[BostonCard]

[quote author=slide link=topic=11130.msg105460#msg105460 date=1416263629]
a far cry from the executional success Stanford had in 2011 when it was #2 in successful (%) of 4th down conversions.

Hmmmm...wonder who was QBing that team.
[/quote]

Even 2012 and 2013 we were at least slightly better than average (48th and 36th, respectively) and had a better than 50% conversion rate.

BC

[BostonCard]

[quote author=slide link=topic=11130.msg105460#msg105460 date=1416263629]
a far cry from the executional success Stanford had in 2011 when it was #2 in successful (%) of 4th down conversions.

Hmmmm...wonder who was QBing that team.
[/quote]

Even 2012 and 2013 we were at least slightly better than average (48th and 36th, respectively) and had a better than 50% conversion rate.

BC

[fullmetal]

I am optimistic about next year, but I'd be more optimistic about next year if Shaw weren't so wedded to football in a phone booth with play action that he runs it no matter what personnel he has.

If only!  We don't run play-action all that often anymore.  It's usually a shotgun, zone-readish sort of handoff that Hogan cannot sell as a fake.

[fullmetal]

I am optimistic about next year, but I'd be more optimistic about next year if Shaw weren't so wedded to football in a phone booth with play action that he runs it no matter what personnel he has.

If only!  We don't run play-action all that often anymore.  It's usually a shotgun, zone-readish sort of handoff that Hogan cannot sell as a fake.

[doug]

I probably should not bother to respond, but one of us is certainly "flat-out wrong" to use your words, if you think the punt at the end of the Utah game and the end of the Fiesta Bowl are the only examples of Shaw's adversity to risk. The examples I could cite are legion (at least 3 punts this year from inside the opponent's 35, and one punt from inside the 30 (which I don't think I have ever seen before); last drive against MSU in the Rose Bowl) are obvious examples without even getting into more subjective areas like play-calling. I see no point in cataloging them all. We clearly see things quite differently. 

[doug]

I probably should not bother to respond, but one of us is certainly "flat-out wrong" to use your words, if you think the punt at the end of the Utah game and the end of the Fiesta Bowl are the only examples of Shaw's adversity to risk. The examples I could cite are legion (at least 3 punts this year from inside the opponent's 35, and one punt from inside the 30 (which I don't think I have ever seen before); last drive against MSU in the Rose Bowl) are obvious examples without even getting into more subjective areas like play-calling. I see no point in cataloging them all. We clearly see things quite differently. 

[stupac2]

I probably should not bother to respond, but one of us is certainly "flat-out wrong" to use your words, if you think the punt at the end of the Utah game and the end of the Fiesta Bowl are the only examples of Shaw's adversity to risk. The examples I could cite are legion (at least 3 punts this year from inside the opponent's 35, and one punt from inside the 30 (which I don't think I have ever seen before); last drive against MSU in the Rose Bowl) are obvious examples without even getting into more subjective areas like play-calling. I see no point in cataloging them all. We clearly see things quite differently.

The problem is that you're not looking at this relative to any kind of baseline. Conservative isn't an absolute standard, it can only be relative. And I think that any kind of rational look at the situation says that Shaw is about average for a football coach. He can be aggressive sometimes, he can be conservative other times. But very rarely does he make a truly stupid decision, which is something that you really can't say about most coaches, not even most NFL coaches. You started by saying that he was hyperbolically conservative and that is just flat-out wrong.

Do I wish that Shaw were sometimes more aggressive? Yes. Do I think that this non-optimal amount of aggression has lost us games? Maybe one over four seasons. It's not that big of a deal.

[stupac2]

I probably should not bother to respond, but one of us is certainly "flat-out wrong" to use your words, if you think the punt at the end of the Utah game and the end of the Fiesta Bowl are the only examples of Shaw's adversity to risk. The examples I could cite are legion (at least 3 punts this year from inside the opponent's 35, and one punt from inside the 30 (which I don't think I have ever seen before); last drive against MSU in the Rose Bowl) are obvious examples without even getting into more subjective areas like play-calling. I see no point in cataloging them all. We clearly see things quite differently.

The problem is that you're not looking at this relative to any kind of baseline. Conservative isn't an absolute standard, it can only be relative. And I think that any kind of rational look at the situation says that Shaw is about average for a football coach. He can be aggressive sometimes, he can be conservative other times. But very rarely does he make a truly stupid decision, which is something that you really can't say about most coaches, not even most NFL coaches. You started by saying that he was hyperbolically conservative and that is just flat-out wrong.

Do I wish that Shaw were sometimes more aggressive? Yes. Do I think that this non-optimal amount of aggression has lost us games? Maybe one over four seasons. It's not that big of a deal.

[fullmetal]

I dunno stupac2.  I would say most coaches don't make those truly boneheaded decisions (else they wouldn't be coaching at the D1 level).  And that lack of truly stupid decision-making means that the bar is set higher for playcalling success.  When Shaw forgoes FGs for field position, you have to wonder if he keeps score by yards instead of points. 

Williamson is a weapon that Shaw has let go to waste.  The kid kicks every day in practice--it's not like he's rusting away.  I don't think we'll see another kicker like him for a while, but I'd be happy to be wrong.

[fullmetal]

I dunno stupac2.  I would say most coaches don't make those truly boneheaded decisions (else they wouldn't be coaching at the D1 level).  And that lack of truly stupid decision-making means that the bar is set higher for playcalling success.  When Shaw forgoes FGs for field position, you have to wonder if he keeps score by yards instead of points. 

Williamson is a weapon that Shaw has let go to waste.  The kid kicks every day in practice--it's not like he's rusting away.  I don't think we'll see another kicker like him for a while, but I'd be happy to be wrong.

[CTcard]

I dunno stupac2.  I would say most coaches don't make those truly boneheaded decisions (else they wouldn't be coaching at the D1 level). 

Apparently you don't read many fan message boards.

It turns out that every coach in the country who hasn't just won the national championship is terrible at play calling and routinely makes AYFKM decisions - particularly being too conservative.


But the decision to punt with 1:30 left in regulation was terrible.

[CTcard]

I dunno stupac2.  I would say most coaches don't make those truly boneheaded decisions (else they wouldn't be coaching at the D1 level). 

Apparently you don't read many fan message boards.

It turns out that every coach in the country who hasn't just won the national championship is terrible at play calling and routinely makes AYFKM decisions - particularly being too conservative.


But the decision to punt with 1:30 left in regulation was terrible.

[Bruce Wang]

But the decision to punt with 1:30 left in regulation was terrible.

At least it wasn't 3rd down.

[Bruce Wang]

But the decision to punt with 1:30 left in regulation was terrible.

At least it wasn't 3rd down.

[yvonne]

I don't buy this Williamson is a weapon business. He's .667. That's not exactly trusty. Compare that with Utah's kicker who's something like .82. To go for a 51-yarder, you need a guy who's not going to miss every third kick.

[yvonne]

I don't buy this Williamson is a weapon business. He's .667. That's not exactly trusty. Compare that with Utah's kicker who's something like .82. To go for a 51-yarder, you need a guy who's not going to miss every third kick.

[stupac2]

But the decision to punt with 1:30 left in regulation was terrible.

It wasn't! If Williamson misses the one in OT no one is making this argument, and that's a really bad way to think about this. He hasn't been a great kicker this year, missing far easier kicks, and it was longer than his career long. He misses that kick more often than not, and if he does the best case scenario is where we ended up anyway. Plus if Rector hauls in that long bomb once we got the ball back, again, no one is questioning this decision.

You can't judge decisions based on what happened afterward, but what the various probabilities were when the decision was made. And it is just absolutely not the case that punting clearly lowered our win%.

I dunno stupac2.  I would say most coaches don't make those truly boneheaded decisions (else they wouldn't be coaching at the D1 level).  And that lack of truly stupid decision-making means that the bar is set higher for playcalling success.  When Shaw forgoes FGs for field position, you have to wonder if he keeps score by yards instead of points.

I don't pay as much attention to what non-Stanford college coaches are doing, but in the NFL they're terrible at it. Look at Barnwell's "Thank You For Not Coaching" column (which, sadly, he no longer does), basically every coach makes decisions that are obviously bad, and many of them do it consistently. Ron Rivera is a great example of someone who was positively wretched at it before seeing the light and making better decisions. I really do not believe based on watching Shaw for 4 years that he's below-average at this. I think that the number of times that he's significantly lowered our odds of winning based on an in-game decision is small, and pretty much dominated by the ending of the Fiesta Bowl.

[stupac2]

But the decision to punt with 1:30 left in regulation was terrible.

It wasn't! If Williamson misses the one in OT no one is making this argument, and that's a really bad way to think about this. He hasn't been a great kicker this year, missing far easier kicks, and it was longer than his career long. He misses that kick more often than not, and if he does the best case scenario is where we ended up anyway. Plus if Rector hauls in that long bomb once we got the ball back, again, no one is questioning this decision.

You can't judge decisions based on what happened afterward, but what the various probabilities were when the decision was made. And it is just absolutely not the case that punting clearly lowered our win%.

I dunno stupac2.  I would say most coaches don't make those truly boneheaded decisions (else they wouldn't be coaching at the D1 level).  And that lack of truly stupid decision-making means that the bar is set higher for playcalling success.  When Shaw forgoes FGs for field position, you have to wonder if he keeps score by yards instead of points.

I don't pay as much attention to what non-Stanford college coaches are doing, but in the NFL they're terrible at it. Look at Barnwell's "Thank You For Not Coaching" column (which, sadly, he no longer does), basically every coach makes decisions that are obviously bad, and many of them do it consistently. Ron Rivera is a great example of someone who was positively wretched at it before seeing the light and making better decisions. I really do not believe based on watching Shaw for 4 years that he's below-average at this. I think that the number of times that he's significantly lowered our odds of winning based on an in-game decision is small, and pretty much dominated by the ending of the Fiesta Bowl.

[OutsiderFan]

There is a very simple way to determine if a 4th down decision in a game is a good one or a bad one. 

Bad decision: the fans on the other team want you to do it
Good decision: the fans on the other team hope you don't do it

In 2010 when Stanford was steamrolling Oregon and led 21-0 when The Ducks faced a 4th and 1 from their own 30 yd line.  While Stanford fans were surely saying "they're crazy to go for it," the reality is they were really hoping Oregon would punt instead.  That was a good decision to go for the first down.

When Stanford faced 4th and 6 from the Utah 35 with less than two minutes left, there isn't a Utah fan in existence that was hoping Stanford would kick the FG or go for it on 4th down.  They all were breathing giant sighs of relief that Stanford punted.  That was a bad decision. 

[OutsiderFan]

There is a very simple way to determine if a 4th down decision in a game is a good one or a bad one. 

Bad decision: the fans on the other team want you to do it
Good decision: the fans on the other team hope you don't do it

In 2010 when Stanford was steamrolling Oregon and led 21-0 when The Ducks faced a 4th and 1 from their own 30 yd line.  While Stanford fans were surely saying "they're crazy to go for it," the reality is they were really hoping Oregon would punt instead.  That was a good decision to go for the first down.

When Stanford faced 4th and 6 from the Utah 35 with less than two minutes left, there isn't a Utah fan in existence that was hoping Stanford would kick the FG or go for it on 4th down.  They all were breathing giant sighs of relief that Stanford punted.  That was a bad decision. 

[stupac2]

There is a very simple way to determine if a 4th down decision in a game is a good one or a bad one. 

Bad decision: the fans on the other team want you to do it
Good decision: the fans on the other team hope you don't do it

In 2010 when Stanford was steamrolling Oregon and led 21-0 when The Ducks faced a 4th and 1 from their own 30 yd line.  While Stanford fans were surely saying "they're crazy to go for it," the reality is they were really hoping Oregon would punt instead.  That was a good decision to go for the first down.

When Stanford faced 4th and 6 from the Utah 35 with less than two minutes left, there isn't a Utah fan in existence that was hoping Stanford would kick the FG or go for it on 4th down.  They all were breathing giant sighs of relief that Stanford punted.  That was a bad decision.

This is crazy for a bunch of reasons. First, the fans' reactions to events in a game don't necessarily mean anything about those events. Second, fans are horrible at telling what decisions actually lead to increased win probabilities. Third, the reason fans of the other team would rather see you punt is because you generally know the outcome. Going for it involves a lot of uncertainty and uncertainty is what makes people nervous. Even though making that kick was probably less favorable to us than overtime (do you really think Williamson is >50% to nail a 50-yarder when he's barely 2/3 from much closer?), fans would generally rather see the ball punted because it means more likelihood of going to "safe" overtime, even though it's entirely possible that kicking was more likely to make us lose! So Utah fans who knew how terrible Williamson has been this year would hardly have been quaking in their boots had he trotted out to attempt that kick.

As I've been saying, it's just not clear-cut which move actually gave us our best chance to win, and being so critical of this decision smacks of not having actually thought this through.

[stupac2]

There is a very simple way to determine if a 4th down decision in a game is a good one or a bad one. 

Bad decision: the fans on the other team want you to do it
Good decision: the fans on the other team hope you don't do it

In 2010 when Stanford was steamrolling Oregon and led 21-0 when The Ducks faced a 4th and 1 from their own 30 yd line.  While Stanford fans were surely saying "they're crazy to go for it," the reality is they were really hoping Oregon would punt instead.  That was a good decision to go for the first down.

When Stanford faced 4th and 6 from the Utah 35 with less than two minutes left, there isn't a Utah fan in existence that was hoping Stanford would kick the FG or go for it on 4th down.  They all were breathing giant sighs of relief that Stanford punted.  That was a bad decision.

This is crazy for a bunch of reasons. First, the fans' reactions to events in a game don't necessarily mean anything about those events. Second, fans are horrible at telling what decisions actually lead to increased win probabilities. Third, the reason fans of the other team would rather see you punt is because you generally know the outcome. Going for it involves a lot of uncertainty and uncertainty is what makes people nervous. Even though making that kick was probably less favorable to us than overtime (do you really think Williamson is >50% to nail a 50-yarder when he's barely 2/3 from much closer?), fans would generally rather see the ball punted because it means more likelihood of going to "safe" overtime, even though it's entirely possible that kicking was more likely to make us lose! So Utah fans who knew how terrible Williamson has been this year would hardly have been quaking in their boots had he trotted out to attempt that kick.

As I've been saying, it's just not clear-cut which move actually gave us our best chance to win, and being so critical of this decision smacks of not having actually thought this through.

[BostonCard]

Well, that's not always right.  In football, whether on offense or defense, emotion tends to be too concerned about downside risk.  In other words, there is a tendency to worry about the opponent going for it on fourth down because of a somewhat inflated concern that they will convert.

That being said, coaches generally, and Shaw in particular, tend to overly discount the value of possession and overly weigh the value of field position.  In this particular case, the math would have strongly favored going either for a field goal (if you had a kicker you thought had even a middling chance of making it) or going for it on fourth down (if you thought the kicker had virtually no chance of making it (let's say the ball had been on the 44 instead of the 34 and it would have been a 57 yard field goal).

If you go for the field goal, the expected value is 3 points * whatever chance you think the kicker has of making it.  Even if you think it is 20%, that's basically almost a 20% of winning the game right there (you need to discount it based on the the probability that the opponent comes back and kicks the tying field goal after that, which is low given that Utah had less than 100 yards of offense in the half).  Even a 10% chance is probably worth it.

On the opposite side of the ledger is how much 15 - 30 yards of field position in their own side of the field make (the value of punting from the 35 yard line is a touchback, which nets 15 yards to downed inside the 10 yard line which nets about 30 yards).  The answer is, not much.  Utah was not moving the ball well, and even though they have a solid kicker who probably could have been counted on to make a 50 yard kick, the chances of them moving 40 yards against our defense in a minute and change weren't all that much greater than the chances of them moving 60 yards.

The kicker, at least in my mind, is that normally you would consider overtime close to a 50/50 proposition (depending on who wins the coin toss).  The thing is, though, I cannot imagine a team more ill-suited to an overtime format that is predicated on scoring from the 25 yard line than a team that has had epic trouble scoring in the red zone this year.

At the time, I was thinking we should have gone for it on fourth down.  Our conversion percentage on third and 7 - 9 is poor (7 conversions in 28 attempts, good for 25%), but had we converted it would have been a makable 44 yard or less field goal, and the attempt would have been as time expired.  25% chance of winning in regulation versus maybe a 5% chance of losing in regulation because of the call is better odds than a less than 50/50 chance in overtime.

BC

[BostonCard]

Well, that's not always right.  In football, whether on offense or defense, emotion tends to be too concerned about downside risk.  In other words, there is a tendency to worry about the opponent going for it on fourth down because of a somewhat inflated concern that they will convert.

That being said, coaches generally, and Shaw in particular, tend to overly discount the value of possession and overly weigh the value of field position.  In this particular case, the math would have strongly favored going either for a field goal (if you had a kicker you thought had even a middling chance of making it) or going for it on fourth down (if you thought the kicker had virtually no chance of making it (let's say the ball had been on the 44 instead of the 34 and it would have been a 57 yard field goal).

If you go for the field goal, the expected value is 3 points * whatever chance you think the kicker has of making it.  Even if you think it is 20%, that's basically almost a 20% of winning the game right there (you need to discount it based on the the probability that the opponent comes back and kicks the tying field goal after that, which is low given that Utah had less than 100 yards of offense in the half).  Even a 10% chance is probably worth it.

On the opposite side of the ledger is how much 15 - 30 yards of field position in their own side of the field make (the value of punting from the 35 yard line is a touchback, which nets 15 yards to downed inside the 10 yard line which nets about 30 yards).  The answer is, not much.  Utah was not moving the ball well, and even though they have a solid kicker who probably could have been counted on to make a 50 yard kick, the chances of them moving 40 yards against our defense in a minute and change weren't all that much greater than the chances of them moving 60 yards.

The kicker, at least in my mind, is that normally you would consider overtime close to a 50/50 proposition (depending on who wins the coin toss).  The thing is, though, I cannot imagine a team more ill-suited to an overtime format that is predicated on scoring from the 25 yard line than a team that has had epic trouble scoring in the red zone this year.

At the time, I was thinking we should have gone for it on fourth down.  Our conversion percentage on third and 7 - 9 is poor (7 conversions in 28 attempts, good for 25%), but had we converted it would have been a makable 44 yard or less field goal, and the attempt would have been as time expired.  25% chance of winning in regulation versus maybe a 5% chance of losing in regulation because of the call is better odds than a less than 50/50 chance in overtime.

BC

[stupac2]

Utah was not moving the ball well, and even though they have a solid kicker who probably could have been counted on to make a 50 yard kick, the chances of them moving 40 yards against our defense in a minute and change weren't all that much greater than the chances of them moving 60 yards.

If we kick and miss they get the ball on the 41, so they only need to move ~25 yards to get into their kicker's range, or the same yardage they'd need to get into the end zone in overtime, but with the added advantage of us needing to defend the whole field. It's not clear at all to me that their EPA in that situation is less than the 1-1.5 you'd give to Williamson kicking it.

Anyway, I'm not saying that the decision to punt was obviously right, I'm saying that it wasn't obviously wrong. Like you I'd probably prefer he go for it rather than kick the FG, but I think the expected winning percentages are all pretty close (and obviously unknowable).

[stupac2]

Utah was not moving the ball well, and even though they have a solid kicker who probably could have been counted on to make a 50 yard kick, the chances of them moving 40 yards against our defense in a minute and change weren't all that much greater than the chances of them moving 60 yards.

If we kick and miss they get the ball on the 41, so they only need to move ~25 yards to get into their kicker's range, or the same yardage they'd need to get into the end zone in overtime, but with the added advantage of us needing to defend the whole field. It's not clear at all to me that their EPA in that situation is less than the 1-1.5 you'd give to Williamson kicking it.

Anyway, I'm not saying that the decision to punt was obviously right, I'm saying that it wasn't obviously wrong. Like you I'd probably prefer he go for it rather than kick the FG, but I think the expected winning percentages are all pretty close (and obviously unknowable).

[StanFan88]

If we give up 14 points I think we'll have a challenging time winning Big Game unless we get some scores from the defense and/or special teams.......

Cal's defense is not Utah's.  Might be the worst defense Stanford has faced all year.  Stanford seems to do pretty well against bad defenses, so I'm optimistic they can get to the high 20s if not 30+.  Should be plenty to win.

[StanFan88]

If we give up 14 points I think we'll have a challenging time winning Big Game unless we get some scores from the defense and/or special teams.......

Cal's defense is not Utah's.  Might be the worst defense Stanford has faced all year.  Stanford seems to do pretty well against bad defenses, so I'm optimistic they can get to the high 20s if not 30+.  Should be plenty to win.

[CTcard]

[quote author=CTcard link=topic=11130.msg105592#msg105592 date=1416345308]But the decision to punt with 1:30 left in regulation was terrible.

It wasn't! If Williamson misses the one in OT no one is making this argument, and that's a really bad way to think about this. He hasn't been a great kicker this year, missing far easier kicks, and it was longer than his career long. He misses that kick more often than not, and if he does the best case scenario is where we ended up anyway. Plus if Rector hauls in that long bomb once we got the ball back, again, no one is questioning this decision.

You can't judge decisions based on what happened afterward, but what the various probabilities were when the decision was made. And it is just absolutely not the case that punting clearly lowered our win%.
[/quote]

You are assuming a lot in about what would happen in alternative universes.

The best arbiter of whether a decision is good or not is whether it works. It's not perfect - there are multiple options that might succeed or fail in any situation - but the actual result is a better measure than fantasizing about probabilities that are not and cannot be known.

If you think the coach made a bad decision but it worked or if you think the coach made a good decision but it didn't work, you might at least briefly question whether you have all those percentages correct.


At this point you are comparing chances to even up. In trying the FG, you have to balance the probability of making it versus the chance you lose if you miss. In my estimation, at 51 yards Williamson had a much better chance of making the FG than Utah would have had in driving the approximately 30 yards in 1:30 to have their own chance at a FG and then actually making it.

On our chances of making it: Williamson's has a very strong leg and length hasn't been an issue for him - accuracy has. His success rate has not been a strong function of distance up to 50 yards.
20-29 yds: 2-4
30-39 yds: 6-8
40-49 yds: 3-5
50+ yds:    1-1

On Utah's chances of driving for and making a FG after a miss: Four times previously in the game, Utah had started drives with field position better or equal to what they would have had after the hypothetical missed FG and had failed to score, compared to one drive where they had scored (without clock pressure). And Phillips, while very good, is not perfect.


However, of course in the end we are arguing about an inherently unknowable issue.

[CTcard]

[quote author=CTcard link=topic=11130.msg105592#msg105592 date=1416345308]But the decision to punt with 1:30 left in regulation was terrible.

It wasn't! If Williamson misses the one in OT no one is making this argument, and that's a really bad way to think about this. He hasn't been a great kicker this year, missing far easier kicks, and it was longer than his career long. He misses that kick more often than not, and if he does the best case scenario is where we ended up anyway. Plus if Rector hauls in that long bomb once we got the ball back, again, no one is questioning this decision.

You can't judge decisions based on what happened afterward, but what the various probabilities were when the decision was made. And it is just absolutely not the case that punting clearly lowered our win%.
[/quote]

You are assuming a lot in about what would happen in alternative universes.

The best arbiter of whether a decision is good or not is whether it works. It's not perfect - there are multiple options that might succeed or fail in any situation - but the actual result is a better measure than fantasizing about probabilities that are not and cannot be known.

If you think the coach made a bad decision but it worked or if you think the coach made a good decision but it didn't work, you might at least briefly question whether you have all those percentages correct.


At this point you are comparing chances to even up. In trying the FG, you have to balance the probability of making it versus the chance you lose if you miss. In my estimation, at 51 yards Williamson had a much better chance of making the FG than Utah would have had in driving the approximately 30 yards in 1:30 to have their own chance at a FG and then actually making it.

On our chances of making it: Williamson's has a very strong leg and length hasn't been an issue for him - accuracy has. His success rate has not been a strong function of distance up to 50 yards.
20-29 yds: 2-4
30-39 yds: 6-8
40-49 yds: 3-5
50+ yds:    1-1

On Utah's chances of driving for and making a FG after a miss: Four times previously in the game, Utah had started drives with field position better or equal to what they would have had after the hypothetical missed FG and had failed to score, compared to one drive where they had scored (without clock pressure). And Phillips, while very good, is not perfect.


However, of course in the end we are arguing about an inherently unknowable issue.

[BostonCard]

[quote author=Boston Card link=topic=11130.msg105617#msg105617 date=1416350490]Utah was not moving the ball well, and even though they have a solid kicker who probably could have been counted on to make a 50 yard kick, the chances of them moving 40 yards against our defense in a minute and change weren't all that much greater than the chances of them moving 60 yards.

If we kick and miss they get the ball on the 41, so they only need to move ~25 yards to get into their kicker's range, or the same yardage they'd need to get into the end zone in overtime, but with the added advantage of us needing to defend the whole field. It's not clear at all to me that their EPA in that situation is less than the 1-1.5 you'd give to Williamson kicking it.

Anyway, I'm not saying that the decision to punt was obviously right, I'm saying that it wasn't obviously wrong. Like you I'd probably prefer he go for it rather than kick the FG, but I think the expected winning percentages are all pretty close (and obviously unknowable).
[/quote]

It was "wrong" in the sense that it reduced the chance that we would win the game, which is all we really care about.  What it was was defensible in that there is enough uncertainty around the outcome that any lots of plausible scenarios could be cited, even though the most likely scenario was that we'd go to overtime anyways, but the likelihood we would win in regulation increased more than the likelihood Utah would win in regulation.

Although Utah was able to move the ball in OT, that was unknown to us at the time (as was the probability of Williamson making a 51 yard field goal).  The coaches were confident enough that Utah wouldn't move the football that they called timeout after Utah failed to advance the ball on first down; that's the mark of expecting to have to force a punt.

There were two other calls that I didn't like at the end of regulation (both defensible, but IMHO, reducing the likelihood we would win).  The first, when Utah was forced to punt, we set up for a return, even though the Utah punter was having an awesome game and we hadn't been able to return anything all game, and that the punter would deliberately punt so as to minimize the chance of a return.  Best option would have been to send the house at him.  Worst case scenario, Utah gets a roughing the kicker penalty and a first down at their 25, with about 40 seconds left in the game.  Best case scenario is we block the kick and either recover deep in Utah territory so we can kick a field goal as time expires, or recover in the end zone (TD) or, the best of all worlds, we force a safety, get the two winning points, and get the ball back on the free kick to kill what was left of the clock.

The other call I didn't like was punting as time expired.  Best shot would have been a Hail Mary, which, although a low probability play, would have also likely resulted in the clock expiring, but at least gave us a chance to win in regulation.

BC

[BostonCard]

[quote author=Boston Card link=topic=11130.msg105617#msg105617 date=1416350490]Utah was not moving the ball well, and even though they have a solid kicker who probably could have been counted on to make a 50 yard kick, the chances of them moving 40 yards against our defense in a minute and change weren't all that much greater than the chances of them moving 60 yards.

If we kick and miss they get the ball on the 41, so they only need to move ~25 yards to get into their kicker's range, or the same yardage they'd need to get into the end zone in overtime, but with the added advantage of us needing to defend the whole field. It's not clear at all to me that their EPA in that situation is less than the 1-1.5 you'd give to Williamson kicking it.

Anyway, I'm not saying that the decision to punt was obviously right, I'm saying that it wasn't obviously wrong. Like you I'd probably prefer he go for it rather than kick the FG, but I think the expected winning percentages are all pretty close (and obviously unknowable).
[/quote]

It was "wrong" in the sense that it reduced the chance that we would win the game, which is all we really care about.  What it was was defensible in that there is enough uncertainty around the outcome that any lots of plausible scenarios could be cited, even though the most likely scenario was that we'd go to overtime anyways, but the likelihood we would win in regulation increased more than the likelihood Utah would win in regulation.

Although Utah was able to move the ball in OT, that was unknown to us at the time (as was the probability of Williamson making a 51 yard field goal).  The coaches were confident enough that Utah wouldn't move the football that they called timeout after Utah failed to advance the ball on first down; that's the mark of expecting to have to force a punt.

There were two other calls that I didn't like at the end of regulation (both defensible, but IMHO, reducing the likelihood we would win).  The first, when Utah was forced to punt, we set up for a return, even though the Utah punter was having an awesome game and we hadn't been able to return anything all game, and that the punter would deliberately punt so as to minimize the chance of a return.  Best option would have been to send the house at him.  Worst case scenario, Utah gets a roughing the kicker penalty and a first down at their 25, with about 40 seconds left in the game.  Best case scenario is we block the kick and either recover deep in Utah territory so we can kick a field goal as time expires, or recover in the end zone (TD) or, the best of all worlds, we force a safety, get the two winning points, and get the ball back on the free kick to kill what was left of the clock.

The other call I didn't like was punting as time expired.  Best shot would have been a Hail Mary, which, although a low probability play, would have also likely resulted in the clock expiring, but at least gave us a chance to win in regulation.

BC

[CTcard]

If we kick and miss they get the ball on the 41,

You are assuming NFL rules.

If we missed the kick they would have received the ball on their own 34.

[CTcard]

If we kick and miss they get the ball on the 41,

You are assuming NFL rules.

If we missed the kick they would have received the ball on their own 34.

[stupac2]

All that I've been saying, and I've been clear about this repeatedly, is that the decision wasn't obviously wrong. The fact that this has gone so back and forth and that the cases you two are presenting rely a lot on various inferences shows that. It wasn't obviously wrong! You think it made us less likely to win the game, and maybe it did, but you don't know. There are plenty of situations where you could know, like if that had been 4th and 2 and we punted.

Also, I totally and completely disagree about judging decisions based on outcomes, that is 100% what's wrong with most fans' thinking about these issues. Horrible decision-making with terrific luck can lead to good outcomes, and good decision-making with lousy luck can lead to bad outcomes. You absolutely have to remove the outcome from your mind and look at the decision with the knowledge the coach had and what they could reasonably expect. Anything else is just post-hoc rationalization.

[stupac2]

All that I've been saying, and I've been clear about this repeatedly, is that the decision wasn't obviously wrong. The fact that this has gone so back and forth and that the cases you two are presenting rely a lot on various inferences shows that. It wasn't obviously wrong! You think it made us less likely to win the game, and maybe it did, but you don't know. There are plenty of situations where you could know, like if that had been 4th and 2 and we punted.

Also, I totally and completely disagree about judging decisions based on outcomes, that is 100% what's wrong with most fans' thinking about these issues. Horrible decision-making with terrific luck can lead to good outcomes, and good decision-making with lousy luck can lead to bad outcomes. You absolutely have to remove the outcome from your mind and look at the decision with the knowledge the coach had and what they could reasonably expect. Anything else is just post-hoc rationalization.

[jacketree]

So here we are four days after the game parsing statistics, some still mad at a coach for making that four-day and counting decision in real time. (Too bad he needed a time out to do it, however.)

The decision to punt was not only not a bad one given the alternatives (hope your skittish kicker makes his career long or get at least 7 yards out of an offense that hasn't finished a drive since its first possession), but that decision worked, save Rector's drop of a catchable ball what, inside the 20 with 10 seconds left?

Maybe he could call a better sequence to set up an easier field goal rather than that whatever play to McCaffrey. And maybe he should have saved that timeout.  But in terms of end game strategy that wasn't awful. Just outscored 13-10 in double OT. Making that 51 yard field goal with all that time left doesn't necessarily equal game winner. You can argue the defense was nails that day, but when push came to shove in OT, they weren't. One blown coverage and Utah scored on one play. Could have gone 99 yards if he needed to and that could have just as easily been right after Stanford kicked off with a 3 point lead.

Beyond strategy, conservatism, and whatever anyone wants to throw on the damnation pile, Stanford has lost the mojo (belief, talent, training, experience, motivation, clutchness, luck, Luck) it had that enabled it to win almost all of its close games against teams with equal or better talent.  Stanford is ten games into its schedule and has yet to win a game against any team with a pulse.  (Washington is on life support.)  I suppose we could isolate those who graduated and throw their successors under the bus.  Or the rest of the team for not playing as well as they used to play. Or the coaches for not coaching as well as they used to coach.  Or the..... Or maybe time waits for no one and the Pac12 decided to get better with or without Stanford.  But if they lose out, this is a Teevensesque 7-win drop off one year to the next.  What gives?  Maybe they need an exorcist.

One year after forcing us to leave Big Game before the end of the 3rd quarter because she couldn't take it anymore, Mrs. Jacketree looks forward to this year's game and says it should be exciting because Cal has a good chance to win.  The fact that it has come to this is {your favorite word here}.

[jacketree]

So here we are four days after the game parsing statistics, some still mad at a coach for making that four-day and counting decision in real time. (Too bad he needed a time out to do it, however.)

The decision to punt was not only not a bad one given the alternatives (hope your skittish kicker makes his career long or get at least 7 yards out of an offense that hasn't finished a drive since its first possession), but that decision worked, save Rector's drop of a catchable ball what, inside the 20 with 10 seconds left?

Maybe he could call a better sequence to set up an easier field goal rather than that whatever play to McCaffrey. And maybe he should have saved that timeout.  But in terms of end game strategy that wasn't awful. Just outscored 13-10 in double OT. Making that 51 yard field goal with all that time left doesn't necessarily equal game winner. You can argue the defense was nails that day, but when push came to shove in OT, they weren't. One blown coverage and Utah scored on one play. Could have gone 99 yards if he needed to and that could have just as easily been right after Stanford kicked off with a 3 point lead.

Beyond strategy, conservatism, and whatever anyone wants to throw on the damnation pile, Stanford has lost the mojo (belief, talent, training, experience, motivation, clutchness, luck, Luck) it had that enabled it to win almost all of its close games against teams with equal or better talent.  Stanford is ten games into its schedule and has yet to win a game against any team with a pulse.  (Washington is on life support.)  I suppose we could isolate those who graduated and throw their successors under the bus.  Or the rest of the team for not playing as well as they used to play. Or the coaches for not coaching as well as they used to coach.  Or the..... Or maybe time waits for no one and the Pac12 decided to get better with or without Stanford.  But if they lose out, this is a Teevensesque 7-win drop off one year to the next.  What gives?  Maybe they need an exorcist.

One year after forcing us to leave Big Game before the end of the 3rd quarter because she couldn't take it anymore, Mrs. Jacketree looks forward to this year's game and says it should be exciting because Cal has a good chance to win.  The fact that it has come to this is {your favorite word here}.

[doug]

I have already made it clear that I think Shaw's decision not to try the FG was wrong, but part of my reasoning wasn't stated. In ~ 50 years of watching football, I don't recall ever seeing a team win a game in which that team punted from inside the opponent's 35-yard line at any point during the game. I am not saying it has never happened, just that I don't recall ever seeing it, to the point that it is axiomatic with me: if you punt from inside the opponent's 35, you will lose. And I said that as Shaw sent on the punt team, same as I said it when he punted twice inside the 35 vs. USC.

[doug]

I have already made it clear that I think Shaw's decision not to try the FG was wrong, but part of my reasoning wasn't stated. In ~ 50 years of watching football, I don't recall ever seeing a team win a game in which that team punted from inside the opponent's 35-yard line at any point during the game. I am not saying it has never happened, just that I don't recall ever seeing it, to the point that it is axiomatic with me: if you punt from inside the opponent's 35, you will lose. And I said that as Shaw sent on the punt team, same as I said it when he punted twice inside the 35 vs. USC.