(09-25-2024, 12:03 AM)GK3 Wrote: This article describes to some extent a new Ukrainian drone that is faster and carries a much bigger payload with a range of several hundred miles. Basically a cruise missile, using a small, cheap turbofan jet engine. I have seen other articles that say it has a payload of nearly 1 ton of explosives.Ukraine definitely has the technical ability to put something like this together. As the article points out they can manufacture jet engines, which most countries cannot. There is always the question of how many they can build, and that we don't know. The guidance system (both design and construction) for such a weapon is also a challenge. These days having a combination GPS-INS is the "bottom tier". IR target recognition is becoming de regueur. Like any new weapons system it will undoubtedly have its teething problems.
Will be interesting to see if they really did put something like this together.
https://simpleflying.com/ukraine-buildin...d%20drones.
(09-25-2024, 02:32 AM)M T Wrote: Could such a drone improve the chance of taking out the Kerch Bridge?Maybe. The quoted range is just on the edge of making it from Kherson to the bridge. The quoted range is undoubtedly an estimate/guess. The actual range may be longer. There is also the option of fitting a smaller warhead. Actually hitting the bridge is tricky unless the missile is equipped with some kind of target recognition system. GPS won't quite do it. A CEP of 10 meters (Tomahawk CEP) probably won't do it. Damage the bridge yes, destroy it no. If you fire "several" missiles the odds of an almost direct hit go way up. An IR or W band seeker makes for "one missile, no bridge". The bridge is also very well protected against drone attacks. There are lots of point defense systems scattered all over the approaches, at least on the Ukraine side. A single missile of this class probably wouldn't make it through. A "swarm" of such missiles accompanied by radar jammers/dummy targets certainly can.
Quote:Speaking of that bridge, Russia is building something alongside itCould be some kind of decoy to confuse drone targeting. I am guessing it is a platform on which to mount very short range missile defenses and/or defenses against Ukrainian USVs.
https://www.newsweek.com/mystery-structu...on-1942475
(09-25-2024, 12:03 AM)GK3 Wrote: This article describes to some extent a new Ukrainian drone that is faster and carries a much bigger payload with a range of several hundred miles. Basically a cruise missile, using a small, cheap turbofan jet engine. I have seen other articles that say it has a payload of nearly 1 ton of explosives.Ukraine definitely has the technical ability to put something like this together. As the article points out they can manufacture jet engines, which most countries cannot. There is always the question of how many they can build, and that we don't know. The guidance system (both design and construction) for such a weapon is also a challenge. These days having a combination GPS-INS is the "bottom tier". IR target recognition is becoming de regueur. Like any new weapons system it will undoubtedly have its teething problems.
Will be interesting to see if they really did put something like this together.
https://simpleflying.com/ukraine-buildin...d%20drones.
(09-25-2024, 02:32 AM)M T Wrote: Could such a drone improve the chance of taking out the Kerch Bridge?Maybe. The quoted range is just on the edge of making it from Kherson to the bridge. The quoted range is undoubtedly an estimate/guess. The actual range may be longer. There is also the option of fitting a smaller warhead. Actually hitting the bridge is tricky unless the missile is equipped with some kind of target recognition system. GPS won't quite do it. A CEP of 10 meters (Tomahawk CEP) probably won't do it. Damage the bridge yes, destroy it no. If you fire "several" missiles the odds of an almost direct hit go way up. An IR or W band seeker makes for "one missile, no bridge". The bridge is also very well protected against drone attacks. There are lots of point defense systems scattered all over the approaches, at least on the Ukraine side. A single missile of this class probably wouldn't make it through. A "swarm" of such missiles accompanied by radar jammers/dummy targets certainly can.
Quote:Speaking of that bridge, Russia is building something alongside itCould be some kind of decoy to confuse drone targeting. I am guessing it is a platform on which to mount very short range missile defenses and/or defenses against Ukrainian USVs.
https://www.newsweek.com/mystery-structu...on-1942475
Quote:While not a transport and logistics hub like Pokrovsk, Vuhledar was heavily fortified and viewed as a crucial bastion at the intersection of Ukraine’s eastern and southern fronts. One prominent Russian war blogger Boris Rozhin said this made the victory “operational, if not operational-strategic.”https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/02/europe/vu...index.html
“The fact is that this ‘balcony’ [an apparent reference to Vuhledar’s elevated position] was located at the junction of the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk fronts posed a constant threat to the grouping that covered the approaches to Mariupol,” he noted, referring to the southern Ukrainian city that has been in Russian hands since 2022.
Just like Avdiivka, another strategic eastern town which fell in February, Vuhledar is a victim not of Russian strategic prowess but brute-force attrition.
Quote:While not a transport and logistics hub like Pokrovsk, Vuhledar was heavily fortified and viewed as a crucial bastion at the intersection of Ukraine’s eastern and southern fronts. One prominent Russian war blogger Boris Rozhin said this made the victory “operational, if not operational-strategic.”https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/02/europe/vu...index.html
“The fact is that this ‘balcony’ [an apparent reference to Vuhledar’s elevated position] was located at the junction of the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk fronts posed a constant threat to the grouping that covered the approaches to Mariupol,” he noted, referring to the southern Ukrainian city that has been in Russian hands since 2022.
Just like Avdiivka, another strategic eastern town which fell in February, Vuhledar is a victim not of Russian strategic prowess but brute-force attrition.
(10-02-2024, 01:42 PM)M T Wrote: I presume we all wish for peace. I hope those in control can find a way to pull back from where the world seems to be.
(10-02-2024, 01:42 PM)M T Wrote: I presume we all wish for peace. I hope those in control can find a way to pull back from where the world seems to be.
(10-04-2024, 08:37 AM)dabigv13 Wrote: F16s won't solve the glide bomb problem. Pretty much every Ukrainian and Western analyst has stated as much. To get within range of the bombers, the F16s would be within range of Russian air defenses.Indeed the analysts state the F16s "would be within range of Russian air defenses". That being true it is tacitly assumed that F-16s could not effectively operate against Russian aircraft launching glide bombs. There are all kinds of major problems with that reasoning.
Quote:During Operation Allied Force, NATO reportedly fired 743 HARMs during the course of the 78-day campaign, but could confirm the destruction of only 3 of the original 25 SA-6 batteries. Over half of the HARMs expended were preemptive targeting shots (PETs), fired at suspected SAM sites, but without a radar to target. During the campaign, Serbian SAM sites fired more than 800 SAMs with only 2 NATO aircraft downed, the majority from fixed sites were fired without radar guidance. Radars were also forced to operate for only 20 seconds or less to avoid destruction by HARMs.An S-400 acquiring a target, firing a missile, and then turning off the illuminator isn't going to hit anything. SEAD is a "real" thing. Russia and Ukraine were not trained or resourced to do it. The "experts" treat that as an immutable premise. It isn't. Ukraine can change that. Israeli non-stealth aircraft operate all the time in areas where they are "within range of air defenses". It doesn't mean you can't do it. It means you have to be aware of and honor the threat.
Quote:Indeed there are reasons to want F-16s operational to do other tasks, such as shooting down air-breathing drones of all kinds. I also agree that the F-16 is not a "war winning" weapon. However, IMO the inability to counter glide bombing by Russia may be a "war losing" inability. The Russians are using this capability in increasingly effective amounts and proficiency. It is making "meat attacks" much more effective. Countering this capability is necessary to give Ukrainian infantry any hope of defending. 2 kG bombs put even the Russian artillery superiority in the shade. It is especially demoralizing if you have absolutely no defense against it.
Still would be great to have them operational in larger numbers for a variety of reasons, but F16s themselves would not be a decisive or "war winning" weapon.
(10-04-2024, 08:37 AM)dabigv13 Wrote: F16s won't solve the glide bomb problem. Pretty much every Ukrainian and Western analyst has stated as much. To get within range of the bombers, the F16s would be within range of Russian air defenses.Indeed the analysts state the F16s "would be within range of Russian air defenses". That being true it is tacitly assumed that F-16s could not effectively operate against Russian aircraft launching glide bombs. There are all kinds of major problems with that reasoning.
Quote:During Operation Allied Force, NATO reportedly fired 743 HARMs during the course of the 78-day campaign, but could confirm the destruction of only 3 of the original 25 SA-6 batteries. Over half of the HARMs expended were preemptive targeting shots (PETs), fired at suspected SAM sites, but without a radar to target. During the campaign, Serbian SAM sites fired more than 800 SAMs with only 2 NATO aircraft downed, the majority from fixed sites were fired without radar guidance. Radars were also forced to operate for only 20 seconds or less to avoid destruction by HARMs.An S-400 acquiring a target, firing a missile, and then turning off the illuminator isn't going to hit anything. SEAD is a "real" thing. Russia and Ukraine were not trained or resourced to do it. The "experts" treat that as an immutable premise. It isn't. Ukraine can change that. Israeli non-stealth aircraft operate all the time in areas where they are "within range of air defenses". It doesn't mean you can't do it. It means you have to be aware of and honor the threat.
Quote:Indeed there are reasons to want F-16s operational to do other tasks, such as shooting down air-breathing drones of all kinds. I also agree that the F-16 is not a "war winning" weapon. However, IMO the inability to counter glide bombing by Russia may be a "war losing" inability. The Russians are using this capability in increasingly effective amounts and proficiency. It is making "meat attacks" much more effective. Countering this capability is necessary to give Ukrainian infantry any hope of defending. 2 kG bombs put even the Russian artillery superiority in the shade. It is especially demoralizing if you have absolutely no defense against it.
Still would be great to have them operational in larger numbers for a variety of reasons, but F16s themselves would not be a decisive or "war winning" weapon.
(10-08-2024, 05:38 PM)TrumpCard Wrote: Will the weather soon be on the Ukrainians' side? Does not seem like much good has happened recently, so the Ukrainians might benefit from a reduction in battlefield activity with both sides hunkering down.https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/10/02/f...son-looms/
(10-08-2024, 05:38 PM)TrumpCard Wrote: Will the weather soon be on the Ukrainians' side? Does not seem like much good has happened recently, so the Ukrainians might benefit from a reduction in battlefield activity with both sides hunkering down.https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/10/02/f...son-looms/
Quote:I don’t believe we can change Putin’s mind, but I believe we can change his calculus, that he realizes that the cost of continuing the war is too high.This belief is very common in the NATO members that are not former Warsaw Pact members. It is held by both the public and the politicians. IMO it is dangerously incorrect. Putin will never stop fighting because the cost of continuing is too high. Putin will not stop until 1) continuing is impossible (i.e. Russia simply is incapable of continuing), or 2) the political cost of continuing becomes greater than the political cost of stopping.
Quote:I don’t believe we can change Putin’s mind, but I believe we can change his calculus, that he realizes that the cost of continuing the war is too high.This belief is very common in the NATO members that are not former Warsaw Pact members. It is held by both the public and the politicians. IMO it is dangerously incorrect. Putin will never stop fighting because the cost of continuing is too high. Putin will not stop until 1) continuing is impossible (i.e. Russia simply is incapable of continuing), or 2) the political cost of continuing becomes greater than the political cost of stopping.
Quote:Is there any limit to the Russian supply of troops? Do you see that advantage fading at all, whether because of diminishing numbers or political backlash?
It’s a good question. Russia’s advantage has been the ability to withstand very high levels of attrition because of the materiel and manpower resources they have, and also their significant capacity for mobilization of resources on a national scale — that is, defense industrial production, manpower recruitment, and the like.
But Russia’s actually operating under very significant constraints. And if anything, its advantage on the battlefield is likely to decline as we get into this winter and look further ahead into 2025. First, in terms of equipment, the Russian military has been sustaining very high levels of loss that are principally being replaced by Soviet-era stocks — not entirely, but at this stage, Russia is eating through its Soviet legacy, and its rate of equipment production is quite low relative to the numbers being lost on the battlefield.
This doesn’t mean that Russia is going to run out of armored fighting vehicles. What it does mean is that the Russian military has increasingly been forced to adjust tactics to minimize their losses, and that also reduces their ability to achieve any operationally meaningful breakthroughs. When you look at manpower, the Russian government has significantly increased the payouts and benefits to recruit personnel. The reason for that is straightforward. It’s clear that at this rate of loss, the Russian contract recruitment campaign is unable to keep up. This too does not mean that Russia is going to run out of manpower, but it’s clear that they’re struggling, and they are not likely to be able to sustain this pace of operations, staying on the offensive with this rate of loss.
Which could mean there’s an incentive for both sides to come to the negotiating table. Perhaps a bit more of an incentive than there was a year ago?
The way I would put it is that the Russian military is actually operating under significant constraints. Given the likely decline in the relative advantage at the front line, Russia’s potential negotiating position actually isn’t all that strong. And while Russia has the resources to sustain the war in the near term, looking just a bit beyond that you see a fairly problematic picture in terms of the rate of inflation in Russia’s overheating economy, the deficit of skilled labor — because the state is pulling workers into the defense industry and contracting them to fight in the war — the steady depletion of Russia’s liquid reserves, and the fact that much of the budget is tied to the current oil price. The economic picture for Russia isn’t particularly rosy. The effort to juggle several different parts of this equation may not be sustainable. And this too must at some point weigh on the Russian leadership’s mind.
Quote:Is there any limit to the Russian supply of troops? Do you see that advantage fading at all, whether because of diminishing numbers or political backlash?
It’s a good question. Russia’s advantage has been the ability to withstand very high levels of attrition because of the materiel and manpower resources they have, and also their significant capacity for mobilization of resources on a national scale — that is, defense industrial production, manpower recruitment, and the like.
But Russia’s actually operating under very significant constraints. And if anything, its advantage on the battlefield is likely to decline as we get into this winter and look further ahead into 2025. First, in terms of equipment, the Russian military has been sustaining very high levels of loss that are principally being replaced by Soviet-era stocks — not entirely, but at this stage, Russia is eating through its Soviet legacy, and its rate of equipment production is quite low relative to the numbers being lost on the battlefield.
This doesn’t mean that Russia is going to run out of armored fighting vehicles. What it does mean is that the Russian military has increasingly been forced to adjust tactics to minimize their losses, and that also reduces their ability to achieve any operationally meaningful breakthroughs. When you look at manpower, the Russian government has significantly increased the payouts and benefits to recruit personnel. The reason for that is straightforward. It’s clear that at this rate of loss, the Russian contract recruitment campaign is unable to keep up. This too does not mean that Russia is going to run out of manpower, but it’s clear that they’re struggling, and they are not likely to be able to sustain this pace of operations, staying on the offensive with this rate of loss.
Which could mean there’s an incentive for both sides to come to the negotiating table. Perhaps a bit more of an incentive than there was a year ago?
The way I would put it is that the Russian military is actually operating under significant constraints. Given the likely decline in the relative advantage at the front line, Russia’s potential negotiating position actually isn’t all that strong. And while Russia has the resources to sustain the war in the near term, looking just a bit beyond that you see a fairly problematic picture in terms of the rate of inflation in Russia’s overheating economy, the deficit of skilled labor — because the state is pulling workers into the defense industry and contracting them to fight in the war — the steady depletion of Russia’s liquid reserves, and the fact that much of the budget is tied to the current oil price. The economic picture for Russia isn’t particularly rosy. The effort to juggle several different parts of this equation may not be sustainable. And this too must at some point weigh on the Russian leadership’s mind.
(10-10-2024, 11:45 AM)Leftcoast Wrote: Honest question. Why do so many people assume Putin couldn't retain power if Russia retrenches back to Crimea? I've seen nothing in the last 20 years which suggests his power is that brittle. In fact I've seen quite the opposite.Hopefully honest answer :-). Obviously predicting what will happen in Russia is a very inexact science. However, the belief that Putin would have serious problems retaining power if the Ukraine war ended without something that looks like "victory" is based on fairly solid ground IMO.
I suppose this could be like the Hemingway (mis) quote: "How do you lose power? Two ways, Gradually and then suddenly" but I don't see any evidence of "gradually". If anything his hold on power looks stronger.
People keep claiming he couldn't retain power but rarely support the claim.
(10-10-2024, 11:45 AM)Leftcoast Wrote: Honest question. Why do so many people assume Putin couldn't retain power if Russia retrenches back to Crimea? I've seen nothing in the last 20 years which suggests his power is that brittle. In fact I've seen quite the opposite.Hopefully honest answer :-). Obviously predicting what will happen in Russia is a very inexact science. However, the belief that Putin would have serious problems retaining power if the Ukraine war ended without something that looks like "victory" is based on fairly solid ground IMO.
I suppose this could be like the Hemingway (mis) quote: "How do you lose power? Two ways, Gradually and then suddenly" but I don't see any evidence of "gradually". If anything his hold on power looks stronger.
People keep claiming he couldn't retain power but rarely support the claim.
(10-10-2024, 02:55 PM)dabigv13 Wrote: Seems Russia has made a deep penetration into Ukrainian held Kursk. If they are unable to quickly counter attack and reclaim that territory, they will probably need to withdraw from a good chunk of the Kursk territory they control.Waiting for more definite info on this, but not sounding good. Reports indicate that Russian VDV troops and Marines from the Pacific Fleet participated in the offensive. This is a far cry from the "national guard" troops that we previously the quality of the opposition Russia rushed to Kursk. If true, diverting those units from use in Donbas is a "win". I hope the Ukrainians have a plan to cut them off. That will be yet another test of Ukrainian contingency planning. Up to now, Russia hasn't surprised Ukraine much in Kursk. Let's hope that remains true and there is a plan to make Russia pay yet again.
https://x.com/RALee85/status/1844488109662273866
(10-10-2024, 02:55 PM)dabigv13 Wrote: Seems Russia has made a deep penetration into Ukrainian held Kursk. If they are unable to quickly counter attack and reclaim that territory, they will probably need to withdraw from a good chunk of the Kursk territory they control.Waiting for more definite info on this, but not sounding good. Reports indicate that Russian VDV troops and Marines from the Pacific Fleet participated in the offensive. This is a far cry from the "national guard" troops that we previously the quality of the opposition Russia rushed to Kursk. If true, diverting those units from use in Donbas is a "win". I hope the Ukrainians have a plan to cut them off. That will be yet another test of Ukrainian contingency planning. Up to now, Russia hasn't surprised Ukraine much in Kursk. Let's hope that remains true and there is a plan to make Russia pay yet again.
https://x.com/RALee85/status/1844488109662273866
