't bother at all. Waiting until September was wasting everyone's time.

Targeting a one-OL class, as they did throughout most of the year, was an error for literally anyone who can do math and can think through the basics of offensive line play. While there are some exceptions, old experienced OL perform way better than young ones. Just look at how much better AT Hall performed in 2017 versus 2016. Or look at the way Khalil Wilkes went from being bossed in the 2012 Pac-12 Championship Game to performing as an above-average starter the next year.

If experience matters, you need to keep a constant fill of offensive linemen in the pipeline -- about 3.5 per year -- to give yourself a fighting chance of having a sufficient number of experienced offensive linemen to form the foundation of a good unit. The coaches only targeted one OL through most of the year, belatedly offering Trey Stratford (who's coming, thank god) and Nicolas Petit-Frere (who turned out to be the #11 player in the nation, and didn't come). Salyer was never that interested and Murray an admissions casualty. If they had anticipated this issue earlier, they would've offered slightly-lower rated offensive linemen and filled the class.

In general, the class was marked by an error to anticipate that not all offered players would come, and that more players would depart than anticipated. Both of these are predictable dynamics; the coaches simply failed to see the obvious. Because of that, there are dire voids in the ILB and OL pipeline. There were obvious targets who could've been offered, but weren't.

Now, I suppose the obvious thing is to say "there weren't academically qualified guys" and other forms of difficult-to-refute counterfactuals. I'll just say that these issues were predicted through basically all of 2017 by close observers, who proposed several alternatives that were ignored. While there are many good players in the 2018 class, there should be many more, and the team will suffer in 2020 as a result of the blunders in this class.

[washingtonismoney]

The sentiment on this board would be a lot different if we picked up two players of high positional need, Dax Hollifield and Chris Murray. Both of those were late signees that we didn't convert. Murray didn't apply and may not have been admissible. 

Well, yes, if they did better then people would be happier. If the steak from the restaurant was medium rare, as I ordered, instead of medium well, I'd be happier with the cooking. "People are happier when results are good rather than bad" is not terribly meaningful.

The question is, "Did the staff reasonably maximize its chances at a good class or was it victimized by luck and circumstance?"

Here the answer is "they did not maximize their chances, not even close." They offered several players too late. For example, waiting on offering Nicolas Petit-Frere and Tyreke Smith was high-grade lunacy. These were high-level prospects who had received tons and tons of interest. You either recruit them seriously, by offering in the spring, or don't bother at all. Waiting until September was wasting everyone's time.

Targeting a one-OL class, as they did throughout most of the year, was an error for literally anyone who can do math and can think through the basics of offensive line play. While there are some exceptions, old experienced OL perform way better than young ones. Just look at how much better AT Hall performed in 2017 versus 2016. Or look at the way Khalil Wilkes went from being bossed in the 2012 Pac-12 Championship Game to performing as an above-average starter the next year.

If experience matters, you need to keep a constant fill of offensive linemen in the pipeline -- about 3.5 per year -- to give yourself a fighting chance of having a sufficient number of experienced offensive linemen to form the foundation of a good unit. The coaches only targeted one OL through most of the year, belatedly offering Trey Stratford (who's coming, thank god) and Nicolas Petit-Frere (who turned out to be the #11 player in the nation, and didn't come). Salyer was never that interested and Murray an admissions casualty. If they had anticipated this issue earlier, they would've offered slightly-lower rated offensive linemen and filled the class.

In general, the class was marked by an error to anticipate that not all offered players would come, and that more players would depart than anticipated. Both of these are predictable dynamics; the coaches simply failed to see the obvious. Because of that, there are dire voids in the ILB and OL pipeline. There were obvious targets who could've been offered, but weren't.

Now, I suppose the obvious thing is to say "there weren't academically qualified guys" and other forms of difficult-to-refute counterfactuals. I'll just say that these issues were predicted through basically all of 2017 by close observers, who proposed several alternatives that were ignored. While there are many good players in the 2018 class, there should be many more, and the team will suffer in 2020 as a result of the blunders in this class.

[washingtonismoney]

The sentiment on this board would be a lot different if we picked up two players of high positional need, Dax Hollifield and Chris Murray. Both of those were late signees that we didn't convert. Murray didn't apply and may not have been admissible. 

Well, yes, if they did better then people would be happier. If the steak from the restaurant was medium rare, as I ordered, instead of medium well, I'd be happier with the cooking. "People are happier when results are good rather than bad" is not terribly meaningful.

The question is, "Did the staff reasonably maximize its chances at a good class or was it victimized by luck and circumstance?"

Here the answer is "they did not maximize their chances, not even close." They offered several players too late. For example, waiting on offering Nicolas Petit-Frere and Tyreke Smith was high-grade lunacy. These were high-level prospects who had received tons and tons of interest. You either recruit them seriously, by offering in the spring, or don't bother at all. Waiting until September was wasting everyone's time.

Targeting a one-OL class, as they did throughout most of the year, was an error for literally anyone who can do math and can think through the basics of offensive line play. While there are some exceptions, old experienced OL perform way better than young ones. Just look at how much better AT Hall performed in 2017 versus 2016. Or look at the way Khalil Wilkes went from being bossed in the 2012 Pac-12 Championship Game to performing as an above-average starter the next year.

If experience matters, you need to keep a constant fill of offensive linemen in the pipeline -- about 3.5 per year -- to give yourself a fighting chance of having a sufficient number of experienced offensive linemen to form the foundation of a good unit. The coaches only targeted one OL through most of the year, belatedly offering Trey Stratford (who's coming, thank god) and Nicolas Petit-Frere (who turned out to be the #11 player in the nation, and didn't come). Salyer was never that interested and Murray an admissions casualty. If they had anticipated this issue earlier, they would've offered slightly-lower rated offensive linemen and filled the class.

In general, the class was marked by an error to anticipate that not all offered players would come, and that more players would depart than anticipated. Both of these are predictable dynamics; the coaches simply failed to see the obvious. Because of that, there are dire voids in the ILB and OL pipeline. There were obvious targets who could've been offered, but weren't.

Now, I suppose the obvious thing is to say "there weren't academically qualified guys" and other forms of difficult-to-refute counterfactuals. I'll just say that these issues were predicted through basically all of 2017 by close observers, who proposed several alternatives that were ignored. While there are many good players in the 2018 class, there should be many more, and the team will suffer in 2020 as a result of the blunders in this class.

[Mick]

Our yield of the applied and admitted is very high. We usually lose zero to two per year. For some reason, some of the most memorable losses of applied and admitted have been ILBs (Kuechly, Mantie Teo, Zumwalt, Hollifield). Not a lot of other people on this list in the last 10 years (Jameis Winston being a notable one).  Who in more recent classes has been admitted and not signed? I think we lost a defensive recruit last year in the Southeast on signing day who was admitted, but I forget the name.

Too bad Teo didn't sign.  He could have had a real, live, actual Stanford girlfriend instead of one of the made-up variety.

[Mick]

Our yield of the applied and admitted is very high. We usually lose zero to two per year. For some reason, some of the most memorable losses of applied and admitted have been ILBs (Kuechly, Mantie Teo, Zumwalt, Hollifield). Not a lot of other people on this list in the last 10 years (Jameis Winston being a notable one).  Who in more recent classes has been admitted and not signed? I think we lost a defensive recruit last year in the Southeast on signing day who was admitted, but I forget the name.

Too bad Teo didn't sign.  He could have had a real, live, actual Stanford girlfriend instead of one of the made-up variety.

[Mick]

Our yield of the applied and admitted is very high. We usually lose zero to two per year. For some reason, some of the most memorable losses of applied and admitted have been ILBs (Kuechly, Mantie Teo, Zumwalt, Hollifield). Not a lot of other people on this list in the last 10 years (Jameis Winston being a notable one).  Who in more recent classes has been admitted and not signed? I think we lost a defensive recruit last year in the Southeast on signing day who was admitted, but I forget the name.

Too bad Teo didn't sign.  He could have had a real, live, actual Stanford girlfriend instead of one of the made-up variety.

[Mick]

Our yield of the applied and admitted is very high. We usually lose zero to two per year. For some reason, some of the most memorable losses of applied and admitted have been ILBs (Kuechly, Mantie Teo, Zumwalt, Hollifield). Not a lot of other people on this list in the last 10 years (Jameis Winston being a notable one).  Who in more recent classes has been admitted and not signed? I think we lost a defensive recruit last year in the Southeast on signing day who was admitted, but I forget the name.

Too bad Teo didn't sign.  He could have had a real, live, actual Stanford girlfriend instead of one of the made-up variety.

[TreesAndBirds]

We are facing increasing headwinds....

Early signing period

Increasing importance of early enrollment, which we dont allow.

Increasing importance of transfers,  from which we dont get much benefit.

Late night games/limited nationwide exposure

Increasing concern about CTE (and possible disproportionate concern from   
Stanford types). Note that Md. legislature proposing to ban pre high school tackle football on public fields.
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/marylan...story.html

Resurgence of LA schools

Delayed workout of Stanford guys with NFL team due to late graduation schedule.

In addition to all the well known speed bumps like admissions standards and mediocre fan support.

Opposing recruiters have a lot to work with.

We will need to be creative/aggressive. We obviously have a lot to offer, and our record of decade long success is impressive, but we cant just rely on what we’ve done in the past. Shaw and company have quite a challenge ahead.

[TreesAndBirds]

We are facing increasing headwinds....

Early signing period

Increasing importance of early enrollment, which we dont allow.

Increasing importance of transfers,  from which we dont get much benefit.

Late night games/limited nationwide exposure

Increasing concern about CTE (and possible disproportionate concern from   
Stanford types). Note that Md. legislature proposing to ban pre high school tackle football on public fields.
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/marylan...story.html

Resurgence of LA schools

Delayed workout of Stanford guys with NFL team due to late graduation schedule.

In addition to all the well known speed bumps like admissions standards and mediocre fan support.

Opposing recruiters have a lot to work with.

We will need to be creative/aggressive. We obviously have a lot to offer, and our record of decade long success is impressive, but we cant just rely on what we’ve done in the past. Shaw and company have quite a challenge ahead.

[TreesAndBirds]

We are facing increasing headwinds....

Early signing period

Increasing importance of early enrollment, which we dont allow.

Increasing importance of transfers,  from which we dont get much benefit.

Late night games/limited nationwide exposure

Increasing concern about CTE (and possible disproportionate concern from   
Stanford types). Note that Md. legislature proposing to ban pre high school tackle football on public fields.
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/marylan...story.html

Resurgence of LA schools

Delayed workout of Stanford guys with NFL team due to late graduation schedule.

In addition to all the well known speed bumps like admissions standards and mediocre fan support.

Opposing recruiters have a lot to work with.

We will need to be creative/aggressive. We obviously have a lot to offer, and our record of decade long success is impressive, but we cant just rely on what we’ve done in the past. Shaw and company have quite a challenge ahead.

[TreesAndBirds]

We are facing increasing headwinds....

Early signing period

Increasing importance of early enrollment, which we dont allow.

Increasing importance of transfers,  from which we dont get much benefit.

Late night games/limited nationwide exposure

Increasing concern about CTE (and possible disproportionate concern from   
Stanford types). Note that Md. legislature proposing to ban pre high school tackle football on public fields.
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/marylan...story.html

Resurgence of LA schools

Delayed workout of Stanford guys with NFL team due to late graduation schedule.

In addition to all the well known speed bumps like admissions standards and mediocre fan support.

Opposing recruiters have a lot to work with.

We will need to be creative/aggressive. We obviously have a lot to offer, and our record of decade long success is impressive, but we cant just rely on what we’ve done in the past. Shaw and company have quite a challenge ahead.

[BostonCard]

The question is, "Did the staff reasonably maximize its chances at a good class or was it victimized by luck and circumstance?"

Here the answer is "they did not maximize their chances, not even close." They offered several players too late. For example, waiting on offering Nicolas Petit-Frere and Tyreke Smith was high-grade lunacy. These were high-level prospects who had received tons and tons of interest. You either recruit them seriously, by offering in the spring, or don't bother at all. Waiting until September was wasting everyone's time.

Targeting a one-OL class, as they did throughout most of the year, was an error for literally anyone who can do math and can think through the basics of offensive line play. While there are some exceptions, old experienced OL perform way better than young ones. Just look at how much better AT Hall performed in 2017 versus 2016. Or look at the way Khalil Wilkes went from being bossed in the 2012 Pac-12 Championship Game to performing as an above-average starter the next year.

If experience matters, you need to keep a constant fill of offensive linemen in the pipeline -- about 3.5 per year -- to give yourself a fighting chance of having a sufficient number of experienced offensive linemen to form the foundation of a good unit. The coaches only targeted one OL through most of the year, belatedly offering Trey Stratford (who's coming, thank god) and Nicolas Petit-Frere (who turned out to be the #11 player in the nation, and didn't come). Salyer was never that interested and Murray an admissions casualty. If they had anticipated this issue earlier, they would've offered slightly-lower rated offensive linemen and filled the class.

In general, the class was marked by an error to anticipate that not all offered players would come, and that more players would depart than anticipated. Both of these are predictable dynamics; the coaches simply failed to see the obvious. Because of that, there are dire voids in the ILB and OL pipeline. There were obvious targets who could've been offered, but weren't.

Now, I suppose the obvious thing is to say "there weren't academically qualified guys" and other forms of difficult-to-refute counterfactuals. I'll just say that these issues were predicted through basically all of 2017 by close observers, who proposed several alternatives that were ignored. While there are many good players in the 2018 class, there should be many more, and the team will suffer in 2020 as a result of the blunders in this class.

That's tough, but my sense is it is a generally fair assessment.  It certainly does look from the outside that the staff fell asleep at the wheel on this class, due to a combination of misjudging the impact of the early signing period, a lack of a meaningful back-up plan, or lack of aggressiveness in recruiting, confounded by a probably larger than expected share of players declaring for the pros early.  Yes, you don't want to make offers to players who will never contribute (in that case, you are making a four-year self-imposed NCAA sanction, since we don't generally run players off the team), but there is a lot of space between the plan A guys and guys who are going to just languish on the bench.  I think we could well have found a couple OL and ILB players who could have helped us, and prevented the sort of wafer thin weakness we've seen at DL the last few years.

The bevy of offers that have gone out the last few days is a step in the right direction, but we need to convert these into signings.

BC

One nit though:

"I'll just say that these issues were predicted through basically all of 2017 by close observers, who proposed several alternatives that were ignored."

Let's just say that fans screaming into a message board or even passing a message via contacts in the AE is not really "proposing an alternative", and not doing what said posts/messages recommended (even if they were legitimate) is not exactly "ignoring".  The staff, so far as I know, does not crowdsource its recruiting strategy out to its fans.

[BostonCard]

The question is, "Did the staff reasonably maximize its chances at a good class or was it victimized by luck and circumstance?"

Here the answer is "they did not maximize their chances, not even close." They offered several players too late. For example, waiting on offering Nicolas Petit-Frere and Tyreke Smith was high-grade lunacy. These were high-level prospects who had received tons and tons of interest. You either recruit them seriously, by offering in the spring, or don't bother at all. Waiting until September was wasting everyone's time.

Targeting a one-OL class, as they did throughout most of the year, was an error for literally anyone who can do math and can think through the basics of offensive line play. While there are some exceptions, old experienced OL perform way better than young ones. Just look at how much better AT Hall performed in 2017 versus 2016. Or look at the way Khalil Wilkes went from being bossed in the 2012 Pac-12 Championship Game to performing as an above-average starter the next year.

If experience matters, you need to keep a constant fill of offensive linemen in the pipeline -- about 3.5 per year -- to give yourself a fighting chance of having a sufficient number of experienced offensive linemen to form the foundation of a good unit. The coaches only targeted one OL through most of the year, belatedly offering Trey Stratford (who's coming, thank god) and Nicolas Petit-Frere (who turned out to be the #11 player in the nation, and didn't come). Salyer was never that interested and Murray an admissions casualty. If they had anticipated this issue earlier, they would've offered slightly-lower rated offensive linemen and filled the class.

In general, the class was marked by an error to anticipate that not all offered players would come, and that more players would depart than anticipated. Both of these are predictable dynamics; the coaches simply failed to see the obvious. Because of that, there are dire voids in the ILB and OL pipeline. There were obvious targets who could've been offered, but weren't.

Now, I suppose the obvious thing is to say "there weren't academically qualified guys" and other forms of difficult-to-refute counterfactuals. I'll just say that these issues were predicted through basically all of 2017 by close observers, who proposed several alternatives that were ignored. While there are many good players in the 2018 class, there should be many more, and the team will suffer in 2020 as a result of the blunders in this class.

That's tough, but my sense is it is a generally fair assessment.  It certainly does look from the outside that the staff fell asleep at the wheel on this class, due to a combination of misjudging the impact of the early signing period, a lack of a meaningful back-up plan, or lack of aggressiveness in recruiting, confounded by a probably larger than expected share of players declaring for the pros early.  Yes, you don't want to make offers to players who will never contribute (in that case, you are making a four-year self-imposed NCAA sanction, since we don't generally run players off the team), but there is a lot of space between the plan A guys and guys who are going to just languish on the bench.  I think we could well have found a couple OL and ILB players who could have helped us, and prevented the sort of wafer thin weakness we've seen at DL the last few years.

The bevy of offers that have gone out the last few days is a step in the right direction, but we need to convert these into signings.

BC

One nit though:

"I'll just say that these issues were predicted through basically all of 2017 by close observers, who proposed several alternatives that were ignored."

Let's just say that fans screaming into a message board or even passing a message via contacts in the AE is not really "proposing an alternative", and not doing what said posts/messages recommended (even if they were legitimate) is not exactly "ignoring".  The staff, so far as I know, does not crowdsource its recruiting strategy out to its fans.

[BostonCard]

The question is, "Did the staff reasonably maximize its chances at a good class or was it victimized by luck and circumstance?"

Here the answer is "they did not maximize their chances, not even close." They offered several players too late. For example, waiting on offering Nicolas Petit-Frere and Tyreke Smith was high-grade lunacy. These were high-level prospects who had received tons and tons of interest. You either recruit them seriously, by offering in the spring, or don't bother at all. Waiting until September was wasting everyone's time.

Targeting a one-OL class, as they did throughout most of the year, was an error for literally anyone who can do math and can think through the basics of offensive line play. While there are some exceptions, old experienced OL perform way better than young ones. Just look at how much better AT Hall performed in 2017 versus 2016. Or look at the way Khalil Wilkes went from being bossed in the 2012 Pac-12 Championship Game to performing as an above-average starter the next year.

If experience matters, you need to keep a constant fill of offensive linemen in the pipeline -- about 3.5 per year -- to give yourself a fighting chance of having a sufficient number of experienced offensive linemen to form the foundation of a good unit. The coaches only targeted one OL through most of the year, belatedly offering Trey Stratford (who's coming, thank god) and Nicolas Petit-Frere (who turned out to be the #11 player in the nation, and didn't come). Salyer was never that interested and Murray an admissions casualty. If they had anticipated this issue earlier, they would've offered slightly-lower rated offensive linemen and filled the class.

In general, the class was marked by an error to anticipate that not all offered players would come, and that more players would depart than anticipated. Both of these are predictable dynamics; the coaches simply failed to see the obvious. Because of that, there are dire voids in the ILB and OL pipeline. There were obvious targets who could've been offered, but weren't.

Now, I suppose the obvious thing is to say "there weren't academically qualified guys" and other forms of difficult-to-refute counterfactuals. I'll just say that these issues were predicted through basically all of 2017 by close observers, who proposed several alternatives that were ignored. While there are many good players in the 2018 class, there should be many more, and the team will suffer in 2020 as a result of the blunders in this class.

That's tough, but my sense is it is a generally fair assessment.  It certainly does look from the outside that the staff fell asleep at the wheel on this class, due to a combination of misjudging the impact of the early signing period, a lack of a meaningful back-up plan, or lack of aggressiveness in recruiting, confounded by a probably larger than expected share of players declaring for the pros early.  Yes, you don't want to make offers to players who will never contribute (in that case, you are making a four-year self-imposed NCAA sanction, since we don't generally run players off the team), but there is a lot of space between the plan A guys and guys who are going to just languish on the bench.  I think we could well have found a couple OL and ILB players who could have helped us, and prevented the sort of wafer thin weakness we've seen at DL the last few years.

The bevy of offers that have gone out the last few days is a step in the right direction, but we need to convert these into signings.

BC

One nit though:

"I'll just say that these issues were predicted through basically all of 2017 by close observers, who proposed several alternatives that were ignored."

Let's just say that fans screaming into a message board or even passing a message via contacts in the AE is not really "proposing an alternative", and not doing what said posts/messages recommended (even if they were legitimate) is not exactly "ignoring".  The staff, so far as I know, does not crowdsource its recruiting strategy out to its fans.

[BostonCard]

The question is, "Did the staff reasonably maximize its chances at a good class or was it victimized by luck and circumstance?"

Here the answer is "they did not maximize their chances, not even close." They offered several players too late. For example, waiting on offering Nicolas Petit-Frere and Tyreke Smith was high-grade lunacy. These were high-level prospects who had received tons and tons of interest. You either recruit them seriously, by offering in the spring, or don't bother at all. Waiting until September was wasting everyone's time.

Targeting a one-OL class, as they did throughout most of the year, was an error for literally anyone who can do math and can think through the basics of offensive line play. While there are some exceptions, old experienced OL perform way better than young ones. Just look at how much better AT Hall performed in 2017 versus 2016. Or look at the way Khalil Wilkes went from being bossed in the 2012 Pac-12 Championship Game to performing as an above-average starter the next year.

If experience matters, you need to keep a constant fill of offensive linemen in the pipeline -- about 3.5 per year -- to give yourself a fighting chance of having a sufficient number of experienced offensive linemen to form the foundation of a good unit. The coaches only targeted one OL through most of the year, belatedly offering Trey Stratford (who's coming, thank god) and Nicolas Petit-Frere (who turned out to be the #11 player in the nation, and didn't come). Salyer was never that interested and Murray an admissions casualty. If they had anticipated this issue earlier, they would've offered slightly-lower rated offensive linemen and filled the class.

In general, the class was marked by an error to anticipate that not all offered players would come, and that more players would depart than anticipated. Both of these are predictable dynamics; the coaches simply failed to see the obvious. Because of that, there are dire voids in the ILB and OL pipeline. There were obvious targets who could've been offered, but weren't.

Now, I suppose the obvious thing is to say "there weren't academically qualified guys" and other forms of difficult-to-refute counterfactuals. I'll just say that these issues were predicted through basically all of 2017 by close observers, who proposed several alternatives that were ignored. While there are many good players in the 2018 class, there should be many more, and the team will suffer in 2020 as a result of the blunders in this class.

That's tough, but my sense is it is a generally fair assessment.  It certainly does look from the outside that the staff fell asleep at the wheel on this class, due to a combination of misjudging the impact of the early signing period, a lack of a meaningful back-up plan, or lack of aggressiveness in recruiting, confounded by a probably larger than expected share of players declaring for the pros early.  Yes, you don't want to make offers to players who will never contribute (in that case, you are making a four-year self-imposed NCAA sanction, since we don't generally run players off the team), but there is a lot of space between the plan A guys and guys who are going to just languish on the bench.  I think we could well have found a couple OL and ILB players who could have helped us, and prevented the sort of wafer thin weakness we've seen at DL the last few years.

The bevy of offers that have gone out the last few days is a step in the right direction, but we need to convert these into signings.

BC

One nit though:

"I'll just say that these issues were predicted through basically all of 2017 by close observers, who proposed several alternatives that were ignored."

Let's just say that fans screaming into a message board or even passing a message via contacts in the AE is not really "proposing an alternative", and not doing what said posts/messages recommended (even if they were legitimate) is not exactly "ignoring".  The staff, so far as I know, does not crowdsource its recruiting strategy out to its fans.

[washingtonismoney]

Yes, the writing was sloppy there. I'm not suggesting that the staff should be paying close attention, or tailoring their strategy, to suit the whims of fans. I am suggesting that the alternatives were so numerous, and obvious, that the coaches can hardly plead ignorance or the difficulties of recruiting.

[washingtonismoney]

Yes, the writing was sloppy there. I'm not suggesting that the staff should be paying close attention, or tailoring their strategy, to suit the whims of fans. I am suggesting that the alternatives were so numerous, and obvious, that the coaches can hardly plead ignorance or the difficulties of recruiting.

[washingtonismoney]

Yes, the writing was sloppy there. I'm not suggesting that the staff should be paying close attention, or tailoring their strategy, to suit the whims of fans. I am suggesting that the alternatives were so numerous, and obvious, that the coaches can hardly plead ignorance or the difficulties of recruiting.

[washingtonismoney]

Yes, the writing was sloppy there. I'm not suggesting that the staff should be paying close attention, or tailoring their strategy, to suit the whims of fans. I am suggesting that the alternatives were so numerous, and obvious, that the coaches can hardly plead ignorance or the difficulties of recruiting.

[Mick]

Sometimes you get yield issues.  Sometimes you get too many, sometimes you don't get enough.  I'm sure they were expecting a year similar to past years.

[Mick]

Sometimes you get yield issues.  Sometimes you get too many, sometimes you don't get enough.  I'm sure they were expecting a year similar to past years.

[Mick]

Sometimes you get yield issues.  Sometimes you get too many, sometimes you don't get enough.  I'm sure they were expecting a year similar to past years.

[Mick]

Sometimes you get yield issues.  Sometimes you get too many, sometimes you don't get enough.  I'm sure they were expecting a year similar to past years.

[CTcard]

We are facing increasing headwinds....
[long list]

Not everything that happens one year is a trend.
After all, I can still remember way back to '17 when Stanford brought in a great recruiting class, complete with the highest ever average player rating.

Stanford does have a habit of letting scholarships lie unused, but that is also hit and miss over the years and not really a trend.

It certainly does look from the outside that the staff fell asleep at the wheel on this class, due to a combination of misjudging the impact of the early signing period, a lack of a meaningful back-up plan, or lack of aggressiveness in recruiting, confounded by a probably larger than expected share of players declaring for the pros early.  ...

From the outside the only thing we really know is that things did not work well this go round. It's not too hard to see some characteristics of Stanford's approach that didn't seem to work out well, but it is much harder to really understand why things that work other years didn't work as well this year. All of the reasons you list look plausible, perhaps even likely, but it's pretty hard to actually know which were really operative - at least in comparison to other years.

I would resist arguments that fundamentally rely upon the coaching staff being dumber than a door-nail, lazy to the point of gross incompetence, or somehow unwilling to have a good football players in the class.

Which perhaps brings us back to,

I'll just say that these issues were predicted through basically all of 2017 by close observers, who proposed several alternatives that were ignored.

I am suggesting that the alternatives were so numerous, and obvious, that the coaches can hardly plead ignorance or the difficulties of recruiting.

I don't think the coaches are ignorant of things that random message board fans know. Agreeing on a course of action may be another issue.

Stanford appears to have consciously made some decisions about how to recruit that may be a hindrance in some years. I suspect the staff thinks that long-term they help.

Particularly noticeable as a reaction against what happened under Harbaugh (and I would probably describe as "excesses under Harbaugh") is that Stanford does not offer very many kids versus most programs, particularly for QBs, and seems to try to make sure that offers are real - i.e. if a kid is offered he is free to commit and lock up a spot.
The plusses and minuses of that approach seem pretty obvious, but perhaps as the timeline gets pushed up further, the balance needs to be reexamined.

[CTcard]

We are facing increasing headwinds....
[long list]

Not everything that happens one year is a trend.
After all, I can still remember way back to '17 when Stanford brought in a great recruiting class, complete with the highest ever average player rating.

Stanford does have a habit of letting scholarships lie unused, but that is also hit and miss over the years and not really a trend.

It certainly does look from the outside that the staff fell asleep at the wheel on this class, due to a combination of misjudging the impact of the early signing period, a lack of a meaningful back-up plan, or lack of aggressiveness in recruiting, confounded by a probably larger than expected share of players declaring for the pros early.  ...

From the outside the only thing we really know is that things did not work well this go round. It's not too hard to see some characteristics of Stanford's approach that didn't seem to work out well, but it is much harder to really understand why things that work other years didn't work as well this year. All of the reasons you list look plausible, perhaps even likely, but it's pretty hard to actually know which were really operative - at least in comparison to other years.

I would resist arguments that fundamentally rely upon the coaching staff being dumber than a door-nail, lazy to the point of gross incompetence, or somehow unwilling to have a good football players in the class.

Which perhaps brings us back to,

I'll just say that these issues were predicted through basically all of 2017 by close observers, who proposed several alternatives that were ignored.

I am suggesting that the alternatives were so numerous, and obvious, that the coaches can hardly plead ignorance or the difficulties of recruiting.

I don't think the coaches are ignorant of things that random message board fans know. Agreeing on a course of action may be another issue.

Stanford appears to have consciously made some decisions about how to recruit that may be a hindrance in some years. I suspect the staff thinks that long-term they help.

Particularly noticeable as a reaction against what happened under Harbaugh (and I would probably describe as "excesses under Harbaugh") is that Stanford does not offer very many kids versus most programs, particularly for QBs, and seems to try to make sure that offers are real - i.e. if a kid is offered he is free to commit and lock up a spot.
The plusses and minuses of that approach seem pretty obvious, but perhaps as the timeline gets pushed up further, the balance needs to be reexamined.

[CTcard]

We are facing increasing headwinds....
[long list]

Not everything that happens one year is a trend.
After all, I can still remember way back to '17 when Stanford brought in a great recruiting class, complete with the highest ever average player rating.

Stanford does have a habit of letting scholarships lie unused, but that is also hit and miss over the years and not really a trend.

It certainly does look from the outside that the staff fell asleep at the wheel on this class, due to a combination of misjudging the impact of the early signing period, a lack of a meaningful back-up plan, or lack of aggressiveness in recruiting, confounded by a probably larger than expected share of players declaring for the pros early.  ...

From the outside the only thing we really know is that things did not work well this go round. It's not too hard to see some characteristics of Stanford's approach that didn't seem to work out well, but it is much harder to really understand why things that work other years didn't work as well this year. All of the reasons you list look plausible, perhaps even likely, but it's pretty hard to actually know which were really operative - at least in comparison to other years.

I would resist arguments that fundamentally rely upon the coaching staff being dumber than a door-nail, lazy to the point of gross incompetence, or somehow unwilling to have a good football players in the class.

Which perhaps brings us back to,

I'll just say that these issues were predicted through basically all of 2017 by close observers, who proposed several alternatives that were ignored.

I am suggesting that the alternatives were so numerous, and obvious, that the coaches can hardly plead ignorance or the difficulties of recruiting.

I don't think the coaches are ignorant of things that random message board fans know. Agreeing on a course of action may be another issue.

Stanford appears to have consciously made some decisions about how to recruit that may be a hindrance in some years. I suspect the staff thinks that long-term they help.

Particularly noticeable as a reaction against what happened under Harbaugh (and I would probably describe as "excesses under Harbaugh") is that Stanford does not offer very many kids versus most programs, particularly for QBs, and seems to try to make sure that offers are real - i.e. if a kid is offered he is free to commit and lock up a spot.
The plusses and minuses of that approach seem pretty obvious, but perhaps as the timeline gets pushed up further, the balance needs to be reexamined.

[CTcard]

We are facing increasing headwinds....
[long list]

Not everything that happens one year is a trend.
After all, I can still remember way back to '17 when Stanford brought in a great recruiting class, complete with the highest ever average player rating.

Stanford does have a habit of letting scholarships lie unused, but that is also hit and miss over the years and not really a trend.

It certainly does look from the outside that the staff fell asleep at the wheel on this class, due to a combination of misjudging the impact of the early signing period, a lack of a meaningful back-up plan, or lack of aggressiveness in recruiting, confounded by a probably larger than expected share of players declaring for the pros early.  ...

From the outside the only thing we really know is that things did not work well this go round. It's not too hard to see some characteristics of Stanford's approach that didn't seem to work out well, but it is much harder to really understand why things that work other years didn't work as well this year. All of the reasons you list look plausible, perhaps even likely, but it's pretty hard to actually know which were really operative - at least in comparison to other years.

I would resist arguments that fundamentally rely upon the coaching staff being dumber than a door-nail, lazy to the point of gross incompetence, or somehow unwilling to have a good football players in the class.

Which perhaps brings us back to,

I'll just say that these issues were predicted through basically all of 2017 by close observers, who proposed several alternatives that were ignored.

I am suggesting that the alternatives were so numerous, and obvious, that the coaches can hardly plead ignorance or the difficulties of recruiting.

I don't think the coaches are ignorant of things that random message board fans know. Agreeing on a course of action may be another issue.

Stanford appears to have consciously made some decisions about how to recruit that may be a hindrance in some years. I suspect the staff thinks that long-term they help.

Particularly noticeable as a reaction against what happened under Harbaugh (and I would probably describe as "excesses under Harbaugh") is that Stanford does not offer very many kids versus most programs, particularly for QBs, and seems to try to make sure that offers are real - i.e. if a kid is offered he is free to commit and lock up a spot.
The plusses and minuses of that approach seem pretty obvious, but perhaps as the timeline gets pushed up further, the balance needs to be reexamined.

[washingtonismoney]

Sometimes you get yield issues.  Sometimes you get too many, sometimes you don't get enough.  I'm sure they were expecting a year similar to past years.

Sure. Some error around the margins is understandable. I'm just saying the strategy was clearly wrong, and borne out of excessive hope. The shortfalls -- at offensive line and inside linebacker -- are clear examples of a flawed strategy.

Let's start with offensive line. Beat reporters indicated early in the year that the staff was targeting 1 offensive lineman for the class. This is a reckless strategy, for reasons I've already insisted on. They proceeded to offer a guy named Jemaree Salyer, who made some nice noises about Stanford but ultimately never showed much actual interest. I don't believe he ever visited. It was pretty clear that, unlike (say) Dax Hollifield, he was intrigued but not really interested. Which, fine. Stanford's not for everyone and that's not a diss on either Stanford or Salyer.

Nevertheless, the coaches were verrrryyyyy slow on developing backup options. They offered Chris Murray in the summer, Nick Petit-Frere in September, and Trey Stratford in December. Given Murray's eventual denial (we presume), the coaches shouldn't have counted on him. Offering the eventual #11 player in September is practically the definition of shooting the moon. It's fortunate Trey Stratford was so interested in Stanford, as a backstop.

Meanwhile there were several guys -- including players who went to SC -- who were pretty darn interested in Stanford and never offered. Had the coaches gone in with a dynamic process, recognizing that your frontline guy will often not come or unanticipated openings will develop, they might've offered them in the summer and filled the pipeline with solid though not overwhelming recruits. You, simply put, need numbers.

The picture is similar at linebacker. Hollifield, an extremely highly touted recruit, was always going to be a tough pull. He reportedly was unsure about moving cross-country. Again, nothing wrong with missing out on a guy who's highly coveted and might want to stay close at home. What *is* wrong, and looks like carelessness, is to not develop more backup options. Given that Mangum-Farrar and Caleb Kelly both had (reportedly) rough rides academically before eventually getting in -- which is a great testament to their dedication and character -- it's possible the numbers picture would've gotten even worse than it was.

Throwing up your hands and saying "well, it's just yield" is a bit odd. These aren't horoscopes; we're not asking them to do divinations based on bird bones. This is a reasonably predictable process whose risks and benefits can be managed. (As evidenced by the fact that plenty of informed fans were consistently warning that something like this would come to pass this year.) Yes, sometimes, despite your best efforts the unanticipated happens and wipes out your crops. But negligence is no excuse for misfortune.

And while the coaches had a great class last year, past success only mitigates present failures. They should learn from their mistakes and lessen the odds of a screw-up in the future. I see some evidence of that in the class of '19, but they've missed out on a number of their top targets already, and it's frankly a disturbing trend.

[washingtonismoney]

Sometimes you get yield issues.  Sometimes you get too many, sometimes you don't get enough.  I'm sure they were expecting a year similar to past years.

Sure. Some error around the margins is understandable. I'm just saying the strategy was clearly wrong, and borne out of excessive hope. The shortfalls -- at offensive line and inside linebacker -- are clear examples of a flawed strategy.

Let's start with offensive line. Beat reporters indicated early in the year that the staff was targeting 1 offensive lineman for the class. This is a reckless strategy, for reasons I've already insisted on. They proceeded to offer a guy named Jemaree Salyer, who made some nice noises about Stanford but ultimately never showed much actual interest. I don't believe he ever visited. It was pretty clear that, unlike (say) Dax Hollifield, he was intrigued but not really interested. Which, fine. Stanford's not for everyone and that's not a diss on either Stanford or Salyer.

Nevertheless, the coaches were verrrryyyyy slow on developing backup options. They offered Chris Murray in the summer, Nick Petit-Frere in September, and Trey Stratford in December. Given Murray's eventual denial (we presume), the coaches shouldn't have counted on him. Offering the eventual #11 player in September is practically the definition of shooting the moon. It's fortunate Trey Stratford was so interested in Stanford, as a backstop.

Meanwhile there were several guys -- including players who went to SC -- who were pretty darn interested in Stanford and never offered. Had the coaches gone in with a dynamic process, recognizing that your frontline guy will often not come or unanticipated openings will develop, they might've offered them in the summer and filled the pipeline with solid though not overwhelming recruits. You, simply put, need numbers.

The picture is similar at linebacker. Hollifield, an extremely highly touted recruit, was always going to be a tough pull. He reportedly was unsure about moving cross-country. Again, nothing wrong with missing out on a guy who's highly coveted and might want to stay close at home. What *is* wrong, and looks like carelessness, is to not develop more backup options. Given that Mangum-Farrar and Caleb Kelly both had (reportedly) rough rides academically before eventually getting in -- which is a great testament to their dedication and character -- it's possible the numbers picture would've gotten even worse than it was.

Throwing up your hands and saying "well, it's just yield" is a bit odd. These aren't horoscopes; we're not asking them to do divinations based on bird bones. This is a reasonably predictable process whose risks and benefits can be managed. (As evidenced by the fact that plenty of informed fans were consistently warning that something like this would come to pass this year.) Yes, sometimes, despite your best efforts the unanticipated happens and wipes out your crops. But negligence is no excuse for misfortune.

And while the coaches had a great class last year, past success only mitigates present failures. They should learn from their mistakes and lessen the odds of a screw-up in the future. I see some evidence of that in the class of '19, but they've missed out on a number of their top targets already, and it's frankly a disturbing trend.

[washingtonismoney]

Sometimes you get yield issues.  Sometimes you get too many, sometimes you don't get enough.  I'm sure they were expecting a year similar to past years.

Sure. Some error around the margins is understandable. I'm just saying the strategy was clearly wrong, and borne out of excessive hope. The shortfalls -- at offensive line and inside linebacker -- are clear examples of a flawed strategy.

Let's start with offensive line. Beat reporters indicated early in the year that the staff was targeting 1 offensive lineman for the class. This is a reckless strategy, for reasons I've already insisted on. They proceeded to offer a guy named Jemaree Salyer, who made some nice noises about Stanford but ultimately never showed much actual interest. I don't believe he ever visited. It was pretty clear that, unlike (say) Dax Hollifield, he was intrigued but not really interested. Which, fine. Stanford's not for everyone and that's not a diss on either Stanford or Salyer.

Nevertheless, the coaches were verrrryyyyy slow on developing backup options. They offered Chris Murray in the summer, Nick Petit-Frere in September, and Trey Stratford in December. Given Murray's eventual denial (we presume), the coaches shouldn't have counted on him. Offering the eventual #11 player in September is practically the definition of shooting the moon. It's fortunate Trey Stratford was so interested in Stanford, as a backstop.

Meanwhile there were several guys -- including players who went to SC -- who were pretty darn interested in Stanford and never offered. Had the coaches gone in with a dynamic process, recognizing that your frontline guy will often not come or unanticipated openings will develop, they might've offered them in the summer and filled the pipeline with solid though not overwhelming recruits. You, simply put, need numbers.

The picture is similar at linebacker. Hollifield, an extremely highly touted recruit, was always going to be a tough pull. He reportedly was unsure about moving cross-country. Again, nothing wrong with missing out on a guy who's highly coveted and might want to stay close at home. What *is* wrong, and looks like carelessness, is to not develop more backup options. Given that Mangum-Farrar and Caleb Kelly both had (reportedly) rough rides academically before eventually getting in -- which is a great testament to their dedication and character -- it's possible the numbers picture would've gotten even worse than it was.

Throwing up your hands and saying "well, it's just yield" is a bit odd. These aren't horoscopes; we're not asking them to do divinations based on bird bones. This is a reasonably predictable process whose risks and benefits can be managed. (As evidenced by the fact that plenty of informed fans were consistently warning that something like this would come to pass this year.) Yes, sometimes, despite your best efforts the unanticipated happens and wipes out your crops. But negligence is no excuse for misfortune.

And while the coaches had a great class last year, past success only mitigates present failures. They should learn from their mistakes and lessen the odds of a screw-up in the future. I see some evidence of that in the class of '19, but they've missed out on a number of their top targets already, and it's frankly a disturbing trend.

[washingtonismoney]

Sometimes you get yield issues.  Sometimes you get too many, sometimes you don't get enough.  I'm sure they were expecting a year similar to past years.

Sure. Some error around the margins is understandable. I'm just saying the strategy was clearly wrong, and borne out of excessive hope. The shortfalls -- at offensive line and inside linebacker -- are clear examples of a flawed strategy.

Let's start with offensive line. Beat reporters indicated early in the year that the staff was targeting 1 offensive lineman for the class. This is a reckless strategy, for reasons I've already insisted on. They proceeded to offer a guy named Jemaree Salyer, who made some nice noises about Stanford but ultimately never showed much actual interest. I don't believe he ever visited. It was pretty clear that, unlike (say) Dax Hollifield, he was intrigued but not really interested. Which, fine. Stanford's not for everyone and that's not a diss on either Stanford or Salyer.

Nevertheless, the coaches were verrrryyyyy slow on developing backup options. They offered Chris Murray in the summer, Nick Petit-Frere in September, and Trey Stratford in December. Given Murray's eventual denial (we presume), the coaches shouldn't have counted on him. Offering the eventual #11 player in September is practically the definition of shooting the moon. It's fortunate Trey Stratford was so interested in Stanford, as a backstop.

Meanwhile there were several guys -- including players who went to SC -- who were pretty darn interested in Stanford and never offered. Had the coaches gone in with a dynamic process, recognizing that your frontline guy will often not come or unanticipated openings will develop, they might've offered them in the summer and filled the pipeline with solid though not overwhelming recruits. You, simply put, need numbers.

The picture is similar at linebacker. Hollifield, an extremely highly touted recruit, was always going to be a tough pull. He reportedly was unsure about moving cross-country. Again, nothing wrong with missing out on a guy who's highly coveted and might want to stay close at home. What *is* wrong, and looks like carelessness, is to not develop more backup options. Given that Mangum-Farrar and Caleb Kelly both had (reportedly) rough rides academically before eventually getting in -- which is a great testament to their dedication and character -- it's possible the numbers picture would've gotten even worse than it was.

Throwing up your hands and saying "well, it's just yield" is a bit odd. These aren't horoscopes; we're not asking them to do divinations based on bird bones. This is a reasonably predictable process whose risks and benefits can be managed. (As evidenced by the fact that plenty of informed fans were consistently warning that something like this would come to pass this year.) Yes, sometimes, despite your best efforts the unanticipated happens and wipes out your crops. But negligence is no excuse for misfortune.

And while the coaches had a great class last year, past success only mitigates present failures. They should learn from their mistakes and lessen the odds of a screw-up in the future. I see some evidence of that in the class of '19, but they've missed out on a number of their top targets already, and it's frankly a disturbing trend.