04-01-2025, 03:17 PM
Oh for sure. Nothing about the pipe dream of a Greenland land grab is actually reasonable or pragmatic. But those waterways are somewhat porous right now.
Outside Topic Way OT: Ukraine
04-04-2025, 08:24 AM
https://www.reuters.com/world/china-hits...025-04-04/
Looks like rare earths just became lots "rarer". I hope our government has a large stockpile of these materials set aside to allow our industries to continue operations for years until alternatives are brought online :-).
https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-track-...53523.html
For those that think Russia is running low on artillery shells. Other items as well
https://www.yahoo.com/news/countries-nea...54817.html
Surprising nobody. The Ottawa Convention was never viable in the face of actual war. The problem is that pretending it was has led to a removal of mine stockpiles and manufacturing capability in signatory nations. That needs to be reversed, unfortunately at the same time demand for other military items is outstripping available capacity.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/04/brief...=url-share (gifted)
IMO this article is quite on point. It is often suggested that Europe can step up and replace the potential loss of US support to Ukraine. As I have said before, Europe does not currently have the intelligence collection capabilities (overhead and airborne in particular) the US has, so even best case there are problems there. However as the article points out there are political, social, and economic problems in Europe that may prevent effective support of Ukraine. The lack of the US as "the adult in the room" in Europe not only reduces the thrust for common actions in Ukraine but can eventually have even worse effects.
Looks like rare earths just became lots "rarer". I hope our government has a large stockpile of these materials set aside to allow our industries to continue operations for years until alternatives are brought online :-).
https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-track-...53523.html
For those that think Russia is running low on artillery shells. Other items as well
Quote:"Despite extensive battlefield losses in Ukraine, the Russian military is reconstituting and growing at a faster rate than most analysts had anticipated," Cavoli wrote.There undoubtedly is a bit of overstatement involved in all of the above designed for the nature of the listeners. However it does appear that despite all kinds of claims to the contrary Russia is staying at least even in armored vehicles and troops. We will know more pretty soon. If Russia starts a serious offensive, we will know they expect to be adequately supplied. If Russia does not, it may be because they are not in as good shape as the article indicates.
He said Moscow is quickly replacing its forces on all fronts, including ammo, armored vehicles, and troops.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/countries-nea...54817.html
Surprising nobody. The Ottawa Convention was never viable in the face of actual war. The problem is that pretending it was has led to a removal of mine stockpiles and manufacturing capability in signatory nations. That needs to be reversed, unfortunately at the same time demand for other military items is outstripping available capacity.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/04/brief...=url-share (gifted)
IMO this article is quite on point. It is often suggested that Europe can step up and replace the potential loss of US support to Ukraine. As I have said before, Europe does not currently have the intelligence collection capabilities (overhead and airborne in particular) the US has, so even best case there are problems there. However as the article points out there are political, social, and economic problems in Europe that may prevent effective support of Ukraine. The lack of the US as "the adult in the room" in Europe not only reduces the thrust for common actions in Ukraine but can eventually have even worse effects.
Quote:Rearming in the name of democracy today could leave the far-right governments of tomorrow — many with close ties to Moscow — in charge of big, muscular militaries.
https://www.reuters.com/world/china-hits...025-04-04/
Looks like rare earths just became lots "rarer". I hope our government has a large stockpile of these materials set aside to allow our industries to continue operations for years until alternatives are brought online :-).
https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-track-...53523.html
For those that think Russia is running low on artillery shells. Other items as well
https://www.yahoo.com/news/countries-nea...54817.html
Surprising nobody. The Ottawa Convention was never viable in the face of actual war. The problem is that pretending it was has led to a removal of mine stockpiles and manufacturing capability in signatory nations. That needs to be reversed, unfortunately at the same time demand for other military items is outstripping available capacity.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/04/brief...=url-share (gifted)
IMO this article is quite on point. It is often suggested that Europe can step up and replace the potential loss of US support to Ukraine. As I have said before, Europe does not currently have the intelligence collection capabilities (overhead and airborne in particular) the US has, so even best case there are problems there. However as the article points out there are political, social, and economic problems in Europe that may prevent effective support of Ukraine. The lack of the US as "the adult in the room" in Europe not only reduces the thrust for common actions in Ukraine but can eventually have even worse effects.
Looks like rare earths just became lots "rarer". I hope our government has a large stockpile of these materials set aside to allow our industries to continue operations for years until alternatives are brought online :-).
https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-track-...53523.html
For those that think Russia is running low on artillery shells. Other items as well
Quote:"Despite extensive battlefield losses in Ukraine, the Russian military is reconstituting and growing at a faster rate than most analysts had anticipated," Cavoli wrote.There undoubtedly is a bit of overstatement involved in all of the above designed for the nature of the listeners. However it does appear that despite all kinds of claims to the contrary Russia is staying at least even in armored vehicles and troops. We will know more pretty soon. If Russia starts a serious offensive, we will know they expect to be adequately supplied. If Russia does not, it may be because they are not in as good shape as the article indicates.
He said Moscow is quickly replacing its forces on all fronts, including ammo, armored vehicles, and troops.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/countries-nea...54817.html
Surprising nobody. The Ottawa Convention was never viable in the face of actual war. The problem is that pretending it was has led to a removal of mine stockpiles and manufacturing capability in signatory nations. That needs to be reversed, unfortunately at the same time demand for other military items is outstripping available capacity.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/04/brief...=url-share (gifted)
IMO this article is quite on point. It is often suggested that Europe can step up and replace the potential loss of US support to Ukraine. As I have said before, Europe does not currently have the intelligence collection capabilities (overhead and airborne in particular) the US has, so even best case there are problems there. However as the article points out there are political, social, and economic problems in Europe that may prevent effective support of Ukraine. The lack of the US as "the adult in the room" in Europe not only reduces the thrust for common actions in Ukraine but can eventually have even worse effects.
Quote:Rearming in the name of democracy today could leave the far-right governments of tomorrow — many with close ties to Moscow — in charge of big, muscular militaries.
04-04-2025, 09:09 AM
https://www.twz.com/sea/greenland-absolu...-in-europe
Of course, one might ask what is "new" about the existence of the GIUK gap and its strategic importance. The answer of course is nothing. The landmasses involved are not important either, unless one counts https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_Air_...n_Keflavik. We (insanely stupidly after just completing a major upgrade) closed the base because with the cold war over we obviously didn't need it anymore :-). We of course reopened it at additional expense later. The US and NATO "fought" the entire cold war without the necessity of land-based support from Greenland. Actually, the GIUK gap is the second line of defense against Russian submarines. We try to attach a tail in the Norwegian sea whenever we can.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GIUK_gap discusses the long history of this seaway in military history. The Bismarck was initially intercepted in the GIUK gap. The link also points out that Russia no longer has to deploy its offensive strategic assets into the Atlantic via the GIUK gap. The Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea are "good enough". That was actually the case by the end of the Cold War. Russia does want to deny the use of the GIUK gap for traffic in the other direction however.
Of course, one might ask what is "new" about the existence of the GIUK gap and its strategic importance. The answer of course is nothing. The landmasses involved are not important either, unless one counts https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_Air_...n_Keflavik. We (insanely stupidly after just completing a major upgrade) closed the base because with the cold war over we obviously didn't need it anymore :-). We of course reopened it at additional expense later. The US and NATO "fought" the entire cold war without the necessity of land-based support from Greenland. Actually, the GIUK gap is the second line of defense against Russian submarines. We try to attach a tail in the Norwegian sea whenever we can.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GIUK_gap discusses the long history of this seaway in military history. The Bismarck was initially intercepted in the GIUK gap. The link also points out that Russia no longer has to deploy its offensive strategic assets into the Atlantic via the GIUK gap. The Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea are "good enough". That was actually the case by the end of the Cold War. Russia does want to deny the use of the GIUK gap for traffic in the other direction however.
https://www.twz.com/sea/greenland-absolu...-in-europe
Of course, one might ask what is "new" about the existence of the GIUK gap and its strategic importance. The answer of course is nothing. The landmasses involved are not important either, unless one counts https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_Air_...n_Keflavik. We (insanely stupidly after just completing a major upgrade) closed the base because with the cold war over we obviously didn't need it anymore :-). We of course reopened it at additional expense later. The US and NATO "fought" the entire cold war without the necessity of land-based support from Greenland. Actually, the GIUK gap is the second line of defense against Russian submarines. We try to attach a tail in the Norwegian sea whenever we can.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GIUK_gap discusses the long history of this seaway in military history. The Bismarck was initially intercepted in the GIUK gap. The link also points out that Russia no longer has to deploy its offensive strategic assets into the Atlantic via the GIUK gap. The Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea are "good enough". That was actually the case by the end of the Cold War. Russia does want to deny the use of the GIUK gap for traffic in the other direction however.
Of course, one might ask what is "new" about the existence of the GIUK gap and its strategic importance. The answer of course is nothing. The landmasses involved are not important either, unless one counts https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_Air_...n_Keflavik. We (insanely stupidly after just completing a major upgrade) closed the base because with the cold war over we obviously didn't need it anymore :-). We of course reopened it at additional expense later. The US and NATO "fought" the entire cold war without the necessity of land-based support from Greenland. Actually, the GIUK gap is the second line of defense against Russian submarines. We try to attach a tail in the Norwegian sea whenever we can.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GIUK_gap discusses the long history of this seaway in military history. The Bismarck was initially intercepted in the GIUK gap. The link also points out that Russia no longer has to deploy its offensive strategic assets into the Atlantic via the GIUK gap. The Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea are "good enough". That was actually the case by the end of the Cold War. Russia does want to deny the use of the GIUK gap for traffic in the other direction however.
04-08-2025, 08:19 AM
Life is too short to waste on crap football.
Life is too short to waste on crap football.
04-08-2025, 11:42 AM
Fate works in mysterious ways. It's nice to see some good news, esp after the recent spate of terrible news following resumption of fatal Russian drone attacks on Ukrainian civilians and the slow loss of ground to the Russian meat assaults.
04-08-2025, 01:00 PM
(04-08-2025, 08:19 AM)gailtate Wrote: Who'd-a-thunkit?!:As the article states, it is undoubtedly an "unintended consequence" of the economic disruption all nations are dealing with. What the article does not mention, but which is arguably more important, is that Saudi Arabia and the rest of OPEC are increasing their production considerably. This glut of supply is driving prices down as well. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/...025-04-04/
https://www.nationalreview.com/the-morni...il-prices/
(04-08-2025, 08:19 AM)gailtate Wrote: Who'd-a-thunkit?!:As the article states, it is undoubtedly an "unintended consequence" of the economic disruption all nations are dealing with. What the article does not mention, but which is arguably more important, is that Saudi Arabia and the rest of OPEC are increasing their production considerably. This glut of supply is driving prices down as well. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/...025-04-04/
https://www.nationalreview.com/the-morni...il-prices/
04-09-2025, 09:29 AM
https://www.airandspaceforces.com/more-e...riorities/
I posted about these aircraft previously. IMO 10 such aircraft are not anywhere close to enough. In the event of a major war we are going to need lots of missions from EA capable aircraft. The USAF, in its "wisdom" elected to forgo any "penetrating" EA aircraft, retiring the EF-111 with no replacement. The reasoning probably was that with stealth aircraft available it wasn't necessary. Some knew then, and all know now, that isn't the case. Delusionally the USAF asserted that Navy EF-18s could fulfill that need if it arose. What are the odds the Navy won't be using every one they have and crying for more?
The EA-37 is a "standoff" system. It doesn't accompany airstrikes (at least in theory). However it can provide useful jamming and confusion of enemy long-range radar systems. That is very valuable because radars operating in L band and below have a much greater chance of detecting (but not targeting) inbound stealth aircraft. It can play the historical role of the EB-66 in Vietnam. It can "get closer" than an EC-130 could, but it can't accompany the strike. It is a relatively lower performance aircraft and very visible target. An EF-111/EA-6/EF-18 it is not.
The C-130 Compass Call was most effective as a communications jammer in the conflicts in the Middle East. This was undoubtedly partly due to the "primitive" state of enemy communications and the fairly quick success of the US SEAD efforts. If you had asked me before the Ukraine war whether the Compass Call aircraft would have much success jamming Russian communications, I would have been skeptical. Ukraine has demonstrated that Russian communications are not nearly as "advanced" as we all assumed they would be. I suspect China actually will be very "advanced". In any event, the EA-37 has at least the same communications jamming capability, with the possible exception of lower effective radiated power (ERP). I am not at all sure sure of lower ERP, I am guessing based on an assumed lower on-board "house power" capability due to a smaller aircraft.
The EA-37 has more sophisticated receivers, exciters, and software than the EC-130 did for radar jamming. It can do a "better" job closer to the front. However, 10 aircraft aren't near enough. The aircraft and aircrew can't fly every day, let alone twice or more a day. The USAF will want to operate at high tempo for many successive days. We have enough strike aircraft and aircrews to do that. We don't have enough EA-37s and aircrews to support them. 3 days "on", 1 day "off" (for crew rest and maintenance), 1 mission per day is about the maximum an aircraft of this type can sustain, and even that is stressful on maintenance and aircrew personnel. There will undoubtedly be aircraft that "break", i.e. 100% availability isn't going to happen. Sadly, there probably will be losses. The USAF definitely needs more of these aircraft.
I posted about these aircraft previously. IMO 10 such aircraft are not anywhere close to enough. In the event of a major war we are going to need lots of missions from EA capable aircraft. The USAF, in its "wisdom" elected to forgo any "penetrating" EA aircraft, retiring the EF-111 with no replacement. The reasoning probably was that with stealth aircraft available it wasn't necessary. Some knew then, and all know now, that isn't the case. Delusionally the USAF asserted that Navy EF-18s could fulfill that need if it arose. What are the odds the Navy won't be using every one they have and crying for more?
The EA-37 is a "standoff" system. It doesn't accompany airstrikes (at least in theory). However it can provide useful jamming and confusion of enemy long-range radar systems. That is very valuable because radars operating in L band and below have a much greater chance of detecting (but not targeting) inbound stealth aircraft. It can play the historical role of the EB-66 in Vietnam. It can "get closer" than an EC-130 could, but it can't accompany the strike. It is a relatively lower performance aircraft and very visible target. An EF-111/EA-6/EF-18 it is not.
The C-130 Compass Call was most effective as a communications jammer in the conflicts in the Middle East. This was undoubtedly partly due to the "primitive" state of enemy communications and the fairly quick success of the US SEAD efforts. If you had asked me before the Ukraine war whether the Compass Call aircraft would have much success jamming Russian communications, I would have been skeptical. Ukraine has demonstrated that Russian communications are not nearly as "advanced" as we all assumed they would be. I suspect China actually will be very "advanced". In any event, the EA-37 has at least the same communications jamming capability, with the possible exception of lower effective radiated power (ERP). I am not at all sure sure of lower ERP, I am guessing based on an assumed lower on-board "house power" capability due to a smaller aircraft.
The EA-37 has more sophisticated receivers, exciters, and software than the EC-130 did for radar jamming. It can do a "better" job closer to the front. However, 10 aircraft aren't near enough. The aircraft and aircrew can't fly every day, let alone twice or more a day. The USAF will want to operate at high tempo for many successive days. We have enough strike aircraft and aircrews to do that. We don't have enough EA-37s and aircrews to support them. 3 days "on", 1 day "off" (for crew rest and maintenance), 1 mission per day is about the maximum an aircraft of this type can sustain, and even that is stressful on maintenance and aircrew personnel. There will undoubtedly be aircraft that "break", i.e. 100% availability isn't going to happen. Sadly, there probably will be losses. The USAF definitely needs more of these aircraft.
https://www.airandspaceforces.com/more-e...riorities/
I posted about these aircraft previously. IMO 10 such aircraft are not anywhere close to enough. In the event of a major war we are going to need lots of missions from EA capable aircraft. The USAF, in its "wisdom" elected to forgo any "penetrating" EA aircraft, retiring the EF-111 with no replacement. The reasoning probably was that with stealth aircraft available it wasn't necessary. Some knew then, and all know now, that isn't the case. Delusionally the USAF asserted that Navy EF-18s could fulfill that need if it arose. What are the odds the Navy won't be using every one they have and crying for more?
The EA-37 is a "standoff" system. It doesn't accompany airstrikes (at least in theory). However it can provide useful jamming and confusion of enemy long-range radar systems. That is very valuable because radars operating in L band and below have a much greater chance of detecting (but not targeting) inbound stealth aircraft. It can play the historical role of the EB-66 in Vietnam. It can "get closer" than an EC-130 could, but it can't accompany the strike. It is a relatively lower performance aircraft and very visible target. An EF-111/EA-6/EF-18 it is not.
The C-130 Compass Call was most effective as a communications jammer in the conflicts in the Middle East. This was undoubtedly partly due to the "primitive" state of enemy communications and the fairly quick success of the US SEAD efforts. If you had asked me before the Ukraine war whether the Compass Call aircraft would have much success jamming Russian communications, I would have been skeptical. Ukraine has demonstrated that Russian communications are not nearly as "advanced" as we all assumed they would be. I suspect China actually will be very "advanced". In any event, the EA-37 has at least the same communications jamming capability, with the possible exception of lower effective radiated power (ERP). I am not at all sure sure of lower ERP, I am guessing based on an assumed lower on-board "house power" capability due to a smaller aircraft.
The EA-37 has more sophisticated receivers, exciters, and software than the EC-130 did for radar jamming. It can do a "better" job closer to the front. However, 10 aircraft aren't near enough. The aircraft and aircrew can't fly every day, let alone twice or more a day. The USAF will want to operate at high tempo for many successive days. We have enough strike aircraft and aircrews to do that. We don't have enough EA-37s and aircrews to support them. 3 days "on", 1 day "off" (for crew rest and maintenance), 1 mission per day is about the maximum an aircraft of this type can sustain, and even that is stressful on maintenance and aircrew personnel. There will undoubtedly be aircraft that "break", i.e. 100% availability isn't going to happen. Sadly, there probably will be losses. The USAF definitely needs more of these aircraft.
I posted about these aircraft previously. IMO 10 such aircraft are not anywhere close to enough. In the event of a major war we are going to need lots of missions from EA capable aircraft. The USAF, in its "wisdom" elected to forgo any "penetrating" EA aircraft, retiring the EF-111 with no replacement. The reasoning probably was that with stealth aircraft available it wasn't necessary. Some knew then, and all know now, that isn't the case. Delusionally the USAF asserted that Navy EF-18s could fulfill that need if it arose. What are the odds the Navy won't be using every one they have and crying for more?
The EA-37 is a "standoff" system. It doesn't accompany airstrikes (at least in theory). However it can provide useful jamming and confusion of enemy long-range radar systems. That is very valuable because radars operating in L band and below have a much greater chance of detecting (but not targeting) inbound stealth aircraft. It can play the historical role of the EB-66 in Vietnam. It can "get closer" than an EC-130 could, but it can't accompany the strike. It is a relatively lower performance aircraft and very visible target. An EF-111/EA-6/EF-18 it is not.
The C-130 Compass Call was most effective as a communications jammer in the conflicts in the Middle East. This was undoubtedly partly due to the "primitive" state of enemy communications and the fairly quick success of the US SEAD efforts. If you had asked me before the Ukraine war whether the Compass Call aircraft would have much success jamming Russian communications, I would have been skeptical. Ukraine has demonstrated that Russian communications are not nearly as "advanced" as we all assumed they would be. I suspect China actually will be very "advanced". In any event, the EA-37 has at least the same communications jamming capability, with the possible exception of lower effective radiated power (ERP). I am not at all sure sure of lower ERP, I am guessing based on an assumed lower on-board "house power" capability due to a smaller aircraft.
The EA-37 has more sophisticated receivers, exciters, and software than the EC-130 did for radar jamming. It can do a "better" job closer to the front. However, 10 aircraft aren't near enough. The aircraft and aircrew can't fly every day, let alone twice or more a day. The USAF will want to operate at high tempo for many successive days. We have enough strike aircraft and aircrews to do that. We don't have enough EA-37s and aircrews to support them. 3 days "on", 1 day "off" (for crew rest and maintenance), 1 mission per day is about the maximum an aircraft of this type can sustain, and even that is stressful on maintenance and aircrew personnel. There will undoubtedly be aircraft that "break", i.e. 100% availability isn't going to happen. Sadly, there probably will be losses. The USAF definitely needs more of these aircraft.
04-09-2025, 11:21 AM
https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraines-mili...52764.html
Maybe the Russia spring offensive is starting. So far, not enough to be "sure" if this is the "real thing". If it is, it seems any kind of "cease fire" is off the table, at least for several months. We will now get to see what the European allies can do to "beef up" Ukraine's ability to defeat "meat attacks". So far, there really hasn't been an effective answer to that question.
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounde...ct-updates
Maybe the Russia spring offensive is starting. So far, not enough to be "sure" if this is the "real thing". If it is, it seems any kind of "cease fire" is off the table, at least for several months. We will now get to see what the European allies can do to "beef up" Ukraine's ability to defeat "meat attacks". So far, there really hasn't been an effective answer to that question.
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounde...ct-updates
Quote:ISW continues to assess that Putin has no interest in ending the war and intends to continue fighting until he accomplishes his objectives in Ukraine, which are the toppling of the current Ukrainian government and the categorical destruction of the Ukrainian military.[37]ODNI apparently thinks similarly. ISW isn't infallible, but they seem to think Putin doesn't intend to sign any ceasefires. World events, such as the drop in oil prices and the possibility of the US applying secondary tariffs to buyers of Russian oil might compel Putin to act otherwise, but I wouldn't count on it.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraines-mili...52764.html
Maybe the Russia spring offensive is starting. So far, not enough to be "sure" if this is the "real thing". If it is, it seems any kind of "cease fire" is off the table, at least for several months. We will now get to see what the European allies can do to "beef up" Ukraine's ability to defeat "meat attacks". So far, there really hasn't been an effective answer to that question.
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounde...ct-updates
Maybe the Russia spring offensive is starting. So far, not enough to be "sure" if this is the "real thing". If it is, it seems any kind of "cease fire" is off the table, at least for several months. We will now get to see what the European allies can do to "beef up" Ukraine's ability to defeat "meat attacks". So far, there really hasn't been an effective answer to that question.
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounde...ct-updates
Quote:ISW continues to assess that Putin has no interest in ending the war and intends to continue fighting until he accomplishes his objectives in Ukraine, which are the toppling of the current Ukrainian government and the categorical destruction of the Ukrainian military.[37]ODNI apparently thinks similarly. ISW isn't infallible, but they seem to think Putin doesn't intend to sign any ceasefires. World events, such as the drop in oil prices and the possibility of the US applying secondary tariffs to buyers of Russian oil might compel Putin to act otherwise, but I wouldn't count on it.
04-09-2025, 01:08 PM
The kicker is that the Sumy/Kharkiv offensives taking shape now were surely being planned during ceasefire talks, indicating that Russia had no intention of abiding by any potential ceasefire agreements.
04-09-2025, 01:59 PM
(04-09-2025, 01:08 PM)fullmetal Wrote: The kicker is that the Sumy/Kharkiv offensives taking shape now were surely being planned during ceasefire talks, indicating that Russia had no intention of abiding by any potential ceasefire agreements.IMO you are totally correct. One could give Russia the benefit of the doubt and say they planned them but could halt their execution if a ceasefire agreement had been reached. However, Putin has set forth his conditions for a cease-fire that amount to a Ukrainian surrender. He has been firm on this. The US may believe he can be "brought around" to something less but there is no evidence that is the case. Russia and the US apparently aren't even talking about that right now in Saudi Arabia. They are only talking about how to "normalize" relations between the US and Russia. IMO this "normalization" should not be allowed without a quid pro quo from Russia. So far there is no sign of that.
(04-09-2025, 01:08 PM)fullmetal Wrote: The kicker is that the Sumy/Kharkiv offensives taking shape now were surely being planned during ceasefire talks, indicating that Russia had no intention of abiding by any potential ceasefire agreements.IMO you are totally correct. One could give Russia the benefit of the doubt and say they planned them but could halt their execution if a ceasefire agreement had been reached. However, Putin has set forth his conditions for a cease-fire that amount to a Ukrainian surrender. He has been firm on this. The US may believe he can be "brought around" to something less but there is no evidence that is the case. Russia and the US apparently aren't even talking about that right now in Saudi Arabia. They are only talking about how to "normalize" relations between the US and Russia. IMO this "normalization" should not be allowed without a quid pro quo from Russia. So far there is no sign of that.
04-18-2025, 08:41 AM
https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/18/europe/ru...index.html
The venom diagram of acceptable solutions to both Russia and Ukraine may be an empty set right now.
BC
The venom diagram of acceptable solutions to both Russia and Ukraine may be an empty set right now.
BC
https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/18/europe/ru...index.html
The venom diagram of acceptable solutions to both Russia and Ukraine may be an empty set right now.
BC
The venom diagram of acceptable solutions to both Russia and Ukraine may be an empty set right now.
BC
04-18-2025, 09:58 AM
I’ve never heard it called a venom diagram before. Spelling hallucinator got your Venn, or were you being creative?
If someone pulled this kind of “deal” after a hurricane or earthquake, they’d wind up in jail.
If someone pulled this kind of “deal” after a hurricane or earthquake, they’d wind up in jail.
04-18-2025, 10:05 AM
Russia wants the US to force Ukraine into giving them territories that are still controlled by Ukraine and that Russia does not have the near term ability to capture.
Ukraine, obviously, is not on board with that. The US doesn't really have much leverage to force Ukraine into that, and Ukraine rightly doesn't trust any US "security guarantees". So instead of the war being over in 24 hours as promised, the US will take their ball(missiles) and go home.
Ukraine, obviously, is not on board with that. The US doesn't really have much leverage to force Ukraine into that, and Ukraine rightly doesn't trust any US "security guarantees". So instead of the war being over in 24 hours as promised, the US will take their ball(missiles) and go home.
Russia wants the US to force Ukraine into giving them territories that are still controlled by Ukraine and that Russia does not have the near term ability to capture.
Ukraine, obviously, is not on board with that. The US doesn't really have much leverage to force Ukraine into that, and Ukraine rightly doesn't trust any US "security guarantees". So instead of the war being over in 24 hours as promised, the US will take their ball(missiles) and go home.
Ukraine, obviously, is not on board with that. The US doesn't really have much leverage to force Ukraine into that, and Ukraine rightly doesn't trust any US "security guarantees". So instead of the war being over in 24 hours as promised, the US will take their ball(missiles) and go home.
04-18-2025, 10:47 AM
Unfortunately Rubio and Vance are giving somewhat opposite messages. That could just be lack of coordination in the administration or it could be some kind of attempt at a diplomatic carrot and stick. Who knows which it is.
It is not at all surprising that the Ukrainians and Russians have irreconcilable positions. The goal of diplomacy is to square that circle. So far diplomacy has failed to accomplish that. As many others have stated peace won't happen until both sides are convinced they can't "win" and "settling" for a peace neither really wants is better than continuing fighting. Putin for sure isn't there yet.
The Administration does have it in its power to significantly tighten the screws. The idea of a "secondary boycott" in the form of tariffs on nations doing business in Russian oil could both send a message and actually make Putin's position considerably less tenable. The obvious problem is that the Administration doesn't seem to believe that forcing Russia to want peace is in the best interest of the US. We talk about "strong action" and then do nothing. If we actually did further sanction Russia, it just might convince them that wanting peace is better for them than continuing to fight. Maybe that will happen.
If the US simply washes its hands of Ukraine, the worst part will not be the loss of further US kinetic military aid. That will be a massive loss of course. It may all by itself give Russia the victory it seeks, independent of what the Europeans can provide. However the real catastrophic loss will be the loss of US tactical and strategic intelligence. The Europeans cannot replace that capability in the near term. In fact, they themselves rely in some measure on the US for those capabilities. Ukraine has some good HUMINT capability, but it has succeeded in hanging on in this war because they get from the US a daily updated Russian ORBAT and intelligence summary. They can therefore extrapolate their own intelligence summary and act accordingly. Surprising Ukraine at this point isn't actually possible. Without our help, it could be. Ukraine doesn't have enough manpower to compensate for surprise with mass. They are also too immobile to compensate with speed. It only takes once.
It is not at all surprising that the Ukrainians and Russians have irreconcilable positions. The goal of diplomacy is to square that circle. So far diplomacy has failed to accomplish that. As many others have stated peace won't happen until both sides are convinced they can't "win" and "settling" for a peace neither really wants is better than continuing fighting. Putin for sure isn't there yet.
The Administration does have it in its power to significantly tighten the screws. The idea of a "secondary boycott" in the form of tariffs on nations doing business in Russian oil could both send a message and actually make Putin's position considerably less tenable. The obvious problem is that the Administration doesn't seem to believe that forcing Russia to want peace is in the best interest of the US. We talk about "strong action" and then do nothing. If we actually did further sanction Russia, it just might convince them that wanting peace is better for them than continuing to fight. Maybe that will happen.
If the US simply washes its hands of Ukraine, the worst part will not be the loss of further US kinetic military aid. That will be a massive loss of course. It may all by itself give Russia the victory it seeks, independent of what the Europeans can provide. However the real catastrophic loss will be the loss of US tactical and strategic intelligence. The Europeans cannot replace that capability in the near term. In fact, they themselves rely in some measure on the US for those capabilities. Ukraine has some good HUMINT capability, but it has succeeded in hanging on in this war because they get from the US a daily updated Russian ORBAT and intelligence summary. They can therefore extrapolate their own intelligence summary and act accordingly. Surprising Ukraine at this point isn't actually possible. Without our help, it could be. Ukraine doesn't have enough manpower to compensate for surprise with mass. They are also too immobile to compensate with speed. It only takes once.
Unfortunately Rubio and Vance are giving somewhat opposite messages. That could just be lack of coordination in the administration or it could be some kind of attempt at a diplomatic carrot and stick. Who knows which it is.
It is not at all surprising that the Ukrainians and Russians have irreconcilable positions. The goal of diplomacy is to square that circle. So far diplomacy has failed to accomplish that. As many others have stated peace won't happen until both sides are convinced they can't "win" and "settling" for a peace neither really wants is better than continuing fighting. Putin for sure isn't there yet.
The Administration does have it in its power to significantly tighten the screws. The idea of a "secondary boycott" in the form of tariffs on nations doing business in Russian oil could both send a message and actually make Putin's position considerably less tenable. The obvious problem is that the Administration doesn't seem to believe that forcing Russia to want peace is in the best interest of the US. We talk about "strong action" and then do nothing. If we actually did further sanction Russia, it just might convince them that wanting peace is better for them than continuing to fight. Maybe that will happen.
If the US simply washes its hands of Ukraine, the worst part will not be the loss of further US kinetic military aid. That will be a massive loss of course. It may all by itself give Russia the victory it seeks, independent of what the Europeans can provide. However the real catastrophic loss will be the loss of US tactical and strategic intelligence. The Europeans cannot replace that capability in the near term. In fact, they themselves rely in some measure on the US for those capabilities. Ukraine has some good HUMINT capability, but it has succeeded in hanging on in this war because they get from the US a daily updated Russian ORBAT and intelligence summary. They can therefore extrapolate their own intelligence summary and act accordingly. Surprising Ukraine at this point isn't actually possible. Without our help, it could be. Ukraine doesn't have enough manpower to compensate for surprise with mass. They are also too immobile to compensate with speed. It only takes once.
It is not at all surprising that the Ukrainians and Russians have irreconcilable positions. The goal of diplomacy is to square that circle. So far diplomacy has failed to accomplish that. As many others have stated peace won't happen until both sides are convinced they can't "win" and "settling" for a peace neither really wants is better than continuing fighting. Putin for sure isn't there yet.
The Administration does have it in its power to significantly tighten the screws. The idea of a "secondary boycott" in the form of tariffs on nations doing business in Russian oil could both send a message and actually make Putin's position considerably less tenable. The obvious problem is that the Administration doesn't seem to believe that forcing Russia to want peace is in the best interest of the US. We talk about "strong action" and then do nothing. If we actually did further sanction Russia, it just might convince them that wanting peace is better for them than continuing to fight. Maybe that will happen.
If the US simply washes its hands of Ukraine, the worst part will not be the loss of further US kinetic military aid. That will be a massive loss of course. It may all by itself give Russia the victory it seeks, independent of what the Europeans can provide. However the real catastrophic loss will be the loss of US tactical and strategic intelligence. The Europeans cannot replace that capability in the near term. In fact, they themselves rely in some measure on the US for those capabilities. Ukraine has some good HUMINT capability, but it has succeeded in hanging on in this war because they get from the US a daily updated Russian ORBAT and intelligence summary. They can therefore extrapolate their own intelligence summary and act accordingly. Surprising Ukraine at this point isn't actually possible. Without our help, it could be. Ukraine doesn't have enough manpower to compensate for surprise with mass. They are also too immobile to compensate with speed. It only takes once.
04-19-2025, 02:55 PM
As a last ditch effort to save this thread, I have deleted all the posts from the last two days, including my own. It's an attempt to "reset" this thread to its intended purpose, which is not to litigate Ukraine's post Soviet history, but to provide factual updates and analysis of the ongoing conflict.
The next step will be to lock this thread, which I have no desire to do. I would love to be able to have reasoned discussions about political matters, and anyone who knows me from the old Bootleg knows that I very much enjoyed engaging others in the back and forth. However, because of historical reasons on this board which ended badly, and the stated desire to have a community focused on Stanford sports, such discussions have been put off limit. This thread has had a narrow exception carved out because of the commentary and analysis that would be difficult to find nearly anywhere else, but if posters can't follow the very narrow parameters set out, it may be time to end the exception that maintains this thread alive. I, for one, would feel very disappointed if that happened.
Note, I'm not the last word here, so if one of the other mods (especially Yvonne) feels strongly, the deleted posts can be restored.
BC
The next step will be to lock this thread, which I have no desire to do. I would love to be able to have reasoned discussions about political matters, and anyone who knows me from the old Bootleg knows that I very much enjoyed engaging others in the back and forth. However, because of historical reasons on this board which ended badly, and the stated desire to have a community focused on Stanford sports, such discussions have been put off limit. This thread has had a narrow exception carved out because of the commentary and analysis that would be difficult to find nearly anywhere else, but if posters can't follow the very narrow parameters set out, it may be time to end the exception that maintains this thread alive. I, for one, would feel very disappointed if that happened.
Note, I'm not the last word here, so if one of the other mods (especially Yvonne) feels strongly, the deleted posts can be restored.
BC
As a last ditch effort to save this thread, I have deleted all the posts from the last two days, including my own. It's an attempt to "reset" this thread to its intended purpose, which is not to litigate Ukraine's post Soviet history, but to provide factual updates and analysis of the ongoing conflict.
The next step will be to lock this thread, which I have no desire to do. I would love to be able to have reasoned discussions about political matters, and anyone who knows me from the old Bootleg knows that I very much enjoyed engaging others in the back and forth. However, because of historical reasons on this board which ended badly, and the stated desire to have a community focused on Stanford sports, such discussions have been put off limit. This thread has had a narrow exception carved out because of the commentary and analysis that would be difficult to find nearly anywhere else, but if posters can't follow the very narrow parameters set out, it may be time to end the exception that maintains this thread alive. I, for one, would feel very disappointed if that happened.
Note, I'm not the last word here, so if one of the other mods (especially Yvonne) feels strongly, the deleted posts can be restored.
BC
The next step will be to lock this thread, which I have no desire to do. I would love to be able to have reasoned discussions about political matters, and anyone who knows me from the old Bootleg knows that I very much enjoyed engaging others in the back and forth. However, because of historical reasons on this board which ended badly, and the stated desire to have a community focused on Stanford sports, such discussions have been put off limit. This thread has had a narrow exception carved out because of the commentary and analysis that would be difficult to find nearly anywhere else, but if posters can't follow the very narrow parameters set out, it may be time to end the exception that maintains this thread alive. I, for one, would feel very disappointed if that happened.
Note, I'm not the last word here, so if one of the other mods (especially Yvonne) feels strongly, the deleted posts can be restored.
BC
in our class Facebook group (class of '82) we have taken a similar hard line on political discussions, pretty much the only ones allowed are if they directly involve a classmate.
We set up a related group for political discussions and invited all the members of the group to join, so far we've had ~10% join the new group. The discussions so far have been mostly civil (my definition of civil is I have not had to either delete any material or ban anyone from the group). I would guess that a similar percentage of members here are interested in these sorts of discussions.
If people want to go deep on politics then maybe an enterprising individual can set up a group to do just that, or interested parties can join existing groups, one existing group is a spin-off of the "current events board" from the bootleg, you can find it here
https://currenteventsboard.com/forums/fo...nts-board/
We set up a related group for political discussions and invited all the members of the group to join, so far we've had ~10% join the new group. The discussions so far have been mostly civil (my definition of civil is I have not had to either delete any material or ban anyone from the group). I would guess that a similar percentage of members here are interested in these sorts of discussions.
If people want to go deep on politics then maybe an enterprising individual can set up a group to do just that, or interested parties can join existing groups, one existing group is a spin-off of the "current events board" from the bootleg, you can find it here
https://currenteventsboard.com/forums/fo...nts-board/
Eric
"the older we get the better we were"
in our class Facebook group (class of '82) we have taken a similar hard line on political discussions, pretty much the only ones allowed are if they directly involve a classmate.
We set up a related group for political discussions and invited all the members of the group to join, so far we've had ~10% join the new group. The discussions so far have been mostly civil (my definition of civil is I have not had to either delete any material or ban anyone from the group). I would guess that a similar percentage of members here are interested in these sorts of discussions.
If people want to go deep on politics then maybe an enterprising individual can set up a group to do just that, or interested parties can join existing groups, one existing group is a spin-off of the "current events board" from the bootleg, you can find it here
https://currenteventsboard.com/forums/fo...nts-board/
We set up a related group for political discussions and invited all the members of the group to join, so far we've had ~10% join the new group. The discussions so far have been mostly civil (my definition of civil is I have not had to either delete any material or ban anyone from the group). I would guess that a similar percentage of members here are interested in these sorts of discussions.
If people want to go deep on politics then maybe an enterprising individual can set up a group to do just that, or interested parties can join existing groups, one existing group is a spin-off of the "current events board" from the bootleg, you can find it here
https://currenteventsboard.com/forums/fo...nts-board/
Eric
"the older we get the better we were"
04-19-2025, 05:07 PM
Thanks BC. But I'd hate to see a motivated Cardboard poster poison the thread deliberately. Maybe we can just prune off-topic posts before another conflict ensues.
Our moderators have a very difficult task. I refer you, myself and others to Carl von Clausewitz's statement that War is merely the continuation of policy by other means. If you accept his theory then War is simply another form of politics, plain and simple. Personally I believe the Ukrainian situation is a clear confirmation of his theory.
That said I believe this board is not the place for the discussion that can arrive from consideration of his theory as it applies to this situation. What is very interesting about this war is that it appears to be a watershed moment in the development of tactics, weapons and strategic thinking about the conduct of conflict between parties.
I think this NYT article clearly articulates how this watershed moment is happening: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025...hs.htmlhap
It describes how tanks, including the Abrams have been reduced to having little value. Drones dominate the frontlines and miles of fiber optic cable dangle from the trees. Watch that film clip of a Ukrainian drone flying along a trench line dropping molten metal on the occupants. A far cry from my day in the jungles of SE Asia.
There has been a lot of discussion this board of drone warfare, but the problem is that it is developing so fast that keep up with it is very hard and as the Time article describes some of this development does not occur in a lab but in a bunker in the war zone. How many drones can you build for the cost of a single M1 Abrams? This is basically war on the cheap but just as deadly. Another issue this conflict is raises is whether a small country and hold its own against a much larger country simply through drones. Drones are far cheaper, easier to produce and just as effective. How much do they level the playing field. Maybe none at all in the long term since if you do not have any land in which to put your bunker then you are sort of of out of luck.
Another aspect of this is how much is this costing Russia in the long term.
Another thought is will this war result in simply a war between drones? If drones have taken artillery and armor out of play and reduced the infantry to cowering in its bunkers, will the side with the best drones win?
I think that this conflict will force every country with an army of significance will have to rethink everything after seeing how this conflict is playing out.
That said I believe this board is not the place for the discussion that can arrive from consideration of his theory as it applies to this situation. What is very interesting about this war is that it appears to be a watershed moment in the development of tactics, weapons and strategic thinking about the conduct of conflict between parties.
I think this NYT article clearly articulates how this watershed moment is happening: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025...hs.htmlhap
It describes how tanks, including the Abrams have been reduced to having little value. Drones dominate the frontlines and miles of fiber optic cable dangle from the trees. Watch that film clip of a Ukrainian drone flying along a trench line dropping molten metal on the occupants. A far cry from my day in the jungles of SE Asia.
There has been a lot of discussion this board of drone warfare, but the problem is that it is developing so fast that keep up with it is very hard and as the Time article describes some of this development does not occur in a lab but in a bunker in the war zone. How many drones can you build for the cost of a single M1 Abrams? This is basically war on the cheap but just as deadly. Another issue this conflict is raises is whether a small country and hold its own against a much larger country simply through drones. Drones are far cheaper, easier to produce and just as effective. How much do they level the playing field. Maybe none at all in the long term since if you do not have any land in which to put your bunker then you are sort of of out of luck.
Another aspect of this is how much is this costing Russia in the long term.
Another thought is will this war result in simply a war between drones? If drones have taken artillery and armor out of play and reduced the infantry to cowering in its bunkers, will the side with the best drones win?
I think that this conflict will force every country with an army of significance will have to rethink everything after seeing how this conflict is playing out.
Our moderators have a very difficult task. I refer you, myself and others to Carl von Clausewitz's statement that War is merely the continuation of policy by other means. If you accept his theory then War is simply another form of politics, plain and simple. Personally I believe the Ukrainian situation is a clear confirmation of his theory.
That said I believe this board is not the place for the discussion that can arrive from consideration of his theory as it applies to this situation. What is very interesting about this war is that it appears to be a watershed moment in the development of tactics, weapons and strategic thinking about the conduct of conflict between parties.
I think this NYT article clearly articulates how this watershed moment is happening: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025...hs.htmlhap
It describes how tanks, including the Abrams have been reduced to having little value. Drones dominate the frontlines and miles of fiber optic cable dangle from the trees. Watch that film clip of a Ukrainian drone flying along a trench line dropping molten metal on the occupants. A far cry from my day in the jungles of SE Asia.
There has been a lot of discussion this board of drone warfare, but the problem is that it is developing so fast that keep up with it is very hard and as the Time article describes some of this development does not occur in a lab but in a bunker in the war zone. How many drones can you build for the cost of a single M1 Abrams? This is basically war on the cheap but just as deadly. Another issue this conflict is raises is whether a small country and hold its own against a much larger country simply through drones. Drones are far cheaper, easier to produce and just as effective. How much do they level the playing field. Maybe none at all in the long term since if you do not have any land in which to put your bunker then you are sort of of out of luck.
Another aspect of this is how much is this costing Russia in the long term.
Another thought is will this war result in simply a war between drones? If drones have taken artillery and armor out of play and reduced the infantry to cowering in its bunkers, will the side with the best drones win?
I think that this conflict will force every country with an army of significance will have to rethink everything after seeing how this conflict is playing out.
That said I believe this board is not the place for the discussion that can arrive from consideration of his theory as it applies to this situation. What is very interesting about this war is that it appears to be a watershed moment in the development of tactics, weapons and strategic thinking about the conduct of conflict between parties.
I think this NYT article clearly articulates how this watershed moment is happening: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025...hs.htmlhap
It describes how tanks, including the Abrams have been reduced to having little value. Drones dominate the frontlines and miles of fiber optic cable dangle from the trees. Watch that film clip of a Ukrainian drone flying along a trench line dropping molten metal on the occupants. A far cry from my day in the jungles of SE Asia.
There has been a lot of discussion this board of drone warfare, but the problem is that it is developing so fast that keep up with it is very hard and as the Time article describes some of this development does not occur in a lab but in a bunker in the war zone. How many drones can you build for the cost of a single M1 Abrams? This is basically war on the cheap but just as deadly. Another issue this conflict is raises is whether a small country and hold its own against a much larger country simply through drones. Drones are far cheaper, easier to produce and just as effective. How much do they level the playing field. Maybe none at all in the long term since if you do not have any land in which to put your bunker then you are sort of of out of luck.
Another aspect of this is how much is this costing Russia in the long term.
Another thought is will this war result in simply a war between drones? If drones have taken artillery and armor out of play and reduced the infantry to cowering in its bunkers, will the side with the best drones win?
I think that this conflict will force every country with an army of significance will have to rethink everything after seeing how this conflict is playing out.
(04-20-2025, 07:10 AM)GK3 Wrote: Our moderators have a very difficult task. I refer you, myself and others to Carl von Clausewitz's statement that War is merely the continuation of policy by other means. If you accept his theory then War is simply another form of politics, plain and simple. Personally I believe the Ukrainian situation is a clear confirmation of his theory.
That said I believe this board is not the place for the discussion that can arrive from consideration of his theory as it applies to this situation. What is very interesting about this war is that it appears to be a watershed moment in the development of tactics, weapons and strategic thinking about the conduct of conflict between parties.
I think this NYT article clearly articulates how this watershed moment is happening: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025...hs.htmlhap
It describes how tanks, including the Abrams have been reduced to having little value. Drones dominate the frontlines and miles of fiber optic cable dangle from the trees. Watch that film clip of a Ukrainian drone flying along a trench line dropping molten metal on the occupants. A far cry from my day in the jungles of SE Asia.
There has been a lot of discussion this board of drone warfare, but the problem is that it is developing so fast that keep up with it is very hard and as the Time article describes some of this development does not occur in a lab but in a bunker in the war zone. How many drones can you build for the cost of a single M1 Abrams? This is basically war on the cheap but just as deadly. Another issue this conflict is raises is whether a small country and hold its own against a much larger country simply through drones. Drones are far cheaper, easier to produce and just as effective. How much do they level the playing field. Maybe none at all in the long term since if you do not have any land in which to put your bunker then you are sort of of out of luck.
Another aspect of this is how much is this costing Russia in the long term.
Another thought is will this war result in simply a war between drones? If drones have taken artillery and armor out of play and reduced the infantry to cowering in its bunkers, will the side with the best drones win?
I think that this conflict will force every country with an army of significance will have to rethink everything after seeing how this conflict is playing out.
There is a lot of stuff that has sort of passed under the radar in the last few months:
1. Ukraine has apparently succeeded in making the Russian glide bombs far less effective. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2...m-useless/
2. The Russian Offensive is now more often measured in meters gained versus kilometers and those meters gained at significant cost to Russia: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60506682
3. Ukraine may be getting stronger faster than Russia: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/uk...ace-talks/
4: The war and the Russian Economy: https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/a...s-economy/
Although we have withdrawn much if not all of our support, Ukraine is producing far more than it used to, particularly in the drone arena. Western Europe seems to be trying to fill in at least some of the losses caused by our withdrawal. Russia seems to continue to follow a strategic plan based on throwing untrained soldiers into so-called "meat" attacks which results in losses they probably can't continue forever before political issues arise at home. If it is true that Ukraine has succeeded in jamming or otherwise reducing the effectiveness of the Russian glide bombs that is a big plus for Ukraine since it has already reduced the effectiveness of Russian armor and artillery via their drone attacks. If Ukraine can produce a sufficient number of their Neptune cruise missile it will further complicate the Russian defensive issues. Russia seems to have no qualms about wasting thousands of soldiers while the Ukraine seems to be trying to replace soldiers with drones. Big question is how long can Russia continue its current strategy before Putin starts to get pushback. These articles provide a variety of viewpoints. No one knows how it will actually work out.
(04-20-2025, 07:10 AM)GK3 Wrote: Our moderators have a very difficult task. I refer you, myself and others to Carl von Clausewitz's statement that War is merely the continuation of policy by other means. If you accept his theory then War is simply another form of politics, plain and simple. Personally I believe the Ukrainian situation is a clear confirmation of his theory.
That said I believe this board is not the place for the discussion that can arrive from consideration of his theory as it applies to this situation. What is very interesting about this war is that it appears to be a watershed moment in the development of tactics, weapons and strategic thinking about the conduct of conflict between parties.
I think this NYT article clearly articulates how this watershed moment is happening: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025...hs.htmlhap
It describes how tanks, including the Abrams have been reduced to having little value. Drones dominate the frontlines and miles of fiber optic cable dangle from the trees. Watch that film clip of a Ukrainian drone flying along a trench line dropping molten metal on the occupants. A far cry from my day in the jungles of SE Asia.
There has been a lot of discussion this board of drone warfare, but the problem is that it is developing so fast that keep up with it is very hard and as the Time article describes some of this development does not occur in a lab but in a bunker in the war zone. How many drones can you build for the cost of a single M1 Abrams? This is basically war on the cheap but just as deadly. Another issue this conflict is raises is whether a small country and hold its own against a much larger country simply through drones. Drones are far cheaper, easier to produce and just as effective. How much do they level the playing field. Maybe none at all in the long term since if you do not have any land in which to put your bunker then you are sort of of out of luck.
Another aspect of this is how much is this costing Russia in the long term.
Another thought is will this war result in simply a war between drones? If drones have taken artillery and armor out of play and reduced the infantry to cowering in its bunkers, will the side with the best drones win?
I think that this conflict will force every country with an army of significance will have to rethink everything after seeing how this conflict is playing out.
There is a lot of stuff that has sort of passed under the radar in the last few months:
1. Ukraine has apparently succeeded in making the Russian glide bombs far less effective. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2...m-useless/
2. The Russian Offensive is now more often measured in meters gained versus kilometers and those meters gained at significant cost to Russia: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60506682
3. Ukraine may be getting stronger faster than Russia: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/uk...ace-talks/
4: The war and the Russian Economy: https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/a...s-economy/
Although we have withdrawn much if not all of our support, Ukraine is producing far more than it used to, particularly in the drone arena. Western Europe seems to be trying to fill in at least some of the losses caused by our withdrawal. Russia seems to continue to follow a strategic plan based on throwing untrained soldiers into so-called "meat" attacks which results in losses they probably can't continue forever before political issues arise at home. If it is true that Ukraine has succeeded in jamming or otherwise reducing the effectiveness of the Russian glide bombs that is a big plus for Ukraine since it has already reduced the effectiveness of Russian armor and artillery via their drone attacks. If Ukraine can produce a sufficient number of their Neptune cruise missile it will further complicate the Russian defensive issues. Russia seems to have no qualms about wasting thousands of soldiers while the Ukraine seems to be trying to replace soldiers with drones. Big question is how long can Russia continue its current strategy before Putin starts to get pushback. These articles provide a variety of viewpoints. No one knows how it will actually work out.
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