[Goose]

I believe Goose said that Ukraine had to attack infrastructure often enough to counter its getting repaired. In the last day, Ukraine attacked an oil pumping station for the third time in short succession. At least some of that is being sold externally so it hurts Russia’s inxome.

Correction: 
it was the 2nd time at this pumping station (11 days later) but in between was another strike on a different pumping station on the same pipeline.

Maybe even better. pipeline still down and all the spare parts used in the first  repair no longer available.

[Goose]

I believe Goose said that Ukraine had to attack infrastructure often enough to counter its getting repaired. In the last day, Ukraine attacked an oil pumping station for the third time in short succession. At least some of that is being sold externally so it hurts Russia’s inxome.

Correction: 
it was the 2nd time at this pumping station (11 days later) but in between was another strike on a different pumping station on the same pipeline.

Maybe even better. pipeline still down and all the spare parts used in the first  repair no longer available.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/trum...37446.html
It looks like yet again Putin got both the US administration and the Europeans to jump at a picture of a T-bone steak that wasn't really on offer. One can imagine the Europeans were going along just to try and influence what the US subsequently would do. It appears that the US is firmly sitting in the "do nothing" camp as far as actually creating conditions for a peace goes.

https://ca.news.yahoo.com/talk-boots-gro...55381.html
This one is for those of you that are sanguine on the probability of German contributions in Ukraine (and NATO for that matter) anytime soon.The Ossis are dead set against it. The current government doesn't have the political capital to do it, at least right now. Anything that is 48-45 in public opinion isn't going to happen with a coalition government that required two ballots to elect their Chancellor.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/trum...37446.html
It looks like yet again Putin got both the US administration and the Europeans to jump at a picture of a T-bone steak that wasn't really on offer. One can imagine the Europeans were going along just to try and influence what the US subsequently would do. It appears that the US is firmly sitting in the "do nothing" camp as far as actually creating conditions for a peace goes.

https://ca.news.yahoo.com/talk-boots-gro...55381.html
This one is for those of you that are sanguine on the probability of German contributions in Ukraine (and NATO for that matter) anytime soon.The Ossis are dead set against it. The current government doesn't have the political capital to do it, at least right now. Anything that is 48-45 in public opinion isn't going to happen with a coalition government that required two ballots to elect their Chancellor.

[dabigv13]

Not Ukraine but on subject of FPV drones-

https://defence-blog.com/colombian-black...-by-drone/

Authorities in Colombia confirmed that a police Black Hawk helicopter was destroyed in a drone strike while carrying out a counternarcotics mission in the Antioquia region.

Video

https://x.com/clashreport/status/1958823116630524085

[dabigv13]

Not Ukraine but on subject of FPV drones-

https://defence-blog.com/colombian-black...-by-drone/

Authorities in Colombia confirmed that a police Black Hawk helicopter was destroyed in a drone strike while carrying out a counternarcotics mission in the Antioquia region.

Video

https://x.com/clashreport/status/1958823116630524085

[M T]

A few days old (Aug. 20), but concerning to me:
Poland says air defenses didn't detect a Russian drone entering its airspace

Poland activated their air defenses at 10PM during one of Russia's nightly drone and missile waves against Ukraine but stood down at midnight.
The next morning, the remains of a drone were found in Poland some 70 miles from the Ukrainian border (and 400 miles from Russia), but it was not detected in flight.

At the time of the article, it was uncertain how (or when) it entered Polish air space.  A drone launched from mainland Russia would have to pass through either Belarus or Ukraine to enter Polish airspace.

"In our assessment, this drone is designed to be very difficult to detect, and that is indeed the case,"  It was thought to be a Russian-produced drone with a self-destruct warhead, used as a decoy.  (The article noted that it had Chinese parts.)

I wonder if this might have been a test by Russia to see if Poland could detect such drones.

[M T]

A few days old (Aug. 20), but concerning to me:
Poland says air defenses didn't detect a Russian drone entering its airspace

Poland activated their air defenses at 10PM during one of Russia's nightly drone and missile waves against Ukraine but stood down at midnight.
The next morning, the remains of a drone were found in Poland some 70 miles from the Ukrainian border (and 400 miles from Russia), but it was not detected in flight.

At the time of the article, it was uncertain how (or when) it entered Polish air space.  A drone launched from mainland Russia would have to pass through either Belarus or Ukraine to enter Polish airspace.

"In our assessment, this drone is designed to be very difficult to detect, and that is indeed the case,"  It was thought to be a Russian-produced drone with a self-destruct warhead, used as a decoy.  (The article noted that it had Chinese parts.)

I wonder if this might have been a test by Russia to see if Poland could detect such drones.

[GK3]

A few days old (Aug. 20), but concerning to me:
Poland says air defenses didn't detect a Russian drone entering its airspace

Poland activated their air defenses at 10PM during one of Russia's nightly drone and missile waves against Ukraine but stood down at midnight.
The next morning, the remains of a drone were found in Poland some 70 miles from the Ukrainian border (and 400 miles from Russia), but it was not detected in flight.

At the time of the article, it was uncertain how (or when) it entered Polish air space.  A drone launched from mainland Russia would have to pass through either Belarus or Ukraine to enter Polish airspace.

"In our assessment, this drone is designed to be very difficult to detect, and that is indeed the case,"  It was thought to be a Russian-produced drone with a self-destruct warhead, used as a decoy.  (The article noted that it had Chinese parts.)

I wonder if this might have been a test by Russia to see if Poland could detect such drones.

Possibly, but unless the self destruct mechanism was really good, the remains could yield intelligence that might be very valuable. You could also ship the drone to Kaliningrad and fly it in that small piece of Russia and see if anyone seemed to see it.

---

https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/trum...37446.html
It looks like yet again Putin got both the US administration and the Europeans to jump at a picture of a T-bone steak that wasn't really on offer. One can imagine the Europeans were going along just to try and influence what the US subsequently would do. It appears that the US is firmly sitting in the "do nothing" camp as far as actually creating conditions for a peace goes.

https://ca.news.yahoo.com/talk-boots-gro...55381.html
This one is for those of you that are sanguine on the probability of German contributions in Ukraine (and NATO for that matter) anytime soon.The Ossis are dead set against it. The current government doesn't have the political capital to do it, at least right now. Anything that is 48-45 in public opinion isn't going to happen with a coalition government that required two ballots to elect their Chancellor.

Are you saying that Germany will not even spend the 2%?

[GK3]

A few days old (Aug. 20), but concerning to me:
Poland says air defenses didn't detect a Russian drone entering its airspace

Poland activated their air defenses at 10PM during one of Russia's nightly drone and missile waves against Ukraine but stood down at midnight.
The next morning, the remains of a drone were found in Poland some 70 miles from the Ukrainian border (and 400 miles from Russia), but it was not detected in flight.

At the time of the article, it was uncertain how (or when) it entered Polish air space.  A drone launched from mainland Russia would have to pass through either Belarus or Ukraine to enter Polish airspace.

"In our assessment, this drone is designed to be very difficult to detect, and that is indeed the case,"  It was thought to be a Russian-produced drone with a self-destruct warhead, used as a decoy.  (The article noted that it had Chinese parts.)

I wonder if this might have been a test by Russia to see if Poland could detect such drones.

Possibly, but unless the self destruct mechanism was really good, the remains could yield intelligence that might be very valuable. You could also ship the drone to Kaliningrad and fly it in that small piece of Russia and see if anyone seemed to see it.

---

https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/trum...37446.html
It looks like yet again Putin got both the US administration and the Europeans to jump at a picture of a T-bone steak that wasn't really on offer. One can imagine the Europeans were going along just to try and influence what the US subsequently would do. It appears that the US is firmly sitting in the "do nothing" camp as far as actually creating conditions for a peace goes.

https://ca.news.yahoo.com/talk-boots-gro...55381.html
This one is for those of you that are sanguine on the probability of German contributions in Ukraine (and NATO for that matter) anytime soon.The Ossis are dead set against it. The current government doesn't have the political capital to do it, at least right now. Anything that is 48-45 in public opinion isn't going to happen with a coalition government that required two ballots to elect their Chancellor.

Are you saying that Germany will not even spend the 2%?

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/trum...37446.html
It looks like yet again Putin got both the US administration and the Europeans to jump at a picture of a T-bone steak that wasn't really on offer. One can imagine the Europeans were going along just to try and influence what the US subsequently would do. It appears that the US is firmly sitting in the "do nothing" camp as far as actually creating conditions for a peace goes.

https://ca.news.yahoo.com/talk-boots-gro...55381.html
This one is for those of you that are sanguine on the probability of German contributions in Ukraine (and NATO for that matter) anytime soon.The Ossis are dead set against it. The current government doesn't have the political capital to do it, at least right now. Anything that is 48-45 in public opinion isn't going to happen with a coalition government that required two ballots to elect their Chancellor.

Are you saying that Germany will not even spend the 2%?

IMO Germany will "spend" more than the 2%. This article covers some of the issues involved. https://www.cnbc.com/2025/06/24/can-germ...arget.html. The problem for Germany is sort of a "perfect storm". Their economy is negatively impacted by the loss of "cheap" Russian energy. The demand for their products is way down internationally. The German labor unions have been accepting minimal raises for 15-20 years in order to keep the economy running smoothly. That period ended a few years ago. They want to "catch up". On top of all that, the integration of the DDR is still problematic. Those states are all still depressed economically, with few bright spots to indicate a way to a better future. Germans also have understandably taken their superior economic status in the EU as a "given". They expect the welfare state safety net to be broad, deep, and bouncy. That takes money.
 
The article mentions the difficulty in borrowing money for Germany. The article doesn't highlight the role Germany has played in the EU as a "lender of last resort". If that lender is now in the capital market (and is expected to be indefinitely) that is going to be very problematic for the EU. Other European states are in that capital market too. None of them can devalue the Euro by themselves. Everybody is bound together by the overall value of the Euro and the demand/price of Euro dominated bonds. This has been a major problem for the PIGS almost since the inception of the Euro. With Germany no longer a "shining star", the Euro is a much less predictable currency. Germany won't like paying the required higher interest rates, as the article discusses. The rest of the EU, particularly the low end, simply cannot pay them. The "knock on" effect may limit what Germany can spend even if the domestic support is there.
 
Historically the problem with German military spending is that new programs get announced with great fanfare and then slowly sink to nothingness. What they actually DO becomes much much less than what they said they would do. This drives both the Bundeswehr and the defense contractors nuts. The defense contractors are also not known for their low prices. Put that all together and a German 3.5% of GDP budget in a given year risks becoming a 2.5% budget in terms of outyear effects.
 
Since about 1995 defense has been the area where "necessary" cuts were annually and continually absorbed. The reunification expenses were indeed massive. The general consensus in the rest of NATO was that Russia was very afraid of a resurgent Germany. Therefore, the "don't scare the bear" ethos became popular in both Germany and the rest of NATO. The German people liked it because it kept their taxes lower. The eventual end of Universal Military Training (UMT) in 2011 was not just a "strategic decision". It was a total sea change in the relationship between the German military and German society. The message was, particularly to younger people, Defense Doesn't Matter. The Bundeswehr became the logical equivalent of the TUV. A necessary government function but in no way socially or politically "special". This latter situation will make increased defense spending as a "permanent" fixture very difficult to sustain in Germany. Thus my concern that when the Ukraine war ends, Germany will revert whatever extra it may be doing as no longer necessary. This may happen well before the Ukraine war ends (i.e. immediately) if the economic/political consequences of the increased spending become bad enough, a not unlikely outcome. The "responsible" political parties are becoming quite concerned about AfD, as IMO they should be. However, their response may (unfortunately probably) not be a robust national debate on defense obligations but rather a race to the bottom. For Germany, the EU, and the world, ouch :-).

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/trum...37446.html
It looks like yet again Putin got both the US administration and the Europeans to jump at a picture of a T-bone steak that wasn't really on offer. One can imagine the Europeans were going along just to try and influence what the US subsequently would do. It appears that the US is firmly sitting in the "do nothing" camp as far as actually creating conditions for a peace goes.

https://ca.news.yahoo.com/talk-boots-gro...55381.html
This one is for those of you that are sanguine on the probability of German contributions in Ukraine (and NATO for that matter) anytime soon.The Ossis are dead set against it. The current government doesn't have the political capital to do it, at least right now. Anything that is 48-45 in public opinion isn't going to happen with a coalition government that required two ballots to elect their Chancellor.

Are you saying that Germany will not even spend the 2%?

IMO Germany will "spend" more than the 2%. This article covers some of the issues involved. https://www.cnbc.com/2025/06/24/can-germ...arget.html. The problem for Germany is sort of a "perfect storm". Their economy is negatively impacted by the loss of "cheap" Russian energy. The demand for their products is way down internationally. The German labor unions have been accepting minimal raises for 15-20 years in order to keep the economy running smoothly. That period ended a few years ago. They want to "catch up". On top of all that, the integration of the DDR is still problematic. Those states are all still depressed economically, with few bright spots to indicate a way to a better future. Germans also have understandably taken their superior economic status in the EU as a "given". They expect the welfare state safety net to be broad, deep, and bouncy. That takes money.
 
The article mentions the difficulty in borrowing money for Germany. The article doesn't highlight the role Germany has played in the EU as a "lender of last resort". If that lender is now in the capital market (and is expected to be indefinitely) that is going to be very problematic for the EU. Other European states are in that capital market too. None of them can devalue the Euro by themselves. Everybody is bound together by the overall value of the Euro and the demand/price of Euro dominated bonds. This has been a major problem for the PIGS almost since the inception of the Euro. With Germany no longer a "shining star", the Euro is a much less predictable currency. Germany won't like paying the required higher interest rates, as the article discusses. The rest of the EU, particularly the low end, simply cannot pay them. The "knock on" effect may limit what Germany can spend even if the domestic support is there.
 
Historically the problem with German military spending is that new programs get announced with great fanfare and then slowly sink to nothingness. What they actually DO becomes much much less than what they said they would do. This drives both the Bundeswehr and the defense contractors nuts. The defense contractors are also not known for their low prices. Put that all together and a German 3.5% of GDP budget in a given year risks becoming a 2.5% budget in terms of outyear effects.
 
Since about 1995 defense has been the area where "necessary" cuts were annually and continually absorbed. The reunification expenses were indeed massive. The general consensus in the rest of NATO was that Russia was very afraid of a resurgent Germany. Therefore, the "don't scare the bear" ethos became popular in both Germany and the rest of NATO. The German people liked it because it kept their taxes lower. The eventual end of Universal Military Training (UMT) in 2011 was not just a "strategic decision". It was a total sea change in the relationship between the German military and German society. The message was, particularly to younger people, Defense Doesn't Matter. The Bundeswehr became the logical equivalent of the TUV. A necessary government function but in no way socially or politically "special". This latter situation will make increased defense spending as a "permanent" fixture very difficult to sustain in Germany. Thus my concern that when the Ukraine war ends, Germany will revert whatever extra it may be doing as no longer necessary. This may happen well before the Ukraine war ends (i.e. immediately) if the economic/political consequences of the increased spending become bad enough, a not unlikely outcome. The "responsible" political parties are becoming quite concerned about AfD, as IMO they should be. However, their response may (unfortunately probably) not be a robust national debate on defense obligations but rather a race to the bottom. For Germany, the EU, and the world, ouch :-).

[GK3]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/trum...37446.html
It looks like yet again Putin got both the US administration and the Europeans to jump at a picture of a T-bone steak that wasn't really on offer. One can imagine the Europeans were going along just to try and influence what the US subsequently would do. It appears that the US is firmly sitting in the "do nothing" camp as far as actually creating conditions for a peace goes.

https://ca.news.yahoo.com/talk-boots-gro...55381.html
This one is for those of you that are sanguine on the probability of German contributions in Ukraine (and NATO for that matter) anytime soon.The Ossis are dead set against it. The current government doesn't have the political capital to do it, at least right now. Anything that is 48-45 in public opinion isn't going to happen with a coalition government that required two ballots to elect their Chancellor.

Are you saying that Germany will not even spend the 2%?

IMO Germany will "spend" more than the 2%. This article covers some of the issues involved. https://www.cnbc.com/2025/06/24/can-germ...arget.html. The problem for Germany is sort of a "perfect storm". Their economy is negatively impacted by the loss of "cheap" Russian energy. The demand for their products is way down internationally. The German labor unions have been accepting minimal raises for 15-20 years in order to keep the economy running smoothly. That period ended a few years ago. They want to "catch up". On top of all that, the integration of the DDR is still problematic. Those states are all still depressed economically, with few bright spots to indicate a way to a better future. Germans also have understandably taken their superior economic status in the EU as a "given". They expect the welfare state safety net to be broad, deep, and bouncy. That takes money.
 
The article mentions the difficulty in borrowing money for Germany. The article doesn't highlight the role Germany has played in the EU as a "lender of last resort". If that lender is now in the capital market (and is expected to be indefinitely) that is going to be very problematic for the EU. Other European states are in that capital market too. None of them can devalue the Euro by themselves. Everybody is bound together by the overall value of the Euro and the demand/price of Euro dominated bonds. This has been a major problem for the PIGS almost since the inception of the Euro. With Germany no longer a "shining star", the Euro is a much less predictable currency. Germany won't like paying the required higher interest rates, as the article discusses. The rest of the EU, particularly the low end, simply cannot pay them. The "knock on" effect may limit what Germany can spend even if the domestic support is there.
 
Historically the problem with German military spending is that new programs get announced with great fanfare and then slowly sink to nothingness. What they actually DO becomes much much less than what they said they would do. This drives both the Bundeswehr and the defense contractors nuts. The defense contractors are also not known for their low prices. Put that all together and a German 3.5% of GDP budget in a given year risks becoming a 2.5% budget in terms of outyear effects.
 
Since about 1995 defense has been the area where "necessary" cuts were annually and continually absorbed. The reunification expenses were indeed massive. The general consensus in the rest of NATO was that Russia was very afraid of a resurgent Germany. Therefore, the "don't scare the bear" ethos became popular in both Germany and the rest of NATO. The German people liked it because it kept their taxes lower. The eventual end of Universal Military Training (UMT) in 2011 was not just a "strategic decision". It was a total sea change in the relationship between the German military and German society. The message was, particularly to younger people, Defense Doesn't Matter. The Bundeswehr became the logical equivalent of the TUV. A necessary government function but in no way socially or politically "special". This latter situation will make increased defense spending as a "permanent" fixture very difficult to sustain in Germany. Thus my concern that when the Ukraine war ends, Germany will revert whatever extra it may be doing as no longer necessary. This may happen well before the Ukraine war ends (i.e. immediately) if the economic/political consequences of the increased spending become bad enough, a not unlikely outcome. The "responsible" political parties are becoming quite concerned about AfD, as IMO they should be. However, their response may (unfortunately probably) not be a robust national debate on defense obligations but rather a race to the bottom. For Germany, the EU, and the world, ouch :-).

Thanks for the very informative reply.  Shows me how much I am out of touch with a country I spent so much time in years ago.  I am surprised at your comment regarding the still existing economic difference between the old West and East German states.  As unrealistic at it is, I always thought that the way forward for Western Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union was to create a United Something of Western Europe. I don't think the European Union comes anywhere close enough to something like that to work. Very hard to remove a thousand years of history. The simple fact is it is very hard to get the majority of any large group of people to agree on anything. Particularly when there are so many years of animosity existing between them.

[GK3]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/trum...37446.html
It looks like yet again Putin got both the US administration and the Europeans to jump at a picture of a T-bone steak that wasn't really on offer. One can imagine the Europeans were going along just to try and influence what the US subsequently would do. It appears that the US is firmly sitting in the "do nothing" camp as far as actually creating conditions for a peace goes.

https://ca.news.yahoo.com/talk-boots-gro...55381.html
This one is for those of you that are sanguine on the probability of German contributions in Ukraine (and NATO for that matter) anytime soon.The Ossis are dead set against it. The current government doesn't have the political capital to do it, at least right now. Anything that is 48-45 in public opinion isn't going to happen with a coalition government that required two ballots to elect their Chancellor.

Are you saying that Germany will not even spend the 2%?

IMO Germany will "spend" more than the 2%. This article covers some of the issues involved. https://www.cnbc.com/2025/06/24/can-germ...arget.html. The problem for Germany is sort of a "perfect storm". Their economy is negatively impacted by the loss of "cheap" Russian energy. The demand for their products is way down internationally. The German labor unions have been accepting minimal raises for 15-20 years in order to keep the economy running smoothly. That period ended a few years ago. They want to "catch up". On top of all that, the integration of the DDR is still problematic. Those states are all still depressed economically, with few bright spots to indicate a way to a better future. Germans also have understandably taken their superior economic status in the EU as a "given". They expect the welfare state safety net to be broad, deep, and bouncy. That takes money.
 
The article mentions the difficulty in borrowing money for Germany. The article doesn't highlight the role Germany has played in the EU as a "lender of last resort". If that lender is now in the capital market (and is expected to be indefinitely) that is going to be very problematic for the EU. Other European states are in that capital market too. None of them can devalue the Euro by themselves. Everybody is bound together by the overall value of the Euro and the demand/price of Euro dominated bonds. This has been a major problem for the PIGS almost since the inception of the Euro. With Germany no longer a "shining star", the Euro is a much less predictable currency. Germany won't like paying the required higher interest rates, as the article discusses. The rest of the EU, particularly the low end, simply cannot pay them. The "knock on" effect may limit what Germany can spend even if the domestic support is there.
 
Historically the problem with German military spending is that new programs get announced with great fanfare and then slowly sink to nothingness. What they actually DO becomes much much less than what they said they would do. This drives both the Bundeswehr and the defense contractors nuts. The defense contractors are also not known for their low prices. Put that all together and a German 3.5% of GDP budget in a given year risks becoming a 2.5% budget in terms of outyear effects.
 
Since about 1995 defense has been the area where "necessary" cuts were annually and continually absorbed. The reunification expenses were indeed massive. The general consensus in the rest of NATO was that Russia was very afraid of a resurgent Germany. Therefore, the "don't scare the bear" ethos became popular in both Germany and the rest of NATO. The German people liked it because it kept their taxes lower. The eventual end of Universal Military Training (UMT) in 2011 was not just a "strategic decision". It was a total sea change in the relationship between the German military and German society. The message was, particularly to younger people, Defense Doesn't Matter. The Bundeswehr became the logical equivalent of the TUV. A necessary government function but in no way socially or politically "special". This latter situation will make increased defense spending as a "permanent" fixture very difficult to sustain in Germany. Thus my concern that when the Ukraine war ends, Germany will revert whatever extra it may be doing as no longer necessary. This may happen well before the Ukraine war ends (i.e. immediately) if the economic/political consequences of the increased spending become bad enough, a not unlikely outcome. The "responsible" political parties are becoming quite concerned about AfD, as IMO they should be. However, their response may (unfortunately probably) not be a robust national debate on defense obligations but rather a race to the bottom. For Germany, the EU, and the world, ouch :-).

Thanks for the very informative reply.  Shows me how much I am out of touch with a country I spent so much time in years ago.  I am surprised at your comment regarding the still existing economic difference between the old West and East German states.  As unrealistic at it is, I always thought that the way forward for Western Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union was to create a United Something of Western Europe. I don't think the European Union comes anywhere close enough to something like that to work. Very hard to remove a thousand years of history. The simple fact is it is very hard to get the majority of any large group of people to agree on anything. Particularly when there are so many years of animosity existing between them.

[Goose]

https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/402...tries.html

Interesting article on the long range drones with big warheads. The only major issue I have with this article is this

To further simplify production, the FP-5 does not employ technologies to reduce radar observability. Low-altitude flight that can follow the curvature of the terrain can help bypass ground-based radars and air defenses, but airborne radars mounted on fighters have long been capable of detecting such targets against ground clutter. That being said, while lacking stealth is a drawback, it is not a critical one, otherwise such a missile would not have been created with such a range and warhead in the first place.

In other words, we wouldn't have built it this way if it was a problem. Of course, that is not a "reason". In point of fact these cruise missiles are very easy meat for fighters controlled by an AWACS. They are "better" than a Shahed class drone in that they are much faster. That puts more pressure on the fighter to "get there" quickly. That is also why the Geran-3 is a more difficult target than a Geran-2. However, the immense radar cross section (coupled with high speed operation) of this new Ukrainian drone makes their detection and targeting by even a half-capable AEW system a certainty. The big plus for Ukraine is that Russia has so far been unable/unwilling to operate an anti-drone CAP with AWACS support. If they can't/don't, these drones could be a real problem. Unfortunately these are one of the few types of targets where an S-400 launcher a hundred km away (that cannot actually "see" the target) can fire a missile under A-50 control and take down the target with very high reliability. Russia has demonstrated that capability, but, again, can they do it at scale in an actual war.
 
Another plus for the new drone is that its large warhead can do enough damage that if even one gets through, that can be "enough". Targeting the Russian fuel supply is an important mission for Ukrainian drones. https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/ukra...46898.html In this effort, Ukraine is following in the footsteps of the Combined Bomber Offensive against Germany in WW II. Postwar analysis has pretty much concluded that attacking electrical generation facilities would have been a much more effective choice. While 19% of Russian generation capacity is nuclear (therefore immune to attack), the rest is not. Refineries are actually much easier to repair than power plants. Power plants require both gas turbines and generators that are not "mass produced". There are also relatively few manufactures of these components, and they are very difficult to ship. Ukraine might want to consider using at least some of these weapons that way.

[Goose]

https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/402...tries.html

Interesting article on the long range drones with big warheads. The only major issue I have with this article is this

To further simplify production, the FP-5 does not employ technologies to reduce radar observability. Low-altitude flight that can follow the curvature of the terrain can help bypass ground-based radars and air defenses, but airborne radars mounted on fighters have long been capable of detecting such targets against ground clutter. That being said, while lacking stealth is a drawback, it is not a critical one, otherwise such a missile would not have been created with such a range and warhead in the first place.

In other words, we wouldn't have built it this way if it was a problem. Of course, that is not a "reason". In point of fact these cruise missiles are very easy meat for fighters controlled by an AWACS. They are "better" than a Shahed class drone in that they are much faster. That puts more pressure on the fighter to "get there" quickly. That is also why the Geran-3 is a more difficult target than a Geran-2. However, the immense radar cross section (coupled with high speed operation) of this new Ukrainian drone makes their detection and targeting by even a half-capable AEW system a certainty. The big plus for Ukraine is that Russia has so far been unable/unwilling to operate an anti-drone CAP with AWACS support. If they can't/don't, these drones could be a real problem. Unfortunately these are one of the few types of targets where an S-400 launcher a hundred km away (that cannot actually "see" the target) can fire a missile under A-50 control and take down the target with very high reliability. Russia has demonstrated that capability, but, again, can they do it at scale in an actual war.
 
Another plus for the new drone is that its large warhead can do enough damage that if even one gets through, that can be "enough". Targeting the Russian fuel supply is an important mission for Ukrainian drones. https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/ukra...46898.html In this effort, Ukraine is following in the footsteps of the Combined Bomber Offensive against Germany in WW II. Postwar analysis has pretty much concluded that attacking electrical generation facilities would have been a much more effective choice. While 19% of Russian generation capacity is nuclear (therefore immune to attack), the rest is not. Refineries are actually much easier to repair than power plants. Power plants require both gas turbines and generators that are not "mass produced". There are also relatively few manufactures of these components, and they are very difficult to ship. Ukraine might want to consider using at least some of these weapons that way.

[BostonCard]

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025...plnews_d-1

Can someone explain the logic here?  Putin has never responded to attempts to placate him so I don’t understand the logic of preventing Ukraine from attacking into Russia making Russia more likely to negotiate; Putin is never going to negotiate unless he faces negative consequences.  Btw, the prior administration used the same logic thinking that we want to avoid escalation, but that only encourages Putin to escalate without consequences.

BC

[BostonCard]

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025...plnews_d-1

Can someone explain the logic here?  Putin has never responded to attempts to placate him so I don’t understand the logic of preventing Ukraine from attacking into Russia making Russia more likely to negotiate; Putin is never going to negotiate unless he faces negative consequences.  Btw, the prior administration used the same logic thinking that we want to avoid escalation, but that only encourages Putin to escalate without consequences.

BC

[M T]

I don't understand why the Flamingo was publicly announced.  Sure, release the info privately to US and allies (to show Ukraine will continue to defend, but with more offense), but send a volley of them to announce the new capability to Russia and the public.

The 3-hour flight time to the longest range would seem to allow vectoring Russian aircraft to cover large areas to shoot these down.  So the main thing for Russia is to find and track them via airborne assets.  Shmel-M radar on an A-50 could track 300 targets within 400 miles (the horizon at max altitude of 15km is 270 miles away; ie, a diameter of 540 miles). The Ukraine-Russia border is about 1200 miles but you have to take into account the routes over the Black Sea). A handful of the Russian A-50 should be able to watch for these entering into Russia. (It isn't clear to me how many A-50 aircraft are available.)  Position aircraft or S-400 launchers to defend close targets quickly. Scramble & vector aircraft for further targets.

For example, Moscow is about 45 minutes flight time for one of these.  That should allow a scrambled fighter to take care of several on a direct path if Russia can detect them entering their airspace and track them after that. (For Moscow, there must be plenty of S-400 missiles to take it out, but Moscow was just an example here.)

In the description, I didn't see if the routing of the missiles can be changed in-flight by ground control.  Additionally, would such missiles be able to maneuver if they detected they were being targeted?

[M T]

I don't understand why the Flamingo was publicly announced.  Sure, release the info privately to US and allies (to show Ukraine will continue to defend, but with more offense), but send a volley of them to announce the new capability to Russia and the public.

The 3-hour flight time to the longest range would seem to allow vectoring Russian aircraft to cover large areas to shoot these down.  So the main thing for Russia is to find and track them via airborne assets.  Shmel-M radar on an A-50 could track 300 targets within 400 miles (the horizon at max altitude of 15km is 270 miles away; ie, a diameter of 540 miles). The Ukraine-Russia border is about 1200 miles but you have to take into account the routes over the Black Sea). A handful of the Russian A-50 should be able to watch for these entering into Russia. (It isn't clear to me how many A-50 aircraft are available.)  Position aircraft or S-400 launchers to defend close targets quickly. Scramble & vector aircraft for further targets.

For example, Moscow is about 45 minutes flight time for one of these.  That should allow a scrambled fighter to take care of several on a direct path if Russia can detect them entering their airspace and track them after that. (For Moscow, there must be plenty of S-400 missiles to take it out, but Moscow was just an example here.)

In the description, I didn't see if the routing of the missiles can be changed in-flight by ground control.  Additionally, would such missiles be able to maneuver if they detected they were being targeted?

[Goose]

I don't understand why the Flamingo was publicly announced.  Sure, release the info privately to US and allies (to show Ukraine will continue to defend, but with more offense), but send a volley of them to announce the new capability to Russia and the public.

The 3-hour flight time to the longest range would seem to allow vectoring Russian aircraft to cover large areas to shoot these down.  So the main thing for Russia is to find and track them via airborne assets.  Shmel-M radar on an A-50 could track 300 targets within 400 miles (the horizon at max altitude of 15km is 270 miles away; ie, a diameter of 540 miles). The Ukraine-Russia border is about 1200 miles but you have to take into account the routes over the Black Sea). A handful of the Russian A-50 should be able to watch for these entering into Russia. (It isn't clear to me how many A-50 aircraft are available.)  Position aircraft or S-400 launchers to defend close targets quickly. Scramble & vector aircraft for further targets.

Great post! IMO what you have described is the recipe to neutralize these new Ukrainian weapons. Practically speaking, the fighters must be in the air at the time the targets are detected. The time lost getting into the area from possibly distant bases is too long. Russia can rotate fighters to ensure nobody has to fly exceptionally long missions. Back in the day, the PVO was expert at this. So far in this war, the VKS hasn't shown the ability to field any kind of persistent CAP. There is no inherent reason they couldn't however.
 
You are also correct that 4 or 5 A-50s could execute the warning and control functions. For Russia, the problem is that even 10 hour missions in these aircraft are exhausting. These aircraft have additional transit times from their bases to their operating area. These aircraft need to be "on station" 24/7. Also, for every hour in the air there is probably several hours of maintenance required on the A-50. It may be that some ground-based radars could function as "gap fillers", but realistically Russia would probably need at least 15 A-50s with trained crews to do a perfect job. Even that wouldn't be enough for a month-in month-out effort. Extended maintenance periods are periodically needed. Crews can only operate 3 days on 1 day off for a month or so without a break. Russia simply hasn't got enough planes to do this effort.
 
The other side of this argument is that Ukraine can't actually launch these drones from random places. Support facilities and launching ramps are required. There is a heavy logistical load. Therefore covering the entire Ukrainian border all the time wouldn't be required. The trick would be knowing how to apportion the limited number of A-50s.

For example, Moscow is about 45 minutes flight time for one of these.  That should allow a scrambled fighter to take care of several on a direct path if Russia can detect them entering their airspace and track them after that. (For Moscow, there must be plenty of S-400 missiles to take it out, but Moscow was just an example here.)

The S-400 A-50 cooperation isn't a routine event. Arguably it should be, but AFAIK it is still somewhat "experimental" and not part of the regular syllabus. It could become "standard", but that would take time and training. Vectoring fighters to specific missiles is also not trivial in that the missile may not (probably will not) take a direct route to its target. The A-50 can't assume the missile will fly straight.

In the description, I didn't see if the routing of the missiles can be changed in-flight by ground control.  Additionally, would such missiles be able to maneuver if they detected they were being targeted?

The missile has no way to know if it is targeted. It has no sensors on board that can do that. Ground control also has no way to get a radio signal to a low flying missile in the middle of Russia, unless of course they use text messages :-).

[Goose]

I don't understand why the Flamingo was publicly announced.  Sure, release the info privately to US and allies (to show Ukraine will continue to defend, but with more offense), but send a volley of them to announce the new capability to Russia and the public.

The 3-hour flight time to the longest range would seem to allow vectoring Russian aircraft to cover large areas to shoot these down.  So the main thing for Russia is to find and track them via airborne assets.  Shmel-M radar on an A-50 could track 300 targets within 400 miles (the horizon at max altitude of 15km is 270 miles away; ie, a diameter of 540 miles). The Ukraine-Russia border is about 1200 miles but you have to take into account the routes over the Black Sea). A handful of the Russian A-50 should be able to watch for these entering into Russia. (It isn't clear to me how many A-50 aircraft are available.)  Position aircraft or S-400 launchers to defend close targets quickly. Scramble & vector aircraft for further targets.

Great post! IMO what you have described is the recipe to neutralize these new Ukrainian weapons. Practically speaking, the fighters must be in the air at the time the targets are detected. The time lost getting into the area from possibly distant bases is too long. Russia can rotate fighters to ensure nobody has to fly exceptionally long missions. Back in the day, the PVO was expert at this. So far in this war, the VKS hasn't shown the ability to field any kind of persistent CAP. There is no inherent reason they couldn't however.
 
You are also correct that 4 or 5 A-50s could execute the warning and control functions. For Russia, the problem is that even 10 hour missions in these aircraft are exhausting. These aircraft have additional transit times from their bases to their operating area. These aircraft need to be "on station" 24/7. Also, for every hour in the air there is probably several hours of maintenance required on the A-50. It may be that some ground-based radars could function as "gap fillers", but realistically Russia would probably need at least 15 A-50s with trained crews to do a perfect job. Even that wouldn't be enough for a month-in month-out effort. Extended maintenance periods are periodically needed. Crews can only operate 3 days on 1 day off for a month or so without a break. Russia simply hasn't got enough planes to do this effort.
 
The other side of this argument is that Ukraine can't actually launch these drones from random places. Support facilities and launching ramps are required. There is a heavy logistical load. Therefore covering the entire Ukrainian border all the time wouldn't be required. The trick would be knowing how to apportion the limited number of A-50s.

For example, Moscow is about 45 minutes flight time for one of these.  That should allow a scrambled fighter to take care of several on a direct path if Russia can detect them entering their airspace and track them after that. (For Moscow, there must be plenty of S-400 missiles to take it out, but Moscow was just an example here.)

The S-400 A-50 cooperation isn't a routine event. Arguably it should be, but AFAIK it is still somewhat "experimental" and not part of the regular syllabus. It could become "standard", but that would take time and training. Vectoring fighters to specific missiles is also not trivial in that the missile may not (probably will not) take a direct route to its target. The A-50 can't assume the missile will fly straight.

In the description, I didn't see if the routing of the missiles can be changed in-flight by ground control.  Additionally, would such missiles be able to maneuver if they detected they were being targeted?

The missile has no way to know if it is targeted. It has no sensors on board that can do that. Ground control also has no way to get a radio signal to a low flying missile in the middle of Russia, unless of course they use text messages :-).

[M T]

Launching from western Ukraine should keep the launchers out of range of any A-50.  They could still enter Russia anywhere along the Ukrainian border, the Sea of Azov, or the Black Sea.  This missile could be launched from Odessa, skirt around Crimea, enter Russia from the Black Sea, and still have more than enough range to reach (say) Moscow.  Even St. Petersburg is within range via that path.

Since they are so fast, I suspect the missiles currently can't maneuver much to hit their target.  But if they could, can you imagine one (or a bunch) being launched as an A-50 leaves its post to return to its base.  The missile would remain out of range of that A-50 but get to the base within a half-hour of the A-50 landing.  If it can pick out the A-50 on the tarmac and hit it, that would be impressive.

Go for the eyes...

[M T]

Launching from western Ukraine should keep the launchers out of range of any A-50.  They could still enter Russia anywhere along the Ukrainian border, the Sea of Azov, or the Black Sea.  This missile could be launched from Odessa, skirt around Crimea, enter Russia from the Black Sea, and still have more than enough range to reach (say) Moscow.  Even St. Petersburg is within range via that path.

Since they are so fast, I suspect the missiles currently can't maneuver much to hit their target.  But if they could, can you imagine one (or a bunch) being launched as an A-50 leaves its post to return to its base.  The missile would remain out of range of that A-50 but get to the base within a half-hour of the A-50 landing.  If it can pick out the A-50 on the tarmac and hit it, that would be impressive.

Go for the eyes...

[GK3]

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025...plnews_d-1

Can someone explain the logic here?  Putin has never responded to attempts to placate him so I don’t understand the logic of preventing Ukraine from attacking into Russia making Russia more likely to negotiate; Putin is never going to negotiate unless he faces negative consequences.  Btw, the prior administration used the same logic thinking that we want to avoid escalation, but that only encourages Putin to escalate without consequences.

BC

You have a very good question.  The only reason I can think of is that we have some sort of intelligence we believe in that says such strikes will result in Russia doing something we really do not want them to do.  What that would be I can't figure.  Tactical nukes or a direct attack on a NATO country seems very unlikely.  Perhaps getting more involved in the Middle East.  Something like giving more help to Iran, say some of their Intermediate range ballistic missles. Israel would love to get us fully involved with Iran and do all the heavy lifting, meaning boots on the ground and significant American casualties.  I have no real idea.  Hard to figure.

---

I don't understand why the Flamingo was publicly announced.  Sure, release the info privately to US and allies (to show Ukraine will continue to defend, but with more offense), but send a volley of them to announce the new capability to Russia and the public.

The 3-hour flight time to the longest range would seem to allow vectoring Russian aircraft to cover large areas to shoot these down.  So the main thing for Russia is to find and track them via airborne assets.  Shmel-M radar on an A-50 could track 300 targets within 400 miles (the horizon at max altitude of 15km is 270 miles away; ie, a diameter of 540 miles). The Ukraine-Russia border is about 1200 miles but you have to take into account the routes over the Black Sea). A handful of the Russian A-50 should be able to watch for these entering into Russia. (It isn't clear to me how many A-50 aircraft are available.)  Position aircraft or S-400 launchers to defend close targets quickly. Scramble & vector aircraft for further targets.

Great post! IMO what you have described is the recipe to neutralize these new Ukrainian weapons. Practically speaking, the fighters must be in the air at the time the targets are detected. The time lost getting into the area from possibly distant bases is too long. Russia can rotate fighters to ensure nobody has to fly exceptionally long missions. Back in the day, the PVO was expert at this. So far in this war, the VKS hasn't shown the ability to field any kind of persistent CAP. There is no inherent reason they couldn't however.
 
You are also correct that 4 or 5 A-50s could execute the warning and control functions. For Russia, the problem is that even 10 hour missions in these aircraft are exhausting. These aircraft have additional transit times from their bases to their operating area. These aircraft need to be "on station" 24/7. Also, for every hour in the air there is probably several hours of maintenance required on the A-50. It may be that some ground-based radars could function as "gap fillers", but realistically Russia would probably need at least 15 A-50s with trained crews to do a perfect job. Even that wouldn't be enough for a month-in month-out effort. Extended maintenance periods are periodically needed. Crews can only operate 3 days on 1 day off for a month or so without a break. Russia simply hasn't got enough planes to do this effort.
 
The other side of this argument is that Ukraine can't actually launch these drones from random places. Support facilities and launching ramps are required. There is a heavy logistical load. Therefore covering the entire Ukrainian border all the time wouldn't be required. The trick would be knowing how to apportion the limited number of A-50s.

For example, Moscow is about 45 minutes flight time for one of these.  That should allow a scrambled fighter to take care of several on a direct path if Russia can detect them entering their airspace and track them after that. (For Moscow, there must be plenty of S-400 missiles to take it out, but Moscow was just an example here.)

The S-400 A-50 cooperation isn't a routine event. Arguably it should be, but AFAIK it is still somewhat "experimental" and not part of the regular syllabus. It could become "standard", but that would take time and training. Vectoring fighters to specific missiles is also not trivial in that the missile may not (probably will not) take a direct route to its target. The A-50 can't assume the missile will fly straight.

In the description, I didn't see if the routing of the missiles can be changed in-flight by ground control.  Additionally, would such missiles be able to maneuver if they detected they were being targeted?

The missile has no way to know if it is targeted. It has no sensors on board that can do that. Ground control also has no way to get a radio signal to a low flying missile in the middle of Russia, unless of course they use text messages :-).

I thought Russia only had 4 or 5 operational A50s. Using them this way would as you say increase the maintenance need and one has no idea how easily they can get new hardware for them.  Plus I would assume that if one got too close to Ukraine, Ukraine might risk one of its F16s to take out a A50. I would assume the first target we would have in a Russian - NATO fight would be the A50s.

[GK3]

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025...plnews_d-1

Can someone explain the logic here?  Putin has never responded to attempts to placate him so I don’t understand the logic of preventing Ukraine from attacking into Russia making Russia more likely to negotiate; Putin is never going to negotiate unless he faces negative consequences.  Btw, the prior administration used the same logic thinking that we want to avoid escalation, but that only encourages Putin to escalate without consequences.

BC

You have a very good question.  The only reason I can think of is that we have some sort of intelligence we believe in that says such strikes will result in Russia doing something we really do not want them to do.  What that would be I can't figure.  Tactical nukes or a direct attack on a NATO country seems very unlikely.  Perhaps getting more involved in the Middle East.  Something like giving more help to Iran, say some of their Intermediate range ballistic missles. Israel would love to get us fully involved with Iran and do all the heavy lifting, meaning boots on the ground and significant American casualties.  I have no real idea.  Hard to figure.

---

I don't understand why the Flamingo was publicly announced.  Sure, release the info privately to US and allies (to show Ukraine will continue to defend, but with more offense), but send a volley of them to announce the new capability to Russia and the public.

The 3-hour flight time to the longest range would seem to allow vectoring Russian aircraft to cover large areas to shoot these down.  So the main thing for Russia is to find and track them via airborne assets.  Shmel-M radar on an A-50 could track 300 targets within 400 miles (the horizon at max altitude of 15km is 270 miles away; ie, a diameter of 540 miles). The Ukraine-Russia border is about 1200 miles but you have to take into account the routes over the Black Sea). A handful of the Russian A-50 should be able to watch for these entering into Russia. (It isn't clear to me how many A-50 aircraft are available.)  Position aircraft or S-400 launchers to defend close targets quickly. Scramble & vector aircraft for further targets.

Great post! IMO what you have described is the recipe to neutralize these new Ukrainian weapons. Practically speaking, the fighters must be in the air at the time the targets are detected. The time lost getting into the area from possibly distant bases is too long. Russia can rotate fighters to ensure nobody has to fly exceptionally long missions. Back in the day, the PVO was expert at this. So far in this war, the VKS hasn't shown the ability to field any kind of persistent CAP. There is no inherent reason they couldn't however.
 
You are also correct that 4 or 5 A-50s could execute the warning and control functions. For Russia, the problem is that even 10 hour missions in these aircraft are exhausting. These aircraft have additional transit times from their bases to their operating area. These aircraft need to be "on station" 24/7. Also, for every hour in the air there is probably several hours of maintenance required on the A-50. It may be that some ground-based radars could function as "gap fillers", but realistically Russia would probably need at least 15 A-50s with trained crews to do a perfect job. Even that wouldn't be enough for a month-in month-out effort. Extended maintenance periods are periodically needed. Crews can only operate 3 days on 1 day off for a month or so without a break. Russia simply hasn't got enough planes to do this effort.
 
The other side of this argument is that Ukraine can't actually launch these drones from random places. Support facilities and launching ramps are required. There is a heavy logistical load. Therefore covering the entire Ukrainian border all the time wouldn't be required. The trick would be knowing how to apportion the limited number of A-50s.

For example, Moscow is about 45 minutes flight time for one of these.  That should allow a scrambled fighter to take care of several on a direct path if Russia can detect them entering their airspace and track them after that. (For Moscow, there must be plenty of S-400 missiles to take it out, but Moscow was just an example here.)

The S-400 A-50 cooperation isn't a routine event. Arguably it should be, but AFAIK it is still somewhat "experimental" and not part of the regular syllabus. It could become "standard", but that would take time and training. Vectoring fighters to specific missiles is also not trivial in that the missile may not (probably will not) take a direct route to its target. The A-50 can't assume the missile will fly straight.

In the description, I didn't see if the routing of the missiles can be changed in-flight by ground control.  Additionally, would such missiles be able to maneuver if they detected they were being targeted?

The missile has no way to know if it is targeted. It has no sensors on board that can do that. Ground control also has no way to get a radio signal to a low flying missile in the middle of Russia, unless of course they use text messages :-).

I thought Russia only had 4 or 5 operational A50s. Using them this way would as you say increase the maintenance need and one has no idea how easily they can get new hardware for them.  Plus I would assume that if one got too close to Ukraine, Ukraine might risk one of its F16s to take out a A50. I would assume the first target we would have in a Russian - NATO fight would be the A50s.

[GK3]

I don't understand why the Flamingo was publicly announced.  Sure, release the info privately to US and allies (to show Ukraine will continue to defend, but with more offense), but send a volley of them to announce the new capability to Russia and the public.

The 3-hour flight time to the longest range would seem to allow vectoring Russian aircraft to cover large areas to shoot these down.  So the main thing for Russia is to find and track them via airborne assets.  Shmel-M radar on an A-50 could track 300 targets within 400 miles (the horizon at max altitude of 15km is 270 miles away; ie, a diameter of 540 miles). The Ukraine-Russia border is about 1200 miles but you have to take into account the routes over the Black Sea). A handful of the Russian A-50 should be able to watch for these entering into Russia. (It isn't clear to me how many A-50 aircraft are available.)  Position aircraft or S-400 launchers to defend close targets quickly. Scramble & vector aircraft for further targets.

Great post! IMO what you have described is the recipe to neutralize these new Ukrainian weapons. Practically speaking, the fighters must be in the air at the time the targets are detected. The time lost getting into the area from possibly distant bases is too long. Russia can rotate fighters to ensure nobody has to fly exceptionally long missions. Back in the day, the PVO was expert at this. So far in this war, the VKS hasn't shown the ability to field any kind of persistent CAP. There is no inherent reason they couldn't however.
 
You are also correct that 4 or 5 A-50s could execute the warning and control functions. For Russia, the problem is that even 10 hour missions in these aircraft are exhausting. These aircraft have additional transit times from their bases to their operating area. These aircraft need to be "on station" 24/7. Also, for every hour in the air there is probably several hours of maintenance required on the A-50. It may be that some ground-based radars could function as "gap fillers", but realistically Russia would probably need at least 15 A-50s with trained crews to do a perfect job. Even that wouldn't be enough for a month-in month-out effort. Extended maintenance periods are periodically needed. Crews can only operate 3 days on 1 day off for a month or so without a break. Russia simply hasn't got enough planes to do this effort.
 
The other side of this argument is that Ukraine can't actually launch these drones from random places. Support facilities and launching ramps are required. There is a heavy logistical load. Therefore covering the entire Ukrainian border all the time wouldn't be required. The trick would be knowing how to apportion the limited number of A-50s.

For example, Moscow is about 45 minutes flight time for one of these.  That should allow a scrambled fighter to take care of several on a direct path if Russia can detect them entering their airspace and track them after that. (For Moscow, there must be plenty of S-400 missiles to take it out, but Moscow was just an example here.)

The S-400 A-50 cooperation isn't a routine event. Arguably it should be, but AFAIK it is still somewhat "experimental" and not part of the regular syllabus. It could become "standard", but that would take time and training. Vectoring fighters to specific missiles is also not trivial in that the missile may not (probably will not) take a direct route to its target. The A-50 can't assume the missile will fly straight.

In the description, I didn't see if the routing of the missiles can be changed in-flight by ground control.  Additionally, would such missiles be able to maneuver if they detected they were being targeted?

The missile has no way to know if it is targeted. It has no sensors on board that can do that. Ground control also has no way to get a radio signal to a low flying missile in the middle of Russia, unless of course they use text messages :-).

I thought Russia only had 4 or 5 operational A50s. Using them this way would as you say increase the maintenance need and one has no idea how easily they can get new hardware for them.  Plus I would assume that if one got too close to Ukraine, Ukraine might risk one of its F16s to take out a A50. I would assume the first target we would have in a Russian - NATO fight would be the A50s.

[GK3]

I don't understand why the Flamingo was publicly announced.  Sure, release the info privately to US and allies (to show Ukraine will continue to defend, but with more offense), but send a volley of them to announce the new capability to Russia and the public.

The 3-hour flight time to the longest range would seem to allow vectoring Russian aircraft to cover large areas to shoot these down.  So the main thing for Russia is to find and track them via airborne assets.  Shmel-M radar on an A-50 could track 300 targets within 400 miles (the horizon at max altitude of 15km is 270 miles away; ie, a diameter of 540 miles). The Ukraine-Russia border is about 1200 miles but you have to take into account the routes over the Black Sea). A handful of the Russian A-50 should be able to watch for these entering into Russia. (It isn't clear to me how many A-50 aircraft are available.)  Position aircraft or S-400 launchers to defend close targets quickly. Scramble & vector aircraft for further targets.

Great post! IMO what you have described is the recipe to neutralize these new Ukrainian weapons. Practically speaking, the fighters must be in the air at the time the targets are detected. The time lost getting into the area from possibly distant bases is too long. Russia can rotate fighters to ensure nobody has to fly exceptionally long missions. Back in the day, the PVO was expert at this. So far in this war, the VKS hasn't shown the ability to field any kind of persistent CAP. There is no inherent reason they couldn't however.
 
You are also correct that 4 or 5 A-50s could execute the warning and control functions. For Russia, the problem is that even 10 hour missions in these aircraft are exhausting. These aircraft have additional transit times from their bases to their operating area. These aircraft need to be "on station" 24/7. Also, for every hour in the air there is probably several hours of maintenance required on the A-50. It may be that some ground-based radars could function as "gap fillers", but realistically Russia would probably need at least 15 A-50s with trained crews to do a perfect job. Even that wouldn't be enough for a month-in month-out effort. Extended maintenance periods are periodically needed. Crews can only operate 3 days on 1 day off for a month or so without a break. Russia simply hasn't got enough planes to do this effort.
 
The other side of this argument is that Ukraine can't actually launch these drones from random places. Support facilities and launching ramps are required. There is a heavy logistical load. Therefore covering the entire Ukrainian border all the time wouldn't be required. The trick would be knowing how to apportion the limited number of A-50s.

For example, Moscow is about 45 minutes flight time for one of these.  That should allow a scrambled fighter to take care of several on a direct path if Russia can detect them entering their airspace and track them after that. (For Moscow, there must be plenty of S-400 missiles to take it out, but Moscow was just an example here.)

The S-400 A-50 cooperation isn't a routine event. Arguably it should be, but AFAIK it is still somewhat "experimental" and not part of the regular syllabus. It could become "standard", but that would take time and training. Vectoring fighters to specific missiles is also not trivial in that the missile may not (probably will not) take a direct route to its target. The A-50 can't assume the missile will fly straight.

In the description, I didn't see if the routing of the missiles can be changed in-flight by ground control.  Additionally, would such missiles be able to maneuver if they detected they were being targeted?

The missile has no way to know if it is targeted. It has no sensors on board that can do that. Ground control also has no way to get a radio signal to a low flying missile in the middle of Russia, unless of course they use text messages :-).

I thought Russia only had 4 or 5 operational A50s. Using them this way would as you say increase the maintenance need and one has no idea how easily they can get new hardware for them.  Plus I would assume that if one got too close to Ukraine, Ukraine might risk one of its F16s to take out a A50. I would assume the first target we would have in a Russian - NATO fight would be the A50s.

[dabigv13]

Ukraine struck Russian gas infrastructure with drones yesterday.

Liquid natural gas storage for export in Ust-Luga, an important port for Russia's sanctions evading "shadow fleet". Pretty nice video.

https://x.com/markito0171/status/1959567250312089911

An oil refinery in Syzran

https://x.com/VyshnyaOstap/status/1959451389265891743

[dabigv13]

Ukraine struck Russian gas infrastructure with drones yesterday.

Liquid natural gas storage for export in Ust-Luga, an important port for Russia's sanctions evading "shadow fleet". Pretty nice video.

https://x.com/markito0171/status/1959567250312089911

An oil refinery in Syzran

https://x.com/VyshnyaOstap/status/1959451389265891743

[Section QQ]

The Bundeswehr became the logical equivalent of the TUV. 

Ouch. But true.

[Section QQ]

The Bundeswehr became the logical equivalent of the TUV. 

Ouch. But true.

[GK3]

I don't understand why the Flamingo was publicly announced.  Sure, release the info privately to US and allies (to show Ukraine will continue to defend, but with more offense), but send a volley of them to announce the new capability to Russia and the public.

The 3-hour flight time to the longest range would seem to allow vectoring Russian aircraft to cover large areas to shoot these down.  So the main thing for Russia is to find and track them via airborne assets.  Shmel-M radar on an A-50 could track 300 targets within 400 miles (the horizon at max altitude of 15km is 270 miles away; ie, a diameter of 540 miles). The Ukraine-Russia border is about 1200 miles but you have to take into account the routes over the Black Sea). A handful of the Russian A-50 should be able to watch for these entering into Russia. (It isn't clear to me how many A-50 aircraft are available.)  Position aircraft or S-400 launchers to defend close targets quickly. Scramble & vector aircraft for further targets.

Great post! IMO what you have described is the recipe to neutralize these new Ukrainian weapons. Practically speaking, the fighters must be in the air at the time the targets are detected. The time lost getting into the area from possibly distant bases is too long. Russia can rotate fighters to ensure nobody has to fly exceptionally long missions. Back in the day, the PVO was expert at this. So far in this war, the VKS hasn't shown the ability to field any kind of persistent CAP. There is no inherent reason they couldn't however.
 
You are also correct that 4 or 5 A-50s could execute the warning and control functions. For Russia, the problem is that even 10 hour missions in these aircraft are exhausting. These aircraft have additional transit times from their bases to their operating area. These aircraft need to be "on station" 24/7. Also, for every hour in the air there is probably several hours of maintenance required on the A-50. It may be that some ground-based radars could function as "gap fillers", but realistically Russia would probably need at least 15 A-50s with trained crews to do a perfect job. Even that wouldn't be enough for a month-in month-out effort. Extended maintenance periods are periodically needed. Crews can only operate 3 days on 1 day off for a month or so without a break. Russia simply hasn't got enough planes to do this effort.
 
The other side of this argument is that Ukraine can't actually launch these drones from random places. Support facilities and launching ramps are required. There is a heavy logistical load. Therefore covering the entire Ukrainian border all the time wouldn't be required. The trick would be knowing how to apportion the limited number of A-50s.

For example, Moscow is about 45 minutes flight time for one of these.  That should allow a scrambled fighter to take care of several on a direct path if Russia can detect them entering their airspace and track them after that. (For Moscow, there must be plenty of S-400 missiles to take it out, but Moscow was just an example here.)

The S-400 A-50 cooperation isn't a routine event. Arguably it should be, but AFAIK it is still somewhat "experimental" and not part of the regular syllabus. It could become "standard", but that would take time and training. Vectoring fighters to specific missiles is also not trivial in that the missile may not (probably will not) take a direct route to its target. The A-50 can't assume the missile will fly straight.

In the description, I didn't see if the routing of the missiles can be changed in-flight by ground control.  Additionally, would such missiles be able to maneuver if they detected they were being targeted?

The missile has no way to know if it is targeted. It has no sensors on board that can do that. Ground control also has no way to get a radio signal to a low flying missile in the middle of Russia, unless of course they use text messages :-).

I thought Russia only had 4 or 5 operational A50s. Using them this way would as you say increase the maintenance need and one has no idea how easily they can get new hardware for them.  Plus I would assume that if one got too close to Ukraine, Ukraine might risk one of its F16s to take out a A50. I would assume the first target we would have in a Russian - NATO fight would be the A50s.

Text Messages :)  love the concept, who know some 18 year old genius will figure how to actually do something like that.  In this day and age, never say never when it comes to tech.

[GK3]

I don't understand why the Flamingo was publicly announced.  Sure, release the info privately to US and allies (to show Ukraine will continue to defend, but with more offense), but send a volley of them to announce the new capability to Russia and the public.

The 3-hour flight time to the longest range would seem to allow vectoring Russian aircraft to cover large areas to shoot these down.  So the main thing for Russia is to find and track them via airborne assets.  Shmel-M radar on an A-50 could track 300 targets within 400 miles (the horizon at max altitude of 15km is 270 miles away; ie, a diameter of 540 miles). The Ukraine-Russia border is about 1200 miles but you have to take into account the routes over the Black Sea). A handful of the Russian A-50 should be able to watch for these entering into Russia. (It isn't clear to me how many A-50 aircraft are available.)  Position aircraft or S-400 launchers to defend close targets quickly. Scramble & vector aircraft for further targets.

Great post! IMO what you have described is the recipe to neutralize these new Ukrainian weapons. Practically speaking, the fighters must be in the air at the time the targets are detected. The time lost getting into the area from possibly distant bases is too long. Russia can rotate fighters to ensure nobody has to fly exceptionally long missions. Back in the day, the PVO was expert at this. So far in this war, the VKS hasn't shown the ability to field any kind of persistent CAP. There is no inherent reason they couldn't however.
 
You are also correct that 4 or 5 A-50s could execute the warning and control functions. For Russia, the problem is that even 10 hour missions in these aircraft are exhausting. These aircraft have additional transit times from their bases to their operating area. These aircraft need to be "on station" 24/7. Also, for every hour in the air there is probably several hours of maintenance required on the A-50. It may be that some ground-based radars could function as "gap fillers", but realistically Russia would probably need at least 15 A-50s with trained crews to do a perfect job. Even that wouldn't be enough for a month-in month-out effort. Extended maintenance periods are periodically needed. Crews can only operate 3 days on 1 day off for a month or so without a break. Russia simply hasn't got enough planes to do this effort.
 
The other side of this argument is that Ukraine can't actually launch these drones from random places. Support facilities and launching ramps are required. There is a heavy logistical load. Therefore covering the entire Ukrainian border all the time wouldn't be required. The trick would be knowing how to apportion the limited number of A-50s.

For example, Moscow is about 45 minutes flight time for one of these.  That should allow a scrambled fighter to take care of several on a direct path if Russia can detect them entering their airspace and track them after that. (For Moscow, there must be plenty of S-400 missiles to take it out, but Moscow was just an example here.)

The S-400 A-50 cooperation isn't a routine event. Arguably it should be, but AFAIK it is still somewhat "experimental" and not part of the regular syllabus. It could become "standard", but that would take time and training. Vectoring fighters to specific missiles is also not trivial in that the missile may not (probably will not) take a direct route to its target. The A-50 can't assume the missile will fly straight.

In the description, I didn't see if the routing of the missiles can be changed in-flight by ground control.  Additionally, would such missiles be able to maneuver if they detected they were being targeted?

The missile has no way to know if it is targeted. It has no sensors on board that can do that. Ground control also has no way to get a radio signal to a low flying missile in the middle of Russia, unless of course they use text messages :-).

I thought Russia only had 4 or 5 operational A50s. Using them this way would as you say increase the maintenance need and one has no idea how easily they can get new hardware for them.  Plus I would assume that if one got too close to Ukraine, Ukraine might risk one of its F16s to take out a A50. I would assume the first target we would have in a Russian - NATO fight would be the A50s.

Text Messages :)  love the concept, who know some 18 year old genius will figure how to actually do something like that.  In this day and age, never say never when it comes to tech.

[BostonCard]

You might think that four years into a war on their doorstep, European countries might diversify their energy supplies, but…

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/europes..._permalink

(Should be gifted)

BC

[BostonCard]

You might think that four years into a war on their doorstep, European countries might diversify their energy supplies, but…

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/europes..._permalink

(Should be gifted)

BC

[fullmetal]

You might think that four years into a war on their doorstep, European countries might diversify their energy supplies, but…

Winters in Europe can be pretty harsh, and now even summers in Europe need more energy to run increasing numbers of air conditioning units.  I think Europe is doing its best to build out renewable supplies, but that hasn't scaled quickly enough.  Unless there are available, central Asian sources of natural gas not financially tied to Russia, it's hard to see what would fill the gap.

[fullmetal]

You might think that four years into a war on their doorstep, European countries might diversify their energy supplies, but…

Winters in Europe can be pretty harsh, and now even summers in Europe need more energy to run increasing numbers of air conditioning units.  I think Europe is doing its best to build out renewable supplies, but that hasn't scaled quickly enough.  Unless there are available, central Asian sources of natural gas not financially tied to Russia, it's hard to see what would fill the gap.

[Goose]

You might think that four years into a war on their doorstep, European countries might diversify their energy supplies, but…

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/europes..._permalink

(Should be gifted)

BC

This situation is unique and inherently not solvable. The refineries are all old. The one in Berlin is Russian owned. The others are owned by a Hungarian company, MOL Group. They are built explicitly to refine "Soviet" crude oil, now rusian and the 'stan's. These refineries can't refine the crude oil the rest of the world can deliver. I think there are some Indonesian alternate sources, but that is it AFAIK. The other problem is delivery. These refineries are all land-locked. Delivery of low-grade but cheap crude oil by pipeline makes them economically viable. Shipping oil any other way is too expensive, and pipelines would have to be built from a port all the way into Hungary/Slovakia. Very expensive capital investment that promises little ROI. The "right answer" would have been to simply buy finished petroleum products elsewhere, but that would be a financial disaster for MOL. They aren't going to do it. The Berlin refinery isn't owned by an EU based company. The German trustee is in no position to expend the necessary funds to upgrade the refinery and find other sources of crude oil that would make economic sense. Thus, here we remain.

UPDATE: Things are a bit better than I thought. https://kyivindependent.com/hungarys-oil...ian-crude/ MOL may have an upgraded refinery by sometime in 2026. From the tone of the article it appears MOL does not intend to switch totally off Ural crude. It may be that only part of the refinery will be upgraded to process non-Ural oil. The Druzhba pipeline is a big source of cheap crude that MOL wants to be an option after this war is over.
 
The Croatian pipeline has a capacity problem. It has more customers than it can serve. Hungary needs another source.

[Goose]

You might think that four years into a war on their doorstep, European countries might diversify their energy supplies, but…

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/europes..._permalink

(Should be gifted)

BC

This situation is unique and inherently not solvable. The refineries are all old. The one in Berlin is Russian owned. The others are owned by a Hungarian company, MOL Group. They are built explicitly to refine "Soviet" crude oil, now rusian and the 'stan's. These refineries can't refine the crude oil the rest of the world can deliver. I think there are some Indonesian alternate sources, but that is it AFAIK. The other problem is delivery. These refineries are all land-locked. Delivery of low-grade but cheap crude oil by pipeline makes them economically viable. Shipping oil any other way is too expensive, and pipelines would have to be built from a port all the way into Hungary/Slovakia. Very expensive capital investment that promises little ROI. The "right answer" would have been to simply buy finished petroleum products elsewhere, but that would be a financial disaster for MOL. They aren't going to do it. The Berlin refinery isn't owned by an EU based company. The German trustee is in no position to expend the necessary funds to upgrade the refinery and find other sources of crude oil that would make economic sense. Thus, here we remain.

UPDATE: Things are a bit better than I thought. https://kyivindependent.com/hungarys-oil...ian-crude/ MOL may have an upgraded refinery by sometime in 2026. From the tone of the article it appears MOL does not intend to switch totally off Ural crude. It may be that only part of the refinery will be upgraded to process non-Ural oil. The Druzhba pipeline is a big source of cheap crude that MOL wants to be an option after this war is over.
 
The Croatian pipeline has a capacity problem. It has more customers than it can serve. Hungary needs another source.