[fullmetal]

Alternatively, is there a world in which one or more NATO countries decide to enforce a "no fly zone" over the parts of Ukraine that remain in Ukrainian control? 

Absolutely no chance.

US AWACS were previously flying in international airspace over the Black Sea to provide intelligence to AFU under the prior admin, iirc.

[fullmetal]

Alternatively, is there a world in which one or more NATO countries decide to enforce a "no fly zone" over the parts of Ukraine that remain in Ukrainian control? 

Absolutely no chance.

US AWACS were previously flying in international airspace over the Black Sea to provide intelligence to AFU under the prior admin, iirc.

[Goose]

Alternatively, is there a world in which one or more NATO countries decide to enforce a "no fly zone" over the parts of Ukraine that remain in Ukrainian control? 

Absolutely no chance.

US AWACS were previously flying in international airspace over the Black Sea to provide intelligence to AFU under the prior admin, iirc.

AFAIK, they still are. They also fly over European airspace near the Ukrainian border. That intelligence still flows, subject to a single interruption by the current administration. That interruption was relatively short.
 
That of course isn't a "no fly zone". There are several reasons that NATO (or individual NATO nations) would not establish a "no fly zone" over territory currently held by Ukraine. The most important one is that it would be relatively useless. The Russian air force seldom penetrates Ukrainian air space. Their glide bomb attacks are launched from inside Russian airspace. The bombs themselves enter Ukrainian airspace, but shooting down bombs is not a capability NATO (or anybody else) really possesses. They are small, cold targets. No electronic signature. They are also not in the air all that long. This is Ukraine's current "main problem" as far as holding off Russian ground advances. A "no fly zone" will not help that.
 
These NATO aircraft would also have to operate under control of Ukrainian controllers. The airspace has to be controlled by somebody. How would that work? In Iraq there were no aircraft other that the US ones in the no fly zones. In Ukraine, Ukraine is also operating an air force. They aren't going to quit doing that and they aren't going to transfer control of their aircraft to some NATO organization sitting in Germany.
 
AFAIK, neither Russia nor Ukraine is using IFF in this war. The NATO aircraft would be at risk of being shot down by both Russia and Ukraine. Russia would just say "Sorry, we thought it was a Ukrainian aircraft". NATO couldn't complain, as it is a totally reasonable assertion. NATO would themselves risk shooting down Ukrainian aircraft that are not equipped to respond to NATO IFF interrogation. It would be a mess.

If a NATO aircraft did shoot down a Russian aircraft inside Ukrainian airspace, how would Russia respond? Obviously, at a minimum, shoot down a NATO aircraft. That is a "minimum" response. Blowing up the airfield from which the NATO aircraft came is another. This spiral of escalation could very easily lead to a shooting war with Russia. IMO it is inconceivable NATO would take that risk, given all the other risks they have not taken.
 
NATO aircraft would be operating from NATO territory, not Ukrainian. They have a long flight just to "get there". The Typhoon is also notoriously short legged. They are better today than when they first came out, but still not great. In order to maintain a "presence", the NATO aircraft would need to refuel. That means tankers operating inside Ukraine. Russia could certainly go after them. After all, they usually fly pretty high and that is one reason the S-400 has such long range.
 
IMO the only benefit of a "no fly zone" would be for NATO to shoot down cruise missiles inside Ukrainian air space. That would be useful to Ukraine. The problems and risks associated with doing that listed above are far too high to make it worthwhile. IMO NATO would never even consider it.

There is another factor that would need to be considered. I am very unsure that NATO, or any NATO nation, could even come close to executing such a task without US assistance. For instance, NATO has a total of 8 MRTT tankers. They are actually "owned" by several different nations. Even if all 8 were committed (and "up" most of the time) it is hard to imagine that would be enough for a sustained effort. Assuming the US "won't play", I don't think it could happen.

[Goose]

Alternatively, is there a world in which one or more NATO countries decide to enforce a "no fly zone" over the parts of Ukraine that remain in Ukrainian control? 

Absolutely no chance.

US AWACS were previously flying in international airspace over the Black Sea to provide intelligence to AFU under the prior admin, iirc.

AFAIK, they still are. They also fly over European airspace near the Ukrainian border. That intelligence still flows, subject to a single interruption by the current administration. That interruption was relatively short.
 
That of course isn't a "no fly zone". There are several reasons that NATO (or individual NATO nations) would not establish a "no fly zone" over territory currently held by Ukraine. The most important one is that it would be relatively useless. The Russian air force seldom penetrates Ukrainian air space. Their glide bomb attacks are launched from inside Russian airspace. The bombs themselves enter Ukrainian airspace, but shooting down bombs is not a capability NATO (or anybody else) really possesses. They are small, cold targets. No electronic signature. They are also not in the air all that long. This is Ukraine's current "main problem" as far as holding off Russian ground advances. A "no fly zone" will not help that.
 
These NATO aircraft would also have to operate under control of Ukrainian controllers. The airspace has to be controlled by somebody. How would that work? In Iraq there were no aircraft other that the US ones in the no fly zones. In Ukraine, Ukraine is also operating an air force. They aren't going to quit doing that and they aren't going to transfer control of their aircraft to some NATO organization sitting in Germany.
 
AFAIK, neither Russia nor Ukraine is using IFF in this war. The NATO aircraft would be at risk of being shot down by both Russia and Ukraine. Russia would just say "Sorry, we thought it was a Ukrainian aircraft". NATO couldn't complain, as it is a totally reasonable assertion. NATO would themselves risk shooting down Ukrainian aircraft that are not equipped to respond to NATO IFF interrogation. It would be a mess.

If a NATO aircraft did shoot down a Russian aircraft inside Ukrainian airspace, how would Russia respond? Obviously, at a minimum, shoot down a NATO aircraft. That is a "minimum" response. Blowing up the airfield from which the NATO aircraft came is another. This spiral of escalation could very easily lead to a shooting war with Russia. IMO it is inconceivable NATO would take that risk, given all the other risks they have not taken.
 
NATO aircraft would be operating from NATO territory, not Ukrainian. They have a long flight just to "get there". The Typhoon is also notoriously short legged. They are better today than when they first came out, but still not great. In order to maintain a "presence", the NATO aircraft would need to refuel. That means tankers operating inside Ukraine. Russia could certainly go after them. After all, they usually fly pretty high and that is one reason the S-400 has such long range.
 
IMO the only benefit of a "no fly zone" would be for NATO to shoot down cruise missiles inside Ukrainian air space. That would be useful to Ukraine. The problems and risks associated with doing that listed above are far too high to make it worthwhile. IMO NATO would never even consider it.

There is another factor that would need to be considered. I am very unsure that NATO, or any NATO nation, could even come close to executing such a task without US assistance. For instance, NATO has a total of 8 MRTT tankers. They are actually "owned" by several different nations. Even if all 8 were committed (and "up" most of the time) it is hard to imagine that would be enough for a sustained effort. Assuming the US "won't play", I don't think it could happen.

[Goose]

https://www.businessinsider.com/wests-ap...try-2025-6

I assume lots of us have seen this article. I think it is 100% dead wrong. It represents a complete lack of understanding of what the US and NATO is trying to accomplish. The point is that NATO recognizes it cannot win a war of attrition with Russia. The US public would never ever accept the kind of casualties Ukraine is suffering. It would also be foolish to do so. Entering into a conflict with Russia that is an Infantry slog is giving the Russians exactly what they want. It is allowing them to maximize their advantage. During the Cold War (when Russia had a bigger relative population) NATO focused on forcing Russia to fight the war we wanted, not the war they wanted. NATO succeed in this to the point the Russian military was convinced that a land war in Europe would be lost without the early use of tactical nuclear weapons.

Ukraine suffers from the lack of ability to dictate the fight to Russia. They have to fight an infantry war because they have no alternative. Ukraine's use of drones has challenged Russia's ability to dictate the character of the conflict. Unfortunately it hasn't and won't accomplish that. It is very useful, but it has not destroyed Russia's ability to fight an Infantry war on Russia's terms. Ukraine does not have the ability to threaten Russia's sovereignty with the forces they have, period. NATO (as long as the US is on board) has an air force that can penetrate Russian air defenses and inflict massive damage. Ukraine does not. That is all by itself a game changer.

[Goose]

https://www.businessinsider.com/wests-ap...try-2025-6

I assume lots of us have seen this article. I think it is 100% dead wrong. It represents a complete lack of understanding of what the US and NATO is trying to accomplish. The point is that NATO recognizes it cannot win a war of attrition with Russia. The US public would never ever accept the kind of casualties Ukraine is suffering. It would also be foolish to do so. Entering into a conflict with Russia that is an Infantry slog is giving the Russians exactly what they want. It is allowing them to maximize their advantage. During the Cold War (when Russia had a bigger relative population) NATO focused on forcing Russia to fight the war we wanted, not the war they wanted. NATO succeed in this to the point the Russian military was convinced that a land war in Europe would be lost without the early use of tactical nuclear weapons.

Ukraine suffers from the lack of ability to dictate the fight to Russia. They have to fight an infantry war because they have no alternative. Ukraine's use of drones has challenged Russia's ability to dictate the character of the conflict. Unfortunately it hasn't and won't accomplish that. It is very useful, but it has not destroyed Russia's ability to fight an Infantry war on Russia's terms. Ukraine does not have the ability to threaten Russia's sovereignty with the forces they have, period. NATO (as long as the US is on board) has an air force that can penetrate Russian air defenses and inflict massive damage. Ukraine does not. That is all by itself a game changer.

[Goose]

I wonder whether Russia could undertake a new invasion within the next 4 years. At that point, the leadership of the US has a good chance of changing and its commitment to NATO may change.(*)

Granted, the world has seen how fickle the US can be and needs to be better prepared for that fickleness. 
 
(*)This is assuming the US continues as it has for nearly 250 years.

Is the U. S. fickle, or is it just one guy? Have we been fickle in the past? We answered the bell multiple times in the last century.

The US, with its 4-year cycle, may change by 180 degrees on any 4-year boundary.  In this cycle, there was a dramatic change

The simple fact is that ANY nation mat change by any number of degrees (including 180) anytime it becomes politically popular/necessary. It doesn't require a 4-year cycle. However, there are some "third rail" commitments that have existed for a very long time in the US. From Sept 30, 1800 (when the Treaty of Mortefontaine abrogated the indefinite term US military alliance with France) until February 28, 1942 (when the US signed the indefinite term Anglo-American Mutual Aid Agreement) the policy of no "entangling" alliances was followed. This policy was recommended by G. Washington and followed religiously until 1942. I make that to be 142 years. Even World War I did not force the US to waver. We fought as an "associated power" and signed no treaties.

FDR undoubtedly would have preferred to break precedent much earlier than he did. The attack by Japan upon US sovereign territory and our unavoidable entry into WW II undoubtedly was the "big enough" event to justify its necessity to even the most dedicated isolationists. The US was hardly "being fickle" with regard to this policy.

Similarly, when the US signed the NATO founding treaty on April 14, 1949 Article 5 had some "weasel words" included in it to allow the US to claim we were not making an open-ended commitment to military action. However, the clause stating an attack on one “shall be considered an attack against them all” is the one that the US presidents and their administrations have emphasized. All presidents from 1949 until the present have recognized that NATO would be an empty vessel if the US would not respond fully to an attack on other NATO nations. These administrations have repeatedly reiterated that commitment. During the Cold War the question always ask was "Would the US risk New York for Paris (or more commonly Bonn)". The answer was always an emphatic yes. Any doubt would have been very corrosive. For 76 years we were steadfast in that commitment. We are not "fickle". Our policy was changed by the realization that WW II was so disruptive that a firm commitment to military cooperation was essential. Subsequently the US realized that living with the continued threat of war in Europe was not tenable. Thus the 76 year commitment to a maximal Article 5 response. It is unclear (to me at least) why we now seem to be willing to accept the possibility of European wars as "not our problem".

[Goose]

I wonder whether Russia could undertake a new invasion within the next 4 years. At that point, the leadership of the US has a good chance of changing and its commitment to NATO may change.(*)

Granted, the world has seen how fickle the US can be and needs to be better prepared for that fickleness. 
 
(*)This is assuming the US continues as it has for nearly 250 years.

Is the U. S. fickle, or is it just one guy? Have we been fickle in the past? We answered the bell multiple times in the last century.

The US, with its 4-year cycle, may change by 180 degrees on any 4-year boundary.  In this cycle, there was a dramatic change

The simple fact is that ANY nation mat change by any number of degrees (including 180) anytime it becomes politically popular/necessary. It doesn't require a 4-year cycle. However, there are some "third rail" commitments that have existed for a very long time in the US. From Sept 30, 1800 (when the Treaty of Mortefontaine abrogated the indefinite term US military alliance with France) until February 28, 1942 (when the US signed the indefinite term Anglo-American Mutual Aid Agreement) the policy of no "entangling" alliances was followed. This policy was recommended by G. Washington and followed religiously until 1942. I make that to be 142 years. Even World War I did not force the US to waver. We fought as an "associated power" and signed no treaties.

FDR undoubtedly would have preferred to break precedent much earlier than he did. The attack by Japan upon US sovereign territory and our unavoidable entry into WW II undoubtedly was the "big enough" event to justify its necessity to even the most dedicated isolationists. The US was hardly "being fickle" with regard to this policy.

Similarly, when the US signed the NATO founding treaty on April 14, 1949 Article 5 had some "weasel words" included in it to allow the US to claim we were not making an open-ended commitment to military action. However, the clause stating an attack on one “shall be considered an attack against them all” is the one that the US presidents and their administrations have emphasized. All presidents from 1949 until the present have recognized that NATO would be an empty vessel if the US would not respond fully to an attack on other NATO nations. These administrations have repeatedly reiterated that commitment. During the Cold War the question always ask was "Would the US risk New York for Paris (or more commonly Bonn)". The answer was always an emphatic yes. Any doubt would have been very corrosive. For 76 years we were steadfast in that commitment. We are not "fickle". Our policy was changed by the realization that WW II was so disruptive that a firm commitment to military cooperation was essential. Subsequently the US realized that living with the continued threat of war in Europe was not tenable. Thus the 76 year commitment to a maximal Article 5 response. It is unclear (to me at least) why we now seem to be willing to accept the possibility of European wars as "not our problem".

[BostonCard]

It appears that the Russian summer offensive has ramped up:

https://www.wsj.com/world/where-russia-i..._permalink

“The center of gravity for this war is not terrain—the place where it’s being decisively waged is the perception space in Western capitals,” said Barros. Referring to the Russians, he added: “If the map is moving, they’re able to say, ‘We’re making progress. Ukraine is screwed. How many more billions are you going to spend?’”

Still, it does look like Russia is attacking from all sides.

BC

[BostonCard]

It appears that the Russian summer offensive has ramped up:

https://www.wsj.com/world/where-russia-i..._permalink

“The center of gravity for this war is not terrain—the place where it’s being decisively waged is the perception space in Western capitals,” said Barros. Referring to the Russians, he added: “If the map is moving, they’re able to say, ‘We’re making progress. Ukraine is screwed. How many more billions are you going to spend?’”

Still, it does look like Russia is attacking from all sides.

BC

[dabigv13]

Some fun video of a Russian Su-25 taking out his wingman with an unguided rocket

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1933549544446243080

The pilot supposedly survived, per Russian social media.

[dabigv13]

Some fun video of a Russian Su-25 taking out his wingman with an unguided rocket

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1933549544446243080

The pilot supposedly survived, per Russian social media.

[M T]

[quote="M T" pid='433618' dateline='1749503290']

The article you referenced said:

Although the systems were purchased under a program designated for Ukraine, U.S. law permits the Secretary of Defense to reallocate the equipment to American forces in cases of “urgent need.”

I'm not aware of any "urgent need" by American forces in the Middle East.

Nor am I.

Now we are.

[M T]

[quote="M T" pid='433618' dateline='1749503290']

The article you referenced said:

Although the systems were purchased under a program designated for Ukraine, U.S. law permits the Secretary of Defense to reallocate the equipment to American forces in cases of “urgent need.”

I'm not aware of any "urgent need" by American forces in the Middle East.

Nor am I.

Now we are.

[fullmetal]

In a detailed statement drawn up at Putin's behest, the Foreign Ministry condemned Israel and accused the West of whipping up anti-Iranian "hysteria".
"We strongly condemn the use of force by the state of Israel in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law," the ministry said.
"Unprovoked military strikes against a sovereign U.N. member state, its citizens, peaceful cities, and nuclear energy infrastructure are categorically unacceptable.
"The international community cannot afford to be indifferent to such atrocities, which destroy peace and damage regional and international security," it said.

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-eas...025-06-13/

O RLY.  But of course, they care not to avoid double standards.

[fullmetal]

In a detailed statement drawn up at Putin's behest, the Foreign Ministry condemned Israel and accused the West of whipping up anti-Iranian "hysteria".
"We strongly condemn the use of force by the state of Israel in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law," the ministry said.
"Unprovoked military strikes against a sovereign U.N. member state, its citizens, peaceful cities, and nuclear energy infrastructure are categorically unacceptable.
"The international community cannot afford to be indifferent to such atrocities, which destroy peace and damage regional and international security," it said.

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-eas...025-06-13/

O RLY.  But of course, they care not to avoid double standards.

[dabigv13]

Without getting too much into the Israel-Iran war, if oil prices go up and stay up, it would be a very big gift to Russia's economy. Their finances are in trouble, but high oil prices would allow them to sustain the war for much longer.

Also, Israel took a page from Ukraine's playbook, with drones released from a covert location within Iran to disable responding missile and air defense units during the initial phases.

Probably this covert short range drone deployment behind enemy lines will be an emerging feature of modern war.

[dabigv13]

Without getting too much into the Israel-Iran war, if oil prices go up and stay up, it would be a very big gift to Russia's economy. Their finances are in trouble, but high oil prices would allow them to sustain the war for much longer.

Also, Israel took a page from Ukraine's playbook, with drones released from a covert location within Iran to disable responding missile and air defense units during the initial phases.

Probably this covert short range drone deployment behind enemy lines will be an emerging feature of modern war.

[M T]

AIUI, Russia has little or no dependence on Iran for drones at this point.  Any destruction of Iran's capability to produce drones won't affect the drone barrage on Ukraine.

I do wonder if US intelligence assets are being diverted from watching Russia/Ukraine, reducing the intel that could be supplied.

[M T]

AIUI, Russia has little or no dependence on Iran for drones at this point.  Any destruction of Iran's capability to produce drones won't affect the drone barrage on Ukraine.

I do wonder if US intelligence assets are being diverted from watching Russia/Ukraine, reducing the intel that could be supplied.

[BostonCard]

In a detailed statement drawn up at Putin's behest, the Foreign Ministry condemned Israel and accused the West of whipping up anti-Iranian "hysteria".
"We strongly condemn the use of force by the state of Israel in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law," the ministry said.
"Unprovoked military strikes against a sovereign U.N. member state, its citizens, peaceful cities, and nuclear energy infrastructure are categorically unacceptable.
"The international community cannot afford to be indifferent to such atrocities, which destroy peace and damage regional and international security," it said.

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-eas...025-06-13/

O RLY.  But of course, they care not to avoid double standards.

oh no, you see, Russia was responding to the "root causes" of the war.  LOL.

BC

[BostonCard]

In a detailed statement drawn up at Putin's behest, the Foreign Ministry condemned Israel and accused the West of whipping up anti-Iranian "hysteria".
"We strongly condemn the use of force by the state of Israel in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law," the ministry said.
"Unprovoked military strikes against a sovereign U.N. member state, its citizens, peaceful cities, and nuclear energy infrastructure are categorically unacceptable.
"The international community cannot afford to be indifferent to such atrocities, which destroy peace and damage regional and international security," it said.

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-eas...025-06-13/

O RLY.  But of course, they care not to avoid double standards.

oh no, you see, Russia was responding to the "root causes" of the war.  LOL.

BC

[Goose]

[quote="M T" pid='433618' dateline='1749503290']

The article you referenced said:

Although the systems were purchased under a program designated for Ukraine, U.S. law permits the Secretary of Defense to reallocate the equipment to American forces in cases of “urgent need.”

I'm not aware of any "urgent need" by American forces in the Middle East.

Nor am I.

Now we are.

I am not sure I understand your point. The Iranians are using ballistic missiles to attack Israel. Their attempt to use air-breathing drones was totally stopped by Israel. In previous attempts against Israel US anti-drone aircraft did the same. No reason to believe the US air capability has diminished. The missiles diverted to the Middle East have no capability against Ballistic Missiles. So where is the new "urgent need"?

[Goose]

[quote="M T" pid='433618' dateline='1749503290']

The article you referenced said:

Although the systems were purchased under a program designated for Ukraine, U.S. law permits the Secretary of Defense to reallocate the equipment to American forces in cases of “urgent need.”

I'm not aware of any "urgent need" by American forces in the Middle East.

Nor am I.

Now we are.

I am not sure I understand your point. The Iranians are using ballistic missiles to attack Israel. Their attempt to use air-breathing drones was totally stopped by Israel. In previous attempts against Israel US anti-drone aircraft did the same. No reason to believe the US air capability has diminished. The missiles diverted to the Middle East have no capability against Ballistic Missiles. So where is the new "urgent need"?

[fullmetal]

AIUI, Russia has little or no dependence on Iran for drones at this point.  Any destruction of Iran's capability to produce drones won't affect the drone barrage on Ukraine.

I do wonder if US intelligence assets are being diverted from watching Russia/Ukraine, reducing the intel that could be supplied.

North Korea is now mass-producing the Shaheds.  And yeah, the Pentagon pizza index is out the roof.

[fullmetal]

AIUI, Russia has little or no dependence on Iran for drones at this point.  Any destruction of Iran's capability to produce drones won't affect the drone barrage on Ukraine.

I do wonder if US intelligence assets are being diverted from watching Russia/Ukraine, reducing the intel that could be supplied.

North Korea is now mass-producing the Shaheds.  And yeah, the Pentagon pizza index is out the roof.

[dabigv13]

[quote="M T" pid='433618' dateline='1749503290']

The article you referenced said:

Although the systems were purchased under a program designated for Ukraine, U.S. law permits the Secretary of Defense to reallocate the equipment to American forces in cases of “urgent need.”

I'm not aware of any "urgent need" by American forces in the Middle East.

Nor am I.

Now we are.

I am not sure I understand your point. The Iranians are using ballistic missiles to attack Israel. Their attempt to use air-breathing drones was totally stopped by Israel. In previous attempts against Israel US anti-drone aircraft did the same. No reason to believe the US air capability has diminished. The missiles diverted to the Middle East have no capability against Ballistic Missiles. So where is the new "urgent need"?

FWIW Iran has also been using shahed type drones in this round. Israel has published videos of them being taken out by Iron Dome missile interceptors along with helicopter machine guns.

Whether the APKWS are necessary too is beyond me.

It's crazy to me that despite all of the signalling something was coming, Iran did not disperse their mobile ballistic missile launchers or air defense systems, and their top military leaders were all sleeping in their homes.

Is Israel much better at SEAD/DEAD than Russia? Probably. But Ukraine also did a much better job at preserving their air defenses. On Day 2/3 it seems Israel has air superiority and freedom of movement- even their non-stealth fighters are operating safely over major Iranian cities and military bases. The Ukraine conflict would have been over a long time ago if Russia could have achieved that, as they had planned.

[dabigv13]

[quote="M T" pid='433618' dateline='1749503290']

The article you referenced said:

Although the systems were purchased under a program designated for Ukraine, U.S. law permits the Secretary of Defense to reallocate the equipment to American forces in cases of “urgent need.”

I'm not aware of any "urgent need" by American forces in the Middle East.

Nor am I.

Now we are.

I am not sure I understand your point. The Iranians are using ballistic missiles to attack Israel. Their attempt to use air-breathing drones was totally stopped by Israel. In previous attempts against Israel US anti-drone aircraft did the same. No reason to believe the US air capability has diminished. The missiles diverted to the Middle East have no capability against Ballistic Missiles. So where is the new "urgent need"?

FWIW Iran has also been using shahed type drones in this round. Israel has published videos of them being taken out by Iron Dome missile interceptors along with helicopter machine guns.

Whether the APKWS are necessary too is beyond me.

It's crazy to me that despite all of the signalling something was coming, Iran did not disperse their mobile ballistic missile launchers or air defense systems, and their top military leaders were all sleeping in their homes.

Is Israel much better at SEAD/DEAD than Russia? Probably. But Ukraine also did a much better job at preserving their air defenses. On Day 2/3 it seems Israel has air superiority and freedom of movement- even their non-stealth fighters are operating safely over major Iranian cities and military bases. The Ukraine conflict would have been over a long time ago if Russia could have achieved that, as they had planned.

[Goose]

FWIW Iran has also been using shahed type drones in this round. Israel has published videos of them being taken out by Iron Dome missile interceptors along with helicopter machine guns.

Whether the APKWS are necessary too is beyond me.

Israel has also published videos of F-16s taking down the Shahed type drones. The ones being taken out by Iron Dome are "leakers". The Israelis have AWACs capability that allows them to vector helicopters to Shahed type drones that the F-16s didn't get. Iron Dome relies on its own radar to acquire the target. APKWS has (at best) an infrared target acquisition capability. The Shahed is a poor infrared target. Its hot (but relatively small) piston engine is behind the delta wing and fuselage, which shield the drone pretty well from head-on acquisition by a MANPADS. If the MANPADS operator is not "on" the target and can get a side view or, better still, a rear view the MANPADS (and APKWS) has a good shot.

The US bases in the Middle East therefore can not be defended by MANPADS unless the are deployed at some significant distance from the base itself. That carries force protection issues for those isolated operators. The cure is worse than the disease. IMO the US would rely on our own air defense forces as the primary defense against Shahed type drones. Up until now, the vast majority of missile attacks upon US forces have been by Iran-backed militias firing ballistic artillery rockets. MANPADS/APKWS are not effective against such missiles. I doubt that Iran would launch Shahed type drones from Iran toward US targets. These slow drones would certainly be detected and almost certainly shot down. Iran would then risk direct retaliation by the US. Attacks by militias (Iran-backed or otherwise) have not produced a US reaction. Direct attacks from Iran very well might. I doubt they would risk it.

It's crazy to me that despite all of the signalling something was coming, Iran did not disperse their mobile ballistic missile launchers or air defense systems,

They may have, at least to the best of their ability.

and their top military leaders were all sleeping in their homes.

Indeed this is strange. I would have thought they would all be required by some Iranian DEFCON level to be sleeping in their "official" well-protected quarters.

Is Israel much better at SEAD/DEAD than Russia? Probably. But Ukraine also did a much better job at preserving their air defenses.

Russia doesn't do SEAD as a separate activity, period. That has never been part of their doctrine. During the Cold War their manuals indicated they might target e.g. a bunch of HAWK batteries on the way in, but it would be part of a strike mission, not an end in itself. Israel, like the US and NATO, regards SEAD as its own mission. This reflects the fact that Russia regarded Air Defense as the "primary" mission of their air force. Offensive action was secondary.  The US and its "allies" look at it exactly opposite. Our air forces are a primary weapon of defeating our enemies and destroying their ability to fight. That requires attaining initial air superiority at an absolute minimum and prosecuting the offensive to obtain air supremacy as an "end state". That is what Israel did.

On Day 2/3 it seems Israel has air superiority and freedom of movement- even their non-stealth fighters are operating safely over major Iranian cities and military bases. The Ukraine conflict would have been over a long time ago if Russia could have achieved that, as they had planned.

To be fair, Israel ran a fairly comprehensive SEAD operation against Iran late last year. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/October_20...es_on_Iran. All of Iran's long range detection radars were destroyed. Iran was effectively blinded. That matters a lot. Iran never had nearly as effective IADS as Ukraine possessed in 2022, not even close. Iran also didn't have the US telling them exactly what to expect. Ukraine also had at least somewhat of an air force. Iran does not.
 
Russia had no "plan" to destroy the Ukrainian air defenses. They flew a few suppression missions accompanying their initial attacks, but unlike the IAF Russia had no "softening up"  missions with BDA and re-attack as needed. Russia was heavily relying on surprise, so such missions were not possible. That is why they had un-escorted IL-76s flying paratroopers into the teeth of a Ukrainian air defense network that still functioned. Subsequently, Russia's lack of any SEAD capability was on full display. After heavy losses, the VKS effectively left the war for quite awhile.

Israel is claiming full air supremacy in Iran, at least in the Tehran area. https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defens...cle-857689 One important point in this article is that Israel can now violate the airspace of Syria and Lebanon at will. The is allows them to fly over Iraq and directly into Northern Iran. While Russia was still in Syria and defending it's airspace, that wasn't possible (except possibly for F-35s). Now it is, and that is a very "big deal".

[Goose]

FWIW Iran has also been using shahed type drones in this round. Israel has published videos of them being taken out by Iron Dome missile interceptors along with helicopter machine guns.

Whether the APKWS are necessary too is beyond me.

Israel has also published videos of F-16s taking down the Shahed type drones. The ones being taken out by Iron Dome are "leakers". The Israelis have AWACs capability that allows them to vector helicopters to Shahed type drones that the F-16s didn't get. Iron Dome relies on its own radar to acquire the target. APKWS has (at best) an infrared target acquisition capability. The Shahed is a poor infrared target. Its hot (but relatively small) piston engine is behind the delta wing and fuselage, which shield the drone pretty well from head-on acquisition by a MANPADS. If the MANPADS operator is not "on" the target and can get a side view or, better still, a rear view the MANPADS (and APKWS) has a good shot.

The US bases in the Middle East therefore can not be defended by MANPADS unless the are deployed at some significant distance from the base itself. That carries force protection issues for those isolated operators. The cure is worse than the disease. IMO the US would rely on our own air defense forces as the primary defense against Shahed type drones. Up until now, the vast majority of missile attacks upon US forces have been by Iran-backed militias firing ballistic artillery rockets. MANPADS/APKWS are not effective against such missiles. I doubt that Iran would launch Shahed type drones from Iran toward US targets. These slow drones would certainly be detected and almost certainly shot down. Iran would then risk direct retaliation by the US. Attacks by militias (Iran-backed or otherwise) have not produced a US reaction. Direct attacks from Iran very well might. I doubt they would risk it.

It's crazy to me that despite all of the signalling something was coming, Iran did not disperse their mobile ballistic missile launchers or air defense systems,

They may have, at least to the best of their ability.

and their top military leaders were all sleeping in their homes.

Indeed this is strange. I would have thought they would all be required by some Iranian DEFCON level to be sleeping in their "official" well-protected quarters.

Is Israel much better at SEAD/DEAD than Russia? Probably. But Ukraine also did a much better job at preserving their air defenses.

Russia doesn't do SEAD as a separate activity, period. That has never been part of their doctrine. During the Cold War their manuals indicated they might target e.g. a bunch of HAWK batteries on the way in, but it would be part of a strike mission, not an end in itself. Israel, like the US and NATO, regards SEAD as its own mission. This reflects the fact that Russia regarded Air Defense as the "primary" mission of their air force. Offensive action was secondary.  The US and its "allies" look at it exactly opposite. Our air forces are a primary weapon of defeating our enemies and destroying their ability to fight. That requires attaining initial air superiority at an absolute minimum and prosecuting the offensive to obtain air supremacy as an "end state". That is what Israel did.

On Day 2/3 it seems Israel has air superiority and freedom of movement- even their non-stealth fighters are operating safely over major Iranian cities and military bases. The Ukraine conflict would have been over a long time ago if Russia could have achieved that, as they had planned.

To be fair, Israel ran a fairly comprehensive SEAD operation against Iran late last year. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/October_20...es_on_Iran. All of Iran's long range detection radars were destroyed. Iran was effectively blinded. That matters a lot. Iran never had nearly as effective IADS as Ukraine possessed in 2022, not even close. Iran also didn't have the US telling them exactly what to expect. Ukraine also had at least somewhat of an air force. Iran does not.
 
Russia had no "plan" to destroy the Ukrainian air defenses. They flew a few suppression missions accompanying their initial attacks, but unlike the IAF Russia had no "softening up"  missions with BDA and re-attack as needed. Russia was heavily relying on surprise, so such missions were not possible. That is why they had un-escorted IL-76s flying paratroopers into the teeth of a Ukrainian air defense network that still functioned. Subsequently, Russia's lack of any SEAD capability was on full display. After heavy losses, the VKS effectively left the war for quite awhile.

Israel is claiming full air supremacy in Iran, at least in the Tehran area. https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defens...cle-857689 One important point in this article is that Israel can now violate the airspace of Syria and Lebanon at will. The is allows them to fly over Iraq and directly into Northern Iran. While Russia was still in Syria and defending it's airspace, that wasn't possible (except possibly for F-35s). Now it is, and that is a very "big deal".

[dabigv13]

Russia had no "plan" to destroy the Ukrainian air defenses. They flew a few suppression missions accompanying their initial attacks, but unlike the IAF Russia had no "softening up"  missions with BDA and re-attack as needed. Russia was heavily relying on surprise, so such missions were not possible. That is why they had un-escorted IL-76s flying paratroopers into the teeth of a Ukrainian air defense network that still functioned. Subsequently, Russia's lack of any SEAD capability was on full display. After heavy losses, the VKS effectively left the war for quit awhile.

This is untrue. Russia clearly tried to achieve air supremacy and attacked Ukrainian air defenses and Ukrainian airbases in the opening phases. They had a plan, their plan just failed because Ukraine dispersed well, they had a very extensive existing air defense network, and Russian missiles were not very accurate.

Initially, the Russian military seemed to pursue an air campaign that attempted to achieve air superiority, which generally aligned with Western expectations. The Russian Air Force launched hundreds of sorties into Ukraine during the first three days to attack air defenses and destroy Ukraine aircraft on the ground. Initial news reports said Russia’s “overwhelming air superiority” enabled it to destroy most of Ukraine’s air defenses and air force.

US Naval Institute report

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedin...ir%20force.

Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) conducted significantly more extensive fixed-wing strike operations during the first days of the invasion than has been previously documented, while Ukrainian ground-based air-defence (GBAD) capabilities were suppressed by initial attacks. 
During this period, Ukrainian fighter aircraft inflicted some losses on VKS aircraft but also took serious casualties due to being totally technologically outmatched and badly outnumbered.
....
From early March, the VKS lost the ability to operate in Ukrainian-controlled airspace except at very low altitudes due to its inability to reliably suppress or destroy increasingly effective, well-dispersed and mobile Ukrainian surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.
.....
Numerous MANPADS provided to Ukrainian troops and later mobile air-defence teams meant that low-altitude Russian fixed-wing and rotary penetrating sorties beyond the frontlines proved to be prohibitively costly during March, and ceased by April 2022.

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-researc...20invasion.

In the prelude to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, many experts expected a fully mobilized Russian Aerospace Forces to quickly establish complete air superiority over Ukraine. A March 2022 New York Times report noted that “one of the biggest surprises of the war in Ukraine is Russia’s failure to defeat the Ukrainian Air Force. Military analysts had expected Russian forces to quickly destroy or paralyze Ukraine’s air defenses and military aircraft, yet neither has happened.”

American observers noted that the Russian Aerospace Forces was “literally … cratering empty fields.” An anonymous Defense Intelligence Agency source claimed that “under half of all Russian missiles hitting their aimpoint … we’re holding Russian missile success at just below 40 percent”—a damning assessment of the Russian technological capabilities. After a few days of the war, it became clear that the Russian Aerospace Forces had failed to establish air superiority over Ukraine and had been forced into a defensive posture by Ukrainian air defense units and fighter pilots. Russian failures were driven by an inability to quickly integrate intelligence with targeting processes, conduct unbiased battle damage assessments (BDAs) to inform war plans, and deconflict air space control between the Russian Aerospace Forces and Russian Army’s ground-based air defenses.

Yet these genuine failures obscure many successes, and the Russian air campaign has demonstrated strength alongside significant flaws. For instance, several months before the air war began, the Russian Aerospace Forces employed its Su-24MR Fencer-E reconnaissance aircraft and the Il-20 Coot electronic intelligence aircraft to generate a location map of Ukrainian air defenses. These technical intelligence platforms were supplemented by Ukrainian human intelligence sources cultivated by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. As the war began, Russian Su-34 bombers, Su-30SM fighters, and Su-35S fighters reportedly flew around 140 sorties in the first few days and struck targets deep inside Ukraine. At the same time, electronic warfare operations suppressed Ukrainian air defense assets. More than 100 fixed air-defense radar sites, surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, and munition storage sites were struck with an effort to remove such facilities “along the routes intended to be used” by advancing Russian forces, according to an analysis by RUSI. In addition, the air campaign was supplemented by large, coordinated missile salvos. Within the first couple months of the conflict, Russia had fired more missiles against Ukraine than any country had employed in a war since World War II.

https://cissm.umd.edu/research-impact/pu...e%20assets.

[dabigv13]

Russia had no "plan" to destroy the Ukrainian air defenses. They flew a few suppression missions accompanying their initial attacks, but unlike the IAF Russia had no "softening up"  missions with BDA and re-attack as needed. Russia was heavily relying on surprise, so such missions were not possible. That is why they had un-escorted IL-76s flying paratroopers into the teeth of a Ukrainian air defense network that still functioned. Subsequently, Russia's lack of any SEAD capability was on full display. After heavy losses, the VKS effectively left the war for quit awhile.

This is untrue. Russia clearly tried to achieve air supremacy and attacked Ukrainian air defenses and Ukrainian airbases in the opening phases. They had a plan, their plan just failed because Ukraine dispersed well, they had a very extensive existing air defense network, and Russian missiles were not very accurate.

Initially, the Russian military seemed to pursue an air campaign that attempted to achieve air superiority, which generally aligned with Western expectations. The Russian Air Force launched hundreds of sorties into Ukraine during the first three days to attack air defenses and destroy Ukraine aircraft on the ground. Initial news reports said Russia’s “overwhelming air superiority” enabled it to destroy most of Ukraine’s air defenses and air force.

US Naval Institute report

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedin...ir%20force.

Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) conducted significantly more extensive fixed-wing strike operations during the first days of the invasion than has been previously documented, while Ukrainian ground-based air-defence (GBAD) capabilities were suppressed by initial attacks. 
During this period, Ukrainian fighter aircraft inflicted some losses on VKS aircraft but also took serious casualties due to being totally technologically outmatched and badly outnumbered.
....
From early March, the VKS lost the ability to operate in Ukrainian-controlled airspace except at very low altitudes due to its inability to reliably suppress or destroy increasingly effective, well-dispersed and mobile Ukrainian surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.
.....
Numerous MANPADS provided to Ukrainian troops and later mobile air-defence teams meant that low-altitude Russian fixed-wing and rotary penetrating sorties beyond the frontlines proved to be prohibitively costly during March, and ceased by April 2022.

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-researc...20invasion.

In the prelude to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, many experts expected a fully mobilized Russian Aerospace Forces to quickly establish complete air superiority over Ukraine. A March 2022 New York Times report noted that “one of the biggest surprises of the war in Ukraine is Russia’s failure to defeat the Ukrainian Air Force. Military analysts had expected Russian forces to quickly destroy or paralyze Ukraine’s air defenses and military aircraft, yet neither has happened.”

American observers noted that the Russian Aerospace Forces was “literally … cratering empty fields.” An anonymous Defense Intelligence Agency source claimed that “under half of all Russian missiles hitting their aimpoint … we’re holding Russian missile success at just below 40 percent”—a damning assessment of the Russian technological capabilities. After a few days of the war, it became clear that the Russian Aerospace Forces had failed to establish air superiority over Ukraine and had been forced into a defensive posture by Ukrainian air defense units and fighter pilots. Russian failures were driven by an inability to quickly integrate intelligence with targeting processes, conduct unbiased battle damage assessments (BDAs) to inform war plans, and deconflict air space control between the Russian Aerospace Forces and Russian Army’s ground-based air defenses.

Yet these genuine failures obscure many successes, and the Russian air campaign has demonstrated strength alongside significant flaws. For instance, several months before the air war began, the Russian Aerospace Forces employed its Su-24MR Fencer-E reconnaissance aircraft and the Il-20 Coot electronic intelligence aircraft to generate a location map of Ukrainian air defenses. These technical intelligence platforms were supplemented by Ukrainian human intelligence sources cultivated by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. As the war began, Russian Su-34 bombers, Su-30SM fighters, and Su-35S fighters reportedly flew around 140 sorties in the first few days and struck targets deep inside Ukraine. At the same time, electronic warfare operations suppressed Ukrainian air defense assets. More than 100 fixed air-defense radar sites, surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, and munition storage sites were struck with an effort to remove such facilities “along the routes intended to be used” by advancing Russian forces, according to an analysis by RUSI. In addition, the air campaign was supplemented by large, coordinated missile salvos. Within the first couple months of the conflict, Russia had fired more missiles against Ukraine than any country had employed in a war since World War II.

https://cissm.umd.edu/research-impact/pu...e%20assets.

[Goose]

Russia had no "plan" to destroy the Ukrainian air defenses. They flew a few suppression missions accompanying their initial attacks, but unlike the IAF Russia had no "softening up"  missions with BDA and re-attack as needed. Russia was heavily relying on surprise, so such missions were not possible. That is why they had un-escorted IL-76s flying paratroopers into the teeth of a Ukrainian air defense network that still functioned. Subsequently, Russia's lack of any SEAD capability was on full display. After heavy losses, the VKS effectively left the war for quit awhile.

This is untrue. Russia clearly tried to achieve air supremacy and attacked Ukrainian air defenses and Ukrainian airbases in the opening phases. They had a plan, their plan just failed because Ukraine dispersed well, they had a very extensive existing air defense network, and Russian missiles were not very accurate.

Initially, the Russian military seemed to pursue an air campaign that attempted to achieve air superiority, which generally aligned with Western expectations. The Russian Air Force launched hundreds of sorties into Ukraine during the first three days to attack air defenses and destroy Ukraine aircraft on the ground. Initial news reports said Russia’s “overwhelming air superiority” enabled it to destroy most of Ukraine’s air defenses and air force.

<snip>

I found these links quite relevant, but I had to cut them from the quote due to length. They are appreciated.
 
I don't think we are actually disagreeing about events. As you say, Russia attacked Ukrainian air defenses and airbases in the opening phases. However, these attacks were executed at the same time the "ground war" started. These are the "suppression missions" I refer to. Russia did not attempt SEAD/DEAD as a preamble to their combined arms attack. They were concomitant operations. Russia hit empty airfields because Ukraine knew they were coming. Where we disagree is the "goal" of the Russian air activity. I am sure that Russia would have loved to achieve air supremacy or superiority if it occurred as a result of their suppression operations. They may have well expected that it would. However their "goal", in keeping with Russian doctrine, was to prevent the Ukrainian air force from interfering with the contemporaneous ground war. They did not need to control the air, but they had to ensure Ukraine didn't control it either.

Russia with an effort to remove such facilities “along the routes intended to be used” by advancing Russian forces, according to an analysis by RUSI.

That isn't "SEAD/DEAD" as such. That is simply Tac Air. This is entirely consistent with Russian doctrine. The mission objective of the VKS was to prevent the UAF from interfering with the Russian ground force attack. Such air operations only peripherally interfered with the UAF's general ability to defend its airspace against the VKS. The distinction is not just semantics. Russia intended to use VKS to expedite the ability of the ground forces to advance and fight the Ukrainian ground forces. That is the battle Russia wants to fight and where they believed they had the advantage. The US OTOH intends to first use their air forces to create the conditions that will allow those air forces to subsequently at will destroy the opposing ground forces (and their logistics) from the air. The "ground war" will then be mostly a walk-over. The First Gulf War was an extreme example of this strategic difference, where the air forces bombed the Iraqis for five weeks before the ground attack began. The first step was the DEAD plan for the Iraqi IADS, the Iraqi air force and the Iraqi C3 capabilities. The second step was the attrition of Iraqi ground forces. Only then did the ground war start.
 
Nothing like that happened in Ukraine, partly because Russia was depending on surprise as a major weapon but mostly because Russia intended that its ground forces would win the war by defeating the Ukrainian ground forces. In order to do that, Russia had to prevent the Ukrainian air forces from intervening in the ground war. That was their goal. Obviously Russia couldn't just ignore the Ukrainian air force. However they would have been perfectly happy with a stalemate in the air. They basically got that. What messed them up was that their ground forces weren't all they were cracked up to be and Ukraine's were much better than Russia expected.

Russian air doctrine (and NATO air doctrine) was heavily influenced during the Cold War by very clear eyed evaluation of how a war in Europe might play out. NATO knew that the Warsaw Pact forces would initially outnumber them greatly and would probably still outnumber them even after all the US troops arrived in Europe. NATO would be fighting a delaying action until they were reinforced. The plan was to use a technologically superior air arm to help slow down the Russian advance. This would be accomplished by both tactical and strategic aircraft. As the Russian supply lines got longer the air force would have more effect on Russian logistics and bring the Russian advance to a halt through combined defensive efforts and attrition of Russian logistics. Then the technologically superior air power would isolate the Russian spearhead and weaken it to the point it could be destroyed. To do that, NATO would need air superiority followed by air supremacy over the Russian ground forces and Russian logistics tail, at least locally.
 
Russia actually bough into a lot of the NATO concepts. The Russian were concerned with the technological superiority of the NATO aircraft. They were particularly concerned with nuclear attack by strategic bombers but were also very concerned about defending their own ground forces. The PVO was responsible for this duty. It had an absolutely massive number of aircraft whose mission was entirely defensive in nature. They operated under strict Ground Controlled Intercept (GCI) rules. The number of sorties these forces could generate was mind-boggling. The PVO was expected to maintain air supremacy over Russian ground forces. The "offensive" part of the air force, the VVS was much smaller. It consisted of strategic bombers and fighter-bombers. As a reference, SU-25s were part of the VVS. The VVS was expected to provide ground support to Russian troops. The VVS would attack NATO missile sites and defend against NATO aircraft as necessary to allow these ground support missions. The VVS would also execute bombing attacks against NATO strategic air bases. The VVS was neither equipped or resourced to seize and maintain air supremacy over NATO ground troops. They were to get in and get out (if they could). Not all that much was expected of them. Note that the VVS did not at that time have air superiority fighters designed to "go after" NATO air and clear the sky.
 
The PVO is gone now, but the thinking remains. The successor VKS is primarily defensive. Note that the VVS as it exists today is a result of a merger between the PVO and the former VVS. They ensure the Russian ground troops aren't destroyed from the air. Any offensive action from them has always been a bonus. https://dupuyinstitute.org/2022/06/16/vv...periority/ is IMO a good explanation of this situation. It points out how the current VVS views the situation.

If they could achieve Air Superiority in the Western sense, they wouldn’t know what to do with it.  They don’t understand it, and don’t care about it.

[Goose]

Russia had no "plan" to destroy the Ukrainian air defenses. They flew a few suppression missions accompanying their initial attacks, but unlike the IAF Russia had no "softening up"  missions with BDA and re-attack as needed. Russia was heavily relying on surprise, so such missions were not possible. That is why they had un-escorted IL-76s flying paratroopers into the teeth of a Ukrainian air defense network that still functioned. Subsequently, Russia's lack of any SEAD capability was on full display. After heavy losses, the VKS effectively left the war for quit awhile.

This is untrue. Russia clearly tried to achieve air supremacy and attacked Ukrainian air defenses and Ukrainian airbases in the opening phases. They had a plan, their plan just failed because Ukraine dispersed well, they had a very extensive existing air defense network, and Russian missiles were not very accurate.

Initially, the Russian military seemed to pursue an air campaign that attempted to achieve air superiority, which generally aligned with Western expectations. The Russian Air Force launched hundreds of sorties into Ukraine during the first three days to attack air defenses and destroy Ukraine aircraft on the ground. Initial news reports said Russia’s “overwhelming air superiority” enabled it to destroy most of Ukraine’s air defenses and air force.

<snip>

I found these links quite relevant, but I had to cut them from the quote due to length. They are appreciated.
 
I don't think we are actually disagreeing about events. As you say, Russia attacked Ukrainian air defenses and airbases in the opening phases. However, these attacks were executed at the same time the "ground war" started. These are the "suppression missions" I refer to. Russia did not attempt SEAD/DEAD as a preamble to their combined arms attack. They were concomitant operations. Russia hit empty airfields because Ukraine knew they were coming. Where we disagree is the "goal" of the Russian air activity. I am sure that Russia would have loved to achieve air supremacy or superiority if it occurred as a result of their suppression operations. They may have well expected that it would. However their "goal", in keeping with Russian doctrine, was to prevent the Ukrainian air force from interfering with the contemporaneous ground war. They did not need to control the air, but they had to ensure Ukraine didn't control it either.

Russia with an effort to remove such facilities “along the routes intended to be used” by advancing Russian forces, according to an analysis by RUSI.

That isn't "SEAD/DEAD" as such. That is simply Tac Air. This is entirely consistent with Russian doctrine. The mission objective of the VKS was to prevent the UAF from interfering with the Russian ground force attack. Such air operations only peripherally interfered with the UAF's general ability to defend its airspace against the VKS. The distinction is not just semantics. Russia intended to use VKS to expedite the ability of the ground forces to advance and fight the Ukrainian ground forces. That is the battle Russia wants to fight and where they believed they had the advantage. The US OTOH intends to first use their air forces to create the conditions that will allow those air forces to subsequently at will destroy the opposing ground forces (and their logistics) from the air. The "ground war" will then be mostly a walk-over. The First Gulf War was an extreme example of this strategic difference, where the air forces bombed the Iraqis for five weeks before the ground attack began. The first step was the DEAD plan for the Iraqi IADS, the Iraqi air force and the Iraqi C3 capabilities. The second step was the attrition of Iraqi ground forces. Only then did the ground war start.
 
Nothing like that happened in Ukraine, partly because Russia was depending on surprise as a major weapon but mostly because Russia intended that its ground forces would win the war by defeating the Ukrainian ground forces. In order to do that, Russia had to prevent the Ukrainian air forces from intervening in the ground war. That was their goal. Obviously Russia couldn't just ignore the Ukrainian air force. However they would have been perfectly happy with a stalemate in the air. They basically got that. What messed them up was that their ground forces weren't all they were cracked up to be and Ukraine's were much better than Russia expected.

Russian air doctrine (and NATO air doctrine) was heavily influenced during the Cold War by very clear eyed evaluation of how a war in Europe might play out. NATO knew that the Warsaw Pact forces would initially outnumber them greatly and would probably still outnumber them even after all the US troops arrived in Europe. NATO would be fighting a delaying action until they were reinforced. The plan was to use a technologically superior air arm to help slow down the Russian advance. This would be accomplished by both tactical and strategic aircraft. As the Russian supply lines got longer the air force would have more effect on Russian logistics and bring the Russian advance to a halt through combined defensive efforts and attrition of Russian logistics. Then the technologically superior air power would isolate the Russian spearhead and weaken it to the point it could be destroyed. To do that, NATO would need air superiority followed by air supremacy over the Russian ground forces and Russian logistics tail, at least locally.
 
Russia actually bough into a lot of the NATO concepts. The Russian were concerned with the technological superiority of the NATO aircraft. They were particularly concerned with nuclear attack by strategic bombers but were also very concerned about defending their own ground forces. The PVO was responsible for this duty. It had an absolutely massive number of aircraft whose mission was entirely defensive in nature. They operated under strict Ground Controlled Intercept (GCI) rules. The number of sorties these forces could generate was mind-boggling. The PVO was expected to maintain air supremacy over Russian ground forces. The "offensive" part of the air force, the VVS was much smaller. It consisted of strategic bombers and fighter-bombers. As a reference, SU-25s were part of the VVS. The VVS was expected to provide ground support to Russian troops. The VVS would attack NATO missile sites and defend against NATO aircraft as necessary to allow these ground support missions. The VVS would also execute bombing attacks against NATO strategic air bases. The VVS was neither equipped or resourced to seize and maintain air supremacy over NATO ground troops. They were to get in and get out (if they could). Not all that much was expected of them. Note that the VVS did not at that time have air superiority fighters designed to "go after" NATO air and clear the sky.
 
The PVO is gone now, but the thinking remains. The successor VKS is primarily defensive. Note that the VVS as it exists today is a result of a merger between the PVO and the former VVS. They ensure the Russian ground troops aren't destroyed from the air. Any offensive action from them has always been a bonus. https://dupuyinstitute.org/2022/06/16/vv...periority/ is IMO a good explanation of this situation. It points out how the current VVS views the situation.

If they could achieve Air Superiority in the Western sense, they wouldn’t know what to do with it.  They don’t understand it, and don’t care about it.

[BostonCard]

Question, and since it doesn’t directly deal with the Ukraine war, feel free to delete…

Since Israel and Iran don’t have a common border, how is this war going to be fought?

BC

[BostonCard]

Question, and since it doesn’t directly deal with the Ukraine war, feel free to delete…

Since Israel and Iran don’t have a common border, how is this war going to be fought?

BC

[Goose]

Question, and since it doesn’t directly deal with the Ukraine war, feel free to delete…

Since Israel and Iran don’t have a common border, how is this war going to be fought?

BC

Iran isn't going to invade Israel, and similarly Israel will not invade Iran. Iran has used proxy's to "invade" Israel with little success. Iran may at some point establish a coalition including Islamic states that do border Israel and can invade them, but that isn't going to be "soon", probably 5-10 years minimum, if ever. Iran will use its proxy forces as much as it can. Iran may also try to involve the Gulf States in an attempt to broker a cease fire. Iran doesn't have may good immediate options.
 
Israel will continue to keep the pressure on Iran militarily by violating the air space of Lebanon/Syria and Iraq. That will continue until Iran finds a way to stop it. IMO the current Israeli government sees the current correlation of forces to be a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. Hezbollah is prostrate. Hamas is severely damaged and under continuing pressure. The Houthis are still in one piece but after breaking the truce may soon be locked in a conflict with the US. The US is actively prosecuting Houthi lines of supply. Israel now has a much more direct line of air attack into Iran. Israel also still has the original "long way around" that requires aerial refueling. The do have the capacity to use that approach as they have already demonstrated. Israel's near-term goal is to convert Iran into a secular state. They intend to do that by demonstrating the theocracy cannot protect the population. There has been and still is significant unrest in Iran. Much of the population already wants a secular state. Israel wants to tip that balance. This is Israel's first goal. In any case, Israel's second goal is to render Iran militarily destitute and without a nuclear program. They will bomb until the second goal is accomplished, hoping the first goal goes along with it. They think they can do that, but it has to be soon because the current situation won't last forever.

The previous US administration attempted with some success to restrain Israel. That was before the "short way" into Iran was available and before Russia was completely out of Syria. Whether the current administration could restrain Israel at this point is unknown. ATM the current administration is trying to claim it is playing Good Cop Bad Cop with Iran. Whether that is by choice or by necessity I don't know. I also doubt the current administration has any intention of cutting off aid to Israel, no matter what they do. Of course, this is all my opinion, not a fact :-).

---

https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israe...ources-say
If this is true (which it very well could be) it is a big advantage for Israel and the US. I am assuming Israel used F-16 drop tanks, which they have plenty of. IMO Israel accepted a larger radar cross-section for the first 2-4 hundred miles or so of the mission because nobody in that immediate region except the US would even notionally have the ability to see an F-35 with a slightly degraded RCS.

[Goose]

Question, and since it doesn’t directly deal with the Ukraine war, feel free to delete…

Since Israel and Iran don’t have a common border, how is this war going to be fought?

BC

Iran isn't going to invade Israel, and similarly Israel will not invade Iran. Iran has used proxy's to "invade" Israel with little success. Iran may at some point establish a coalition including Islamic states that do border Israel and can invade them, but that isn't going to be "soon", probably 5-10 years minimum, if ever. Iran will use its proxy forces as much as it can. Iran may also try to involve the Gulf States in an attempt to broker a cease fire. Iran doesn't have may good immediate options.
 
Israel will continue to keep the pressure on Iran militarily by violating the air space of Lebanon/Syria and Iraq. That will continue until Iran finds a way to stop it. IMO the current Israeli government sees the current correlation of forces to be a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. Hezbollah is prostrate. Hamas is severely damaged and under continuing pressure. The Houthis are still in one piece but after breaking the truce may soon be locked in a conflict with the US. The US is actively prosecuting Houthi lines of supply. Israel now has a much more direct line of air attack into Iran. Israel also still has the original "long way around" that requires aerial refueling. The do have the capacity to use that approach as they have already demonstrated. Israel's near-term goal is to convert Iran into a secular state. They intend to do that by demonstrating the theocracy cannot protect the population. There has been and still is significant unrest in Iran. Much of the population already wants a secular state. Israel wants to tip that balance. This is Israel's first goal. In any case, Israel's second goal is to render Iran militarily destitute and without a nuclear program. They will bomb until the second goal is accomplished, hoping the first goal goes along with it. They think they can do that, but it has to be soon because the current situation won't last forever.

The previous US administration attempted with some success to restrain Israel. That was before the "short way" into Iran was available and before Russia was completely out of Syria. Whether the current administration could restrain Israel at this point is unknown. ATM the current administration is trying to claim it is playing Good Cop Bad Cop with Iran. Whether that is by choice or by necessity I don't know. I also doubt the current administration has any intention of cutting off aid to Israel, no matter what they do. Of course, this is all my opinion, not a fact :-).

---

https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israe...ources-say
If this is true (which it very well could be) it is a big advantage for Israel and the US. I am assuming Israel used F-16 drop tanks, which they have plenty of. IMO Israel accepted a larger radar cross-section for the first 2-4 hundred miles or so of the mission because nobody in that immediate region except the US would even notionally have the ability to see an F-35 with a slightly degraded RCS.

[gocard14]

Thanks for the analysis Goose and a lot of that rings true. 

I also wonder about the timeline here. Having seriously degraded Irans air defenses, and possibly having weathered or destroyed much of Iran's ballistic missile response capability, what is preventing this from turning into a months long campaign of aerial bombardment? Especially if Israeli planes can now get close enough to use "dumb" bombs which they presumably have or can get a much larger supply of. 

Internally, while there is dislike of Netenyahu, all parties are in favor of preventing an Iranian nuclear program or at least are standing behind the flag. Internationally, Iran has made few friends and many enemies. Even countries that dislike Israel are likely happy to see the two have at it, which fits the fact that there has seemed to be little international outcry.

[gocard14]

Thanks for the analysis Goose and a lot of that rings true. 

I also wonder about the timeline here. Having seriously degraded Irans air defenses, and possibly having weathered or destroyed much of Iran's ballistic missile response capability, what is preventing this from turning into a months long campaign of aerial bombardment? Especially if Israeli planes can now get close enough to use "dumb" bombs which they presumably have or can get a much larger supply of. 

Internally, while there is dislike of Netenyahu, all parties are in favor of preventing an Iranian nuclear program or at least are standing behind the flag. Internationally, Iran has made few friends and many enemies. Even countries that dislike Israel are likely happy to see the two have at it, which fits the fact that there has seemed to be little international outcry.