[Goose]

Ukraine has had successful counterattacks recently. Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk were both at risk of falling if Russian advances continued, but Ukraine seems to have stabilized and retaken some territory in both locations. 

Ukrainian forces are retaking more and more villages around Pokrovsk. Russian channels report of problems in manpower and Russian glide bombs being jammed.

Together with reports coming from Toretsk, Chasiv Yar and Kupyansk, where Ukrainian forces are gradually pushing back Russian troops, this seems to be not a local outlier, but a general development.

https://x.com/Tendar/status/1897663041589690831

Ukraine still holding on in Kursk as well.

One has to wonder if Russia is not pushing as hard because they think they are going to get what they want in a ceasefire settlement and don't need to. Even if Putin isn't thinking that, it is hard to imagine his troops don't have it cross their minds occasionally. Who want to be the last Russian killed in Ukraine?

Important to remember that while Ukraine has been through a lot, they aren't on the edge of crumbling and desperate for any possible deal.

Agree. Ukraine isn't "done". It is going to be interesting how the US and Russia think they will negotiate an end to the war if Ukraine isn't included and just keeps fighting. If Europe can actually provide adequate support that might be possible, at least for awhile. However, without Patriots and ATACMS Ukraine will have significantly fewer options. It isn't over til its over, and that isn't yet. "Miracles" do happen.

[Goose]

Ukraine has had successful counterattacks recently. Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk were both at risk of falling if Russian advances continued, but Ukraine seems to have stabilized and retaken some territory in both locations. 

Ukrainian forces are retaking more and more villages around Pokrovsk. Russian channels report of problems in manpower and Russian glide bombs being jammed.

Together with reports coming from Toretsk, Chasiv Yar and Kupyansk, where Ukrainian forces are gradually pushing back Russian troops, this seems to be not a local outlier, but a general development.

https://x.com/Tendar/status/1897663041589690831

Ukraine still holding on in Kursk as well.

One has to wonder if Russia is not pushing as hard because they think they are going to get what they want in a ceasefire settlement and don't need to. Even if Putin isn't thinking that, it is hard to imagine his troops don't have it cross their minds occasionally. Who want to be the last Russian killed in Ukraine?

Important to remember that while Ukraine has been through a lot, they aren't on the edge of crumbling and desperate for any possible deal.

Agree. Ukraine isn't "done". It is going to be interesting how the US and Russia think they will negotiate an end to the war if Ukraine isn't included and just keeps fighting. If Europe can actually provide adequate support that might be possible, at least for awhile. However, without Patriots and ATACMS Ukraine will have significantly fewer options. It isn't over til its over, and that isn't yet. "Miracles" do happen.

[dabigv13]

PM @DonaldTusk
 in Parliament: Poland must pursue the most advanced capabilities, including nuclear and modern unconventional weapons. This is a serious race - a race for security, not for war.

https://x.com/PremierRP_en/status/1898002064380227905

[dabigv13]

PM @DonaldTusk
 in Parliament: Poland must pursue the most advanced capabilities, including nuclear and modern unconventional weapons. This is a serious race - a race for security, not for war.

https://x.com/PremierRP_en/status/1898002064380227905

[TrumpCard]

Predictable.  Who is next?  Does the U.S. have leverage to be able to deter Poland (or others likely to follow Poland's lead) from doing this?  Does Poland get any military cooperation from the U.S. that's irreplaceable?  Let's assume for the sake of argument that the U.S. would be willing to impose sanctions against Poland (or copycats) to deter Poland (or copycats) from pursuing nukes.  Would/could the EU honor those sanctions?

[TrumpCard]

Predictable.  Who is next?  Does the U.S. have leverage to be able to deter Poland (or others likely to follow Poland's lead) from doing this?  Does Poland get any military cooperation from the U.S. that's irreplaceable?  Let's assume for the sake of argument that the U.S. would be willing to impose sanctions against Poland (or copycats) to deter Poland (or copycats) from pursuing nukes.  Would/could the EU honor those sanctions?

[Goose]

Predictable.  Who is next?  Does the U.S. have leverage to be able to deter Poland (or others likely to follow Poland's lead) from doing this?  Does Poland get any military cooperation from the U.S. that's irreplaceable?  Let's assume for the sake of argument that the U.S. would be willing to impose sanctions against Poland (or copycats) to deter Poland (or copycats) from pursuing nukes.  Would/could the EU honor those sanctions?

Using France as an example, no, the US wouldn't impose sanctions. Back then, we blustered a bit but really did nothing. We did nothing when France left the military arm of NATO either. We didn't impose sanctions back in the day where we were willing to guarantee an nuclear umbrella for NATO. Since apparently we no longer are willing to do that, it seems irrational to deny NATO nations the option of doing it themselves. The rest of the EU would, for that reason if not others, not honor any sanctions the US might impose. Right now, it seems reasonable for Poland to assume that they are doing exactly what the US wants them to do. They are defending themselves. Of course, that has side effects, proliferation being the most obvious. There are others that operationally may be just as bad. I am waiting for Turkey, Greece, and Montenegro to announce their new nuclear programs. That will be fun to watch :-).

[Goose]

Predictable.  Who is next?  Does the U.S. have leverage to be able to deter Poland (or others likely to follow Poland's lead) from doing this?  Does Poland get any military cooperation from the U.S. that's irreplaceable?  Let's assume for the sake of argument that the U.S. would be willing to impose sanctions against Poland (or copycats) to deter Poland (or copycats) from pursuing nukes.  Would/could the EU honor those sanctions?

Using France as an example, no, the US wouldn't impose sanctions. Back then, we blustered a bit but really did nothing. We did nothing when France left the military arm of NATO either. We didn't impose sanctions back in the day where we were willing to guarantee an nuclear umbrella for NATO. Since apparently we no longer are willing to do that, it seems irrational to deny NATO nations the option of doing it themselves. The rest of the EU would, for that reason if not others, not honor any sanctions the US might impose. Right now, it seems reasonable for Poland to assume that they are doing exactly what the US wants them to do. They are defending themselves. Of course, that has side effects, proliferation being the most obvious. There are others that operationally may be just as bad. I am waiting for Turkey, Greece, and Montenegro to announce their new nuclear programs. That will be fun to watch :-).

[BostonCard]

Thanks, Goose, for your thorough discussion, which was super informative.  It does seem like we are seeing a lot of people jumping the gun on the future of warfare, assuming that drone swarms will overwhelm defenses (this was in the context of a future war in the Pacific).  Notwithstanding the questions of jamming and communication range someone pointed out that at the end of the day, you are trying to propel an explosive charge a distance.  The greater the warhead, and the greater the distance, the more propulsion you will need.  This is a problem for cheap and even not-so-cheap drones, and that missiles have been largely optimized to maximize the size and distance a warhead is delivered in a way that drones generally cannot be.

As is often the case BC you said more in a few words than I did with many. I would only add "you are trying to propel an explosive charge a distance quickly."

Wish it was an original thought on my end, but I was repeating and paraphrasing a Twitter/X (or maybe BlueSky) thread.  I would have credited/linked, but I couldn't find the original.   It was a bit of rebuttal to some of the "tech bros" who were denigrating cruise missiles, by saying that they are pointless compared to a swarm of drones that cost orders of magnitude less, and they pointed out that the limitations are dictated by simple physics.

And yes, delivering a large payload over long distances fast makes it even harder.

BC

[BostonCard]

Thanks, Goose, for your thorough discussion, which was super informative.  It does seem like we are seeing a lot of people jumping the gun on the future of warfare, assuming that drone swarms will overwhelm defenses (this was in the context of a future war in the Pacific).  Notwithstanding the questions of jamming and communication range someone pointed out that at the end of the day, you are trying to propel an explosive charge a distance.  The greater the warhead, and the greater the distance, the more propulsion you will need.  This is a problem for cheap and even not-so-cheap drones, and that missiles have been largely optimized to maximize the size and distance a warhead is delivered in a way that drones generally cannot be.

As is often the case BC you said more in a few words than I did with many. I would only add "you are trying to propel an explosive charge a distance quickly."

Wish it was an original thought on my end, but I was repeating and paraphrasing a Twitter/X (or maybe BlueSky) thread.  I would have credited/linked, but I couldn't find the original.   It was a bit of rebuttal to some of the "tech bros" who were denigrating cruise missiles, by saying that they are pointless compared to a swarm of drones that cost orders of magnitude less, and they pointed out that the limitations are dictated by simple physics.

And yes, delivering a large payload over long distances fast makes it even harder.

BC

[BostonCard]

Ukraine still holding on in Kursk as well.

Important to remember that while Ukraine has been through a lot, they aren't on the edge of crumbling and desperate for any possible deal.

Sadly maybe not. The situation in Kursk looks like it is pretty dire.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/m...plnews_d-1

BC

[BostonCard]

Ukraine still holding on in Kursk as well.

Important to remember that while Ukraine has been through a lot, they aren't on the edge of crumbling and desperate for any possible deal.

Sadly maybe not. The situation in Kursk looks like it is pretty dire.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/m...plnews_d-1

BC

[Goose]

Ukraine still holding on in Kursk as well.

Important to remember that while Ukraine has been through a lot, they aren't on the edge of crumbling and desperate for any possible deal.

Sadly maybe not. The situation in Kursk looks like it is pretty dire.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/m...plnews_d-1

BC

Hopefully Ukraine knows what it is doing. Sometimes letting your opponent advance in order to cut off one arm of the pincer is a good tactic. Ukraine can't afford to lose lots of troops, so let us hope this is a tactic and not a tactical reverse. I have no idea how well Ukraine is prepared to retreat from the emergent pocket, but that doesn't sound like something they would be good at. Evacuations are always dangerous and Ukrainian units as a rule do not posses enough organic transport to do so rapidly.

[Goose]

Ukraine still holding on in Kursk as well.

Important to remember that while Ukraine has been through a lot, they aren't on the edge of crumbling and desperate for any possible deal.

Sadly maybe not. The situation in Kursk looks like it is pretty dire.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/m...plnews_d-1

BC

Hopefully Ukraine knows what it is doing. Sometimes letting your opponent advance in order to cut off one arm of the pincer is a good tactic. Ukraine can't afford to lose lots of troops, so let us hope this is a tactic and not a tactical reverse. I have no idea how well Ukraine is prepared to retreat from the emergent pocket, but that doesn't sound like something they would be good at. Evacuations are always dangerous and Ukrainian units as a rule do not posses enough organic transport to do so rapidly.

[dabigv13]

Yeah I may have spoken too soon in regards to Kursk. They have stabilized there after Russia has made big penetrations before, but the fact it keeps happening means it's probably time to get out.

The incursion is the grey area west of Kurilovka. I imagine Ukraine will be able to retake it, they will certainly need to try.

[dabigv13]

Yeah I may have spoken too soon in regards to Kursk. They have stabilized there after Russia has made big penetrations before, but the fact it keeps happening means it's probably time to get out.

The incursion is the grey area west of Kurilovka. I imagine Ukraine will be able to retake it, they will certainly need to try.

[dabigv13]

Ukraine seems to have withdrawn from most of their prior holding in Kursk. Seems like it was pretty orderly at least.

https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1899225883044356489

[dabigv13]

Ukraine seems to have withdrawn from most of their prior holding in Kursk. Seems like it was pretty orderly at least.

https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1899225883044356489

[Goose]

Ukraine seems to have withdrawn from most of their prior holding in Kursk. Seems like it was pretty orderly at least.

https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1899225883044356489

Good thing they managed to withdraw. I guess the idea of keeping it as a negotiating tool just wasn't possible. It will be interesting where the Russians try to go next. It may be that the Kursk incursion finally did draw enough Russian strength away from other fronts that the Russian advances elsewhere slowed down.

Right now the "mud season" is apparently beginning in Ukraine. If that is so, there will be an unavoidable slowdown in operations by both sides for about a month, maybe more. It will be interesting to see if Russia withdraws troops from Kursk and commits them in the Donbas.

It does seem a bit strange to me that this evacuation is making news on X but not so much in "mainstream" media. I would consider it important news. It is "there", but not exactly highlighted. https://www.cnn.com/2025/03/09/europe/ru...index.html

[Goose]

Ukraine seems to have withdrawn from most of their prior holding in Kursk. Seems like it was pretty orderly at least.

https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1899225883044356489

Good thing they managed to withdraw. I guess the idea of keeping it as a negotiating tool just wasn't possible. It will be interesting where the Russians try to go next. It may be that the Kursk incursion finally did draw enough Russian strength away from other fronts that the Russian advances elsewhere slowed down.

Right now the "mud season" is apparently beginning in Ukraine. If that is so, there will be an unavoidable slowdown in operations by both sides for about a month, maybe more. It will be interesting to see if Russia withdraws troops from Kursk and commits them in the Donbas.

It does seem a bit strange to me that this evacuation is making news on X but not so much in "mainstream" media. I would consider it important news. It is "there", but not exactly highlighted. https://www.cnn.com/2025/03/09/europe/ru...index.html

[fullmetal]

Well, Russian units may stretch themselves as they advance in Kursk, so hopefully there are enough Ukraining assets around to take advantage of any situations that present themselves.  Getting out before mud season seems wise.

[fullmetal]

Well, Russian units may stretch themselves as they advance in Kursk, so hopefully there are enough Ukraining assets around to take advantage of any situations that present themselves.  Getting out before mud season seems wise.

[fullmetal]

A lot happened during our little Cardboard blip.

The United States will immediately lift the pause in intelligence sharing and resume security assistance to Ukraine, according to a joint statement issued after a meeting of the Ukrainian and U.S. delegations in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on Tuesday.

In return, Ukraine agreed to accept a U.S. proposal for the immediate introduction of a temporary 30-day ceasefire that can be extended by mutual agreement, subject to acceptance and simultaneous implementation by Russia.

https://www.politico.eu/article/us-ukrai...in-jeddah/

https://abcnews.go.com/International/cea...=119703072

[fullmetal]

A lot happened during our little Cardboard blip.

The United States will immediately lift the pause in intelligence sharing and resume security assistance to Ukraine, according to a joint statement issued after a meeting of the Ukrainian and U.S. delegations in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on Tuesday.

In return, Ukraine agreed to accept a U.S. proposal for the immediate introduction of a temporary 30-day ceasefire that can be extended by mutual agreement, subject to acceptance and simultaneous implementation by Russia.

https://www.politico.eu/article/us-ukrai...in-jeddah/

https://abcnews.go.com/International/cea...=119703072

[Griffins78]

And Poland confirmed that arms are shipping

[Griffins78]

And Poland confirmed that arms are shipping

[BostonCard]

Interesting development, the U.S. “quietly” allowed a waiver to let banks pay for Russian oil and gas expire:

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/...efire-deal

BC

[BostonCard]

Interesting development, the U.S. “quietly” allowed a waiver to let banks pay for Russian oil and gas expire:

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/...efire-deal

BC

[fullmetal]

Surprised they let it expire, but it's another bargaining chip.  And as far as it's effectively more sanctions, I'm all for it.

[fullmetal]

Surprised they let it expire, but it's another bargaining chip.  And as far as it's effectively more sanctions, I'm all for it.

[BostonCard]

(Gifted) Economist article about how Ukraine managed to withdraw its troops from Kursk, barely.

https://econ.st/3FwPJJh

The partial withdrawal—from the town of Sudzha and other villages inside Kursk—is a blow to Ukraine’s military leadership. But it is not quite the complete disaster claimed by Russian propaganda, which Donald Trump inexplicably decided to amplify in a social-media post claiming that “thousands of Ukrainian soldiers” were “completely surrounded”. That was never the case. There have been serious losses; the withdrawal was chaotic in parts, and Russia captured at least dozens of prisoners. But the Ukrainians retreated relatively intact and a sizeable force still remains up to 10km inside Russia, having taken up more defensible positions on high ground. “Trump appears to be getting his information from Russian Instagram reels,” one military commander says.

BC

[BostonCard]

(Gifted) Economist article about how Ukraine managed to withdraw its troops from Kursk, barely.

https://econ.st/3FwPJJh

The partial withdrawal—from the town of Sudzha and other villages inside Kursk—is a blow to Ukraine’s military leadership. But it is not quite the complete disaster claimed by Russian propaganda, which Donald Trump inexplicably decided to amplify in a social-media post claiming that “thousands of Ukrainian soldiers” were “completely surrounded”. That was never the case. There have been serious losses; the withdrawal was chaotic in parts, and Russia captured at least dozens of prisoners. But the Ukrainians retreated relatively intact and a sizeable force still remains up to 10km inside Russia, having taken up more defensible positions on high ground. “Trump appears to be getting his information from Russian Instagram reels,” one military commander says.

BC

[Goose]

More Drones. I can't help myself :-).

 

It appears that Russian troops still prefer the DJI Mavic 3  to the "similar" drones made in Russia from Chinese parts. That is a bit counter-intuitive because the Russian built drones operate in different frequency bands and therefore should be less prone to jamming. There are other possible interpretations of the Russian troops asking the public to supply DJI drones. First and most compelling one is that DJI drones are available to the general public. The bespoke ones provided by Russian manufactures are generally not. Therefore asking the public for them is somewhat pointless. Even if these drones were available DJI's production undoubtedly dwarfs anything being done by Russia.

 

Second, the "official" drone units of the Russian Army are battalion level assets, although often they are treated as regimental assets. Any given infantry company is therefore at the mercy of higher formations as to whether they have drone support at all, and if they do, how much. The higher formation's priorities may not be the infantry company's priorities. Many (most?) of the troops soliciting drones from the general public are probably "unofficial" drone units created by company-sized organizations trying to survive. They aren't eligible for drones through the regular supply systems and have no training on operating them if the could get them. Thus DJI products are the only viable solution for them. The existence of such units may be tenuous if one accepts this ISW analysis.

 

The article even more importantly confirms that Russia has the ability to flash (program the onboard non-volatile memory) in DJI drones with new firmware. This supports my conjecture that Russia has a copy of the source code. The article also references Ukraine using a USB stick to upload new (or patch the existing) firmware to disable the DJI "house" ID messages. The ability to do this confirms Ukraine either has the source code or has substantially reverse engineered it. It is a little disconcerting that different Ukrainian units seem to have software of different origins. That flexibility can speed up solving problems, but if the solutions are not propagated quickly to other units the benefits could be wasted. It may also lead to duplication of effort. The early stages of this effort are described here.

 

Other organizations had reverse engineered the DJI "house" ID messages prior to the start of the Ukraine war. The existence of these messages was also confirmed by hackers who reverse engineered their content. The message includes both the GPS location of the drone and of the drone operator(!). This message type was transmitted for at least three months by all DJI drones operated by Ukraine. DJI sells their AeroScope system to track DJI drones. It uses the DJI "house" messages to do so. The DJI "house" message is one of TWO different drone ID messages routinely broadcast by DJI drones. The second message type is mandated by the  FCC/EU. Putting the drone in "FCC mode" to increase power will enable the FCC message type. Presumably Ukraine and Russia have also modified the code to prevent that message from being transmitted.

 

The section of the prefer the DJI Mavic 3 article titled "Avoiding The Jam" states

What the firmware hack cannot change is the drone’s operating frequencies. This makes the DJI drones easier to jam than locally made FPVs which are made with an increasing variety of different frequencies, as well as using frequency-hopping and other techniques to evade jamming.

If read literally this statement is false. The DJI Mavic 3 series is equipped to operate in the 2.4-2.5 GHz ISM band and also the 5.725-5.875 GHz ISM band. These frequency BANDS are fixed by hardware installed. However the exact FREQUENCIES used in these bands (and the pattern of their use) can and has been changed by Ukrainian extensions of the DJI the firmware. There are indeed hardware limitations on the resolution of frequencies that are available to the firmware. However these limitations are much less restrictive than the set actually used in a "stock" DJI product.

 

The ability to alter the exact frequencies and the hopping pattern can defeat some kinds of jammers. A barrage noise jammer won't care. A multi-tone jammer may be defeated. Jammers that take advantage of "known" DJI signal characteristics will very probably be defeated. As a trivial example a DJI drone with modified firmware can move the control signal between the 2.4 GHz ISM band and the 5.8 GHz ISM band at will to avoid jamming. This is a "macro" example. There are many more subtle approaches. An example of this extracted from a relatively recent article about Ukrainian drones on the battlefield.

The Kremlin is shipping new electronic-warfare radio jammers in a desperate effort to protect assault groups, the blogger explained. But they don’t work very well. “The enemy adapts extremely quickly, changing frequencies,” according to the blogger, “while our E.W. systems at best cover less than half the frequencies they use.”

 

The locally made FPVs in general attempt to avoid jamming by operating in BANDS different from the ones used by the Mavic drones. Most jammers are targeted to a specific frequency range. This may be an entire band or a subset thereof. For instance, a jammer may cover the 2.4-2.5 GHz ISM band. If the control link is moved to the 5.8 GHz ISM band, that jammer becomes useless. If an additional 5.8 GHz ISM band jammer is brought online, the DJI drones may have no answer, depending on the type of jammer used. The drone has only two bands, and with the "stock" DJI drone hardware one cannot chose what bands they are. Of course, the opponent needs twice as many jammers to jam both bands simultaneously. Locally made drones can chose a different band for the "second" frequency range. In principle, it can be anywhere in the 0.3 GHz to 18 GHz frequency range. Going lower in frequency creates problems with antenna size. Going higher creates problems with increasing path loss. In a previous post we see Russian using the 1.4 GHz frequency range. Jammers are a finite resource. It is prohibitively expensive (even for the US) to have even 20 watt jammers contiguously covering 0.3 GHz to 18 GHz located everywhere Ukrainian drones may be encountered.

 

Once again, it must be pointed out that "stock" DJI drones utilize frequency hopping. So did (do) GSM cell phones. Noting all that special about it. Hopping can defeat some types of jammers but not others. In general, fast hoping works "better" than slow hopping. DJI drones can't hop fast enough to matter much. Anything slower than 1000 hops per second was considered "slow" in the early 1990s.

---

The following are "leftovers" from my previous efforts that are IMO interesting but that did not fit well into the narrative.

---

 At 26:19 into the video [Ref 1] shows a simple, compact "drone detector". It has two antennas. The longer one appears to be an appropriate length (3.15 inches) for a 1/4 wavelength antenna in the 850-930 MHz frequency range used by the Orlan-10.  The shorter one appears to be a an appropriate length (2.41 inches) for a 1/2 wavelength antenna in the 2400-2500 MHz frequency range used by DJI compatible drones (as well as most other commercial drones). Hard to judge exactly from the pictures. The electronics inside probably consists of two band pass filters and two successive detection log video amplifiers (SDLVA), most probably an AD8313 (readily available on eBay or commercially for more $). A small micro-controller (ESP32-<something>) and a few "piece" parts completes the device. Parts cost about $75, less if you hunt around a bit. There are alternative approaches but I am guessing a "broadband"  approach is desirable/necessary for the frequency hopping control signals. The 70 dB dynamic range of the SDLVA allows for high sensitivity and "good" dynamic range.

[Goose]

More Drones. I can't help myself :-).

 

It appears that Russian troops still prefer the DJI Mavic 3  to the "similar" drones made in Russia from Chinese parts. That is a bit counter-intuitive because the Russian built drones operate in different frequency bands and therefore should be less prone to jamming. There are other possible interpretations of the Russian troops asking the public to supply DJI drones. First and most compelling one is that DJI drones are available to the general public. The bespoke ones provided by Russian manufactures are generally not. Therefore asking the public for them is somewhat pointless. Even if these drones were available DJI's production undoubtedly dwarfs anything being done by Russia.

 

Second, the "official" drone units of the Russian Army are battalion level assets, although often they are treated as regimental assets. Any given infantry company is therefore at the mercy of higher formations as to whether they have drone support at all, and if they do, how much. The higher formation's priorities may not be the infantry company's priorities. Many (most?) of the troops soliciting drones from the general public are probably "unofficial" drone units created by company-sized organizations trying to survive. They aren't eligible for drones through the regular supply systems and have no training on operating them if the could get them. Thus DJI products are the only viable solution for them. The existence of such units may be tenuous if one accepts this ISW analysis.

 

The article even more importantly confirms that Russia has the ability to flash (program the onboard non-volatile memory) in DJI drones with new firmware. This supports my conjecture that Russia has a copy of the source code. The article also references Ukraine using a USB stick to upload new (or patch the existing) firmware to disable the DJI "house" ID messages. The ability to do this confirms Ukraine either has the source code or has substantially reverse engineered it. It is a little disconcerting that different Ukrainian units seem to have software of different origins. That flexibility can speed up solving problems, but if the solutions are not propagated quickly to other units the benefits could be wasted. It may also lead to duplication of effort. The early stages of this effort are described here.

 

Other organizations had reverse engineered the DJI "house" ID messages prior to the start of the Ukraine war. The existence of these messages was also confirmed by hackers who reverse engineered their content. The message includes both the GPS location of the drone and of the drone operator(!). This message type was transmitted for at least three months by all DJI drones operated by Ukraine. DJI sells their AeroScope system to track DJI drones. It uses the DJI "house" messages to do so. The DJI "house" message is one of TWO different drone ID messages routinely broadcast by DJI drones. The second message type is mandated by the  FCC/EU. Putting the drone in "FCC mode" to increase power will enable the FCC message type. Presumably Ukraine and Russia have also modified the code to prevent that message from being transmitted.

 

The section of the prefer the DJI Mavic 3 article titled "Avoiding The Jam" states

What the firmware hack cannot change is the drone’s operating frequencies. This makes the DJI drones easier to jam than locally made FPVs which are made with an increasing variety of different frequencies, as well as using frequency-hopping and other techniques to evade jamming.

If read literally this statement is false. The DJI Mavic 3 series is equipped to operate in the 2.4-2.5 GHz ISM band and also the 5.725-5.875 GHz ISM band. These frequency BANDS are fixed by hardware installed. However the exact FREQUENCIES used in these bands (and the pattern of their use) can and has been changed by Ukrainian extensions of the DJI the firmware. There are indeed hardware limitations on the resolution of frequencies that are available to the firmware. However these limitations are much less restrictive than the set actually used in a "stock" DJI product.

 

The ability to alter the exact frequencies and the hopping pattern can defeat some kinds of jammers. A barrage noise jammer won't care. A multi-tone jammer may be defeated. Jammers that take advantage of "known" DJI signal characteristics will very probably be defeated. As a trivial example a DJI drone with modified firmware can move the control signal between the 2.4 GHz ISM band and the 5.8 GHz ISM band at will to avoid jamming. This is a "macro" example. There are many more subtle approaches. An example of this extracted from a relatively recent article about Ukrainian drones on the battlefield.

The Kremlin is shipping new electronic-warfare radio jammers in a desperate effort to protect assault groups, the blogger explained. But they don’t work very well. “The enemy adapts extremely quickly, changing frequencies,” according to the blogger, “while our E.W. systems at best cover less than half the frequencies they use.”

 

The locally made FPVs in general attempt to avoid jamming by operating in BANDS different from the ones used by the Mavic drones. Most jammers are targeted to a specific frequency range. This may be an entire band or a subset thereof. For instance, a jammer may cover the 2.4-2.5 GHz ISM band. If the control link is moved to the 5.8 GHz ISM band, that jammer becomes useless. If an additional 5.8 GHz ISM band jammer is brought online, the DJI drones may have no answer, depending on the type of jammer used. The drone has only two bands, and with the "stock" DJI drone hardware one cannot chose what bands they are. Of course, the opponent needs twice as many jammers to jam both bands simultaneously. Locally made drones can chose a different band for the "second" frequency range. In principle, it can be anywhere in the 0.3 GHz to 18 GHz frequency range. Going lower in frequency creates problems with antenna size. Going higher creates problems with increasing path loss. In a previous post we see Russian using the 1.4 GHz frequency range. Jammers are a finite resource. It is prohibitively expensive (even for the US) to have even 20 watt jammers contiguously covering 0.3 GHz to 18 GHz located everywhere Ukrainian drones may be encountered.

 

Once again, it must be pointed out that "stock" DJI drones utilize frequency hopping. So did (do) GSM cell phones. Noting all that special about it. Hopping can defeat some types of jammers but not others. In general, fast hoping works "better" than slow hopping. DJI drones can't hop fast enough to matter much. Anything slower than 1000 hops per second was considered "slow" in the early 1990s.

---

The following are "leftovers" from my previous efforts that are IMO interesting but that did not fit well into the narrative.

---

 At 26:19 into the video [Ref 1] shows a simple, compact "drone detector". It has two antennas. The longer one appears to be an appropriate length (3.15 inches) for a 1/4 wavelength antenna in the 850-930 MHz frequency range used by the Orlan-10.  The shorter one appears to be a an appropriate length (2.41 inches) for a 1/2 wavelength antenna in the 2400-2500 MHz frequency range used by DJI compatible drones (as well as most other commercial drones). Hard to judge exactly from the pictures. The electronics inside probably consists of two band pass filters and two successive detection log video amplifiers (SDLVA), most probably an AD8313 (readily available on eBay or commercially for more $). A small micro-controller (ESP32-<something>) and a few "piece" parts completes the device. Parts cost about $75, less if you hunt around a bit. There are alternative approaches but I am guessing a "broadband"  approach is desirable/necessary for the frequency hopping control signals. The 70 dB dynamic range of the SDLVA allows for high sensitivity and "good" dynamic range.

[Goose]

The video [Ref 2] depicts the aggressive operation of Ukrainian drones in Kursk. It confirms that very often the vehicles destroyed by drones are previously immobilized either by previous drone attacks, mines, artillery, or simply broken down. As the video notes Ukrainian FPV "racing drone" operators have developed a tactic of initially targeting the tracks/wheels of Russian armored vehicles. The "running gear" of these vehicles is almost always more fragile than the actual "armored" body of the vehicle. This is particularly true of Russian tanks and BMPs. The engine compartment is also an alternative. Damaging the running gear usually immobilizes the vehicle.

 

Ukrainian drone operators can much more easily destroy a target that is not moving, even if more than one attempt is necessary. There is little hurry, as the vehicle isn't capable of withdrawing. The remaining "runners" can be preferentially attacked first. The Russian crew, knowing this, virtually always abandons the immobile vehicle, leading to open hatches. These empty openings make it much easier for drones to destroy the vehicle. For that reason this event is commonly seen in internet videos. This tactic has delivered good results for Ukraine.

 

Fortunately NATO armored vehicles have better protected running gear. This is a result of providing good protection against modern dual warhead ATGMs. Having armor that resists them but running gear that doesn't isn't viable. However, NATO vehicles are marginally less robust in their running gear than their "body". That said, a Leopard 1A5 with a cope cage added survived 12 hits by Russian drones. The Leopard 1 was notoriously under-protected by US standards. It was designed in a period where it was assumed protection from ATGMs was ultimately impossible and therefore not a design goal. It was however much lighter as a result :-). The first Leopard 1s were delivered in 1972. When appropriate composite armor became available, as demonstrated in 1984 with the first Abrams deliveries, it became clear the Leopard 1 needed better protection. The Leopard 2 delivered better protection. The referenced article provides detail on the remediation applied by Ukraine to the engine compartment and rear of the Leopard 1 tank.

---

The article Ukrainian drones describes a similar recent action by Ukraine near Pokrovsk.

The Russians were spotted by a drone with an infrared camera and then “met with warmth,” the 24th Mechanized Brigade reported. “Infantry, artillery and drone crews did everything to make the invaders’ journey unforgettable.” As the sun rose, 14 of the attacking vehicles were destroyed or immobilized. The rest retreated, five of them damaged.

A combined arms defense is clearly the most effective way of turning back a mechanized force. Detecting it early was a key element in lining up the strength to decimate it.

---

The Ukrainian drones article contains quite a bit of raw information that is quite interesting. However the main thesis in this article is a discussion of how much pain and death Ukrainian drones are delivering to the Russian infantry. The thesis statement is

A few weeks after finally capturing the ruins of Chasiv Yar, a town in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast that was a locus of a yearlong Russian offensive, the Russian survivors are bogged down in and around the town.

This statement is probably true. However, the Russians did capture the town. The article does not suggest they intend to retreat from it. Drones haven't forced Russia to retreat, nor has anything else. In the end, that is what matters. It is also still muddy in Ukraine, there is heavy fighting in Kursk, and ceasefire negotiations are going on. When these elements are sorted out, the Russia offensive in Donbas IMO will continue, unless a ceasefire is indeed put in place.

---

I am including some links on the use of US drones in Ukraine. It hasn't gone well. In some cases, the reasons are a bit obscure. There are also drone evaluations going on that don't make the internet. Hopefully the following will be useful. Wikipedia Switchblade Whatever Happened to Switchblade Army won't buy more 300s Army buys more Switchblades. IMO it is unclear what this all means. It looks a lot like pork to me, but that isn't at all clear.

[Goose]

The video [Ref 2] depicts the aggressive operation of Ukrainian drones in Kursk. It confirms that very often the vehicles destroyed by drones are previously immobilized either by previous drone attacks, mines, artillery, or simply broken down. As the video notes Ukrainian FPV "racing drone" operators have developed a tactic of initially targeting the tracks/wheels of Russian armored vehicles. The "running gear" of these vehicles is almost always more fragile than the actual "armored" body of the vehicle. This is particularly true of Russian tanks and BMPs. The engine compartment is also an alternative. Damaging the running gear usually immobilizes the vehicle.

 

Ukrainian drone operators can much more easily destroy a target that is not moving, even if more than one attempt is necessary. There is little hurry, as the vehicle isn't capable of withdrawing. The remaining "runners" can be preferentially attacked first. The Russian crew, knowing this, virtually always abandons the immobile vehicle, leading to open hatches. These empty openings make it much easier for drones to destroy the vehicle. For that reason this event is commonly seen in internet videos. This tactic has delivered good results for Ukraine.

 

Fortunately NATO armored vehicles have better protected running gear. This is a result of providing good protection against modern dual warhead ATGMs. Having armor that resists them but running gear that doesn't isn't viable. However, NATO vehicles are marginally less robust in their running gear than their "body". That said, a Leopard 1A5 with a cope cage added survived 12 hits by Russian drones. The Leopard 1 was notoriously under-protected by US standards. It was designed in a period where it was assumed protection from ATGMs was ultimately impossible and therefore not a design goal. It was however much lighter as a result :-). The first Leopard 1s were delivered in 1972. When appropriate composite armor became available, as demonstrated in 1984 with the first Abrams deliveries, it became clear the Leopard 1 needed better protection. The Leopard 2 delivered better protection. The referenced article provides detail on the remediation applied by Ukraine to the engine compartment and rear of the Leopard 1 tank.

---

The article Ukrainian drones describes a similar recent action by Ukraine near Pokrovsk.

The Russians were spotted by a drone with an infrared camera and then “met with warmth,” the 24th Mechanized Brigade reported. “Infantry, artillery and drone crews did everything to make the invaders’ journey unforgettable.” As the sun rose, 14 of the attacking vehicles were destroyed or immobilized. The rest retreated, five of them damaged.

A combined arms defense is clearly the most effective way of turning back a mechanized force. Detecting it early was a key element in lining up the strength to decimate it.

---

The Ukrainian drones article contains quite a bit of raw information that is quite interesting. However the main thesis in this article is a discussion of how much pain and death Ukrainian drones are delivering to the Russian infantry. The thesis statement is

A few weeks after finally capturing the ruins of Chasiv Yar, a town in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast that was a locus of a yearlong Russian offensive, the Russian survivors are bogged down in and around the town.

This statement is probably true. However, the Russians did capture the town. The article does not suggest they intend to retreat from it. Drones haven't forced Russia to retreat, nor has anything else. In the end, that is what matters. It is also still muddy in Ukraine, there is heavy fighting in Kursk, and ceasefire negotiations are going on. When these elements are sorted out, the Russia offensive in Donbas IMO will continue, unless a ceasefire is indeed put in place.

---

I am including some links on the use of US drones in Ukraine. It hasn't gone well. In some cases, the reasons are a bit obscure. There are also drone evaluations going on that don't make the internet. Hopefully the following will be useful. Wikipedia Switchblade Whatever Happened to Switchblade Army won't buy more 300s Army buys more Switchblades. IMO it is unclear what this all means. It looks a lot like pork to me, but that isn't at all clear.

[GK3]

The video [Ref 2] depicts the aggressive operation of Ukrainian drones in Kursk. It confirms that very often the vehicles destroyed by drones are previously immobilized either by previous drone attacks, mines, artillery, or simply broken down. As the video notes Ukrainian FPV "racing drone" operators have developed a tactic of initially targeting the tracks/wheels of Russian armored vehicles. The "running gear" of these vehicles is almost always more fragile than the actual "armored" body of the vehicle. This is particularly true of Russian tanks and BMPs. The engine compartment is also an alternative. Damaging the running gear usually immobilizes the vehicle.

 

Ukrainian drone operators can much more easily destroy a target that is not moving, even if more than one attempt is necessary. There is little hurry, as the vehicle isn't capable of withdrawing. The remaining "runners" can be preferentially attacked first. The Russian crew, knowing this, virtually always abandons the immobile vehicle, leading to open hatches. These empty openings make it much easier for drones to destroy the vehicle. For that reason this event is commonly seen in internet videos. This tactic has delivered good results for Ukraine.

 

Fortunately NATO armored vehicles have better protected running gear. This is a result of providing good protection against modern dual warhead ATGMs. Having armor that resists them but running gear that doesn't isn't viable. However, NATO vehicles are marginally less robust in their running gear than their "body". That said, a Leopard 1A5 with a cope cage added survived 12 hits by Russian drones. The Leopard 1 was notoriously under-protected by US standards. It was designed in a period where it was assumed protection from ATGMs was ultimately impossible and therefore not a design goal. It was however much lighter as a result :-). The first Leopard 1s were delivered in 1972. When appropriate composite armor became available, as demonstrated in 1984 with the first Abrams deliveries, it became clear the Leopard 1 needed better protection. The Leopard 2 delivered better protection. The referenced article provides detail on the remediation applied by Ukraine to the engine compartment and rear of the Leopard 1 tank.

---

The article Ukrainian drones describes a similar recent action by Ukraine near Pokrovsk.

The Russians were spotted by a drone with an infrared camera and then “met with warmth,” the 24th Mechanized Brigade reported. “Infantry, artillery and drone crews did everything to make the invaders’ journey unforgettable.” As the sun rose, 14 of the attacking vehicles were destroyed or immobilized. The rest retreated, five of them damaged.

A combined arms defense is clearly the most effective way of turning back a mechanized force. Detecting it early was a key element in lining up the strength to decimate it.

---

The Ukrainian drones article contains quite a bit of raw information that is quite interesting. However the main thesis in this article is a discussion of how much pain and death Ukrainian drones are delivering to the Russian infantry. The thesis statement is

A few weeks after finally capturing the ruins of Chasiv Yar, a town in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast that was a locus of a yearlong Russian offensive, the Russian survivors are bogged down in and around the town.

This statement is probably true. However, the Russians did capture the town. The article does not suggest they intend to retreat from it. Drones haven't forced Russia to retreat, nor has anything else. In the end, that is what matters. It is also still muddy in Ukraine, there is heavy fighting in Kursk, and ceasefire negotiations are going on. When these elements are sorted out, the Russia offensive in Donbas IMO will continue, unless a ceasefire is indeed put in place.

---

I am including some links on the use of US drones in Ukraine. It hasn't gone well. In some cases, the reasons are a bit obscure. There are also drone evaluations going on that don't make the internet. Hopefully the following will be useful. Wikipedia Switchblade Whatever Happened to Switchblade Army won't buy more 300s Army buys more Switchblades. IMO it is unclear what this all means. It looks a lot like pork to me, but that isn't at all clear.

Unfortunately, I cannot pull up the references I am referring to but assume the info is valid.

Ukraine has hit apparently hit the Moscow refinery which produces 50 percent of the fuel and for the city. It has apparently hit other locations using a new long range (900 miles) cruise missile of its own manufacture. They have reportedly also hit the gas line control station which feeds Hungary with half its natural gas. What appears to be true is that Ukraine has had an impact on the total number of S400 system available and Russia has had to move them around to try and defend a very large aria. Ukraine appears to have succeeded in reducing the Russians ability to defend all targets and has succeeded in making it's own medium range cruise missile which can penetrate what is left of the Russian defensives. My gut feeling is that the more damage Ukraine can cause in Russia, the more pressure Putin is going to have to deal with.  
The big question for Putin is if he cannot defend Russian targets and protect the natural gas line that feeds Hungary are those in Russia with all the money going to go along with loss of income, destruction of assets etc.
While Ukraine has had to give up its gains in Kursk, they seem to causing significant economic impact on other parts of the Russian Economy.
Since Hungrary has been dependent on Russian gas and oil, now would seem to be a great opportunity to prove it can replace those loses

[GK3]

The video [Ref 2] depicts the aggressive operation of Ukrainian drones in Kursk. It confirms that very often the vehicles destroyed by drones are previously immobilized either by previous drone attacks, mines, artillery, or simply broken down. As the video notes Ukrainian FPV "racing drone" operators have developed a tactic of initially targeting the tracks/wheels of Russian armored vehicles. The "running gear" of these vehicles is almost always more fragile than the actual "armored" body of the vehicle. This is particularly true of Russian tanks and BMPs. The engine compartment is also an alternative. Damaging the running gear usually immobilizes the vehicle.

 

Ukrainian drone operators can much more easily destroy a target that is not moving, even if more than one attempt is necessary. There is little hurry, as the vehicle isn't capable of withdrawing. The remaining "runners" can be preferentially attacked first. The Russian crew, knowing this, virtually always abandons the immobile vehicle, leading to open hatches. These empty openings make it much easier for drones to destroy the vehicle. For that reason this event is commonly seen in internet videos. This tactic has delivered good results for Ukraine.

 

Fortunately NATO armored vehicles have better protected running gear. This is a result of providing good protection against modern dual warhead ATGMs. Having armor that resists them but running gear that doesn't isn't viable. However, NATO vehicles are marginally less robust in their running gear than their "body". That said, a Leopard 1A5 with a cope cage added survived 12 hits by Russian drones. The Leopard 1 was notoriously under-protected by US standards. It was designed in a period where it was assumed protection from ATGMs was ultimately impossible and therefore not a design goal. It was however much lighter as a result :-). The first Leopard 1s were delivered in 1972. When appropriate composite armor became available, as demonstrated in 1984 with the first Abrams deliveries, it became clear the Leopard 1 needed better protection. The Leopard 2 delivered better protection. The referenced article provides detail on the remediation applied by Ukraine to the engine compartment and rear of the Leopard 1 tank.

---

The article Ukrainian drones describes a similar recent action by Ukraine near Pokrovsk.

The Russians were spotted by a drone with an infrared camera and then “met with warmth,” the 24th Mechanized Brigade reported. “Infantry, artillery and drone crews did everything to make the invaders’ journey unforgettable.” As the sun rose, 14 of the attacking vehicles were destroyed or immobilized. The rest retreated, five of them damaged.

A combined arms defense is clearly the most effective way of turning back a mechanized force. Detecting it early was a key element in lining up the strength to decimate it.

---

The Ukrainian drones article contains quite a bit of raw information that is quite interesting. However the main thesis in this article is a discussion of how much pain and death Ukrainian drones are delivering to the Russian infantry. The thesis statement is

A few weeks after finally capturing the ruins of Chasiv Yar, a town in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast that was a locus of a yearlong Russian offensive, the Russian survivors are bogged down in and around the town.

This statement is probably true. However, the Russians did capture the town. The article does not suggest they intend to retreat from it. Drones haven't forced Russia to retreat, nor has anything else. In the end, that is what matters. It is also still muddy in Ukraine, there is heavy fighting in Kursk, and ceasefire negotiations are going on. When these elements are sorted out, the Russia offensive in Donbas IMO will continue, unless a ceasefire is indeed put in place.

---

I am including some links on the use of US drones in Ukraine. It hasn't gone well. In some cases, the reasons are a bit obscure. There are also drone evaluations going on that don't make the internet. Hopefully the following will be useful. Wikipedia Switchblade Whatever Happened to Switchblade Army won't buy more 300s Army buys more Switchblades. IMO it is unclear what this all means. It looks a lot like pork to me, but that isn't at all clear.

Unfortunately, I cannot pull up the references I am referring to but assume the info is valid.

Ukraine has hit apparently hit the Moscow refinery which produces 50 percent of the fuel and for the city. It has apparently hit other locations using a new long range (900 miles) cruise missile of its own manufacture. They have reportedly also hit the gas line control station which feeds Hungary with half its natural gas. What appears to be true is that Ukraine has had an impact on the total number of S400 system available and Russia has had to move them around to try and defend a very large aria. Ukraine appears to have succeeded in reducing the Russians ability to defend all targets and has succeeded in making it's own medium range cruise missile which can penetrate what is left of the Russian defensives. My gut feeling is that the more damage Ukraine can cause in Russia, the more pressure Putin is going to have to deal with.  
The big question for Putin is if he cannot defend Russian targets and protect the natural gas line that feeds Hungary are those in Russia with all the money going to go along with loss of income, destruction of assets etc.
While Ukraine has had to give up its gains in Kursk, they seem to causing significant economic impact on other parts of the Russian Economy.
Since Hungrary has been dependent on Russian gas and oil, now would seem to be a great opportunity to prove it can replace those loses

[Goose]

Unfortunately, I cannot pull up the references I am referring to but assume the info is valid.


Ukraine has hit apparently hit the Moscow refinery which produces 50 percent of the fuel and for the city. It has apparently hit other locations using a new long range (900 miles) cruise missile of its own manufacture. They have reportedly also hit the gas line control station which feeds Hungary with half its natural gas.

Maybe these are some of them, or equivalent.
/russian-oil-flows-to-hungary-interrupted-as-ukraine-steps-up-energy-infrastructure-attacks/2-1-1791466
https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-drones-...ry-2045758

While it is great Ukraine can do this, the necessary condition to make such actions effective is persistence. The oil pipeline was down for "a few hours". What is absolutely required is the ability to strike it again very quickly to take it down again. A few hours is a nuisance. A few days is a problem. A month is a disaster. Ukraine needs to get into the days-months region to be effective. Let's hope they can.

We don't know the extent of the damage to the refinery in Moscow. It is a similar situation. Of course, if the refinery damage is extensive enough that production is halted for weeks, it is a "big deal". So far, AFAIK, Ukraine hast yet accomplished that.

What appears to be true is that Ukraine has had an impact on the total number of S400 system available and Russia has had to move them around to try and defend a very large aria. Ukraine appears to have succeeded in reducing the Russians ability to defend all targets

I am not sure about the role of S-400 missile systems and Ukraine's impact on the total number of them available. Some have certainly been destroyed. Russia also fired quite a few S-400 missiles in a "ground to ground" role. That said, Russia's count of S-400 batteries has not been materially reduced. Russia has at no time in its history been able to come anywhere close to "defending all targets" with SAMs alone. To counter low-flying air breathing cruise missiles fired in any quantity, AWACS and fighter aircraft are a necessity. Period. Russia isn't doing that, for some reason.

S-400s are actually pretty much a waste for such targets (as are Patriots) because they have the same radar horizon limitations that cheaper, smaller SHORAD systems, such Pantsir and Tor have.  Big long range missiles are no better (actually they are worse) than the SA-15s fired by a Tor or SA-22 fired by a Pantsir. If the cruise missile is at 30 meters altitude the radar horizon is 24.6 km. At a missile speed of 800 k/hr the defender has 3.7 minutes to shoot it down if it is going to fly directly over the defender. If the missile has a non-zero angle rate, it will be less. Of course, Ukraine (with help from the US) designs their missile routes to avoid the SAMS as much as possible. S-400s are less mobile than SHORAD systems are. The S-400s tend to stay put, so they are easier to avoid. Russia doesn't have enough SAMs to put them right next to every important target. Even if Ukraine has to "defeat"  one point-defense SAM, there are ways to do it. 

and has succeeded in making it's own medium range cruise missile which can penetrate what is left of the Russian defensives. My gut feeling is that the more damage Ukraine can cause in Russia, the more pressure Putin is going to have to deal with. The big question for Putin is if he cannot defend Russian targets and protect the natural gas line that feeds Hungary are those in Russia with all the money going to go along with loss of income, destruction of assets etc.

Indeed Ukraine has demonstrated they can penetrate the Russian defenses, such as they are. What they have yet to demonstrate is that they can deliver enough ordinance repeatably and reliably enough to create the economic and political fallout necessary to force Putin to yield.  I hope they can.

While Ukraine has had to give up its gains in Kursk, they seem to causing significant economic impact on other parts of the Russian Economy.

The good news is that Ukrane has held on to some of its gains in Kursk. As far as causing "significant economic impact" on the Russian economy due to cruise missile attacks, IMO Ukraine is not even close to "there" yet. That can change, and change quickly. If Ukraine can actually shut down the pipeline to Hungary more or less permanently, that would do it.

[Goose]

Unfortunately, I cannot pull up the references I am referring to but assume the info is valid.


Ukraine has hit apparently hit the Moscow refinery which produces 50 percent of the fuel and for the city. It has apparently hit other locations using a new long range (900 miles) cruise missile of its own manufacture. They have reportedly also hit the gas line control station which feeds Hungary with half its natural gas.

Maybe these are some of them, or equivalent.
/russian-oil-flows-to-hungary-interrupted-as-ukraine-steps-up-energy-infrastructure-attacks/2-1-1791466
https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-drones-...ry-2045758

While it is great Ukraine can do this, the necessary condition to make such actions effective is persistence. The oil pipeline was down for "a few hours". What is absolutely required is the ability to strike it again very quickly to take it down again. A few hours is a nuisance. A few days is a problem. A month is a disaster. Ukraine needs to get into the days-months region to be effective. Let's hope they can.

We don't know the extent of the damage to the refinery in Moscow. It is a similar situation. Of course, if the refinery damage is extensive enough that production is halted for weeks, it is a "big deal". So far, AFAIK, Ukraine hast yet accomplished that.

What appears to be true is that Ukraine has had an impact on the total number of S400 system available and Russia has had to move them around to try and defend a very large aria. Ukraine appears to have succeeded in reducing the Russians ability to defend all targets

I am not sure about the role of S-400 missile systems and Ukraine's impact on the total number of them available. Some have certainly been destroyed. Russia also fired quite a few S-400 missiles in a "ground to ground" role. That said, Russia's count of S-400 batteries has not been materially reduced. Russia has at no time in its history been able to come anywhere close to "defending all targets" with SAMs alone. To counter low-flying air breathing cruise missiles fired in any quantity, AWACS and fighter aircraft are a necessity. Period. Russia isn't doing that, for some reason.

S-400s are actually pretty much a waste for such targets (as are Patriots) because they have the same radar horizon limitations that cheaper, smaller SHORAD systems, such Pantsir and Tor have.  Big long range missiles are no better (actually they are worse) than the SA-15s fired by a Tor or SA-22 fired by a Pantsir. If the cruise missile is at 30 meters altitude the radar horizon is 24.6 km. At a missile speed of 800 k/hr the defender has 3.7 minutes to shoot it down if it is going to fly directly over the defender. If the missile has a non-zero angle rate, it will be less. Of course, Ukraine (with help from the US) designs their missile routes to avoid the SAMS as much as possible. S-400s are less mobile than SHORAD systems are. The S-400s tend to stay put, so they are easier to avoid. Russia doesn't have enough SAMs to put them right next to every important target. Even if Ukraine has to "defeat"  one point-defense SAM, there are ways to do it. 

and has succeeded in making it's own medium range cruise missile which can penetrate what is left of the Russian defensives. My gut feeling is that the more damage Ukraine can cause in Russia, the more pressure Putin is going to have to deal with. The big question for Putin is if he cannot defend Russian targets and protect the natural gas line that feeds Hungary are those in Russia with all the money going to go along with loss of income, destruction of assets etc.

Indeed Ukraine has demonstrated they can penetrate the Russian defenses, such as they are. What they have yet to demonstrate is that they can deliver enough ordinance repeatably and reliably enough to create the economic and political fallout necessary to force Putin to yield.  I hope they can.

While Ukraine has had to give up its gains in Kursk, they seem to causing significant economic impact on other parts of the Russian Economy.

The good news is that Ukrane has held on to some of its gains in Kursk. As far as causing "significant economic impact" on the Russian economy due to cruise missile attacks, IMO Ukraine is not even close to "there" yet. That can change, and change quickly. If Ukraine can actually shut down the pipeline to Hungary more or less permanently, that would do it.