[dabigv13]

I think Ukraine would continue to fight for much longer than January 2025 without US aid, though they would certainly lose territory. I think many Ukrainian soldiers fairly presume that to surrender would mean death or imprisonment or worse. Civilians remember Bucha and Irpin.

And the Russian armed forces are a pretty spent force themselves. It will take a while to reconstitute forces to the degree a sustained offensive is possible.

Also pretty ridiculous IMHO to blame the administration for not making the point to the American people about the importance of Ukraine aid. Biden has mentioned it a lot in his public addresses, and there is no serious controversy in the Democratic party about Ukraine aid. Things turned in the Republican party once the certainty of Tr*mp as nominee crystallized. Draw your own conclusions there, but I don't think Biden has much sway with the farthest right Republican base voters whose opinion shifted on Ukraine aid.

[dabigv13]

I think Ukraine would continue to fight for much longer than January 2025 without US aid, though they would certainly lose territory. I think many Ukrainian soldiers fairly presume that to surrender would mean death or imprisonment or worse. Civilians remember Bucha and Irpin.

And the Russian armed forces are a pretty spent force themselves. It will take a while to reconstitute forces to the degree a sustained offensive is possible.

Also pretty ridiculous IMHO to blame the administration for not making the point to the American people about the importance of Ukraine aid. Biden has mentioned it a lot in his public addresses, and there is no serious controversy in the Democratic party about Ukraine aid. Things turned in the Republican party once the certainty of Tr*mp as nominee crystallized. Draw your own conclusions there, but I don't think Biden has much sway with the farthest right Republican base voters whose opinion shifted on Ukraine aid.

[Goose]

I think Ukraine would continue to fight for much longer than January 2025 without US aid, though they would certainly lose territory. I think many Ukrainian soldiers fairly presume that to surrender would mean death or imprisonment or worse. Civilians remember Bucha and Irpin.

You may be correct about how long the Ukrainian solders would fight. I agree with you that surrender is probably not an option. However, what is a option is to run away and attempt to make it into Poland, or Romania, or Hungary. Once you are convinced that staying where you are and fighting is doomed to failure, troops have an annoying habit of voting with their feet. They often regret it soon thereafter, but by then the line is breached, cohesion is lost, and continuing to run looks even more attractive.

And the Russian armed forces are a pretty spent force themselves. It will take a while to reconstitute forces to the degree a sustained offensive is possible.

True, but if the other side melts away you don't need a "sustained offensive" to achieve great success. Ukraine already demonstrated this during their offensive around Kupyansk. Once they were through the front line the Russians were running away so fast the challenge was to keep up with them. Another great example is the pursuit of the Italian Army across North Africa in 1941. 

British XIII Corps of 36,000 men advanced over 500 miles across the desert in Libya and destroyed the Italian Army (Figure 1). In the process they captured over 130,000 prisoners, 480 tanks, 845 pieces of artillery and killed or destroyed countless more.

The Italian Tenth Army had over 250,000 troops, but they didn't want to fight. The British XIII Corps is the same group that Rommel then overran in the other direction. The British force was no juggernaut. It had a lot of troops that had never fought before. It lacked all kinds of critical supplies. It was often advancing using captured fuel. But when the enemy melts away, it doesn't matter.

Also pretty ridiculous IMHO to blame the administration for not making the point to the American people about the importance of Ukraine aid. Biden has mentioned it a lot in his public addresses, and there is no serious controversy in the Democratic party about Ukraine aid. 

IMO "mentioning a lot" in his public addresses is totally inadequate. When a very significant decision has been made that commits the nation to a particular course of action, it is absolutely essential that those actions be kept at the top of the public's awareness. That didn't happen. Months went by when nothing much was happening in Ukraine. It fell off the "news cycle". When that happens, people lose interest. That makes it easier for an opposition point of view to develop. In the beginning, IMO the vast majority of the country supported our intervention. The administration needed to ensure it stayed that way. They know how to run a PR campaign. Yes, it may not be easy, but it needed to be done. It may have failed even if it was done. The fact remains the administration did not spend lots of time and effort ensuring the public remained onboard. Possibly it was because they felt there was no serious controversy in the Democratic party. Unfortunately, that leaves out a lot of people, and that is a problem.

Things turned in the Republican party once the certainty of Tr*mp as nominee crystallized. Draw your own conclusions there, but I don't think Biden has much sway with the farthest right Republican base voters whose opinion shifted on Ukraine aid.

Dodging the Terry rule minefield here is tricky. It may indeed be true that no matter what the administration did a significant opposition may have developed to Ukraine military aid. However, greater effort made early on to get get potential dissidents onboard would have at least identified the problem earlier. I contrast this administration's efforts to those of FDR regarding isolationist sentiment while he was helping the UK before the US entered WWII. FDR didn't even have the advantage of initial public support. It was an uphill battle all the way, but at least it was fought out in the public sector and was a major topic of discussion the whole way. Arguably FDR didn't succeed either, and it took Pearl Harbor to finish the job of actually changing public opinion. However, it wasn't due to lack of effort.

[Goose]

I think Ukraine would continue to fight for much longer than January 2025 without US aid, though they would certainly lose territory. I think many Ukrainian soldiers fairly presume that to surrender would mean death or imprisonment or worse. Civilians remember Bucha and Irpin.

You may be correct about how long the Ukrainian solders would fight. I agree with you that surrender is probably not an option. However, what is a option is to run away and attempt to make it into Poland, or Romania, or Hungary. Once you are convinced that staying where you are and fighting is doomed to failure, troops have an annoying habit of voting with their feet. They often regret it soon thereafter, but by then the line is breached, cohesion is lost, and continuing to run looks even more attractive.

And the Russian armed forces are a pretty spent force themselves. It will take a while to reconstitute forces to the degree a sustained offensive is possible.

True, but if the other side melts away you don't need a "sustained offensive" to achieve great success. Ukraine already demonstrated this during their offensive around Kupyansk. Once they were through the front line the Russians were running away so fast the challenge was to keep up with them. Another great example is the pursuit of the Italian Army across North Africa in 1941. 

British XIII Corps of 36,000 men advanced over 500 miles across the desert in Libya and destroyed the Italian Army (Figure 1). In the process they captured over 130,000 prisoners, 480 tanks, 845 pieces of artillery and killed or destroyed countless more.

The Italian Tenth Army had over 250,000 troops, but they didn't want to fight. The British XIII Corps is the same group that Rommel then overran in the other direction. The British force was no juggernaut. It had a lot of troops that had never fought before. It lacked all kinds of critical supplies. It was often advancing using captured fuel. But when the enemy melts away, it doesn't matter.

Also pretty ridiculous IMHO to blame the administration for not making the point to the American people about the importance of Ukraine aid. Biden has mentioned it a lot in his public addresses, and there is no serious controversy in the Democratic party about Ukraine aid. 

IMO "mentioning a lot" in his public addresses is totally inadequate. When a very significant decision has been made that commits the nation to a particular course of action, it is absolutely essential that those actions be kept at the top of the public's awareness. That didn't happen. Months went by when nothing much was happening in Ukraine. It fell off the "news cycle". When that happens, people lose interest. That makes it easier for an opposition point of view to develop. In the beginning, IMO the vast majority of the country supported our intervention. The administration needed to ensure it stayed that way. They know how to run a PR campaign. Yes, it may not be easy, but it needed to be done. It may have failed even if it was done. The fact remains the administration did not spend lots of time and effort ensuring the public remained onboard. Possibly it was because they felt there was no serious controversy in the Democratic party. Unfortunately, that leaves out a lot of people, and that is a problem.

Things turned in the Republican party once the certainty of Tr*mp as nominee crystallized. Draw your own conclusions there, but I don't think Biden has much sway with the farthest right Republican base voters whose opinion shifted on Ukraine aid.

Dodging the Terry rule minefield here is tricky. It may indeed be true that no matter what the administration did a significant opposition may have developed to Ukraine military aid. However, greater effort made early on to get get potential dissidents onboard would have at least identified the problem earlier. I contrast this administration's efforts to those of FDR regarding isolationist sentiment while he was helping the UK before the US entered WWII. FDR didn't even have the advantage of initial public support. It was an uphill battle all the way, but at least it was fought out in the public sector and was a major topic of discussion the whole way. Arguably FDR didn't succeed either, and it took Pearl Harbor to finish the job of actually changing public opinion. However, it wasn't due to lack of effort.

[dabigv13]

Feel like we are living in two different realities. Biden has been forcefully making the case for Ukraine aid from the beginning. What exactly are you looking for him to do? And whatever you say you want him to do, consider that anything more likely would have the effect of even sooner polarizing Republicans against it. This is not the politics of the 40s but even so as you admit yourself FDR needed Pearl Harbor for the US to join the war. He had big majorities in Congress that Biden does not and even Lend-Lease was not easy. But again that has very little application to today.

The failure of the US to provide aid to Ukraine can be entirely put down to the Republican party, specifically the wing of it that has been friendlier to Russia. Tucker Carlson just did a bizarre interview with Putin; it's that wing of the party that has been Ukraine skeptical from the outset. Nothing Biden does is going to convince those people to support Ukraine. You have Trump saying he's going to make a deal to end the war on Day 1, and that undercuts any ability for the administration to get aid through. What could Biden possibly have done to convince people like Marjorie Taylor Greene or Donald Trump to change their minds on Ukraine aid?

For my part I will continue to keep any discussion of US politics squarely within the confines of how it relates to Ukraine and Ukraine aid.

[dabigv13]

Feel like we are living in two different realities. Biden has been forcefully making the case for Ukraine aid from the beginning. What exactly are you looking for him to do? And whatever you say you want him to do, consider that anything more likely would have the effect of even sooner polarizing Republicans against it. This is not the politics of the 40s but even so as you admit yourself FDR needed Pearl Harbor for the US to join the war. He had big majorities in Congress that Biden does not and even Lend-Lease was not easy. But again that has very little application to today.

The failure of the US to provide aid to Ukraine can be entirely put down to the Republican party, specifically the wing of it that has been friendlier to Russia. Tucker Carlson just did a bizarre interview with Putin; it's that wing of the party that has been Ukraine skeptical from the outset. Nothing Biden does is going to convince those people to support Ukraine. You have Trump saying he's going to make a deal to end the war on Day 1, and that undercuts any ability for the administration to get aid through. What could Biden possibly have done to convince people like Marjorie Taylor Greene or Donald Trump to change their minds on Ukraine aid?

For my part I will continue to keep any discussion of US politics squarely within the confines of how it relates to Ukraine and Ukraine aid.

[GK3]

Feel like we are living in two different realities. Biden has been forcefully making the case for Ukraine aid from the beginning. What exactly are you looking for him to do? And whatever you say you want him to do, consider that anything more likely would have the effect of even sooner polarizing Republicans against it. This is not the politics of the 40s but even so as you admit yourself FDR needed Pearl Harbor for the US to join the war. He had big majorities in Congress that Biden does not and even Lend-Lease was not easy. But again that has very little application to today.

The failure of the US to provide aid to Ukraine can be entirely put down to the Republican party, specifically the wing of it that has been friendlier to Russia. Tucker Carlson just did a bizarre interview with Putin; it's that wing of the party that has been Ukraine skeptical from the outset. Nothing Biden does is going to convince those people to support Ukraine. You have Trump saying he's going to make a deal to end the war on Day 1, and that undercuts any ability for the administration to get aid through. What could Biden possibly have done to convince people like Marjorie Taylor Greene or Donald Trump to change their minds on Ukraine aid?

For my part I will continue to keep any discussion of US politics squarely within the confines of how it relates to Ukraine and Ukraine aid.

FWLIW trying to keep a discussion of US Politics solely to the Ukraine is a fools errand.,  It is all tied together one way or another. All I have to say on the subject. I feel badly about the Ukraine no matter what.

[GK3]

Feel like we are living in two different realities. Biden has been forcefully making the case for Ukraine aid from the beginning. What exactly are you looking for him to do? And whatever you say you want him to do, consider that anything more likely would have the effect of even sooner polarizing Republicans against it. This is not the politics of the 40s but even so as you admit yourself FDR needed Pearl Harbor for the US to join the war. He had big majorities in Congress that Biden does not and even Lend-Lease was not easy. But again that has very little application to today.

The failure of the US to provide aid to Ukraine can be entirely put down to the Republican party, specifically the wing of it that has been friendlier to Russia. Tucker Carlson just did a bizarre interview with Putin; it's that wing of the party that has been Ukraine skeptical from the outset. Nothing Biden does is going to convince those people to support Ukraine. You have Trump saying he's going to make a deal to end the war on Day 1, and that undercuts any ability for the administration to get aid through. What could Biden possibly have done to convince people like Marjorie Taylor Greene or Donald Trump to change their minds on Ukraine aid?

For my part I will continue to keep any discussion of US politics squarely within the confines of how it relates to Ukraine and Ukraine aid.

FWLIW trying to keep a discussion of US Politics solely to the Ukraine is a fools errand.,  It is all tied together one way or another. All I have to say on the subject. I feel badly about the Ukraine no matter what.

[TrumpCard]

I’m not a fan of censorship, but it’s now everywhere. My extended family has rules about what can/can’t be discussed. I agree that setting lines is incredibly tricky. In my family, people accidentally bleed over the line and then everyone agrees to go back to their corner. It’s ridiculous. I suppose it’s more defensible in the context of this forum, but it’s still approximately the same thing. It is what it is. I don’t make the rules in my family or here. I just laugh because that’s the only reaction that makes any sense to me.

[TrumpCard]

I’m not a fan of censorship, but it’s now everywhere. My extended family has rules about what can/can’t be discussed. I agree that setting lines is incredibly tricky. In my family, people accidentally bleed over the line and then everyone agrees to go back to their corner. It’s ridiculous. I suppose it’s more defensible in the context of this forum, but it’s still approximately the same thing. It is what it is. I don’t make the rules in my family or here. I just laugh because that’s the only reaction that makes any sense to me.

[Mick]

I’m not a fan of censorship, but it’s now everywhere. My extended family has rules about what can/can’t be discussed. I agree that setting lines is incredibly tricky. In my family, people accidentally bleed over the line and then everyone agrees to go back to their corner. It’s ridiculous. I suppose it’s more defensible in the context of this forum, but it’s still approximately the same thing. It is what it is. I don’t make the rules in my family or here. I just laugh because that’s the only reaction that makes any sense to me.

+1. Sounds familiar.

[Mick]

I’m not a fan of censorship, but it’s now everywhere. My extended family has rules about what can/can’t be discussed. I agree that setting lines is incredibly tricky. In my family, people accidentally bleed over the line and then everyone agrees to go back to their corner. It’s ridiculous. I suppose it’s more defensible in the context of this forum, but it’s still approximately the same thing. It is what it is. I don’t make the rules in my family or here. I just laugh because that’s the only reaction that makes any sense to me.

+1. Sounds familiar.

[GK3]

I’m not a fan of censorship, but it’s now everywhere. My extended family has rules about what can/can’t be discussed. I agree that setting lines is incredibly tricky. In my family, people accidentally bleed over the line and then everyone agrees to go back to their corner. It’s ridiculous. I suppose it’s more defensible in the context of this forum, but it’s still approximately the same thing. It is what it is. I don’t make the rules in my family or here. I just laugh because that’s the only reaction that makes any sense to me.

+1. Sounds familiar.

Frankly, we either delete all the posts that have any political implications, or we set up a separate board where those of us who are Stanford Sports Fans, but also care about the rest of life, can say what we want to say.  If you don't like it, you don't have to go there.  From my point the world is a mess, if you want to ignore it, do so.

[GK3]

I’m not a fan of censorship, but it’s now everywhere. My extended family has rules about what can/can’t be discussed. I agree that setting lines is incredibly tricky. In my family, people accidentally bleed over the line and then everyone agrees to go back to their corner. It’s ridiculous. I suppose it’s more defensible in the context of this forum, but it’s still approximately the same thing. It is what it is. I don’t make the rules in my family or here. I just laugh because that’s the only reaction that makes any sense to me.

+1. Sounds familiar.

Frankly, we either delete all the posts that have any political implications, or we set up a separate board where those of us who are Stanford Sports Fans, but also care about the rest of life, can say what we want to say.  If you don't like it, you don't have to go there.  From my point the world is a mess, if you want to ignore it, do so.

[Genuine Realist]

FWIW, this line is now in it's 23rd month, some sort of record for longevity.

[Genuine Realist]

FWIW, this line is now in it's 23rd month, some sort of record for longevity.

[81alum]

I started this by asking our expert (Goose) a military question--how long Ukraine could hold out without the resumption of American aid.  I had in mind a discussion of ammunition stockpiles, etc.  I do have very strong feelings about whether that aid should be resumed, but I did not express those feelings in an attempt to keep this topic focused on Ukraine and to adhere to the desire to prevent political divisions from shattering what has been a surprisingly interesting thread.

Furthermore, I do not need the Cardboard to discuss American politics, to evaluate the President or Congress, or similar topics.  I read my professional journals and my choice of political media for that information.  Besides, I really don't have the emotional energy to become a de facto moderator of a political science thread that Goose obviously (and thankfully) does have to become a de facto moderator of a military strategy/tactics thread.  Most of the time I'd rather devote myself to frivolities like WBB.  I spend my working life immersed in the study of politics, and I don't want the Cardboard be become work.  That is just me, but I imagine the rest of you don't want the Cardboard to become too much like the rest of media, either.

I think, with an occasional reminder about walking a fine line, we can keep this unique thread going.

[81alum]

I started this by asking our expert (Goose) a military question--how long Ukraine could hold out without the resumption of American aid.  I had in mind a discussion of ammunition stockpiles, etc.  I do have very strong feelings about whether that aid should be resumed, but I did not express those feelings in an attempt to keep this topic focused on Ukraine and to adhere to the desire to prevent political divisions from shattering what has been a surprisingly interesting thread.

Furthermore, I do not need the Cardboard to discuss American politics, to evaluate the President or Congress, or similar topics.  I read my professional journals and my choice of political media for that information.  Besides, I really don't have the emotional energy to become a de facto moderator of a political science thread that Goose obviously (and thankfully) does have to become a de facto moderator of a military strategy/tactics thread.  Most of the time I'd rather devote myself to frivolities like WBB.  I spend my working life immersed in the study of politics, and I don't want the Cardboard be become work.  That is just me, but I imagine the rest of you don't want the Cardboard to become too much like the rest of media, either.

I think, with an occasional reminder about walking a fine line, we can keep this unique thread going.

[fullmetal]

I worry about the influence of Russia in US political discourse.  I've noticed an uptick in the number of "shared posts" on my social media feed specifically attacking a certain presidential candidate for certain things unrelated to Ukraine.  At the same time, I'm seeing a lot of anti-Ukraine stuff, the same old tropes.  And now Putin has gotten a certain US news pundit with a large following to essentially serve as a mouthpiece.  The Russians sure know how to exploit our media.

[fullmetal]

I worry about the influence of Russia in US political discourse.  I've noticed an uptick in the number of "shared posts" on my social media feed specifically attacking a certain presidential candidate for certain things unrelated to Ukraine.  At the same time, I'm seeing a lot of anti-Ukraine stuff, the same old tropes.  And now Putin has gotten a certain US news pundit with a large following to essentially serve as a mouthpiece.  The Russians sure know how to exploit our media.

[Goose]

I want to respond to recent concerns about my post that criticized the administrations inability (so far) to ensure the flow of US military assistance to Ukraine. I am sensitive to the need to keep "politics" out of this thread, not just because it might get shut down (which obviously I very much do not want to happen), but also because the discussion here is largely strategic and tactical in nature. Politics plays a minimal role in that. That said, I have at times directed criticism at "the administration" since the beginning of my participation in this thread.  Each time I did consider whether doing so was "necessary" and/or constructive. I will cite the ones I remember.

At the beginning of the Ukraine war I was not quite as much pro-intervention as some of this thread. What I did say was that if the US decided to support Ukraine with military aid, it was critical that "the administration" realize that they were "upping the ante". For that reason they had to ensure that the public was aware of the down-side risks and the consequences of failure.  Continuing public involvement was necessary. My point was that it was entirely reasonable to conclude that choosing to not help Ukraine would convince Putin (and the rest of the world) that the US wouldn't attempt to prevent unprovoked aggression. This required action on our part. However, if the US intervened and failed to "win", that would show Putin (and the rest of the world) that the US COULDN'T prevent unprovoked aggression. That would be orders of magnitude worse and must not happen.

Very early on (well before the F-16 initiative in the EU was even imagined) I criticized the administration for not starting to train Ukrainian personnel to operate and maintain F-16 jets just in case the decision to provide them was eventually made. It would allow transitioning from concept to action quickly enough to catch the Russians unprepared. F-16s could keep the Russians of the backs of Ukrainian troops. If we never provided F-16s the pilot training would do no harm. It was a low-risk low-cost way to get inside the Russian decision cycle. I have also repeatedly questioned the failure to provide ATACMS missiles for the HIMARS launchers we did provide to Ukraine. Ukraine needs a "deep strike" capability very badly, and the ATACMS would have provided that.

I have also criticized the announcement of " major" equipment grants when the actual delivery of said items was at best many months (sometimes over a year) away. This gives the illusion of "doing something" while not actually doing it. The contractual delays on the NASAMS missile deliveries was one example.  Another was the announcement of the GLSDB for Ukraine when we didn't actually have any, had none on order, and had not evaluated it as a weapon system. This also gave Russia a "heads up" on what to anticipate facing and plenty of time to prepare accordingly. This has been accompanied by me criticizing a "lack of urgency", particularly  by the DoD in getting stuff to Ukraine promptly. Some delays are unavoidable, but there have been several instances where we announced the decision to supply something, had the "stuff" in inventory, and took months to get it there. We did not move at "the speed of war". It could be a lack of coordination and many other things, but in war, why doesn't matter. If you need it and it is not available, bad things happen.

I reiterate these points because I did consider in each case whether my comment was "political". My thinking was that these comments were entirely strategic in nature. It had to do with how we are participating in the war, not which individual was making "errors" or which party was "at fault". The "administration" includes the DoD and lots of other organs of government that are (at least in theory) not politically involved at all. I must admit the fact I got very little feedback questioning the appropriateness of these comments (although obviously I didn't get universal agreement to them :-) indicated to me I was on the right track and not crossing the Terry rule line.

Most recently, I had just stated my opinion that Ukraine could not survive 12 months of no direct, full up, US military aid. I could have just left it at that. I didn't. I went on to say that it was incumbent on the administration to make that not happen. That goes back the the very first criticism I cited above. If we intervene, we are "in this war", and failure has inevitable consequences to the US (let alone Ukraine). The degree of difficulty and "whys" don't matter. These "whys" needed to be evaluated before we decided to enter the war and plans made to mitigate their effects. The "unforgiving minute" is in play. Sometimes things happen that couldn't be anticipated. The current situation is, IMO, not one of cases. There are some others who agree with me on this subject.

https://www.yahoo.com/news/baltic-nordic...40663.html

In the future I will simply state what IMO needs to happen (solutions to strategic/tactical problems). That may be considered an implicit criticism of those that are not making happen what I suggest :-). I can't help that. The alternative would be to simply cite problems, and I don't believe that "works". The solutions are often what we are discussing in this thread. Hopefully taking the modified approach will produce an acceptable result.

[Goose]

I want to respond to recent concerns about my post that criticized the administrations inability (so far) to ensure the flow of US military assistance to Ukraine. I am sensitive to the need to keep "politics" out of this thread, not just because it might get shut down (which obviously I very much do not want to happen), but also because the discussion here is largely strategic and tactical in nature. Politics plays a minimal role in that. That said, I have at times directed criticism at "the administration" since the beginning of my participation in this thread.  Each time I did consider whether doing so was "necessary" and/or constructive. I will cite the ones I remember.

At the beginning of the Ukraine war I was not quite as much pro-intervention as some of this thread. What I did say was that if the US decided to support Ukraine with military aid, it was critical that "the administration" realize that they were "upping the ante". For that reason they had to ensure that the public was aware of the down-side risks and the consequences of failure.  Continuing public involvement was necessary. My point was that it was entirely reasonable to conclude that choosing to not help Ukraine would convince Putin (and the rest of the world) that the US wouldn't attempt to prevent unprovoked aggression. This required action on our part. However, if the US intervened and failed to "win", that would show Putin (and the rest of the world) that the US COULDN'T prevent unprovoked aggression. That would be orders of magnitude worse and must not happen.

Very early on (well before the F-16 initiative in the EU was even imagined) I criticized the administration for not starting to train Ukrainian personnel to operate and maintain F-16 jets just in case the decision to provide them was eventually made. It would allow transitioning from concept to action quickly enough to catch the Russians unprepared. F-16s could keep the Russians of the backs of Ukrainian troops. If we never provided F-16s the pilot training would do no harm. It was a low-risk low-cost way to get inside the Russian decision cycle. I have also repeatedly questioned the failure to provide ATACMS missiles for the HIMARS launchers we did provide to Ukraine. Ukraine needs a "deep strike" capability very badly, and the ATACMS would have provided that.

I have also criticized the announcement of " major" equipment grants when the actual delivery of said items was at best many months (sometimes over a year) away. This gives the illusion of "doing something" while not actually doing it. The contractual delays on the NASAMS missile deliveries was one example.  Another was the announcement of the GLSDB for Ukraine when we didn't actually have any, had none on order, and had not evaluated it as a weapon system. This also gave Russia a "heads up" on what to anticipate facing and plenty of time to prepare accordingly. This has been accompanied by me criticizing a "lack of urgency", particularly  by the DoD in getting stuff to Ukraine promptly. Some delays are unavoidable, but there have been several instances where we announced the decision to supply something, had the "stuff" in inventory, and took months to get it there. We did not move at "the speed of war". It could be a lack of coordination and many other things, but in war, why doesn't matter. If you need it and it is not available, bad things happen.

I reiterate these points because I did consider in each case whether my comment was "political". My thinking was that these comments were entirely strategic in nature. It had to do with how we are participating in the war, not which individual was making "errors" or which party was "at fault". The "administration" includes the DoD and lots of other organs of government that are (at least in theory) not politically involved at all. I must admit the fact I got very little feedback questioning the appropriateness of these comments (although obviously I didn't get universal agreement to them :-) indicated to me I was on the right track and not crossing the Terry rule line.

Most recently, I had just stated my opinion that Ukraine could not survive 12 months of no direct, full up, US military aid. I could have just left it at that. I didn't. I went on to say that it was incumbent on the administration to make that not happen. That goes back the the very first criticism I cited above. If we intervene, we are "in this war", and failure has inevitable consequences to the US (let alone Ukraine). The degree of difficulty and "whys" don't matter. These "whys" needed to be evaluated before we decided to enter the war and plans made to mitigate their effects. The "unforgiving minute" is in play. Sometimes things happen that couldn't be anticipated. The current situation is, IMO, not one of cases. There are some others who agree with me on this subject.

https://www.yahoo.com/news/baltic-nordic...40663.html

In the future I will simply state what IMO needs to happen (solutions to strategic/tactical problems). That may be considered an implicit criticism of those that are not making happen what I suggest :-). I can't help that. The alternative would be to simply cite problems, and I don't believe that "works". The solutions are often what we are discussing in this thread. Hopefully taking the modified approach will produce an acceptable result.

[BigJohn043]

I want to respond to recent concerns about my post that criticized the administrations inability (so far) to ensure the flow of US military assistance to Ukraine. I am sensitive to the need to keep "politics" out of this thread, not just because it might get shut down (which obviously I very much do not want to happen), but also because the discussion here is largely strategic and tactical in nature. Politics plays a minimal role in that. That said, I have at times directed criticism at "the administration" since the beginning of my participation in this thread.  Each time I did consider whether doing so was "necessary" and/or constructive. I will cite the ones I remember.

At the beginning of the Ukraine war I was not quite as much pro-intervention as some of this thread. What I did say was that if the US decided to support Ukraine with military aid, it was critical that "the administration" realize that they were "upping the ante". For that reason they had to ensure that the public was aware of the down-side risks and the consequences of failure.  Continuing public involvement was necessary. My point was that it was entirely reasonable to conclude that choosing to not help Ukraine would convince Putin (and the rest of the world) that the US wouldn't attempt to prevent unprovoked aggression. This required action on our part. However, if the US intervened and failed to "win", that would show Putin (and the rest of the world) that the US COULDN'T prevent unprovoked aggression. That would be orders of magnitude worse and must not happen.

Very early on (well before the F-16 initiative in the EU was even imagined) I criticized the administration for not starting to train Ukrainian personnel to operate and maintain F-16 jets just in case the decision to provide them was eventually made. It would allow transitioning from concept to action quickly enough to catch the Russians unprepared. F-16s could keep the Russians of the backs of Ukrainian troops. If we never provided F-16s the pilot training would do no harm. It was a low-risk low-cost way to get inside the Russian decision cycle. I have also repeatedly questioned the failure to provide ATACMS missiles for the HIMARS launchers we did provide to Ukraine. Ukraine needs a "deep strike" capability very badly, and the ATACMS would have provided that.

I have also criticized the announcement of " major" equipment grants when the actual delivery of said items was at best many months (sometimes over a year) away. This gives the illusion of "doing something" while not actually doing it. The contractual delays on the NASAMS missile deliveries was one example.  Another was the announcement of the GLSDB for Ukraine when we didn't actually have any, had none on order, and had not evaluated it as a weapon system. This also gave Russia a "heads up" on what to anticipate facing and plenty of time to prepare accordingly. This has been accompanied by me criticizing a "lack of urgency", particularly  by the DoD in getting stuff to Ukraine promptly. Some delays are unavoidable, but there have been several instances where we announced the decision to supply something, had the "stuff" in inventory, and took months to get it there. We did not move at "the speed of war". It could be a lack of coordination and many other things, but in war, why doesn't matter. If you need it and it is not available, bad things happen.

I reiterate these points because I did consider in each case whether my comment was "political". My thinking was that these comments were entirely strategic in nature. It had to do with how we are participating in the war, not which individual was making "errors" or which party was "at fault". The "administration" includes the DoD and lots of other organs of government that are (at least in theory) not politically involved at all. I must admit the fact I got very little feedback questioning the appropriateness of these comments (although obviously I didn't get universal agreement to them :-) indicated to me I was on the right track and not crossing the Terry rule line.

Most recently, I had just stated my opinion that Ukraine could not survive 12 months of no direct, full up, US military aid. I could have just left it at that. I didn't. I went on to say that it was incumbent on the administration to make that not happen. That goes back the the very first criticism I cited above. If we intervene, we are "in this war", and failure has inevitable consequences to the US (let alone Ukraine). The degree of difficulty and "whys" don't matter. These "whys" needed to be evaluated before we decided to enter the war and plans made to mitigate their effects. The "unforgiving minute" is in play. Sometimes things happen that couldn't be anticipated. The current situation is, IMO, not one of cases. There are some others who agree with me on this subject.

https://www.yahoo.com/news/baltic-nordic...40663.html

In the future I will simply state what IMO needs to happen (solutions to strategic/tactical problems). That may be considered an implicit criticism of those that are not making happen what I suggest :-). I can't help that. The alternative would be to simply cite problems, and I don't believe that "works". The solutions are often what we are discussing in this thread. Hopefully taking the modified approach will produce an acceptable result.

An honest question.  Why is US aid so important?  The EU is already giving more and obviously they have a much more direct interest in the conflict.  Given that many countries in the EU underspend on their NATO commitments, is it totally irrational to ask them to foot the bill here?

https://app.23degrees.io/view/tAuBi41Lxv..._csv_final

Maybe the answer is they just won't.

FWIW, I would fund the Ukraine war every day....

[BigJohn043]

I want to respond to recent concerns about my post that criticized the administrations inability (so far) to ensure the flow of US military assistance to Ukraine. I am sensitive to the need to keep "politics" out of this thread, not just because it might get shut down (which obviously I very much do not want to happen), but also because the discussion here is largely strategic and tactical in nature. Politics plays a minimal role in that. That said, I have at times directed criticism at "the administration" since the beginning of my participation in this thread.  Each time I did consider whether doing so was "necessary" and/or constructive. I will cite the ones I remember.

At the beginning of the Ukraine war I was not quite as much pro-intervention as some of this thread. What I did say was that if the US decided to support Ukraine with military aid, it was critical that "the administration" realize that they were "upping the ante". For that reason they had to ensure that the public was aware of the down-side risks and the consequences of failure.  Continuing public involvement was necessary. My point was that it was entirely reasonable to conclude that choosing to not help Ukraine would convince Putin (and the rest of the world) that the US wouldn't attempt to prevent unprovoked aggression. This required action on our part. However, if the US intervened and failed to "win", that would show Putin (and the rest of the world) that the US COULDN'T prevent unprovoked aggression. That would be orders of magnitude worse and must not happen.

Very early on (well before the F-16 initiative in the EU was even imagined) I criticized the administration for not starting to train Ukrainian personnel to operate and maintain F-16 jets just in case the decision to provide them was eventually made. It would allow transitioning from concept to action quickly enough to catch the Russians unprepared. F-16s could keep the Russians of the backs of Ukrainian troops. If we never provided F-16s the pilot training would do no harm. It was a low-risk low-cost way to get inside the Russian decision cycle. I have also repeatedly questioned the failure to provide ATACMS missiles for the HIMARS launchers we did provide to Ukraine. Ukraine needs a "deep strike" capability very badly, and the ATACMS would have provided that.

I have also criticized the announcement of " major" equipment grants when the actual delivery of said items was at best many months (sometimes over a year) away. This gives the illusion of "doing something" while not actually doing it. The contractual delays on the NASAMS missile deliveries was one example.  Another was the announcement of the GLSDB for Ukraine when we didn't actually have any, had none on order, and had not evaluated it as a weapon system. This also gave Russia a "heads up" on what to anticipate facing and plenty of time to prepare accordingly. This has been accompanied by me criticizing a "lack of urgency", particularly  by the DoD in getting stuff to Ukraine promptly. Some delays are unavoidable, but there have been several instances where we announced the decision to supply something, had the "stuff" in inventory, and took months to get it there. We did not move at "the speed of war". It could be a lack of coordination and many other things, but in war, why doesn't matter. If you need it and it is not available, bad things happen.

I reiterate these points because I did consider in each case whether my comment was "political". My thinking was that these comments were entirely strategic in nature. It had to do with how we are participating in the war, not which individual was making "errors" or which party was "at fault". The "administration" includes the DoD and lots of other organs of government that are (at least in theory) not politically involved at all. I must admit the fact I got very little feedback questioning the appropriateness of these comments (although obviously I didn't get universal agreement to them :-) indicated to me I was on the right track and not crossing the Terry rule line.

Most recently, I had just stated my opinion that Ukraine could not survive 12 months of no direct, full up, US military aid. I could have just left it at that. I didn't. I went on to say that it was incumbent on the administration to make that not happen. That goes back the the very first criticism I cited above. If we intervene, we are "in this war", and failure has inevitable consequences to the US (let alone Ukraine). The degree of difficulty and "whys" don't matter. These "whys" needed to be evaluated before we decided to enter the war and plans made to mitigate their effects. The "unforgiving minute" is in play. Sometimes things happen that couldn't be anticipated. The current situation is, IMO, not one of cases. There are some others who agree with me on this subject.

https://www.yahoo.com/news/baltic-nordic...40663.html

In the future I will simply state what IMO needs to happen (solutions to strategic/tactical problems). That may be considered an implicit criticism of those that are not making happen what I suggest :-). I can't help that. The alternative would be to simply cite problems, and I don't believe that "works". The solutions are often what we are discussing in this thread. Hopefully taking the modified approach will produce an acceptable result.

An honest question.  Why is US aid so important?  The EU is already giving more and obviously they have a much more direct interest in the conflict.  Given that many countries in the EU underspend on their NATO commitments, is it totally irrational to ask them to foot the bill here?

https://app.23degrees.io/view/tAuBi41Lxv..._csv_final

Maybe the answer is they just won't.

FWIW, I would fund the Ukraine war every day....

[Goose]

An honest question.  Why is US aid so important?  The EU is already giving more and obviously they have a much more direct interest in the conflict.  Given that many countries in the EU underspend on their NATO commitments, is it totally irrational to ask them to foot the bill here?

https://app.23degrees.io/view/tAuBi41Lxv..._csv_final

Maybe the answer is they just won't.

FWIW, I would fund the Ukraine war every day....

If it were just a matter of money, it might be reasonable to expect the EU nations, especially Germany, France and the Netherlands to pick up most of the tab. However, it is also a matter of capability. The US has a far larger "stock" of things like 155 mm ammunition. The EU made this "big deal" about how they were going to supply a million 155 mm shells to Ukraine last year. It turns out they couldn't do it. They have problems with manufacturing capability (as does the US) and their stocks are much smaller. The Europeans can't simply take it out of stock. Bad as our manufacturing is, it seems the EU has even more limited capacity.

The US military simply has a lot more "stuff", lots of which we periodically replace anyway. Much of the armament used in the world comes from the US. Germany has Rheinmetall who makes lots of good stuff. They claim they can supply lots of stuff immediately. Then, when push comes to shove it turns out they "can't quite do that".

The fact that many EU nations did not spend their requisite 2.0% of GDP for military purposes has indeed put the EU armament factories in a bad squeeze over the years. As in the US, there have been lots of mergers and acquisitions. However, since these are all independent countries, they don't want their arms to depend on the countries around them. The want to spend the money "at home". This wrecks economy of scale. Many of these countries (Italy for instance) have taken on a lot of NATO responsibilities (since the US 6th fleet basically ceased to exist). However, their economies are simply too weak to allow them to spend 2.0% of their GDP on weapons. Germany was kind of exempted from the requirement by the costs of reunification and the doctrine of "Don't scare the Bear". The German politicians liked that just fine and never reversed the trend.

The bottom line is that IMO it is going to take both the US AND the EU doing all they can to supply Ukraine's needs. Ukraine is supplying the bodies. Every body else is supplying the bullets. As your chart shows, the EU has promised lots of financial aid. Not sure how much of that is being delivered though.

[Goose]

An honest question.  Why is US aid so important?  The EU is already giving more and obviously they have a much more direct interest in the conflict.  Given that many countries in the EU underspend on their NATO commitments, is it totally irrational to ask them to foot the bill here?

https://app.23degrees.io/view/tAuBi41Lxv..._csv_final

Maybe the answer is they just won't.

FWIW, I would fund the Ukraine war every day....

If it were just a matter of money, it might be reasonable to expect the EU nations, especially Germany, France and the Netherlands to pick up most of the tab. However, it is also a matter of capability. The US has a far larger "stock" of things like 155 mm ammunition. The EU made this "big deal" about how they were going to supply a million 155 mm shells to Ukraine last year. It turns out they couldn't do it. They have problems with manufacturing capability (as does the US) and their stocks are much smaller. The Europeans can't simply take it out of stock. Bad as our manufacturing is, it seems the EU has even more limited capacity.

The US military simply has a lot more "stuff", lots of which we periodically replace anyway. Much of the armament used in the world comes from the US. Germany has Rheinmetall who makes lots of good stuff. They claim they can supply lots of stuff immediately. Then, when push comes to shove it turns out they "can't quite do that".

The fact that many EU nations did not spend their requisite 2.0% of GDP for military purposes has indeed put the EU armament factories in a bad squeeze over the years. As in the US, there have been lots of mergers and acquisitions. However, since these are all independent countries, they don't want their arms to depend on the countries around them. The want to spend the money "at home". This wrecks economy of scale. Many of these countries (Italy for instance) have taken on a lot of NATO responsibilities (since the US 6th fleet basically ceased to exist). However, their economies are simply too weak to allow them to spend 2.0% of their GDP on weapons. Germany was kind of exempted from the requirement by the costs of reunification and the doctrine of "Don't scare the Bear". The German politicians liked that just fine and never reversed the trend.

The bottom line is that IMO it is going to take both the US AND the EU doing all they can to supply Ukraine's needs. Ukraine is supplying the bodies. Every body else is supplying the bullets. As your chart shows, the EU has promised lots of financial aid. Not sure how much of that is being delivered though.

[Goose]

https://www.statista.com/statistics/5840...countries/ shows the NATO countries military spending as a percentage of GDP. There are some countries that do not reach 2% of GDP for military spending that really have no excuse. Germany at 1.57% is the poster child for this situation. At the end of the cold war, Germany spent lots of money getting the Russians out of Europe (especially East Germany). Russia didn't have the cash to bring it's troops home and house them. Germany paid the bill. Germany also paid a very large part of the costs to allow Poland to switch to a market economy in a single year. On top of that, Germany had the significant expense of absorbing and integrating East Germany into the nation. To some extent, this goes on still.

The US and other NATO nations therefore didn't object when Germany's military expenditures dropped significantly. Germany had it's own issues and had been generous in helping Eastern Europe. Additionally, the US and other NATO allies knew Russia was very nervous about German military power. The US in particular wanted to reassure Russia that Germany would never come after them again. Low military spending in Germany helped make that case.

That was all well and good, but by 2000 or so the situation had changed. Germany needed to ramp up it's defense spending to correspond to it's place in the world economy. Unfortunately the German politicians had got very used to spending that money on other things. They didn't want to give up their extra "peace dividend", and they didn't. Unfortunately, much of the rest of NATO interpreted that as carte blanche to do the same.

Germany, France, Netherlands, Norway, Canada and probably Belgium can undoubtedly afford to spend 2% of their GDP on defense. They just haven't done so. This unfortunately has caused the defense industry in these countries to reduce capacity and in many cases to go out of business. Many of these firms were forced to team up with US and UK firms to maintain even minimal capacity. Doing business with the US and in Asia has been essential to preserving their existence. Even if all these countries decided to dump a bunch of money into defense tomorrow, many of the indigenous defense contractors couldn't do much with it in the short term. It is also politically impossible in most cases to spend that kind of defense money outside the country, where capacity may exist. For that reason, what the EU can do for Ukraine in the near term is quite limited.

It might seem that the PIGS have such weak economies that they actually can't afford the 2% level of defense spending. This is essentially true, except Greece somehow manages to spend a whopping 3.01% on defense. Of course, that is mostly to counter Türkiye, one of their NATO allies. There are also quite a few "small" NATO countries that actually do meet the 2% spending goal. There are many more that do not. While not good, in general these nations GDP is so small that 2% of it isn't enough to greatly alter the business case for defense contractors in the EU, even if these nations were willing to buy outside their own country. These nations have in many cases taken advantage of the opportunity to "help" Ukraine by sending obsolete equipment to Ukraine in return for new equipment (in the future) from more prosperous NATO allies. Probably the best they could do anyway.

[Goose]

https://www.statista.com/statistics/5840...countries/ shows the NATO countries military spending as a percentage of GDP. There are some countries that do not reach 2% of GDP for military spending that really have no excuse. Germany at 1.57% is the poster child for this situation. At the end of the cold war, Germany spent lots of money getting the Russians out of Europe (especially East Germany). Russia didn't have the cash to bring it's troops home and house them. Germany paid the bill. Germany also paid a very large part of the costs to allow Poland to switch to a market economy in a single year. On top of that, Germany had the significant expense of absorbing and integrating East Germany into the nation. To some extent, this goes on still.

The US and other NATO nations therefore didn't object when Germany's military expenditures dropped significantly. Germany had it's own issues and had been generous in helping Eastern Europe. Additionally, the US and other NATO allies knew Russia was very nervous about German military power. The US in particular wanted to reassure Russia that Germany would never come after them again. Low military spending in Germany helped make that case.

That was all well and good, but by 2000 or so the situation had changed. Germany needed to ramp up it's defense spending to correspond to it's place in the world economy. Unfortunately the German politicians had got very used to spending that money on other things. They didn't want to give up their extra "peace dividend", and they didn't. Unfortunately, much of the rest of NATO interpreted that as carte blanche to do the same.

Germany, France, Netherlands, Norway, Canada and probably Belgium can undoubtedly afford to spend 2% of their GDP on defense. They just haven't done so. This unfortunately has caused the defense industry in these countries to reduce capacity and in many cases to go out of business. Many of these firms were forced to team up with US and UK firms to maintain even minimal capacity. Doing business with the US and in Asia has been essential to preserving their existence. Even if all these countries decided to dump a bunch of money into defense tomorrow, many of the indigenous defense contractors couldn't do much with it in the short term. It is also politically impossible in most cases to spend that kind of defense money outside the country, where capacity may exist. For that reason, what the EU can do for Ukraine in the near term is quite limited.

It might seem that the PIGS have such weak economies that they actually can't afford the 2% level of defense spending. This is essentially true, except Greece somehow manages to spend a whopping 3.01% on defense. Of course, that is mostly to counter Türkiye, one of their NATO allies. There are also quite a few "small" NATO countries that actually do meet the 2% spending goal. There are many more that do not. While not good, in general these nations GDP is so small that 2% of it isn't enough to greatly alter the business case for defense contractors in the EU, even if these nations were willing to buy outside their own country. These nations have in many cases taken advantage of the opportunity to "help" Ukraine by sending obsolete equipment to Ukraine in return for new equipment (in the future) from more prosperous NATO allies. Probably the best they could do anyway.

[GK3]

I want to respond to recent concerns about my post that criticized the administrations inability (so far) to ensure the flow of US military assistance to Ukraine. I am sensitive to the need to keep "politics" out of this thread, not just because it might get shut down (which obviously I very much do not want to happen), but also because the discussion here is largely strategic and tactical in nature. Politics plays a minimal role in that. That said, I have at times directed criticism at "the administration" since the beginning of my participation in this thread.  Each time I did consider whether doing so was "necessary" and/or constructive. I will cite the ones I remember.

At the beginning of the Ukraine war I was not quite as much pro-intervention as some of this thread. What I did say was that if the US decided to support Ukraine with military aid, it was critical that "the administration" realize that they were "upping the ante". For that reason they had to ensure that the public was aware of the down-side risks and the consequences of failure.  Continuing public involvement was necessary. My point was that it was entirely reasonable to conclude that choosing to not help Ukraine would convince Putin (and the rest of the world) that the US wouldn't attempt to prevent unprovoked aggression. This required action on our part. However, if the US intervened and failed to "win", that would show Putin (and the rest of the world) that the US COULDN'T prevent unprovoked aggression. That would be orders of magnitude worse and must not happen.

Very early on (well before the F-16 initiative in the EU was even imagined) I criticized the administration for not starting to train Ukrainian personnel to operate and maintain F-16 jets just in case the decision to provide them was eventually made. It would allow transitioning from concept to action quickly enough to catch the Russians unprepared. F-16s could keep the Russians of the backs of Ukrainian troops. If we never provided F-16s the pilot training would do no harm. It was a low-risk low-cost way to get inside the Russian decision cycle. I have also repeatedly questioned the failure to provide ATACMS missiles for the HIMARS launchers we did provide to Ukraine. Ukraine needs a "deep strike" capability very badly, and the ATACMS would have provided that.

I have also criticized the announcement of " major" equipment grants when the actual delivery of said items was at best many months (sometimes over a year) away. This gives the illusion of "doing something" while not actually doing it. The contractual delays on the NASAMS missile deliveries was one example.  Another was the announcement of the GLSDB for Ukraine when we didn't actually have any, had none on order, and had not evaluated it as a weapon system. This also gave Russia a "heads up" on what to anticipate facing and plenty of time to prepare accordingly. This has been accompanied by me criticizing a "lack of urgency", particularly  by the DoD in getting stuff to Ukraine promptly. Some delays are unavoidable, but there have been several instances where we announced the decision to supply something, had the "stuff" in inventory, and took months to get it there. We did not move at "the speed of war". It could be a lack of coordination and many other things, but in war, why doesn't matter. If you need it and it is not available, bad things happen.

I reiterate these points because I did consider in each case whether my comment was "political". My thinking was that these comments were entirely strategic in nature. It had to do with how we are participating in the war, not which individual was making "errors" or which party was "at fault". The "administration" includes the DoD and lots of other organs of government that are (at least in theory) not politically involved at all. I must admit the fact I got very little feedback questioning the appropriateness of these comments (although obviously I didn't get universal agreement to them :-) indicated to me I was on the right track and not crossing the Terry rule line.

Most recently, I had just stated my opinion that Ukraine could not survive 12 months of no direct, full up, US military aid. I could have just left it at that. I didn't. I went on to say that it was incumbent on the administration to make that not happen. That goes back the the very first criticism I cited above. If we intervene, we are "in this war", and failure has inevitable consequences to the US (let alone Ukraine). The degree of difficulty and "whys" don't matter. These "whys" needed to be evaluated before we decided to enter the war and plans made to mitigate their effects. The "unforgiving minute" is in play. Sometimes things happen that couldn't be anticipated. The current situation is, IMO, not one of cases. There are some others who agree with me on this subject.

https://www.yahoo.com/news/baltic-nordic...40663.html

In the future I will simply state what IMO needs to happen (solutions to strategic/tactical problems). That may be considered an implicit criticism of those that are not making happen what I suggest :-). I can't help that. The alternative would be to simply cite problems, and I don't believe that "works". The solutions are often what we are discussing in this thread. Hopefully taking the modified approach will produce an acceptable result.

Goose,
I rarely see any points in your comments where I would disagree, but to say that Strategic thinking is not affected by political thinking is simply not true. I am of the opinion that politics plays a brobdingnagian role in our final strategic thinking.  Our military comes up with strategic plans but they are indeed affected by our political thinking.  Is that good, probably not.  If the political thinkers are convinced that there are WMD in Country x then our strategic plans involve those weapons whether or not they exist.  I can only say that I have strong reasons to believe that the thinking in Washington has a great impact on the strategic planning of our military, whether they believe it or not. As far as the Ukraine goes, our political thinking will absolutely control our strategic thinking in that regard.



w

[GK3]

I want to respond to recent concerns about my post that criticized the administrations inability (so far) to ensure the flow of US military assistance to Ukraine. I am sensitive to the need to keep "politics" out of this thread, not just because it might get shut down (which obviously I very much do not want to happen), but also because the discussion here is largely strategic and tactical in nature. Politics plays a minimal role in that. That said, I have at times directed criticism at "the administration" since the beginning of my participation in this thread.  Each time I did consider whether doing so was "necessary" and/or constructive. I will cite the ones I remember.

At the beginning of the Ukraine war I was not quite as much pro-intervention as some of this thread. What I did say was that if the US decided to support Ukraine with military aid, it was critical that "the administration" realize that they were "upping the ante". For that reason they had to ensure that the public was aware of the down-side risks and the consequences of failure.  Continuing public involvement was necessary. My point was that it was entirely reasonable to conclude that choosing to not help Ukraine would convince Putin (and the rest of the world) that the US wouldn't attempt to prevent unprovoked aggression. This required action on our part. However, if the US intervened and failed to "win", that would show Putin (and the rest of the world) that the US COULDN'T prevent unprovoked aggression. That would be orders of magnitude worse and must not happen.

Very early on (well before the F-16 initiative in the EU was even imagined) I criticized the administration for not starting to train Ukrainian personnel to operate and maintain F-16 jets just in case the decision to provide them was eventually made. It would allow transitioning from concept to action quickly enough to catch the Russians unprepared. F-16s could keep the Russians of the backs of Ukrainian troops. If we never provided F-16s the pilot training would do no harm. It was a low-risk low-cost way to get inside the Russian decision cycle. I have also repeatedly questioned the failure to provide ATACMS missiles for the HIMARS launchers we did provide to Ukraine. Ukraine needs a "deep strike" capability very badly, and the ATACMS would have provided that.

I have also criticized the announcement of " major" equipment grants when the actual delivery of said items was at best many months (sometimes over a year) away. This gives the illusion of "doing something" while not actually doing it. The contractual delays on the NASAMS missile deliveries was one example.  Another was the announcement of the GLSDB for Ukraine when we didn't actually have any, had none on order, and had not evaluated it as a weapon system. This also gave Russia a "heads up" on what to anticipate facing and plenty of time to prepare accordingly. This has been accompanied by me criticizing a "lack of urgency", particularly  by the DoD in getting stuff to Ukraine promptly. Some delays are unavoidable, but there have been several instances where we announced the decision to supply something, had the "stuff" in inventory, and took months to get it there. We did not move at "the speed of war". It could be a lack of coordination and many other things, but in war, why doesn't matter. If you need it and it is not available, bad things happen.

I reiterate these points because I did consider in each case whether my comment was "political". My thinking was that these comments were entirely strategic in nature. It had to do with how we are participating in the war, not which individual was making "errors" or which party was "at fault". The "administration" includes the DoD and lots of other organs of government that are (at least in theory) not politically involved at all. I must admit the fact I got very little feedback questioning the appropriateness of these comments (although obviously I didn't get universal agreement to them :-) indicated to me I was on the right track and not crossing the Terry rule line.

Most recently, I had just stated my opinion that Ukraine could not survive 12 months of no direct, full up, US military aid. I could have just left it at that. I didn't. I went on to say that it was incumbent on the administration to make that not happen. That goes back the the very first criticism I cited above. If we intervene, we are "in this war", and failure has inevitable consequences to the US (let alone Ukraine). The degree of difficulty and "whys" don't matter. These "whys" needed to be evaluated before we decided to enter the war and plans made to mitigate their effects. The "unforgiving minute" is in play. Sometimes things happen that couldn't be anticipated. The current situation is, IMO, not one of cases. There are some others who agree with me on this subject.

https://www.yahoo.com/news/baltic-nordic...40663.html

In the future I will simply state what IMO needs to happen (solutions to strategic/tactical problems). That may be considered an implicit criticism of those that are not making happen what I suggest :-). I can't help that. The alternative would be to simply cite problems, and I don't believe that "works". The solutions are often what we are discussing in this thread. Hopefully taking the modified approach will produce an acceptable result.

Goose,
I rarely see any points in your comments where I would disagree, but to say that Strategic thinking is not affected by political thinking is simply not true. I am of the opinion that politics plays a brobdingnagian role in our final strategic thinking.  Our military comes up with strategic plans but they are indeed affected by our political thinking.  Is that good, probably not.  If the political thinkers are convinced that there are WMD in Country x then our strategic plans involve those weapons whether or not they exist.  I can only say that I have strong reasons to believe that the thinking in Washington has a great impact on the strategic planning of our military, whether they believe it or not. As far as the Ukraine goes, our political thinking will absolutely control our strategic thinking in that regard.



w

[Goose]

Goose,
I rarely see any points in your comments where I would disagree, but to say that Strategic thinking is not affected by political thinking is simply not true. I am of the opinion that politics plays a of immense proportions role in our final strategic thinking.  Our military comes up with strategic plans but they are indeed affected by our political thinking.  Is that good, probably not.  If the political thinkers are convinced that there are WMD in Country x then our strategic plans involve those weapons whether or not they exist.  I can only say that I have strong reasons to believe that the thinking in Washington has a great impact on the strategic planning of our military, whether they believe it or not. As far as the Ukraine goes, our political thinking will absolutely control our strategic thinking in that regard.

I agree with almost all of the above. I think the issue may be the definition of "political". Perhaps I wasn't clear. My point was that I have tried to ensure that MY criticisms of "the administration" were not driven by my political opinions (which candidates I support) and was strictly directed at the strategic problems caused by what I believed were "failures" in execution. I do however separate strategic decisions made by politicians from "political thinking" and "political biases".

The country is lead by an elected president. He is a politician. That doesn't mean that all or most of his thinking is "political" in nature (or at least in the past it didn't). FDR believed Germany was a serious threat to the US. That had next to nothing to do with politics. In fact it was not politically popular. FDR could have just shut up about it. Politically, that would have been the "right thing to do". He didn't. He tried to "lead" the country to share his understanding. He made decisions that were politically unpopular to aid Britain. It turns out history proved him right.

Some might argue that certain presidents have be affected by what is perceived by their political opponents as a political bias. The assertion that "Well, FDR thought that way because he was a Democrat" existed. It is often true that members of a given political party as a group view the international situation differently than members of other political parties. However, it may be (or at least in the past was) individuals join a particular party because of what they think rather than visa-versa. IMO a "political decision" would be intervening in Ukraine because you thought it would be politically popular and get you votes. I don't think we did that. There are examples in US history of going to war because it was "popular", particularly the Mexican War and the Spanish-American war. It was true that after Pearl Harbor, declaring war was politically popular. That is not IMO why FDR did so :-).

It is also true that the appointed members of the executive branch usually share the view of the president regarding the international scene. Presidents tend to appoint like-minded people in order to accomplish what "needs to be done". The appointed members tend to promote staff that agree with them. These staff are not directly political appointments, but there is a selection "bias". The saying is that all presidents get the CIA they want. It usually takes about 2 years to make that happen :-). There is no doubt that administrations become an echo chamber to some large extent.

I therefore do not agree that our political thinking controls our strategic thinking. The thinking of our president, who is a politician, can and should drive our strategic thinking. That thinking is undoubtedly influenced by the philosophy of the president and the like-minded people he appoints. It should not however be based on what is "popular" and will get him re-elected. In short, it is not "political". The president is also responsible for choosing a strategic approach that will accomplish his goals and that can be executed. The latter part does certainly involve politics. He has to bring the American people along with him. If they are already there, no problem. If he can't "bring them along", a different strategy must be chosen. The part of the administration that is ostensibly "non-political" does need to deliver the full range of strategies that they think are workable. It is up to the politicians to choose (and modify) the one that will work.

Whatever strategy is chosen, the administration has to have a plan to get and keep the American people onboard. That may be easy in the beginning when the sacrifices and downsides are not so obvious. The opposition parties may also be keeping quiet for political reasons. None of those positive circumstances will persist, and the administration needs to have a plan for that eventuality. If the administration doubts it can ensure that situation, it needs a different strategy. OTOH, once a strategy is launched, it is imperative that the "political" side of that strategy succeed. IMO the latter is in deep trouble at present.

[Goose]

Goose,
I rarely see any points in your comments where I would disagree, but to say that Strategic thinking is not affected by political thinking is simply not true. I am of the opinion that politics plays a of immense proportions role in our final strategic thinking.  Our military comes up with strategic plans but they are indeed affected by our political thinking.  Is that good, probably not.  If the political thinkers are convinced that there are WMD in Country x then our strategic plans involve those weapons whether or not they exist.  I can only say that I have strong reasons to believe that the thinking in Washington has a great impact on the strategic planning of our military, whether they believe it or not. As far as the Ukraine goes, our political thinking will absolutely control our strategic thinking in that regard.

I agree with almost all of the above. I think the issue may be the definition of "political". Perhaps I wasn't clear. My point was that I have tried to ensure that MY criticisms of "the administration" were not driven by my political opinions (which candidates I support) and was strictly directed at the strategic problems caused by what I believed were "failures" in execution. I do however separate strategic decisions made by politicians from "political thinking" and "political biases".

The country is lead by an elected president. He is a politician. That doesn't mean that all or most of his thinking is "political" in nature (or at least in the past it didn't). FDR believed Germany was a serious threat to the US. That had next to nothing to do with politics. In fact it was not politically popular. FDR could have just shut up about it. Politically, that would have been the "right thing to do". He didn't. He tried to "lead" the country to share his understanding. He made decisions that were politically unpopular to aid Britain. It turns out history proved him right.

Some might argue that certain presidents have be affected by what is perceived by their political opponents as a political bias. The assertion that "Well, FDR thought that way because he was a Democrat" existed. It is often true that members of a given political party as a group view the international situation differently than members of other political parties. However, it may be (or at least in the past was) individuals join a particular party because of what they think rather than visa-versa. IMO a "political decision" would be intervening in Ukraine because you thought it would be politically popular and get you votes. I don't think we did that. There are examples in US history of going to war because it was "popular", particularly the Mexican War and the Spanish-American war. It was true that after Pearl Harbor, declaring war was politically popular. That is not IMO why FDR did so :-).

It is also true that the appointed members of the executive branch usually share the view of the president regarding the international scene. Presidents tend to appoint like-minded people in order to accomplish what "needs to be done". The appointed members tend to promote staff that agree with them. These staff are not directly political appointments, but there is a selection "bias". The saying is that all presidents get the CIA they want. It usually takes about 2 years to make that happen :-). There is no doubt that administrations become an echo chamber to some large extent.

I therefore do not agree that our political thinking controls our strategic thinking. The thinking of our president, who is a politician, can and should drive our strategic thinking. That thinking is undoubtedly influenced by the philosophy of the president and the like-minded people he appoints. It should not however be based on what is "popular" and will get him re-elected. In short, it is not "political". The president is also responsible for choosing a strategic approach that will accomplish his goals and that can be executed. The latter part does certainly involve politics. He has to bring the American people along with him. If they are already there, no problem. If he can't "bring them along", a different strategy must be chosen. The part of the administration that is ostensibly "non-political" does need to deliver the full range of strategies that they think are workable. It is up to the politicians to choose (and modify) the one that will work.

Whatever strategy is chosen, the administration has to have a plan to get and keep the American people onboard. That may be easy in the beginning when the sacrifices and downsides are not so obvious. The opposition parties may also be keeping quiet for political reasons. None of those positive circumstances will persist, and the administration needs to have a plan for that eventuality. If the administration doubts it can ensure that situation, it needs a different strategy. OTOH, once a strategy is launched, it is imperative that the "political" side of that strategy succeed. IMO the latter is in deep trouble at present.

[dabigv13]

War is politics by another means. Of course strategy and politics can't be separated. The reason we haven't sent F16s and ATACMS is political of course. The administration cannot unilaterally do things, what aid is provided is bounded by what has been appropriated from Congress. If we send one F16 that's a lot of artillery ammo, air defense missiles, IFVs we are not sending.

So when Goose has opined about what the administration should do it's impossible to discuss why that is not being done without an examination of the underlying politics.

I would like Ukraine to have squadrons of F16s and hundreds of ATACMS. The reason they don't is mostly political. In a sense it is strategic too, but strategic in the way that it would be really bad strategy to give Ukraine a few F16s instead of lots of artillery ammo and air defense missiles.

[dabigv13]

War is politics by another means. Of course strategy and politics can't be separated. The reason we haven't sent F16s and ATACMS is political of course. The administration cannot unilaterally do things, what aid is provided is bounded by what has been appropriated from Congress. If we send one F16 that's a lot of artillery ammo, air defense missiles, IFVs we are not sending.

So when Goose has opined about what the administration should do it's impossible to discuss why that is not being done without an examination of the underlying politics.

I would like Ukraine to have squadrons of F16s and hundreds of ATACMS. The reason they don't is mostly political. In a sense it is strategic too, but strategic in the way that it would be really bad strategy to give Ukraine a few F16s instead of lots of artillery ammo and air defense missiles.

[fullmetal]

Goose, any political tinge in your comments is primarily motivated by your desire to get to the truth of strategy/tactics.  I support your full analyses, and no one here should be triggered by an understanding of the context within which you mention politics.

There was a time when civil rights and the abolitionist movements were "political" and not a matter of humanity.  When people make ground truths into footballs of partisan politics, they make claims that ground truths are merely opinions.  We should not cede that ground, imo.

Glory to Ukraine.

[fullmetal]

Goose, any political tinge in your comments is primarily motivated by your desire to get to the truth of strategy/tactics.  I support your full analyses, and no one here should be triggered by an understanding of the context within which you mention politics.

There was a time when civil rights and the abolitionist movements were "political" and not a matter of humanity.  When people make ground truths into footballs of partisan politics, they make claims that ground truths are merely opinions.  We should not cede that ground, imo.

Glory to Ukraine.

[Goose]

War is politics by another means. Of course strategy and politics can't be separated.

IMO true, but Clausewitz was of course referring to international relations, not domestic ones. The Terry rule applies only to the latter, not the former as I understand it. Moderators feel free to correct me if I am wrong.

The reason we haven't sent F16s and ATACMS is political of course. The administration cannot unilaterally do things, what aid is provided is bounded by what has been appropriated from Congress. If we send one F16 that's a lot of artillery ammo, air defense missiles, IFVs we are not sending.

I don't at all agree. Right now it is impossible to send any military aid at all to Ukraine because Congress has not approved it. Domestic political considerations play a primary role. However, ignoring that elephant, in the past that was not the case. The administration had several potentially good reasons to not supply ATACMS. 

First and foremost, IMO the Army was dead set against it because their supply of ATACMS isn't near as large as they wish it were and the PrSM was not yet being delivered at all. It is now arriving, but in minuscule quantities. It is also unclear if it works. Second, the administration was/is concerned Ukraine would use such a missile to attack Russia and Russia would escalate this war significantly, i.e. use tactical nuclear weapons. This is an evaluation of Russian strategic doctrine. I am glad I am not the one that has to do that. Lastly, the fact Biden said unequivocally we would not do that means that if we do so, Russia may decide we are "dangerously unreliable" and use that as a reason to escalate the war. All of these reasons are potentially valid and are not in any way, as near as I can tell, political. The administration decided the sh** to worth ratio was not favorable. I actually don't agree, but it is not my call.

The F-16s are in a similar condition. The administration undoubtedly considers the US supplying them to be a bridge too far. Remember, the US was absolutely unwilling to supply any modern tanks until the UK and (subsequently) Germany did. Poland has already been sending their older Russian models. The US is operating with an (over?) abundance of caution. The administration really, really doesn't want to start a US vs Russia war. That is just too dangerous.

When the other NATO countries actually start delivering their F-16s, will this reason go away (as it apparently did with Abrams)? If it does, are F-16s a "zero sum" game with other weapons systems? It is unclear to me this is necessarily the case. The US has many F-16s that are going to the boneyard at best. The actual cost is nowhere near the "book value" of the "asset". However, once it is declared "surplus", it has to be sent to the boneyard or "de-militarized", which in this case probably means destroyed. Giving it to an ally is actually cheaper than either.

So when Goose has opined about what the administration should do it's impossible to discuss why that is not being done without an examination of the underlying politics.

In some cases you are correct. The reasons we aren't doing something may be domestic politics. In many cases, as I think I have demonstrated above, it is not the case. In the past I thought it "OK" to point out the consequences of not executing the action and urging greater effort to make it possible :-).  I am not going to do the latter anymore as it gets too close to domestic politics.

I would like Ukraine to have squadrons of F16s and hundreds of ATACMS. The reason they don't is mostly political.

A above, I disagree.

 In a sense it is strategic too, but strategic in the way that it would be really bad strategy to give Ukraine a few F16s instead of lots of artillery ammo and air defense missiles.

Why is it of necessity a "zero sum" game? It may be, but it is unclear to me why that is the case.

[Goose]

War is politics by another means. Of course strategy and politics can't be separated.

IMO true, but Clausewitz was of course referring to international relations, not domestic ones. The Terry rule applies only to the latter, not the former as I understand it. Moderators feel free to correct me if I am wrong.

The reason we haven't sent F16s and ATACMS is political of course. The administration cannot unilaterally do things, what aid is provided is bounded by what has been appropriated from Congress. If we send one F16 that's a lot of artillery ammo, air defense missiles, IFVs we are not sending.

I don't at all agree. Right now it is impossible to send any military aid at all to Ukraine because Congress has not approved it. Domestic political considerations play a primary role. However, ignoring that elephant, in the past that was not the case. The administration had several potentially good reasons to not supply ATACMS. 

First and foremost, IMO the Army was dead set against it because their supply of ATACMS isn't near as large as they wish it were and the PrSM was not yet being delivered at all. It is now arriving, but in minuscule quantities. It is also unclear if it works. Second, the administration was/is concerned Ukraine would use such a missile to attack Russia and Russia would escalate this war significantly, i.e. use tactical nuclear weapons. This is an evaluation of Russian strategic doctrine. I am glad I am not the one that has to do that. Lastly, the fact Biden said unequivocally we would not do that means that if we do so, Russia may decide we are "dangerously unreliable" and use that as a reason to escalate the war. All of these reasons are potentially valid and are not in any way, as near as I can tell, political. The administration decided the sh** to worth ratio was not favorable. I actually don't agree, but it is not my call.

The F-16s are in a similar condition. The administration undoubtedly considers the US supplying them to be a bridge too far. Remember, the US was absolutely unwilling to supply any modern tanks until the UK and (subsequently) Germany did. Poland has already been sending their older Russian models. The US is operating with an (over?) abundance of caution. The administration really, really doesn't want to start a US vs Russia war. That is just too dangerous.

When the other NATO countries actually start delivering their F-16s, will this reason go away (as it apparently did with Abrams)? If it does, are F-16s a "zero sum" game with other weapons systems? It is unclear to me this is necessarily the case. The US has many F-16s that are going to the boneyard at best. The actual cost is nowhere near the "book value" of the "asset". However, once it is declared "surplus", it has to be sent to the boneyard or "de-militarized", which in this case probably means destroyed. Giving it to an ally is actually cheaper than either.

So when Goose has opined about what the administration should do it's impossible to discuss why that is not being done without an examination of the underlying politics.

In some cases you are correct. The reasons we aren't doing something may be domestic politics. In many cases, as I think I have demonstrated above, it is not the case. In the past I thought it "OK" to point out the consequences of not executing the action and urging greater effort to make it possible :-).  I am not going to do the latter anymore as it gets too close to domestic politics.

I would like Ukraine to have squadrons of F16s and hundreds of ATACMS. The reason they don't is mostly political.

A above, I disagree.

 In a sense it is strategic too, but strategic in the way that it would be really bad strategy to give Ukraine a few F16s instead of lots of artillery ammo and air defense missiles.

Why is it of necessity a "zero sum" game? It may be, but it is unclear to me why that is the case.

[GK3]

Goose,
I rarely see any points in your comments where I would disagree, but to say that Strategic thinking is not affected by political thinking is simply not true. I am of the opinion that politics plays a of immense proportions role in our final strategic thinking.  Our military comes up with strategic plans but they are indeed affected by our political thinking.  Is that good, probably not.  If the political thinkers are convinced that there are WMD in Country x then our strategic plans involve those weapons whether or not they exist.  I can only say that I have strong reasons to believe that the thinking in Washington has a great impact on the strategic planning of our military, whether they believe it or not. As far as the Ukraine goes, our political thinking will absolutely control our strategic thinking in that regard.

I agree with almost all of the above. I think the issue may be the definition of "political". Perhaps I wasn't clear. My point was that I have tried to ensure that MY criticisms of "the administration" were not driven by my political opinions (which candidates I support) and was strictly directed at the strategic problems caused by what I believed were "failures" in execution. I do however separate strategic decisions made by politicians from "political thinking" and "political biases".

The country is lead by an elected president. He is a politician. That doesn't mean that all or most of his thinking is "political" in nature (or at least in the past it didn't). FDR believed Germany was a serious threat to the US. That had next to nothing to do with politics. In fact it was not politically popular. FDR could have just shut up about it. Politically, that would have been the "right thing to do". He didn't. He tried to "lead" the country to share his understanding. He made decisions that were politically unpopular to aid Britain. It turns out history proved him right.

Some might argue that certain presidents have be affected by what is perceived by their political opponents as a political bias. The assertion that "Well, FDR thought that way because he was a Democrat" existed. It is often true that members of a given political party as a group view the international situation differently than members of other political parties. However, it may be (or at least in the past was) individuals join a particular party because of what they think rather than visa-versa. IMO a "political decision" would be intervening in Ukraine because you thought it would be politically popular and get you votes. I don't think we did that. There are examples in US history of going to war because it was "popular", particularly the Mexican War and the Spanish-American war. It was true that after Pearl Harbor, declaring war was politically popular. That is not IMO why FDR did so :-).

It is also true that the appointed members of the executive branch usually share the view of the president regarding the international scene. Presidents tend to appoint like-minded people in order to accomplish what "needs to be done". The appointed members tend to promote staff that agree with them. These staff are not directly political appointments, but there is a selection "bias". The saying is that all presidents get the CIA they want. It usually takes about 2 years to make that happen :-). There is no doubt that administrations become an echo chamber to some large extent.

I therefore do not agree that our political thinking controls our strategic thinking. The thinking of our president, who is a politician, can and should drive our strategic thinking. That thinking is undoubtedly influenced by the philosophy of the president and the like-minded people he appoints. It should not however be based on what is "popular" and will get him re-elected. In short, it is not "political". The president is also responsible for choosing a strategic approach that will accomplish his goals and that can be executed. The latter part does certainly involve politics. He has to bring the American people along with him. If they are already there, no problem. If he can't "bring them along", a different strategy must be chosen. The part of the administration that is ostensibly "non-political" does need to deliver the full range of strategies that they think are workable. It is up to the politicians to choose (and modify) the one that will work.

Whatever strategy is chosen, the administration has to have a plan to get and keep the American people onboard. That may be easy in the beginning when the sacrifices and downsides are not so obvious. The opposition parties may also be keeping quiet for political reasons. None of those positive circumstances will persist, and the administration needs to have a plan for that eventuality. If the administration doubts it can ensure that situation, it needs a different strategy. OTOH, once a strategy is launched, it is imperative that the "political" side of that strategy succeed. IMO the latter is in deep trouble at present.

I agree with almost all, except the part about politics and strategic thinking. It has nothing to do with what party you belong to wants but what the people at the top believe and want.  Long ago, far away in another galaxy, I was told, face to face by a three star that the intelligence report my unit had put together was contrary to what the NCA wanted to hear and I was to withdraw it.  Your point about the fact that it is imperative that the "political" side of the strategy succeed is probably by far the most important comment in all of this.  Too often it doesn't turn out the way the political side wanted. Too often the political side in office won't listen to those with differing opinions. Human nature makes tough decisions even tougher.

[GK3]

Goose,
I rarely see any points in your comments where I would disagree, but to say that Strategic thinking is not affected by political thinking is simply not true. I am of the opinion that politics plays a of immense proportions role in our final strategic thinking.  Our military comes up with strategic plans but they are indeed affected by our political thinking.  Is that good, probably not.  If the political thinkers are convinced that there are WMD in Country x then our strategic plans involve those weapons whether or not they exist.  I can only say that I have strong reasons to believe that the thinking in Washington has a great impact on the strategic planning of our military, whether they believe it or not. As far as the Ukraine goes, our political thinking will absolutely control our strategic thinking in that regard.

I agree with almost all of the above. I think the issue may be the definition of "political". Perhaps I wasn't clear. My point was that I have tried to ensure that MY criticisms of "the administration" were not driven by my political opinions (which candidates I support) and was strictly directed at the strategic problems caused by what I believed were "failures" in execution. I do however separate strategic decisions made by politicians from "political thinking" and "political biases".

The country is lead by an elected president. He is a politician. That doesn't mean that all or most of his thinking is "political" in nature (or at least in the past it didn't). FDR believed Germany was a serious threat to the US. That had next to nothing to do with politics. In fact it was not politically popular. FDR could have just shut up about it. Politically, that would have been the "right thing to do". He didn't. He tried to "lead" the country to share his understanding. He made decisions that were politically unpopular to aid Britain. It turns out history proved him right.

Some might argue that certain presidents have be affected by what is perceived by their political opponents as a political bias. The assertion that "Well, FDR thought that way because he was a Democrat" existed. It is often true that members of a given political party as a group view the international situation differently than members of other political parties. However, it may be (or at least in the past was) individuals join a particular party because of what they think rather than visa-versa. IMO a "political decision" would be intervening in Ukraine because you thought it would be politically popular and get you votes. I don't think we did that. There are examples in US history of going to war because it was "popular", particularly the Mexican War and the Spanish-American war. It was true that after Pearl Harbor, declaring war was politically popular. That is not IMO why FDR did so :-).

It is also true that the appointed members of the executive branch usually share the view of the president regarding the international scene. Presidents tend to appoint like-minded people in order to accomplish what "needs to be done". The appointed members tend to promote staff that agree with them. These staff are not directly political appointments, but there is a selection "bias". The saying is that all presidents get the CIA they want. It usually takes about 2 years to make that happen :-). There is no doubt that administrations become an echo chamber to some large extent.

I therefore do not agree that our political thinking controls our strategic thinking. The thinking of our president, who is a politician, can and should drive our strategic thinking. That thinking is undoubtedly influenced by the philosophy of the president and the like-minded people he appoints. It should not however be based on what is "popular" and will get him re-elected. In short, it is not "political". The president is also responsible for choosing a strategic approach that will accomplish his goals and that can be executed. The latter part does certainly involve politics. He has to bring the American people along with him. If they are already there, no problem. If he can't "bring them along", a different strategy must be chosen. The part of the administration that is ostensibly "non-political" does need to deliver the full range of strategies that they think are workable. It is up to the politicians to choose (and modify) the one that will work.

Whatever strategy is chosen, the administration has to have a plan to get and keep the American people onboard. That may be easy in the beginning when the sacrifices and downsides are not so obvious. The opposition parties may also be keeping quiet for political reasons. None of those positive circumstances will persist, and the administration needs to have a plan for that eventuality. If the administration doubts it can ensure that situation, it needs a different strategy. OTOH, once a strategy is launched, it is imperative that the "political" side of that strategy succeed. IMO the latter is in deep trouble at present.

I agree with almost all, except the part about politics and strategic thinking. It has nothing to do with what party you belong to wants but what the people at the top believe and want.  Long ago, far away in another galaxy, I was told, face to face by a three star that the intelligence report my unit had put together was contrary to what the NCA wanted to hear and I was to withdraw it.  Your point about the fact that it is imperative that the "political" side of the strategy succeed is probably by far the most important comment in all of this.  Too often it doesn't turn out the way the political side wanted. Too often the political side in office won't listen to those with differing opinions. Human nature makes tough decisions even tougher.