[ADPinWDC]

The biggest challenge is how many lives would it take now to take back the HEAVILY MINED Donbas / Donetsk / Luhansk?  
Another year of fighting and 400,000 casualties will not win back territory.  Drone attacks are ingenious and damage Russia, but they don't win back territory.

Harsh realities have set in

“Right,” Graham replied. “Well, here’s the reality — Ukraine cannot evict every Russian soldier that occupies Ukrainian territory. They fought like tigers. They kept Russian advances to the minimum. Zelensky has been a good wartime leader, but the credit does go to the Ukrainian people through their military who are outgunned and outmanned, and the only reason they’re able to stay in this fight because of American weapons. People forget that it was Trump who gave Javelins to the Ukrainian military before he left office and that allowed them to stop Russia from taking Kyiv. And these weapons being provided by the United States gives a qualitative edge to Ukraine to stay in the fight. How does this end? There’s going to be compromise. Ukraine’s going to have to recognize that there will be parts of Ukraine under Russian control. That doesn’t mean transferring title to Russia, but East Germany and West Germany existed for a long time until reunification.”

https://www.breitbart.com/clips/2025/08/...n-control/

[ADPinWDC]

The biggest challenge is how many lives would it take now to take back the HEAVILY MINED Donbas / Donetsk / Luhansk?  
Another year of fighting and 400,000 casualties will not win back territory.  Drone attacks are ingenious and damage Russia, but they don't win back territory.

Harsh realities have set in

“Right,” Graham replied. “Well, here’s the reality — Ukraine cannot evict every Russian soldier that occupies Ukrainian territory. They fought like tigers. They kept Russian advances to the minimum. Zelensky has been a good wartime leader, but the credit does go to the Ukrainian people through their military who are outgunned and outmanned, and the only reason they’re able to stay in this fight because of American weapons. People forget that it was Trump who gave Javelins to the Ukrainian military before he left office and that allowed them to stop Russia from taking Kyiv. And these weapons being provided by the United States gives a qualitative edge to Ukraine to stay in the fight. How does this end? There’s going to be compromise. Ukraine’s going to have to recognize that there will be parts of Ukraine under Russian control. That doesn’t mean transferring title to Russia, but East Germany and West Germany existed for a long time until reunification.”

https://www.breitbart.com/clips/2025/08/...n-control/

[dabigv13]

You are correct that the territory Russia presently holds is unlikely to be liberated by Ukraine any time soon. But, there is a big difference between acknowledging Russian de facto control over portions of Ukrainian de jure territory, something I don't think many Ukrainians or their supporters would have much issue with, and strongarming Ukraine to cede cities and fortified territory that Ukraine still occupies and Ukrainian citizens still live in.

The territory that Ukraine still holds in Donetsk has a mix of high ground, cities, and Ukraine's densest fortifications. If a "land swap" just gives that to them, the pathway is open for Russia to drive on the major city of Dnipro across favorable terrain, and likely further from there. This is what Putin is asking for and Trump seems open to. The visit from all major European leaders seems to have at least forestalled this, but for how long is uncertain.

[dabigv13]

You are correct that the territory Russia presently holds is unlikely to be liberated by Ukraine any time soon. But, there is a big difference between acknowledging Russian de facto control over portions of Ukrainian de jure territory, something I don't think many Ukrainians or their supporters would have much issue with, and strongarming Ukraine to cede cities and fortified territory that Ukraine still occupies and Ukrainian citizens still live in.

The territory that Ukraine still holds in Donetsk has a mix of high ground, cities, and Ukraine's densest fortifications. If a "land swap" just gives that to them, the pathway is open for Russia to drive on the major city of Dnipro across favorable terrain, and likely further from there. This is what Putin is asking for and Trump seems open to. The visit from all major European leaders seems to have at least forestalled this, but for how long is uncertain.

[GK3]

The biggest challenge is how many lives would it take now to take back the HEAVILY MINED Donbas / Donetsk / Luhansk?  
Another year of fighting and 400,000 casualties will not win back territory.  Drone attacks are ingenious and damage Russia, but they don't win back territory.

Harsh realities have set in

“Right,” Graham replied. “Well, here’s the reality — Ukraine cannot evict every Russian soldier that occupies Ukrainian territory. They fought like tigers. They kept Russian advances to the minimum. Zelensky has been a good wartime leader, but the credit does go to the Ukrainian people through their military who are outgunned and outmanned, and the only reason they’re able to stay in this fight because of American weapons. People forget that it was Trump who gave Javelins to the Ukrainian military before he left office and that allowed them to stop Russia from taking Kyiv. And these weapons being provided by the United States gives a qualitative edge to Ukraine to stay in the fight. How does this end? There’s going to be compromise. Ukraine’s going to have to recognize that there will be parts of Ukraine under Russian control. That doesn’t mean transferring title to Russia, but East Germany and West Germany existed for a long time until reunification.”

https://www.breitbart.com/clips/2025/08/...n-control/

West Germany and East Germany came into existence due to the politics of WWII.  There is no comparison to the centuries long relationship of Russia and Ukraine which dates back more than 1,000 years to what was known as Kyivan Rus.  There are both periods of joint development and periods where Ukraine and Russia developed separately.  One could easily earn a doctorate on this subject, it is an old and very complex relationship.  None of that as far as I am concerned gives Putin any legal basis for his attack.

[GK3]

The biggest challenge is how many lives would it take now to take back the HEAVILY MINED Donbas / Donetsk / Luhansk?  
Another year of fighting and 400,000 casualties will not win back territory.  Drone attacks are ingenious and damage Russia, but they don't win back territory.

Harsh realities have set in

“Right,” Graham replied. “Well, here’s the reality — Ukraine cannot evict every Russian soldier that occupies Ukrainian territory. They fought like tigers. They kept Russian advances to the minimum. Zelensky has been a good wartime leader, but the credit does go to the Ukrainian people through their military who are outgunned and outmanned, and the only reason they’re able to stay in this fight because of American weapons. People forget that it was Trump who gave Javelins to the Ukrainian military before he left office and that allowed them to stop Russia from taking Kyiv. And these weapons being provided by the United States gives a qualitative edge to Ukraine to stay in the fight. How does this end? There’s going to be compromise. Ukraine’s going to have to recognize that there will be parts of Ukraine under Russian control. That doesn’t mean transferring title to Russia, but East Germany and West Germany existed for a long time until reunification.”

https://www.breitbart.com/clips/2025/08/...n-control/

West Germany and East Germany came into existence due to the politics of WWII.  There is no comparison to the centuries long relationship of Russia and Ukraine which dates back more than 1,000 years to what was known as Kyivan Rus.  There are both periods of joint development and periods where Ukraine and Russia developed separately.  One could easily earn a doctorate on this subject, it is an old and very complex relationship.  None of that as far as I am concerned gives Putin any legal basis for his attack.

[Goose]

TODAY:  
"Europe must stop relying on avoiding the worst-possible outcome and hoping for the best when it comes to Trump. They need to stop relying on changing his mind and dramatically step up their support for the Ukrainian army. They have to show that they’re really in this for the long run by providing way more weaponry, way more support, and maybe eventually committing to putting forces on the ground to protect any peace that eventually comes." 
Prof. Matthias Matthijs, Senior Fellow at CFR, and Prof at SAIS. 
https://www.cfr.org/article/major-takeaw...an-leaders

Americans have been begging NATO Europeans for years to increase their % of GDP devoted to the military. Given Putin's clear intent to rebuild the Soviet Union, I suspect they will take this threat seriously. Germany, France, Italy and the UK combined have (near as I can tell) a little over 700,000 active members of the military. Russia alone has 623k active, 188k on reserve (I'm sure Goose can come up with more accurate figures). NATO combined has (I think) 850k frontline military with 650k in reserve (inclusive of USA).

I can indeed come up with some figures. How accurate they are is often difficult to know. I do however think your 623k active troops for Russia is quite low. General Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, stated in April 2025 that Russia has 623,000 military personnel fighting against Ukraine. Clearly, all of the Russian military is not fighting in Ukraine. Here's what I ended up with.
Country    Active Duty     Reserve Source
Germany       182,496       34,600 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bundeswehr
France          270,000       63,700 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Armed_Forces
UK               140,244       31,967 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Armed_Forces

Russia 1     1,100,000  1,500,000 https://worldpopulationreview.com/countr...by-country
Russia 2     1,320,000  2,000,000 https://www.statista.com/statistics/1334...a-by-type/

US             1,326,050     806,700 https://worldpopulationreview.com/countr...by-country

"3 EU"          592,740     130,267
 
The 1.32 million Russian active duty personnel number shows up in several places. One of them is the announcement that Putin intends to increase that number to 1.5 million. Before reserves are counted, i.e. ready to fight tonight, Russia has more than a 2:1 superiority in manpower. After the reserve callup, the ratio is 4.6:1 in favor of Russia. With the US forces added the ratio before reserve callup would be 1.5:1 in favor of the NATO contingent. However, since the US Army contingent would have to be deployed a fair distance, it would be more realistic to consider the post-callup ratio of 1.2:1 in favor of Russia. Obviously there are lots of requirements on both sides pulling the numbers actually available down. However, no matter how one cuts it Russia would be operating with a numerical advantage and much shorter lines of supply than the US contingent would have.

I think NATO collectively outspends Russia by 3:1.

One has to be very, very careful with military budget numbers coming out of/about Russia. None of them are "reliable". So many things in the Russian military-industrial complex are done by decree rather than a "contract" that even the Russian military itself has no idea what things actually cost. That is one factor that makes corruption rampant. That said, it is undoubtedly correct that the US/EU/NATO forces outspend Russia in terms of absolute dollars. How expenditure relates to military utility (for all involved) is unclear.

I don't know why it's taken NATO/Europe so long to wake up. Glad they have.

I doubt they actually have "woken up". There are many social and political movements in Europe that are hostile to increased military spending, period. There are several generations of Europeans that have never imagined they might be called upon to defend their nation or that there was any need to do so. Most of those people still feel that way. Clearly Russia's activities in Ukraine have created significant angst in the body politic of Europe, but how deep that runs is as yet unknown. One metric is that there has not been any surge in volunteers for the German military :-). We have not yet seen how the electorate will view the required expenditures. Germany is dealing with a worse economic situation than they have seen in many, many years. AfD definitely doesn't want an increase in military expenditures at the expense of "Germany's interests". The UK is in such bad economic shape they are laying up perfectly good warships because they can't afford to crew them  My post on July 4th addressed some of these issues.
 
One serious concern is that when the war in Ukraine ends, however it ends, and things return to "normal", will anyone in Europe be willing to spend the money and draft the troops needed to defend themselves, especially if they are unsure their fellow NATO members will. Nobody so far has suggested, even sotto voce  the idea of reinstating UMT. Without that, the Europeans won't have the necessary manpower in any case.

[Goose]

TODAY:  
"Europe must stop relying on avoiding the worst-possible outcome and hoping for the best when it comes to Trump. They need to stop relying on changing his mind and dramatically step up their support for the Ukrainian army. They have to show that they’re really in this for the long run by providing way more weaponry, way more support, and maybe eventually committing to putting forces on the ground to protect any peace that eventually comes." 
Prof. Matthias Matthijs, Senior Fellow at CFR, and Prof at SAIS. 
https://www.cfr.org/article/major-takeaw...an-leaders

Americans have been begging NATO Europeans for years to increase their % of GDP devoted to the military. Given Putin's clear intent to rebuild the Soviet Union, I suspect they will take this threat seriously. Germany, France, Italy and the UK combined have (near as I can tell) a little over 700,000 active members of the military. Russia alone has 623k active, 188k on reserve (I'm sure Goose can come up with more accurate figures). NATO combined has (I think) 850k frontline military with 650k in reserve (inclusive of USA).

I can indeed come up with some figures. How accurate they are is often difficult to know. I do however think your 623k active troops for Russia is quite low. General Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, stated in April 2025 that Russia has 623,000 military personnel fighting against Ukraine. Clearly, all of the Russian military is not fighting in Ukraine. Here's what I ended up with.
Country    Active Duty     Reserve Source
Germany       182,496       34,600 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bundeswehr
France          270,000       63,700 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Armed_Forces
UK               140,244       31,967 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Armed_Forces

Russia 1     1,100,000  1,500,000 https://worldpopulationreview.com/countr...by-country
Russia 2     1,320,000  2,000,000 https://www.statista.com/statistics/1334...a-by-type/

US             1,326,050     806,700 https://worldpopulationreview.com/countr...by-country

"3 EU"          592,740     130,267
 
The 1.32 million Russian active duty personnel number shows up in several places. One of them is the announcement that Putin intends to increase that number to 1.5 million. Before reserves are counted, i.e. ready to fight tonight, Russia has more than a 2:1 superiority in manpower. After the reserve callup, the ratio is 4.6:1 in favor of Russia. With the US forces added the ratio before reserve callup would be 1.5:1 in favor of the NATO contingent. However, since the US Army contingent would have to be deployed a fair distance, it would be more realistic to consider the post-callup ratio of 1.2:1 in favor of Russia. Obviously there are lots of requirements on both sides pulling the numbers actually available down. However, no matter how one cuts it Russia would be operating with a numerical advantage and much shorter lines of supply than the US contingent would have.

I think NATO collectively outspends Russia by 3:1.

One has to be very, very careful with military budget numbers coming out of/about Russia. None of them are "reliable". So many things in the Russian military-industrial complex are done by decree rather than a "contract" that even the Russian military itself has no idea what things actually cost. That is one factor that makes corruption rampant. That said, it is undoubtedly correct that the US/EU/NATO forces outspend Russia in terms of absolute dollars. How expenditure relates to military utility (for all involved) is unclear.

I don't know why it's taken NATO/Europe so long to wake up. Glad they have.

I doubt they actually have "woken up". There are many social and political movements in Europe that are hostile to increased military spending, period. There are several generations of Europeans that have never imagined they might be called upon to defend their nation or that there was any need to do so. Most of those people still feel that way. Clearly Russia's activities in Ukraine have created significant angst in the body politic of Europe, but how deep that runs is as yet unknown. One metric is that there has not been any surge in volunteers for the German military :-). We have not yet seen how the electorate will view the required expenditures. Germany is dealing with a worse economic situation than they have seen in many, many years. AfD definitely doesn't want an increase in military expenditures at the expense of "Germany's interests". The UK is in such bad economic shape they are laying up perfectly good warships because they can't afford to crew them  My post on July 4th addressed some of these issues.
 
One serious concern is that when the war in Ukraine ends, however it ends, and things return to "normal", will anyone in Europe be willing to spend the money and draft the troops needed to defend themselves, especially if they are unsure their fellow NATO members will. Nobody so far has suggested, even sotto voce  the idea of reinstating UMT. Without that, the Europeans won't have the necessary manpower in any case.

[BostonCard]

As far as I understand it, Russia wants to claim territory in Donetsk and Luhansk that it does not control.  It would be one thing for Ukraine to cede land that it has lost militarily; it’s quite another to cede land that it still controls.  Furthermore, the land that Russia seeks is heavily fortified, and much more defensible than the land ahead of it.  The very legitimate worry on Ukraine’s side is that if it agrees to cede the land, then Russia regroups and attacks from there at some future date.

It would be great if we can get to a peace in Ukraine and Russia. But I don’t think Putin wants peace; he wants a capitulation.  Failing that, he wants to give Trump the illusion that he is willing to push for peace, to give him time and space to accomplish his maximalist goals militarily.  Based on what we’ve seen in the last week, I don’t think there is any difference in the assessment that Putin is “tapping us along” (to use Trump’s term).  I hope I am wrong, and that we get to a peace, even one that involves painful concessions by Ukraine.  But I think Putin is deliberately sticking to a demand that will be a bridge too far for Ukraine to take because he doesn’t want a peace deal; he just wants to look like he is not the obstacle to peace.

BC

---

1755643583[/url]']
I doubt they actually have "woken up". There are many social and political movements in Europe that are hostile to increased military spending, period. There are several generations of Europeans that have never imagined they might be called upon to defend their nation or that there was any need to do so. Most of those people still feel that way. Clearly Russia's activities in Ukraine have created significant angst in the body politic of Europe, but how deep that runs is as yet unknown. One metric is that there has not been any surge in volunteers for the German military :-). We have not yet seen how the electorate will view the required expenditures. Germany is dealing with a worse economic situation than they have seen in many, many years. AfD definitely doesn't want an increase in military expenditures at the expense of "Germany's interests". The UK is in such bad economic shape they are laying up perfectly good warships because they can't afford to crew them  My post on July 4th addressed some of these issues.

I think the chances that Europe (ex Spain) spends 5% of GDP on defense absent a direct attack on a NATO country is pretty slim.  Talk, as they say, is cheap, and Europeans know that this administration will only be around another 3 years and change.  I think we will see more spending, and everyone but Spain and Canada should exceed the old 2% target.  But another 3% spending on defense and defense-adjacent infrastructure will have to come from somewhere, so Europeans will have to either increase taxes (probably tough to do by that amount given taxes are already fairly high), increase productivity and GDP (the former is hard and no one really knows how to do it; the latter would require increasing the labor force, and given the resistance that Macron encountered increasing the retirement age, from 62 to 64, that does not bode well), redirecting money from the welfare state to defense (see the previous comment on increasing the retirement age), or further borrowing (but many countries are have debts exceeding 100% GDP).  Increased defense spending has been promised, but I expect a lot of electoral pushback once it is implemented, so I expect we won’t get to 5% outside of Poland and the Baltic countries.

BC

[BostonCard]

As far as I understand it, Russia wants to claim territory in Donetsk and Luhansk that it does not control.  It would be one thing for Ukraine to cede land that it has lost militarily; it’s quite another to cede land that it still controls.  Furthermore, the land that Russia seeks is heavily fortified, and much more defensible than the land ahead of it.  The very legitimate worry on Ukraine’s side is that if it agrees to cede the land, then Russia regroups and attacks from there at some future date.

It would be great if we can get to a peace in Ukraine and Russia. But I don’t think Putin wants peace; he wants a capitulation.  Failing that, he wants to give Trump the illusion that he is willing to push for peace, to give him time and space to accomplish his maximalist goals militarily.  Based on what we’ve seen in the last week, I don’t think there is any difference in the assessment that Putin is “tapping us along” (to use Trump’s term).  I hope I am wrong, and that we get to a peace, even one that involves painful concessions by Ukraine.  But I think Putin is deliberately sticking to a demand that will be a bridge too far for Ukraine to take because he doesn’t want a peace deal; he just wants to look like he is not the obstacle to peace.

BC

---

1755643583[/url]']
I doubt they actually have "woken up". There are many social and political movements in Europe that are hostile to increased military spending, period. There are several generations of Europeans that have never imagined they might be called upon to defend their nation or that there was any need to do so. Most of those people still feel that way. Clearly Russia's activities in Ukraine have created significant angst in the body politic of Europe, but how deep that runs is as yet unknown. One metric is that there has not been any surge in volunteers for the German military :-). We have not yet seen how the electorate will view the required expenditures. Germany is dealing with a worse economic situation than they have seen in many, many years. AfD definitely doesn't want an increase in military expenditures at the expense of "Germany's interests". The UK is in such bad economic shape they are laying up perfectly good warships because they can't afford to crew them  My post on July 4th addressed some of these issues.

I think the chances that Europe (ex Spain) spends 5% of GDP on defense absent a direct attack on a NATO country is pretty slim.  Talk, as they say, is cheap, and Europeans know that this administration will only be around another 3 years and change.  I think we will see more spending, and everyone but Spain and Canada should exceed the old 2% target.  But another 3% spending on defense and defense-adjacent infrastructure will have to come from somewhere, so Europeans will have to either increase taxes (probably tough to do by that amount given taxes are already fairly high), increase productivity and GDP (the former is hard and no one really knows how to do it; the latter would require increasing the labor force, and given the resistance that Macron encountered increasing the retirement age, from 62 to 64, that does not bode well), redirecting money from the welfare state to defense (see the previous comment on increasing the retirement age), or further borrowing (but many countries are have debts exceeding 100% GDP).  Increased defense spending has been promised, but I expect a lot of electoral pushback once it is implemented, so I expect we won’t get to 5% outside of Poland and the Baltic countries.

BC

[GK3]

As far as I understand it, Russia wants to claim territory in Donetsk and Luhansk that it does not control.  It would be one thing for Ukraine to cede land that it has lost militarily; it’s quite another to cede land that it still controls.  Furthermore, the land that Russia seeks is heavily fortified, and much more defensible than the land ahead of it.  The very legitimate worry on Ukraine’s side is that if it agrees to cede the land, then Russia regroups and attacks from there at some future date.

It would be great if we can get to a peace in Ukraine and Russia. But I don’t think Putin wants peace; he wants a capitulation.  Failing that, he wants to give Trump the illusion that he is willing to push for peace, to give him time and space to accomplish his maximalist goals militarily.  Based on what we’ve seen in the last week, I don’t think there is any difference in the assessment that Putin is “tapping us along” (to use Trump’s term).  I hope I am wrong, and that we get to a peace, even one that involves painful concessions by Ukraine.  But I think Putin is deliberately sticking to a demand that will be a bridge too far for Ukraine to take because he doesn’t want a peace deal; he just wants to look like he is not the obstacle to peace.

BC

No question in my mind is that if Ukraine gives up an inch it will just postpone the next attack, this time probably much better prepared. Anybody who thinks Putin will accept any solution other than full control of Ukraine just isn't thinking.  IF and only IF what is left of Ukraine is accepted into 
NATO with full rights under article 5 maybe  some sort of real peace might be possible. Out best solution is to let the actuarial tables catch up with Putin so we can deal with his successor whoever that might be.

[GK3]

As far as I understand it, Russia wants to claim territory in Donetsk and Luhansk that it does not control.  It would be one thing for Ukraine to cede land that it has lost militarily; it’s quite another to cede land that it still controls.  Furthermore, the land that Russia seeks is heavily fortified, and much more defensible than the land ahead of it.  The very legitimate worry on Ukraine’s side is that if it agrees to cede the land, then Russia regroups and attacks from there at some future date.

It would be great if we can get to a peace in Ukraine and Russia. But I don’t think Putin wants peace; he wants a capitulation.  Failing that, he wants to give Trump the illusion that he is willing to push for peace, to give him time and space to accomplish his maximalist goals militarily.  Based on what we’ve seen in the last week, I don’t think there is any difference in the assessment that Putin is “tapping us along” (to use Trump’s term).  I hope I am wrong, and that we get to a peace, even one that involves painful concessions by Ukraine.  But I think Putin is deliberately sticking to a demand that will be a bridge too far for Ukraine to take because he doesn’t want a peace deal; he just wants to look like he is not the obstacle to peace.

BC

No question in my mind is that if Ukraine gives up an inch it will just postpone the next attack, this time probably much better prepared. Anybody who thinks Putin will accept any solution other than full control of Ukraine just isn't thinking.  IF and only IF what is left of Ukraine is accepted into 
NATO with full rights under article 5 maybe  some sort of real peace might be possible. Out best solution is to let the actuarial tables catch up with Putin so we can deal with his successor whoever that might be.

[Goose]

I wonder what role is most important in our national interest? Money, Arms or Boots on the Ground, or all 3?  Have we ever clearly defined what our National Interests are?  They change, but they do not change much. Since 1963, how many ill fated adventures have gotten involved in only to look back at failure?

I was actually quite surprised these questions did not generate much more discussion. It may be that at this point in the Ukraine conflict it is almost a postulate on this board that preventing Russia from absorbing Ukraine is in the US national interest. However, IMO it is important to recognize that the first Bush administration considered that the preferred outcome. The Clinton administration was agnostic enough on that subject that the security "assurances" contained in the Trilateral Agreement contained no assurances that the US would actively oppose such an outcome. The second Bush administration responded to the election of a pro-western government in Ukraine by publicly advocating Ukraine's admission to NATO. Both Germany and France were a very "hard no" at that time. The Bush administration therefore backed away from that position, Ukraine having said that was "ok". During the Obama administration Russia invaded Crimea and the southern Ukraine. At that point the administration did not declare it in the national interest of the US to prevent Russia absorbing that part of Ukraine. During the first Trump administration there was no declaration that the US considered Ukraine's future existence a national interest of the United States. IMO the US had always considered Ukraine as "too hard to do" in terms of defending it from Russia. Defending Ukraine's rights as a nation by military action is not and was not a "national priority".
 
There is another set of US interests that are involved in the Ukraine war. The US has pushed for the rule of law to persist among nations. One nation can't simply decide to take over another. This preference by the US is not absolute. There are instances in Africa, the middle east, south Asia etc. where the US deplores such actions but isn't going to do anything about them. In many cases both nations are operating outside the law and neither is innocent. In other cases the risk of failure is high enough that said failure would do more harm than good. In these cases we do nothing. Some obsolete examples of this approach would be Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. The point to be made here is that the US often weighs the benefits of "enforcing" the rule of law regarding aggression vs the cost of doing so. That cost can be the cost of success (in lives and dollars) and the cost of failure (in lives, dollars, and diplomatic clout). It has been assumed after the formation of NATO that the US would not allow European wars to break out. The conflicts in the Balkans is an example of the US intervening to prevent such an action. It also demonstrated the idea that non-NATO states had to follow the rules too :-).
 
IMO it was the latter policy that caused the US to involve itself in Ukraine. It wasn't Ukraine itself that was the critical national interest. It was the principal that territorial disputes in Europe could not be decided by a war. This has been a pillar of US policy since the end of WW II. The administration felt that protecting this principle was in the US national interest. That is why we are "involved". However, the US had a choice. One approach would have been to declare this conflict "not a European one" and stay out of it. That would quite possibly have been considered a weak and disingenuous response  (which it would indeed have been). However, the damage that response could do to the principle needed to be weighed against the damage that will be done by attempting to enforce the principle and failing.  If you don't have a plan that is pretty much guaranteed to work, it is probably better to stay out of it. It appears we had no real "plan" other than reacting to events as they happened. That is why we are now where we are. Good intentions but no reasonable plan often leads to that result. Subsequent bad decisions may well have increased the damage failing to preserve Ukraine's sovereignty will have on world peace in general and  US foreign policy in particular, but from day one, it appears we had no plan to "win". Thus we are not winning :-).

[Goose]

I wonder what role is most important in our national interest? Money, Arms or Boots on the Ground, or all 3?  Have we ever clearly defined what our National Interests are?  They change, but they do not change much. Since 1963, how many ill fated adventures have gotten involved in only to look back at failure?

I was actually quite surprised these questions did not generate much more discussion. It may be that at this point in the Ukraine conflict it is almost a postulate on this board that preventing Russia from absorbing Ukraine is in the US national interest. However, IMO it is important to recognize that the first Bush administration considered that the preferred outcome. The Clinton administration was agnostic enough on that subject that the security "assurances" contained in the Trilateral Agreement contained no assurances that the US would actively oppose such an outcome. The second Bush administration responded to the election of a pro-western government in Ukraine by publicly advocating Ukraine's admission to NATO. Both Germany and France were a very "hard no" at that time. The Bush administration therefore backed away from that position, Ukraine having said that was "ok". During the Obama administration Russia invaded Crimea and the southern Ukraine. At that point the administration did not declare it in the national interest of the US to prevent Russia absorbing that part of Ukraine. During the first Trump administration there was no declaration that the US considered Ukraine's future existence a national interest of the United States. IMO the US had always considered Ukraine as "too hard to do" in terms of defending it from Russia. Defending Ukraine's rights as a nation by military action is not and was not a "national priority".
 
There is another set of US interests that are involved in the Ukraine war. The US has pushed for the rule of law to persist among nations. One nation can't simply decide to take over another. This preference by the US is not absolute. There are instances in Africa, the middle east, south Asia etc. where the US deplores such actions but isn't going to do anything about them. In many cases both nations are operating outside the law and neither is innocent. In other cases the risk of failure is high enough that said failure would do more harm than good. In these cases we do nothing. Some obsolete examples of this approach would be Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. The point to be made here is that the US often weighs the benefits of "enforcing" the rule of law regarding aggression vs the cost of doing so. That cost can be the cost of success (in lives and dollars) and the cost of failure (in lives, dollars, and diplomatic clout). It has been assumed after the formation of NATO that the US would not allow European wars to break out. The conflicts in the Balkans is an example of the US intervening to prevent such an action. It also demonstrated the idea that non-NATO states had to follow the rules too :-).
 
IMO it was the latter policy that caused the US to involve itself in Ukraine. It wasn't Ukraine itself that was the critical national interest. It was the principal that territorial disputes in Europe could not be decided by a war. This has been a pillar of US policy since the end of WW II. The administration felt that protecting this principle was in the US national interest. That is why we are "involved". However, the US had a choice. One approach would have been to declare this conflict "not a European one" and stay out of it. That would quite possibly have been considered a weak and disingenuous response  (which it would indeed have been). However, the damage that response could do to the principle needed to be weighed against the damage that will be done by attempting to enforce the principle and failing.  If you don't have a plan that is pretty much guaranteed to work, it is probably better to stay out of it. It appears we had no real "plan" other than reacting to events as they happened. That is why we are now where we are. Good intentions but no reasonable plan often leads to that result. Subsequent bad decisions may well have increased the damage failing to preserve Ukraine's sovereignty will have on world peace in general and  US foreign policy in particular, but from day one, it appears we had no plan to "win". Thus we are not winning :-).

[BostonCard]

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/moscow-..._permalink

According to that proposal, which Lavrov erroneously described as approved by Kyiv at the time, Russia would have a veto power over any action by the other guarantors of Ukrainian security—making those assurances pointless. On Wednesday, Lavrov said China should also have equal powers in these guarantees.

And there it is; Russia essentially insisting on a veto over Western security guarantees, which is ridiculous at its face.  As I surmised earlier, Russia is basically trying to give the illusion that it is willing to negotiate for peace in order to forestall further reaction from the US while not actually negotiating.  Sadly, it seems like the strategy has been effective to date.

BC

[BostonCard]

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/moscow-..._permalink

According to that proposal, which Lavrov erroneously described as approved by Kyiv at the time, Russia would have a veto power over any action by the other guarantors of Ukrainian security—making those assurances pointless. On Wednesday, Lavrov said China should also have equal powers in these guarantees.

And there it is; Russia essentially insisting on a veto over Western security guarantees, which is ridiculous at its face.  As I surmised earlier, Russia is basically trying to give the illusion that it is willing to negotiate for peace in order to forestall further reaction from the US while not actually negotiating.  Sadly, it seems like the strategy has been effective to date.

BC

[Goose]

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/moscow-..._permalink

According to that proposal, which Lavrov erroneously described as approved by Kyiv at the time, Russia would have a veto power over any action by the other guarantors of Ukrainian security—making those assurances pointless. On Wednesday, Lavrov said China should also have equal powers in these guarantees.

And there it is; Russia essentially insisting on a veto over Western security guarantees, which is ridiculous at its face.  As I surmised earlier, Russia is basically trying to give the illusion that it is willing to negotiate for peace in order to forestall further reaction from the US while not actually negotiating.  Sadly, it seems like the strategy has been effective to date.

BC

Indeed. The administration has a chance to force Putin to compromise. To do that they would have to make nice we with India and other importers of Russian oil. This administration doesn't know how to create win-win situations. Therefore they will do nothing.

[Goose]

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/moscow-..._permalink

According to that proposal, which Lavrov erroneously described as approved by Kyiv at the time, Russia would have a veto power over any action by the other guarantors of Ukrainian security—making those assurances pointless. On Wednesday, Lavrov said China should also have equal powers in these guarantees.

And there it is; Russia essentially insisting on a veto over Western security guarantees, which is ridiculous at its face.  As I surmised earlier, Russia is basically trying to give the illusion that it is willing to negotiate for peace in order to forestall further reaction from the US while not actually negotiating.  Sadly, it seems like the strategy has been effective to date.

BC

Indeed. The administration has a chance to force Putin to compromise. To do that they would have to make nice we with India and other importers of Russian oil. This administration doesn't know how to create win-win situations. Therefore they will do nothing.

[GK3]

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/moscow-..._permalink

According to that proposal, which Lavrov erroneously described as approved by Kyiv at the time, Russia would have a veto power over any action by the other guarantors of Ukrainian security—making those assurances pointless. On Wednesday, Lavrov said China should also have equal powers in these guarantees.

And there it is; Russia essentially insisting on a veto over Western security guarantees, which is ridiculous at its face.  As I surmised earlier, Russia is basically trying to give the illusion that it is willing to negotiate for peace in order to forestall further reaction from the US while not actually negotiating.  Sadly, it seems like the strategy has been effective to date.

BC

Indeed. The administration has a chance to force Putin to compromise. To do that they would have to make nice we with India and other importers of Russian oil. This administration doesn't know how to create win-win situations. Therefore they will do nothing.

Couldn't agree more.  Not much more I am willing to say on this subject.

But going back to the head count of the Russian Military I think it is safe to say the Russian army is not well trained. That fact reduces their potential threat.  Russia has lost over 1,000,000 men since the war started.  The more Russians the Ukrainians can kill the better.  At some point, and one that is probably very hard to see from a distance, the losses will cause internal issues within Russia, similar to their ill fated trip to Afghanistan many years ago.  If Ukraine can continue to bring the war home to Russians in Russia via long range drone attacks, more pressure will be created that Putin will have to deal with. 
Russia also has to replace or at least try to replace its lost hardware. Much is made of their armor loses, but I am beginning to wonder if that makes any difference at all.  Tanks are an image of another age and another style of war, my guess is most become small caliber artillery pieces. 
In the end you can't evade General Patton's famous statement regarding making the other poor bastard die for his country. However they do it, the Ukrainian forces simply need to focus on inflicting as many casualties as possible and by whatever means. I still think the economic pressures will continue to grow and force some kind of solution.  I hope.

[GK3]

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/moscow-..._permalink

According to that proposal, which Lavrov erroneously described as approved by Kyiv at the time, Russia would have a veto power over any action by the other guarantors of Ukrainian security—making those assurances pointless. On Wednesday, Lavrov said China should also have equal powers in these guarantees.

And there it is; Russia essentially insisting on a veto over Western security guarantees, which is ridiculous at its face.  As I surmised earlier, Russia is basically trying to give the illusion that it is willing to negotiate for peace in order to forestall further reaction from the US while not actually negotiating.  Sadly, it seems like the strategy has been effective to date.

BC

Indeed. The administration has a chance to force Putin to compromise. To do that they would have to make nice we with India and other importers of Russian oil. This administration doesn't know how to create win-win situations. Therefore they will do nothing.

Couldn't agree more.  Not much more I am willing to say on this subject.

But going back to the head count of the Russian Military I think it is safe to say the Russian army is not well trained. That fact reduces their potential threat.  Russia has lost over 1,000,000 men since the war started.  The more Russians the Ukrainians can kill the better.  At some point, and one that is probably very hard to see from a distance, the losses will cause internal issues within Russia, similar to their ill fated trip to Afghanistan many years ago.  If Ukraine can continue to bring the war home to Russians in Russia via long range drone attacks, more pressure will be created that Putin will have to deal with. 
Russia also has to replace or at least try to replace its lost hardware. Much is made of their armor loses, but I am beginning to wonder if that makes any difference at all.  Tanks are an image of another age and another style of war, my guess is most become small caliber artillery pieces. 
In the end you can't evade General Patton's famous statement regarding making the other poor bastard die for his country. However they do it, the Ukrainian forces simply need to focus on inflicting as many casualties as possible and by whatever means. I still think the economic pressures will continue to grow and force some kind of solution.  I hope.

[dabigv13]

Some more information on Ukraine's new cruise missile. They are using a lot of "off the shelf" tech- turbofan engines from L-39 jet trainers, and warheads from Soviet FAB gravity bombs.

Commentary online suggests this could allow a large number to be built from existing stock quickly, but that further production of the engines could then be a limiting factor once the readily available supply dries up. There are many thousands of those L-39 jets in service (~10k), but production of new turbofan engines will be tough to hit their 3,000 per year goal.

Also suggestions that the range (3000km) and speed (850-900 km/h) estimates originally shared are perhaps ambitious with this engine though of course it is possible the engine has been modified from it's typical commercial version.

https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1958636077792592213
https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1958562813699309817

[dabigv13]

Some more information on Ukraine's new cruise missile. They are using a lot of "off the shelf" tech- turbofan engines from L-39 jet trainers, and warheads from Soviet FAB gravity bombs.

Commentary online suggests this could allow a large number to be built from existing stock quickly, but that further production of the engines could then be a limiting factor once the readily available supply dries up. There are many thousands of those L-39 jets in service (~10k), but production of new turbofan engines will be tough to hit their 3,000 per year goal.

Also suggestions that the range (3000km) and speed (850-900 km/h) estimates originally shared are perhaps ambitious with this engine though of course it is possible the engine has been modified from it's typical commercial version.

https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1958636077792592213
https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1958562813699309817

[Goose]

Some more information on Ukraine's new cruise missile. They are using a lot of "off the shelf" tech- turbofan engines from L-39 jet trainers, and warheads from Soviet FAB gravity bombs.

Commentary online suggests this could allow a large number to be built from existing stock quickly, but that further production of the engines could then be a limiting factor once the readily available supply dries up. There are many thousands of those L-39 jets in service (~10k),

Not so sure about that number. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aero_L-39_Albatros says 2,900 (total) were built. Ukraine operated a number of them, but nowhere near even 1,000 of them

but production of new turbofan engines will be tough to hit their 3,000 per year goal.

Possibly. However if they don't use the Ivchenko AI-25TL but rather its contemporary substitutes e.g. Garrett TFE731 (https://www.code1aviation.com/731) or the Williams FJ44-4M they may be able to simply buy them in the required quantity.

Also suggestions that the range (3000km) and speed (850-900 km/h) estimates originally shared are perhaps ambitious with this engine though of course it is possible the engine has been modified from it's typical commercial version.

https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1958636077792592213
https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1958562813699309817

IMO both the range and speed estimates are probably over-optimistic. The missile undoubtedly cannot attain maximum range when traveling entirely at maximum speed, so there is a trade-off there. The best cruising altitude also may not be usable because it makes the missile too vulnerable. All that said, the substitute engines do have better specifications than the "original". It should also be noted that even the original engine had a second, superior set of specifications for operation at "military power". Normally such engines can be operated at 110% of rated thrust. It is not recommended to do that for "long periods" and a complete inspection/overhaul is required after each such use. Since the missile isn't coming back, the latter is not an issue :-). The question would be how reliable is the engine at this power setting and for how long.

[Goose]

Some more information on Ukraine's new cruise missile. They are using a lot of "off the shelf" tech- turbofan engines from L-39 jet trainers, and warheads from Soviet FAB gravity bombs.

Commentary online suggests this could allow a large number to be built from existing stock quickly, but that further production of the engines could then be a limiting factor once the readily available supply dries up. There are many thousands of those L-39 jets in service (~10k),

Not so sure about that number. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aero_L-39_Albatros says 2,900 (total) were built. Ukraine operated a number of them, but nowhere near even 1,000 of them

but production of new turbofan engines will be tough to hit their 3,000 per year goal.

Possibly. However if they don't use the Ivchenko AI-25TL but rather its contemporary substitutes e.g. Garrett TFE731 (https://www.code1aviation.com/731) or the Williams FJ44-4M they may be able to simply buy them in the required quantity.

Also suggestions that the range (3000km) and speed (850-900 km/h) estimates originally shared are perhaps ambitious with this engine though of course it is possible the engine has been modified from it's typical commercial version.

https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1958636077792592213
https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1958562813699309817

IMO both the range and speed estimates are probably over-optimistic. The missile undoubtedly cannot attain maximum range when traveling entirely at maximum speed, so there is a trade-off there. The best cruising altitude also may not be usable because it makes the missile too vulnerable. All that said, the substitute engines do have better specifications than the "original". It should also be noted that even the original engine had a second, superior set of specifications for operation at "military power". Normally such engines can be operated at 110% of rated thrust. It is not recommended to do that for "long periods" and a complete inspection/overhaul is required after each such use. Since the missile isn't coming back, the latter is not an issue :-). The question would be how reliable is the engine at this power setting and for how long.

[GK3]

Some more information on Ukraine's new cruise missile. They are using a lot of "off the shelf" tech- turbofan engines from L-39 jet trainers, and warheads from Soviet FAB gravity bombs.

Commentary online suggests this could allow a large number to be built from existing stock quickly, but that further production of the engines could then be a limiting factor once the readily available supply dries up. There are many thousands of those L-39 jets in service (~10k), but production of new turbofan engines will be tough to hit their 3,000 per year goal.

Also suggestions that the range (3000km) and speed (850-900 km/h) estimates originally shared are perhaps ambitious with this engine though of course it is possible the engine has been modified from it's typical commercial version.

https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1958636077792592213
https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1958562813699309817

I warhead that large can do some serious damage to a manufacturing facility, refinery or tank farm.  Big question can they get enough through.

[GK3]

Some more information on Ukraine's new cruise missile. They are using a lot of "off the shelf" tech- turbofan engines from L-39 jet trainers, and warheads from Soviet FAB gravity bombs.

Commentary online suggests this could allow a large number to be built from existing stock quickly, but that further production of the engines could then be a limiting factor once the readily available supply dries up. There are many thousands of those L-39 jets in service (~10k), but production of new turbofan engines will be tough to hit their 3,000 per year goal.

Also suggestions that the range (3000km) and speed (850-900 km/h) estimates originally shared are perhaps ambitious with this engine though of course it is possible the engine has been modified from it's typical commercial version.

https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1958636077792592213
https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1958562813699309817

I warhead that large can do some serious damage to a manufacturing facility, refinery or tank farm.  Big question can they get enough through.

[Goose]

I warhead that large can do some serious damage to a manufacturing facility, refinery or tank farm.  Big question can they get enough through.

This is a great question. There have never before in history been "precision" long range weapons that could hit a very specific target with a "big" (1000-2000 lb warhead) at ranges of 500 miles or so. We have seen weapons used that could carry such a warhead (the German V-1) over that kind of distance but not with anywhere near the accuracy required. The closest analog history has for us is probably the US glide bomb attacks against Iraq. Those bombs didn't win the war for the US. We still had to send troops into the country and invade it.
 
Much to the chagrin of the precision weapons advocates the vast majority of war games indicate that precision weapons cannot render a country incapable of continuing aggressive war. They can do lots of damage. The strategic bombing campaign of WW II did lots of damage, not using accuracy but rather mass. It clearly did not end the war. OTOH it clearly damaged the axis powers ability to wage war.
 
It may be there is a set of critical targets that, if destroyed, would force Russia to stop fighting. Hopefully there is and Ukraine knows what they are :-). There may be a set of targets that if threatened would cause the Russian people to politically force Russia to stop fighting. Unfortunately IMO that is an even harder set of targets to name.
 
There is an argument that in WW II the US naval blockade of Japan would have very quickly forced a Japanese surrender without an invasion of Japan. Similarly, it can be argued that Germany would have been starved into submission if WW I had continued even a few months longer. I don't think precision missiles carrying 1 ton warheads can do that to Russia. However, it would be foolish not to try.

[Goose]

I warhead that large can do some serious damage to a manufacturing facility, refinery or tank farm.  Big question can they get enough through.

This is a great question. There have never before in history been "precision" long range weapons that could hit a very specific target with a "big" (1000-2000 lb warhead) at ranges of 500 miles or so. We have seen weapons used that could carry such a warhead (the German V-1) over that kind of distance but not with anywhere near the accuracy required. The closest analog history has for us is probably the US glide bomb attacks against Iraq. Those bombs didn't win the war for the US. We still had to send troops into the country and invade it.
 
Much to the chagrin of the precision weapons advocates the vast majority of war games indicate that precision weapons cannot render a country incapable of continuing aggressive war. They can do lots of damage. The strategic bombing campaign of WW II did lots of damage, not using accuracy but rather mass. It clearly did not end the war. OTOH it clearly damaged the axis powers ability to wage war.
 
It may be there is a set of critical targets that, if destroyed, would force Russia to stop fighting. Hopefully there is and Ukraine knows what they are :-). There may be a set of targets that if threatened would cause the Russian people to politically force Russia to stop fighting. Unfortunately IMO that is an even harder set of targets to name.
 
There is an argument that in WW II the US naval blockade of Japan would have very quickly forced a Japanese surrender without an invasion of Japan. Similarly, it can be argued that Germany would have been starved into submission if WW I had continued even a few months longer. I don't think precision missiles carrying 1 ton warheads can do that to Russia. However, it would be foolish not to try.

[dabigv13]

Getting the accuracy right will be important. There is extensive GNSS denial all over Russia, so these missiles will likely need good inertial guidance. I doubt that Ukraine will be able to use more advanced guidance such as video terrain matching. Their kludged long range drones thus far have had some success, so I'm optimistic they can make it work.

[dabigv13]

Getting the accuracy right will be important. There is extensive GNSS denial all over Russia, so these missiles will likely need good inertial guidance. I doubt that Ukraine will be able to use more advanced guidance such as video terrain matching. Their kludged long range drones thus far have had some success, so I'm optimistic they can make it work.

[GK3]

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/moscow-..._permalink

According to that proposal, which Lavrov erroneously described as approved by Kyiv at the time, Russia would have a veto power over any action by the other guarantors of Ukrainian security—making those assurances pointless. On Wednesday, Lavrov said China should also have equal powers in these guarantees.

And there it is; Russia essentially insisting on a veto over Western security guarantees, which is ridiculous at its face.  As I surmised earlier, Russia is basically trying to give the illusion that it is willing to negotiate for peace in order to forestall further reaction from the US while not actually negotiating.  Sadly, it seems like the strategy has been effective to date.

BC

Indeed. The administration has a chance to force Putin to compromise. To do that they would have to make nice we with India and other importers of Russian oil. This administration doesn't know how to create win-win situations. Therefore they will do nothing.

I don't think there is much chance of us getting any more involved in the Ukraine mess unless Russia attacks a NATO ally, and even then I don't know what this administration will do.  I am more worried about us getting dragged into a real war with Iran.  I don't think there is any question that Israeli leadership is trying to make that happen. Not sure we are smart enough to avoid that possibility.

---

Getting the accuracy right will be important. There is extensive GNSS denial all over Russia, so these missiles will likely need good inertial guidance. I doubt that Ukraine will be able to use more advanced guidance such as video terrain matching. Their kludged long range drones thus far have had some success, so I'm optimistic they can make it work.

I think this question has some very interesting issues, first and foremost would be what would the most logical targets be for these weapons?  It is logical to assume that things like factories, refineries and pipeline terminals would be first.  I do think you have to think about Russia's transportation infrastructure. They have limited long haul rail lines and are pretty dependent on them.  There will be critical bridges and other choke points which if seriously damaged would cause some major issues. The bridge to Crimea would be an obvious target.  If you can drop a major rail bridge it can't be fixed as easily or quickly as a road and with Winter not too far away it would get complicated.  Things like this might be defended to a lesser extent making a successful attack more probable. 
A symbolic target like Moscow would also be possible.

[GK3]

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/moscow-..._permalink

According to that proposal, which Lavrov erroneously described as approved by Kyiv at the time, Russia would have a veto power over any action by the other guarantors of Ukrainian security—making those assurances pointless. On Wednesday, Lavrov said China should also have equal powers in these guarantees.

And there it is; Russia essentially insisting on a veto over Western security guarantees, which is ridiculous at its face.  As I surmised earlier, Russia is basically trying to give the illusion that it is willing to negotiate for peace in order to forestall further reaction from the US while not actually negotiating.  Sadly, it seems like the strategy has been effective to date.

BC

Indeed. The administration has a chance to force Putin to compromise. To do that they would have to make nice we with India and other importers of Russian oil. This administration doesn't know how to create win-win situations. Therefore they will do nothing.

I don't think there is much chance of us getting any more involved in the Ukraine mess unless Russia attacks a NATO ally, and even then I don't know what this administration will do.  I am more worried about us getting dragged into a real war with Iran.  I don't think there is any question that Israeli leadership is trying to make that happen. Not sure we are smart enough to avoid that possibility.

---

Getting the accuracy right will be important. There is extensive GNSS denial all over Russia, so these missiles will likely need good inertial guidance. I doubt that Ukraine will be able to use more advanced guidance such as video terrain matching. Their kludged long range drones thus far have had some success, so I'm optimistic they can make it work.

I think this question has some very interesting issues, first and foremost would be what would the most logical targets be for these weapons?  It is logical to assume that things like factories, refineries and pipeline terminals would be first.  I do think you have to think about Russia's transportation infrastructure. They have limited long haul rail lines and are pretty dependent on them.  There will be critical bridges and other choke points which if seriously damaged would cause some major issues. The bridge to Crimea would be an obvious target.  If you can drop a major rail bridge it can't be fixed as easily or quickly as a road and with Winter not too far away it would get complicated.  Things like this might be defended to a lesser extent making a successful attack more probable. 
A symbolic target like Moscow would also be possible.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/trum...52511.html

I had to post this, despite the fact it is difficult to guess what practical impact it will have, if any.

“It is very hard, if not impossible, to win a war without attacking an invaders country. It’s like a great team in sports that has a fantastic defense, but is not allowed to play offense. There is no chance of winning! It is like that with Ukraine and Russia,”

Of course, this quote ignores the fact Ukraine did attack Russia in the Kursk Oblast. It went relatively well until it became clear Ukraine lacked the follow-on forces to make such an attack a true existential threat. So does this mean the US will now help Ukraine attack Russia? Why wasn't this being said in 2022?
 
IMO (broken record) there is/was a way that Ukraine could force Russia to the peace table without invading Russia proper. Ukraine needed to "win" in the south and at least threaten, if not actually accomplish, taking Crimea back from Russia. This area had several advantages for Ukraine. First, it was not recognized as part of Russia by the US, so there were fewer weapons restrictions. Second, it is much more difficult for Russia to supply than the Donbas or Kursk. Cutting the supply routes is reasonably possible. Third, if Russia lost Crimea it would be worse off than when the war started. Putin would have to explain that. It would be as if Ukraine had invaded Russia without actually doing so. Apparently that wasn't the plan :-).

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/trum...52511.html

I had to post this, despite the fact it is difficult to guess what practical impact it will have, if any.

“It is very hard, if not impossible, to win a war without attacking an invaders country. It’s like a great team in sports that has a fantastic defense, but is not allowed to play offense. There is no chance of winning! It is like that with Ukraine and Russia,”

Of course, this quote ignores the fact Ukraine did attack Russia in the Kursk Oblast. It went relatively well until it became clear Ukraine lacked the follow-on forces to make such an attack a true existential threat. So does this mean the US will now help Ukraine attack Russia? Why wasn't this being said in 2022?
 
IMO (broken record) there is/was a way that Ukraine could force Russia to the peace table without invading Russia proper. Ukraine needed to "win" in the south and at least threaten, if not actually accomplish, taking Crimea back from Russia. This area had several advantages for Ukraine. First, it was not recognized as part of Russia by the US, so there were fewer weapons restrictions. Second, it is much more difficult for Russia to supply than the Donbas or Kursk. Cutting the supply routes is reasonably possible. Third, if Russia lost Crimea it would be worse off than when the war started. Putin would have to explain that. It would be as if Ukraine had invaded Russia without actually doing so. Apparently that wasn't the plan :-).

[M T]

I believe Goose said that Ukraine had to attack infrastructure often enough to counter its getting repaired. In the last day, Ukraine attacked an oil pumping station for the third time in short succession. At least some of that is being sold externally so it hurts Russia’s inxome.

[M T]

I believe Goose said that Ukraine had to attack infrastructure often enough to counter its getting repaired. In the last day, Ukraine attacked an oil pumping station for the third time in short succession. At least some of that is being sold externally so it hurts Russia’s inxome.

[Goose]

I believe Goose said that Ukraine had to attack infrastructure often enough to counter its getting repaired. In the last day, Ukraine attacked a gas(?) pumping station for the third time in short succession. At least some of that is being sold externally so it hurts Russia’s inxome.

Indeed. Ideally you time the attacks so that all the repairs are almost done and then you strike again , killing the repair workers and resetting the function of the target.

[Goose]

I believe Goose said that Ukraine had to attack infrastructure often enough to counter its getting repaired. In the last day, Ukraine attacked a gas(?) pumping station for the third time in short succession. At least some of that is being sold externally so it hurts Russia’s inxome.

Indeed. Ideally you time the attacks so that all the repairs are almost done and then you strike again , killing the repair workers and resetting the function of the target.

[M T]

I believe Goose said that Ukraine had to attack infrastructure often enough to counter its getting repaired. In the last day, Ukraine attacked an oil pumping station for the third time in short succession. At least some of that is being sold externally so it hurts Russia’s inxome.

Correction: 
it was the 2nd time at this pumping station (11 days later) but in between was another strike on a different pumping station on the same pipeline.

[M T]

I believe Goose said that Ukraine had to attack infrastructure often enough to counter its getting repaired. In the last day, Ukraine attacked an oil pumping station for the third time in short succession. At least some of that is being sold externally so it hurts Russia’s inxome.

Correction: 
it was the 2nd time at this pumping station (11 days later) but in between was another strike on a different pumping station on the same pipeline.