[dabigv13]

A very informative thread on the S-500 system, basically an upgraded version of the S-300V system. 
The S-500 is not a derivative of the S-400 system, which is itself derived from the S-300P/F system. As shown recently the S-400 does not seem to be able to defend itself from ATACMS, a short range ballistic missile, and this is not too surprising as it's main role was to defend against slower air breathing threats such as planes and cruise missiles.

The S-500 was recently deployed to Crimea per Ukrainian GUR head Kyrylo Budanov to protect the Kerch bridge. This is the first time it has been deployed, and Russia probably only has one operational system. It should be their best ballistic missile defense system, however it seems very liable to being overwhelmed with even a small number of missiles as the thread explains.

https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1800981129966563744
https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1801322095185375647

[dabigv13]

A very informative thread on the S-500 system, basically an upgraded version of the S-300V system. 
The S-500 is not a derivative of the S-400 system, which is itself derived from the S-300P/F system. As shown recently the S-400 does not seem to be able to defend itself from ATACMS, a short range ballistic missile, and this is not too surprising as it's main role was to defend against slower air breathing threats such as planes and cruise missiles.

The S-500 was recently deployed to Crimea per Ukrainian GUR head Kyrylo Budanov to protect the Kerch bridge. This is the first time it has been deployed, and Russia probably only has one operational system. It should be their best ballistic missile defense system, however it seems very liable to being overwhelmed with even a small number of missiles as the thread explains.

https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1800981129966563744
https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1801322095185375647

[Goose]

A very informative thread on the S-500 system, basically an upgraded version of the S-300V system. 
The S-500 is not a derivative of the S-400 system, which is itself derived from the S-300P/F system. As shown recently the S-400 does not seem to be able to defend itself from ATACMS, a short range ballistic missile, and this is not too surprising as it's main role was to defend against slower air breathing threats such as planes and cruise missiles.

Yes and no. The Patriot was originally designed and built to operate against air-breathing threats as well. It didn't stay that way however, interestingly enough possibly for political reasons. The USAF could and did argue the US Army didn't need Patriots because the USAF would take down all the air-breathers. Originally Patriot, as a point defense weapon, was justified as a weapon to take out "leakers". That argument didn't justify building lots of expensive missile systems, so the ABM capability became the raison d'être for Patriot. As a bonus, it actually worked (sort of :-)! Supposedly the S-400 was going down the same path, according to its developers. It has a lot of modifications to give it ABM capability. How well they work is still TBD. No inherent reasons I know of that it couldn't.

The S-500 was recently deployed to Crimea per Ukrainian GUR head Kyrylo Budanov to protect the Kerch bridge. This is the first time it has been deployed, and Russia probably only has one operational system. It should be their best ballistic missile defense system, however it seems very liable to being overwhelmed with even a small number of missiles as the thread explains.

https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1800981129966563744
https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1801322095185375647

Some points not mentioned so far is that the first of anything, Russian or US, usually doesn't work very well. First, it takes time, sometimes lots of time, to fix the deficiencies. Sometimes  it isn't possible to fix it. Second extensive pre-deployment testing is essential to having any chance to deliver a first article that "works". Testing ABM systems is at best very, very expensive. You need a target and you need a "realistic" scenario and geometry. The US is pretty good at this. Russia, not so much. On top of that the contractor really really wants the first article to get accepted. If your DOD is corrupt, it can be a lot easier to "pass" the tests. Even in the US the desire to protect a program's budget can lead to some collusive "funny business".

Patriot worked pretty well in its first operational use against SCUDs. How well is still classified. Probably Patriot worked better than its detractors said and worse than its fans said. In the interim, there have been lots of "lessons learned" and both hardware and software upgrades. It is safe to say it works very well at this point. Of course, the new radars will make it work much better :-).

[Goose]

A very informative thread on the S-500 system, basically an upgraded version of the S-300V system. 
The S-500 is not a derivative of the S-400 system, which is itself derived from the S-300P/F system. As shown recently the S-400 does not seem to be able to defend itself from ATACMS, a short range ballistic missile, and this is not too surprising as it's main role was to defend against slower air breathing threats such as planes and cruise missiles.

Yes and no. The Patriot was originally designed and built to operate against air-breathing threats as well. It didn't stay that way however, interestingly enough possibly for political reasons. The USAF could and did argue the US Army didn't need Patriots because the USAF would take down all the air-breathers. Originally Patriot, as a point defense weapon, was justified as a weapon to take out "leakers". That argument didn't justify building lots of expensive missile systems, so the ABM capability became the raison d'être for Patriot. As a bonus, it actually worked (sort of :-)! Supposedly the S-400 was going down the same path, according to its developers. It has a lot of modifications to give it ABM capability. How well they work is still TBD. No inherent reasons I know of that it couldn't.

The S-500 was recently deployed to Crimea per Ukrainian GUR head Kyrylo Budanov to protect the Kerch bridge. This is the first time it has been deployed, and Russia probably only has one operational system. It should be their best ballistic missile defense system, however it seems very liable to being overwhelmed with even a small number of missiles as the thread explains.

https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1800981129966563744
https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1801322095185375647

Some points not mentioned so far is that the first of anything, Russian or US, usually doesn't work very well. First, it takes time, sometimes lots of time, to fix the deficiencies. Sometimes  it isn't possible to fix it. Second extensive pre-deployment testing is essential to having any chance to deliver a first article that "works". Testing ABM systems is at best very, very expensive. You need a target and you need a "realistic" scenario and geometry. The US is pretty good at this. Russia, not so much. On top of that the contractor really really wants the first article to get accepted. If your DOD is corrupt, it can be a lot easier to "pass" the tests. Even in the US the desire to protect a program's budget can lead to some collusive "funny business".

Patriot worked pretty well in its first operational use against SCUDs. How well is still classified. Probably Patriot worked better than its detractors said and worse than its fans said. In the interim, there have been lots of "lessons learned" and both hardware and software upgrades. It is safe to say it works very well at this point. Of course, the new radars will make it work much better :-).

[GK3]

A very informative thread on the S-500 system, basically an upgraded version of the S-300V system. 
The S-500 is not a derivative of the S-400 system, which is itself derived from the S-300P/F system. As shown recently the S-400 does not seem to be able to defend itself from ATACMS, a short range ballistic missile, and this is not too surprising as it's main role was to defend against slower air breathing threats such as planes and cruise missiles.

Yes and no. The Patriot was originally designed and built to operate against air-breathing threats as well. It didn't stay that way however, interestingly enough possibly for political reasons. The USAF could and did argue the US Army didn't need Patriots because the USAF would take down all the air-breathers. Originally Patriot, as a point defense weapon, was justified as a weapon to take out "leakers". That argument didn't justify building lots of expensive missile systems, so the ABM capability became the raison d'être for Patriot. As a bonus, it actually worked (sort of :-)! Supposedly the S-400 was going down the same path, according to its developers. It has a lot of modifications to give it ABM capability. How well they work is still TBD. No inherent reasons I know of that it couldn't.

The S-500 was recently deployed to Crimea per Ukrainian GUR head Kyrylo Budanov to protect the Kerch bridge. This is the first time it has been deployed, and Russia probably only has one operational system. It should be their best ballistic missile defense system, however it seems very liable to being overwhelmed with even a small number of missiles as the thread explains.

https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1800981129966563744
https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1801322095185375647

Some points not mentioned so far is that the first of anything, Russian or US, usually doesn't work very well. First, it takes time, sometimes lots of time, to fix the deficiencies. Sometimes  it isn't possible to fix it. Second extensive pre-deployment testing is essential to having any chance to deliver a first article that "works". Testing ABM systems is at best very, very expensive. You need a target and you need a "realistic" scenario and geometry. The US is pretty good at this. Russia, not so much. On top of that the contractor really really wants the first article to get accepted. If your DOD is corrupt, it can be a lot easier to "pass" the tests. Even in the US the desire to protect a program's budget can lead to some collusive "funny business".

Patriot worked pretty well in its first operational use against SCUDs. How well is still classified. Probably Patriot worked better than its detractors said and worse than its fans said. In the interim, there have been lots of "lessons learned" and both hardware and software upgrades. It is safe to say it works very well at this point. Of course, the new radars will make it work much better :-).

I think Ukraine recently took out another S400 by using lots of small FPV drones to overwhelm the radar array which was eventually destroyed by a few, the the bigger weapons took out the launchers and missles.  Is it possible to take out these multimillion dollar weapons so simply?  Maybe not simply, but pretty inexpensively.

[GK3]

A very informative thread on the S-500 system, basically an upgraded version of the S-300V system. 
The S-500 is not a derivative of the S-400 system, which is itself derived from the S-300P/F system. As shown recently the S-400 does not seem to be able to defend itself from ATACMS, a short range ballistic missile, and this is not too surprising as it's main role was to defend against slower air breathing threats such as planes and cruise missiles.

Yes and no. The Patriot was originally designed and built to operate against air-breathing threats as well. It didn't stay that way however, interestingly enough possibly for political reasons. The USAF could and did argue the US Army didn't need Patriots because the USAF would take down all the air-breathers. Originally Patriot, as a point defense weapon, was justified as a weapon to take out "leakers". That argument didn't justify building lots of expensive missile systems, so the ABM capability became the raison d'être for Patriot. As a bonus, it actually worked (sort of :-)! Supposedly the S-400 was going down the same path, according to its developers. It has a lot of modifications to give it ABM capability. How well they work is still TBD. No inherent reasons I know of that it couldn't.

The S-500 was recently deployed to Crimea per Ukrainian GUR head Kyrylo Budanov to protect the Kerch bridge. This is the first time it has been deployed, and Russia probably only has one operational system. It should be their best ballistic missile defense system, however it seems very liable to being overwhelmed with even a small number of missiles as the thread explains.

https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1800981129966563744
https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1801322095185375647

Some points not mentioned so far is that the first of anything, Russian or US, usually doesn't work very well. First, it takes time, sometimes lots of time, to fix the deficiencies. Sometimes  it isn't possible to fix it. Second extensive pre-deployment testing is essential to having any chance to deliver a first article that "works". Testing ABM systems is at best very, very expensive. You need a target and you need a "realistic" scenario and geometry. The US is pretty good at this. Russia, not so much. On top of that the contractor really really wants the first article to get accepted. If your DOD is corrupt, it can be a lot easier to "pass" the tests. Even in the US the desire to protect a program's budget can lead to some collusive "funny business".

Patriot worked pretty well in its first operational use against SCUDs. How well is still classified. Probably Patriot worked better than its detractors said and worse than its fans said. In the interim, there have been lots of "lessons learned" and both hardware and software upgrades. It is safe to say it works very well at this point. Of course, the new radars will make it work much better :-).

I think Ukraine recently took out another S400 by using lots of small FPV drones to overwhelm the radar array which was eventually destroyed by a few, the the bigger weapons took out the launchers and missles.  Is it possible to take out these multimillion dollar weapons so simply?  Maybe not simply, but pretty inexpensively.

[dabigv13]

I have not heard of an S-400 or S-400 component being taken out with FPV drones. ATACMS and GMLRS mostly. And one off claims of Neptune and long range fixed wing drone, though no video or other confirmatory evidence of those strikes. 

S-400 would usually be deployed too deep in the rear for FPV drones, unless perhaps some special forces team deployed with them behind enemy lines.

[dabigv13]

I have not heard of an S-400 or S-400 component being taken out with FPV drones. ATACMS and GMLRS mostly. And one off claims of Neptune and long range fixed wing drone, though no video or other confirmatory evidence of those strikes. 

S-400 would usually be deployed too deep in the rear for FPV drones, unless perhaps some special forces team deployed with them behind enemy lines.

[Goose]

I have not heard of an S-400 or S-400 component being taken out with FPV drones. ATACMS and GMLRS mostly. And one off claims of Neptune and long range fixed wing drone, though no video or other confirmatory evidence of those strikes. 

S-400 would usually be deployed too deep in the rear for FPV drones, unless perhaps some special forces team deployed with them behind enemy lines.

The only reference I found was this: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66805897. 

used drones to take out radar equipment, then cruise missiles to hit air defence missile launchers

The "radar equipment" may have been parts of a Tor or a Pantsir that was forward deployed to shoot down cruise missiles and/or aircraft that would launch such missiles. It is correct that normally an S-400 would be placed pretty far back. That said, Russia often gets sloppy. They may have got too close. The S-400 radar itself may have been the target of the drones.

There is some known bogus computer game videos out there showing drones destroying an S-400. That muddies the water a lot.

[Goose]

I have not heard of an S-400 or S-400 component being taken out with FPV drones. ATACMS and GMLRS mostly. And one off claims of Neptune and long range fixed wing drone, though no video or other confirmatory evidence of those strikes. 

S-400 would usually be deployed too deep in the rear for FPV drones, unless perhaps some special forces team deployed with them behind enemy lines.

The only reference I found was this: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66805897. 

used drones to take out radar equipment, then cruise missiles to hit air defence missile launchers

The "radar equipment" may have been parts of a Tor or a Pantsir that was forward deployed to shoot down cruise missiles and/or aircraft that would launch such missiles. It is correct that normally an S-400 would be placed pretty far back. That said, Russia often gets sloppy. They may have got too close. The S-400 radar itself may have been the target of the drones.

There is some known bogus computer game videos out there showing drones destroying an S-400. That muddies the water a lot.

[gocard14]

Does anyone know if this article is at least reasonabley factual?
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/20...to-crimea/
If true, Russia's ability to defend Crimea from air attacks maybe become limited. The Ukrainians are seemingly becoming very good at taking out the S400. If Russia can't keep their S400 batteries up and functiioning, the F16s may have increased lattitude in terms of what they can do.

The fact that Ukraine has used ATACMS to destroy "several" S-400 and S-300 batteries is well enough documented that IMO it can be taken as a fact. The quantity and location is also very probably accurate. From there, things go downhill pretty fast. The Ukrainians claim the S-400s (and whatever may have been supposed to protect them) did not  destroy a single ATACMS. If this is true, it could be immensely significant. We have no independent confirmation of this.

There are multiple possible causes of the failure. IF the S-400 was operating "normally" and IF the crew was of "typical" skill and were unable to destroy any of the inbound missiles it points to design deficiencies in the S-400. Russia may or may not be able to correct these  deficiencies quickly. If they can't, the implications are obvious and the ability of F-16s to operate inside Crimea (or inside Russia for that matter) is greatly enhanced. The S-400s can be destroyed by ATACMS and the F-16s can utilize that gap to get inside the defended area without loss. A "big deal" if true.

It is also possible these batteries were not yet operational. Why Russia would deploy and thereby expose a battery that wasn't operational yet is anybodies  guess. Maybe the date on the orders was wrong.

It also may be that the battery was operational but concentrating against low angle cruise missile targets/drones and wanted high duty cycle on these low altitude targets. The S-400 was therefore not maintaining surveillance at all altitudes. It is possible it literally didn't "see" the incoming. It is important to remember that the S-400 is designed to be used as part of an IADS where long-range acquisition radars detect the targets and designate them for individual batteries. It isn't being used that way in Ukraine. Each battery is acquiring its own targets. That undoubtedly degrades the effectiveness of the S-400 considerably. The SOPs may need to change.

It is also possible the crews were just not well trained. It may be they were sent to a "quiet" sector to work up and get ready for a move to the "real war" in a couple of months. If so, it didn't work out so well.

According to Newsweek on Sept 21, 2023 Russia had (on paper at least) 96 S-400 systems. https://www.newsweek.com/russia-s400-air...ne-1828058. The article said "Russia's S-400 Air Defense Systems Are Being Cut to Shreds". Those "shreds" still loom pretty large 9 months later. https://www.newsweek.com/how-many-s-400-...ia-1904353. Russia is supposedly down to 56 systems. Nobody (that is talking) really knows.

In reality neither Russia nor Ukraine has ever had an "impenetrable" air defense system precluding the operation of fixed wing aircraft in each other's airspace, particularly at low altitudes. Even if all 56 remaining Russian S-400s were committed to the fight that would be the case. What has been true is that the probability of running into an unexpectedly located SAM is high enough that neither side was willing to chance it. Attrition would be way too high. Once your pilots are dead you have no air force. Neither side has or has ever had a doctrine that their air force kills SAMs. ATACMS helps a lot (the USAF HATES it :-), but the reality is that to survive in a contested environment an air force needs a DEAD plan. SAM systems are vulnerable to attrition too and they don't move nearly as fast or as often as aircraft. They also don't work without radars that are just screaming "hit me". Hopefully the training the F-16 pilots are receiving includes that part of the syllabus.

Russia was fully aware that an IADS that depended entirely on SAM missiles wouldn't work. Geography and the radar horizon dictates this. They poured massive resources and skilled people into making the PVO an effective (arguably in the 1970s the most effective) part of their IADS. Russia developed the GCI to an art form. They can't afford to do that anymore and folded the PVO into the regular air force. What remains is vulnerable, but you have to make a plan to attack it.

The USAF uses stealth to perform the initial attack and it is, dare I say it, a "no brainer" on how we do it. It works. The subsequent air strikes use HARMs to clean up anything that survived somehow. It isn't efficient, but there are so many HARMs flying around nobody is turning on their radars. Ukraine isn't getting any F-35s (or even F-117s). Ukraine is going to have to do it the "old fashioned way". The good news is that there is no PVO to get in the way. The bad news is that the S-400 is a "challenge". Ukraine has ATACMS. That can help a lot, especially if the S-400 can't defend itself against them at all.

Speaking of the F117, I've been a bit surprised there hasn't been more of a push to send those over. 

We retired them over 15 years ago and have about 60ish. I'm sure there is classified stealth tech but at this point we're talking about 40 year old technology, designed in the 70s. I'm sure they're a bear to maintain, but also sure Ukraine would love to learn how for a few squadrons.

[gocard14]

Does anyone know if this article is at least reasonabley factual?
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/20...to-crimea/
If true, Russia's ability to defend Crimea from air attacks maybe become limited. The Ukrainians are seemingly becoming very good at taking out the S400. If Russia can't keep their S400 batteries up and functiioning, the F16s may have increased lattitude in terms of what they can do.

The fact that Ukraine has used ATACMS to destroy "several" S-400 and S-300 batteries is well enough documented that IMO it can be taken as a fact. The quantity and location is also very probably accurate. From there, things go downhill pretty fast. The Ukrainians claim the S-400s (and whatever may have been supposed to protect them) did not  destroy a single ATACMS. If this is true, it could be immensely significant. We have no independent confirmation of this.

There are multiple possible causes of the failure. IF the S-400 was operating "normally" and IF the crew was of "typical" skill and were unable to destroy any of the inbound missiles it points to design deficiencies in the S-400. Russia may or may not be able to correct these  deficiencies quickly. If they can't, the implications are obvious and the ability of F-16s to operate inside Crimea (or inside Russia for that matter) is greatly enhanced. The S-400s can be destroyed by ATACMS and the F-16s can utilize that gap to get inside the defended area without loss. A "big deal" if true.

It is also possible these batteries were not yet operational. Why Russia would deploy and thereby expose a battery that wasn't operational yet is anybodies  guess. Maybe the date on the orders was wrong.

It also may be that the battery was operational but concentrating against low angle cruise missile targets/drones and wanted high duty cycle on these low altitude targets. The S-400 was therefore not maintaining surveillance at all altitudes. It is possible it literally didn't "see" the incoming. It is important to remember that the S-400 is designed to be used as part of an IADS where long-range acquisition radars detect the targets and designate them for individual batteries. It isn't being used that way in Ukraine. Each battery is acquiring its own targets. That undoubtedly degrades the effectiveness of the S-400 considerably. The SOPs may need to change.

It is also possible the crews were just not well trained. It may be they were sent to a "quiet" sector to work up and get ready for a move to the "real war" in a couple of months. If so, it didn't work out so well.

According to Newsweek on Sept 21, 2023 Russia had (on paper at least) 96 S-400 systems. https://www.newsweek.com/russia-s400-air...ne-1828058. The article said "Russia's S-400 Air Defense Systems Are Being Cut to Shreds". Those "shreds" still loom pretty large 9 months later. https://www.newsweek.com/how-many-s-400-...ia-1904353. Russia is supposedly down to 56 systems. Nobody (that is talking) really knows.

In reality neither Russia nor Ukraine has ever had an "impenetrable" air defense system precluding the operation of fixed wing aircraft in each other's airspace, particularly at low altitudes. Even if all 56 remaining Russian S-400s were committed to the fight that would be the case. What has been true is that the probability of running into an unexpectedly located SAM is high enough that neither side was willing to chance it. Attrition would be way too high. Once your pilots are dead you have no air force. Neither side has or has ever had a doctrine that their air force kills SAMs. ATACMS helps a lot (the USAF HATES it :-), but the reality is that to survive in a contested environment an air force needs a DEAD plan. SAM systems are vulnerable to attrition too and they don't move nearly as fast or as often as aircraft. They also don't work without radars that are just screaming "hit me". Hopefully the training the F-16 pilots are receiving includes that part of the syllabus.

Russia was fully aware that an IADS that depended entirely on SAM missiles wouldn't work. Geography and the radar horizon dictates this. They poured massive resources and skilled people into making the PVO an effective (arguably in the 1970s the most effective) part of their IADS. Russia developed the GCI to an art form. They can't afford to do that anymore and folded the PVO into the regular air force. What remains is vulnerable, but you have to make a plan to attack it.

The USAF uses stealth to perform the initial attack and it is, dare I say it, a "no brainer" on how we do it. It works. The subsequent air strikes use HARMs to clean up anything that survived somehow. It isn't efficient, but there are so many HARMs flying around nobody is turning on their radars. Ukraine isn't getting any F-35s (or even F-117s). Ukraine is going to have to do it the "old fashioned way". The good news is that there is no PVO to get in the way. The bad news is that the S-400 is a "challenge". Ukraine has ATACMS. That can help a lot, especially if the S-400 can't defend itself against them at all.

Speaking of the F117, I've been a bit surprised there hasn't been more of a push to send those over. 

We retired them over 15 years ago and have about 60ish. I'm sure there is classified stealth tech but at this point we're talking about 40 year old technology, designed in the 70s. I'm sure they're a bear to maintain, but also sure Ukraine would love to learn how for a few squadrons.

[Goose]

Speaking of the F117, I've been a bit surprised there hasn't been more of a push to send those over. 

We retired them over 15 years ago and have about 60ish. I'm sure there is classified stealth tech but at this point we're talking about 40 year old technology, designed in the 70s. I'm sure they're a bear to maintain, but also sure Ukraine would love to learn how for a few squadrons.

Not happening. A significant part of the 40 year old technology isn't in the public domain. There are also lots of "trade secrets" involved that are art, not science. We don't want to give any of those away.

The F-117 isn't as "stealthy" as our later aircraft and it also doesn't have lots of things a "general purpose" aircraft needs (e.g. a radar!). It is a "one trick pony". That trick is still important, but the effort required to do that trick is orders of magnitude greater than generating F-16 squadrons is going to be for Ukraine. Using the F-117 effectively also requires a real-time intelligence, route planning and targeting structure Ukraine doesn't have. As we proved in Kosovo, even we don't always do that right.

[Goose]

Speaking of the F117, I've been a bit surprised there hasn't been more of a push to send those over. 

We retired them over 15 years ago and have about 60ish. I'm sure there is classified stealth tech but at this point we're talking about 40 year old technology, designed in the 70s. I'm sure they're a bear to maintain, but also sure Ukraine would love to learn how for a few squadrons.

Not happening. A significant part of the 40 year old technology isn't in the public domain. There are also lots of "trade secrets" involved that are art, not science. We don't want to give any of those away.

The F-117 isn't as "stealthy" as our later aircraft and it also doesn't have lots of things a "general purpose" aircraft needs (e.g. a radar!). It is a "one trick pony". That trick is still important, but the effort required to do that trick is orders of magnitude greater than generating F-16 squadrons is going to be for Ukraine. Using the F-117 effectively also requires a real-time intelligence, route planning and targeting structure Ukraine doesn't have. As we proved in Kosovo, even we don't always do that right.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-draft...00608.html

This article may be way too pessimistic regarding the prospects for Ukraine to increase the size of their military. However, it does point out there are certainly "issues" that work against doing so. The population dynamics regarding Russia are what they are. All along it has been clear that Ukraine could not win a "numbers game". Avoiding that was critical. The hope was that the Ukraine's offensive of late last summer would create the conditions to end the war relatively soon. Ukraine would break the land bridge and threaten Crimea. Russia wouldn't have the option of banging away and winning by attrition. That didn't happen, and it is improbable Ukraine can muster a significant offensive this summer.  In fact, the question is more what kind of offensive Russia can and will put together.

---

https://www.yahoo.com/news/plane-ukraine...35069.html
Somehow I missed the fact Ukraine was actually getting TWO aircraft from Sweden. That does make a significant difference. One aircraft can be undergoing maintenance while the other flies. This article also contains a somewhat understated description of how the F-16s can be initially employed. The concept of first using F-16s to "protect cities" from cruise missiles and drones is undoubtedly going to happen. The mini-AWACS will be key in locating these targets and vectoring appropriate F-16s to them. Keeping the F-16s out of danger while doing this by keeping them "back" however isn't possible. A quick look at the map shows that the two main cities in Ukraine are close to the Russian border. Both the controllers and the pilots will need to "honor the threat". To be effective, AWACS can't hide. The long range capability of the S-400 was designed to (among other things) force NATO AWACS away from the battle area and/or lower altitudes. Ukraine will need to keep that in mind too.

IMO Ukraine will very early on look for a way to "make a splash" with their F-16s. It won't be something they intend to do every day, but rather something to get the Russian's attention". Right now Russia can pretty well discount any air threat. They get careless and get away with it. For example, F-16s shooting down Russian aircraft that are launching glide bombs will force Russia to change their operations. The idea is that Ukraine can force Russia to "honor the threat" everywhere even though Ukraine has too few aircraft to attack everywhere. Russia doesn't know where and when they will get hit. Ukraine can impose a cost on Russian operations all out of proportion to the force they have. This is a type of "fleet in being" argument. It is not what it does but what it could do that is the issue. Of course, a "fleet in being" can't win the war. Eventually it must actually engage and fight to do that. Hopefully the Ukrainian air force can and will eventually do that.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-draft...00608.html

This article may be way too pessimistic regarding the prospects for Ukraine to increase the size of their military. However, it does point out there are certainly "issues" that work against doing so. The population dynamics regarding Russia are what they are. All along it has been clear that Ukraine could not win a "numbers game". Avoiding that was critical. The hope was that the Ukraine's offensive of late last summer would create the conditions to end the war relatively soon. Ukraine would break the land bridge and threaten Crimea. Russia wouldn't have the option of banging away and winning by attrition. That didn't happen, and it is improbable Ukraine can muster a significant offensive this summer.  In fact, the question is more what kind of offensive Russia can and will put together.

---

https://www.yahoo.com/news/plane-ukraine...35069.html
Somehow I missed the fact Ukraine was actually getting TWO aircraft from Sweden. That does make a significant difference. One aircraft can be undergoing maintenance while the other flies. This article also contains a somewhat understated description of how the F-16s can be initially employed. The concept of first using F-16s to "protect cities" from cruise missiles and drones is undoubtedly going to happen. The mini-AWACS will be key in locating these targets and vectoring appropriate F-16s to them. Keeping the F-16s out of danger while doing this by keeping them "back" however isn't possible. A quick look at the map shows that the two main cities in Ukraine are close to the Russian border. Both the controllers and the pilots will need to "honor the threat". To be effective, AWACS can't hide. The long range capability of the S-400 was designed to (among other things) force NATO AWACS away from the battle area and/or lower altitudes. Ukraine will need to keep that in mind too.

IMO Ukraine will very early on look for a way to "make a splash" with their F-16s. It won't be something they intend to do every day, but rather something to get the Russian's attention". Right now Russia can pretty well discount any air threat. They get careless and get away with it. For example, F-16s shooting down Russian aircraft that are launching glide bombs will force Russia to change their operations. The idea is that Ukraine can force Russia to "honor the threat" everywhere even though Ukraine has too few aircraft to attack everywhere. Russia doesn't know where and when they will get hit. Ukraine can impose a cost on Russian operations all out of proportion to the force they have. This is a type of "fleet in being" argument. It is not what it does but what it could do that is the issue. Of course, a "fleet in being" can't win the war. Eventually it must actually engage and fight to do that. Hopefully the Ukrainian air force can and will eventually do that.

[gailtate]

Yes, yes, I am aware that I stretch the topic somewhat, but it's indirectly connected to Ukraine because Putin is directly in the corner of Iran's proxy thugs-with-missiles. And so I ask: Is it time for the Allies to up the ante on what's escalating here, AKA the Red Sea? How much longer do we enable the mullahs? https://apnews.com/article/us-navy-yemen...cf819913fb

[gailtate]

Yes, yes, I am aware that I stretch the topic somewhat, but it's indirectly connected to Ukraine because Putin is directly in the corner of Iran's proxy thugs-with-missiles. And so I ask: Is it time for the Allies to up the ante on what's escalating here, AKA the Red Sea? How much longer do we enable the mullahs? https://apnews.com/article/us-navy-yemen...cf819913fb

[dabigv13]

Ukraine struck a Russian airbase with a mass drone attack last night. At first I thought it may be related to the recent degradation of Russian air defenses in Crimea and Belgorod, but this was in Rostov so it could mean their air defense systems are really spread thin or that they are just leaky to large scale drone attacks.

https://x.com/bradyafr/status/1801629416545521924
https://www.twz.com/air/ukraine-strikes-...lback-base

[dabigv13]

Ukraine struck a Russian airbase with a mass drone attack last night. At first I thought it may be related to the recent degradation of Russian air defenses in Crimea and Belgorod, but this was in Rostov so it could mean their air defense systems are really spread thin or that they are just leaky to large scale drone attacks.

https://x.com/bradyafr/status/1801629416545521924
https://www.twz.com/air/ukraine-strikes-...lback-base

[Goose]

Ukraine struck a Russian airbase with a mass drone attack last night. At first I thought it may be related to the recent degradation of Russian air defenses in Crimea and Belgorod, but this was in Rostov so it could mean their air defense systems are really spread thin or that they are just leaky to large scale drone attacks.

https://x.com/bradyafr/status/1801629416545521924
https://www.twz.com/air/ukraine-strikes-...lback-base

Good post! The Russian air defense is indeed spread thin and is by its design vulnerable to mass drone strikes. Of course that is true of the vast majority of all air defense systems. The drones used in these attacks (Dragon and Splash types, whatever these are) are not the hobbyist "quadcopter" type. They are larger and longer range, probably somewhat similar in concept to the Shahed 131.

As  has been pointed out before these drones fly low. As a result the radar horizon for an "early warning" radar based on the ground is about 20 miles. Nobody has (or can afford) early warning radars spaced that densely. Even if they could the drone would relatively quickly exit that range and now you have no idea where it is. High value targets may be protected by a local "point defense" system that can shoot down drones in the 20 mile radius coverage circle. Nobody has enough point defense missile systems to protect every (or even most) high value targets. Further, these systems can only engage "a few" targets at a time. If 70 drones show up at essentially the same time, it may kill some of them but not all of them. On top of that, the cost of the missile that hits the drone is at least 5 times the cost of the drone. If the point defense system is a Patriot battery the cost differential may be 1000 to 1. This system design inherently leaks and is not cost sustainable. Right now, Ukraine is in the same boat FWIW.

In order to defeat these drones you need at a minimum a Barrier Combat Air Patrol (BARCAP) with fighters equipped with look-down shoot down capability. The BARCAP operates at a high altitude so it can see drones (or a swarm of drones) long before they reach the target. The aircraft are also faster that the low-cost drones and can cover a lot more ground than a point defense missile system can. The pilots can also call upon other aircraft for help and vector them to the area under attack long before the drones actually engage. Back in the day the PVO could do this. Too bad for Russia its gone :-). This system is not ideal because in most cases fighter aircraft do not have a "great" radar. The antenna space limitations preclude really high gain, really high power, and 360 degree coverage. There are some exceptions, but they are not Russian.

The "current" best practices is to add an AWACS to the system. It has a great radar and can see the drones much more easily. It can also direct the fighters in an "optimal" way. In addition, the "early warning" provided by the AWACS can allow the BARCAP to be reinforced by aircraft standing "alerts" on the ground. These aircraft can be immediately vectored toward the drone stream. Russia can, in theory, use an A-50 to do this. They aren't and AFAIK they haven't practiced such an operation against drones. Obviously that is what Israel and the allied air forces did against Iran. Granted they had the advantage of a very long drone flight to chew up the attack, but they did it. Russia (and Ukraine) will have to be quicker.

Obviously maintaining a BARCAP is a resource intensive operation. You need quite a few pilots and planes to do it. Lots of guys will get lots of hours drilling holes in the sky to no result. That is what you have to do though. Ground based missiles won't cut it unless they are active radar homing and the AWACS can control them directly. Missiles cost a lot. So do aircraft. However, aircraft can be used repeatedly. Missiles can't.

[Goose]

Ukraine struck a Russian airbase with a mass drone attack last night. At first I thought it may be related to the recent degradation of Russian air defenses in Crimea and Belgorod, but this was in Rostov so it could mean their air defense systems are really spread thin or that they are just leaky to large scale drone attacks.

https://x.com/bradyafr/status/1801629416545521924
https://www.twz.com/air/ukraine-strikes-...lback-base

Good post! The Russian air defense is indeed spread thin and is by its design vulnerable to mass drone strikes. Of course that is true of the vast majority of all air defense systems. The drones used in these attacks (Dragon and Splash types, whatever these are) are not the hobbyist "quadcopter" type. They are larger and longer range, probably somewhat similar in concept to the Shahed 131.

As  has been pointed out before these drones fly low. As a result the radar horizon for an "early warning" radar based on the ground is about 20 miles. Nobody has (or can afford) early warning radars spaced that densely. Even if they could the drone would relatively quickly exit that range and now you have no idea where it is. High value targets may be protected by a local "point defense" system that can shoot down drones in the 20 mile radius coverage circle. Nobody has enough point defense missile systems to protect every (or even most) high value targets. Further, these systems can only engage "a few" targets at a time. If 70 drones show up at essentially the same time, it may kill some of them but not all of them. On top of that, the cost of the missile that hits the drone is at least 5 times the cost of the drone. If the point defense system is a Patriot battery the cost differential may be 1000 to 1. This system design inherently leaks and is not cost sustainable. Right now, Ukraine is in the same boat FWIW.

In order to defeat these drones you need at a minimum a Barrier Combat Air Patrol (BARCAP) with fighters equipped with look-down shoot down capability. The BARCAP operates at a high altitude so it can see drones (or a swarm of drones) long before they reach the target. The aircraft are also faster that the low-cost drones and can cover a lot more ground than a point defense missile system can. The pilots can also call upon other aircraft for help and vector them to the area under attack long before the drones actually engage. Back in the day the PVO could do this. Too bad for Russia its gone :-). This system is not ideal because in most cases fighter aircraft do not have a "great" radar. The antenna space limitations preclude really high gain, really high power, and 360 degree coverage. There are some exceptions, but they are not Russian.

The "current" best practices is to add an AWACS to the system. It has a great radar and can see the drones much more easily. It can also direct the fighters in an "optimal" way. In addition, the "early warning" provided by the AWACS can allow the BARCAP to be reinforced by aircraft standing "alerts" on the ground. These aircraft can be immediately vectored toward the drone stream. Russia can, in theory, use an A-50 to do this. They aren't and AFAIK they haven't practiced such an operation against drones. Obviously that is what Israel and the allied air forces did against Iran. Granted they had the advantage of a very long drone flight to chew up the attack, but they did it. Russia (and Ukraine) will have to be quicker.

Obviously maintaining a BARCAP is a resource intensive operation. You need quite a few pilots and planes to do it. Lots of guys will get lots of hours drilling holes in the sky to no result. That is what you have to do though. Ground based missiles won't cut it unless they are active radar homing and the AWACS can control them directly. Missiles cost a lot. So do aircraft. However, aircraft can be used repeatedly. Missiles can't.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-prove...01670.html

Interesting article but I am posting it mostly for a paragraph that IMO is totally incorrect.

Even with American-made F-16 fighters arriving soon, Ukraine's air force probably can't drive off Russian jets lobbing glide bombs from 50 miles behind Russian lines, safe behind ground-based air defenses.

1.  The maximum range of the Russian glide bombs is (supposedly) 40-60 km https://understandingwar.org/backgrounde...ng-russias (21.6-32.4 Nautical miles (Nm), 24.9-37.3 Statue miles). No matter which kind of miles one uses, it isn't "50 miles".
   
2. In order to achieve that range the Russian SU-35 aircraft has to be at relatively high altitude (say 30,000 ft) and flying relatively fast, not supersonic, but "fast". At a speed of 500 Nm/hr the SU-35 executes a maximum-rate (22.5 degres/sec) 180 degree turn in 8 seconds. This requires pulling lots of Gs and puts a big strain on the airframe. That turn takes the SU-35 at least 1 Nm beyond the place it released the bomb.  At 30,000 ft and that speed the SU-35 is very visible to both ground based and airborne radars.
   
3. The range of an AIM-120D-3 AMRAAM is 86-97 Nm, 3 times that of the Russian glide bombs the SU-35 carries. The older AIM-120C has a range of 57-65 Nm, 2 times that of the Russian glide bombs.
   

Given the above facts, one must conclude that if the SU-35 can be "lobbing glide bombs from 32.4 miles behind Russian lines, safe behind ground-based air defenses." the Ukrainian F-16s can be "lobbing AMRAAMs from 32.4 miles behind Ukrainian lines, safe behind ground-based air defenses." and thereby blow up the SU-35s. One may say "Wait, Ukraine doesn't have enough Patriots to closely defend the entire airspace". That is true. Russia also doesn't have enough S-400s to closely defend their side either.

Realistically the situation is much more complex than the article posits, and F-16s will make it even more complicated. Right now the SU-35s don't launch from maximum range. There is no point in doing so. If Ukraine moves a Patriot to the area the SU-35s are probably dead anyway. If there isn't one, they are safe because Ukraine has nothing else that can hit them. Often the targets of the strike aren't right at the furthest forward point of Ukrainian controlled territory. The SU-35s have to "get closer".  Obviously there is no line on the ground saying where is safe and where is not.

When Ukrainian F-16s show up, the SU-35s at a minimum will have to be more professional and "honor the threat". So will the F-16s. The "ground-based air defenses" are themselves targets as the title of the article demonstrates. Some F-16s can be executing SEAD while other F-16s are defending against the SU-35s and their glide bombs. The F-16 can carry six AIM-120s, although four is much more common. To carry six requires the wingtip rails where the sidewinders normally go. One F-16 can make a lot of SU-35s abort their mission even if all the AIM-120s miss. Some probably won't which will make the next mission much less probable. F-16s can carry up to four HARMs, but usually carry only two. An F-16 with four HARMS and a targeting pod was the USAF attempt at preserving something akin to the "Wild Weasel" capability, but it didn't last. https://www.military.com/defensetech/201...es-destroy Ukraine undoubtedly isn't getting the targeting pod in any case.

So far in this war the VKS has been very conservative. The did essentially nothing until they had a weapon (the glide-bombs) they could use from a standoff range that was perfectly safe. When they lost a few planes they stood down for awhile. The F-16s will ensure that no place is "perfectly safe". Some places near or in Ukraine will become markedly less safe for Russian air. That is an important improvement, especially if the VKS simply quits attempting to go there

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-prove...01670.html

Interesting article but I am posting it mostly for a paragraph that IMO is totally incorrect.

Even with American-made F-16 fighters arriving soon, Ukraine's air force probably can't drive off Russian jets lobbing glide bombs from 50 miles behind Russian lines, safe behind ground-based air defenses.

1.  The maximum range of the Russian glide bombs is (supposedly) 40-60 km https://understandingwar.org/backgrounde...ng-russias (21.6-32.4 Nautical miles (Nm), 24.9-37.3 Statue miles). No matter which kind of miles one uses, it isn't "50 miles".
   
2. In order to achieve that range the Russian SU-35 aircraft has to be at relatively high altitude (say 30,000 ft) and flying relatively fast, not supersonic, but "fast". At a speed of 500 Nm/hr the SU-35 executes a maximum-rate (22.5 degres/sec) 180 degree turn in 8 seconds. This requires pulling lots of Gs and puts a big strain on the airframe. That turn takes the SU-35 at least 1 Nm beyond the place it released the bomb.  At 30,000 ft and that speed the SU-35 is very visible to both ground based and airborne radars.
   
3. The range of an AIM-120D-3 AMRAAM is 86-97 Nm, 3 times that of the Russian glide bombs the SU-35 carries. The older AIM-120C has a range of 57-65 Nm, 2 times that of the Russian glide bombs.
   

Given the above facts, one must conclude that if the SU-35 can be "lobbing glide bombs from 32.4 miles behind Russian lines, safe behind ground-based air defenses." the Ukrainian F-16s can be "lobbing AMRAAMs from 32.4 miles behind Ukrainian lines, safe behind ground-based air defenses." and thereby blow up the SU-35s. One may say "Wait, Ukraine doesn't have enough Patriots to closely defend the entire airspace". That is true. Russia also doesn't have enough S-400s to closely defend their side either.

Realistically the situation is much more complex than the article posits, and F-16s will make it even more complicated. Right now the SU-35s don't launch from maximum range. There is no point in doing so. If Ukraine moves a Patriot to the area the SU-35s are probably dead anyway. If there isn't one, they are safe because Ukraine has nothing else that can hit them. Often the targets of the strike aren't right at the furthest forward point of Ukrainian controlled territory. The SU-35s have to "get closer".  Obviously there is no line on the ground saying where is safe and where is not.

When Ukrainian F-16s show up, the SU-35s at a minimum will have to be more professional and "honor the threat". So will the F-16s. The "ground-based air defenses" are themselves targets as the title of the article demonstrates. Some F-16s can be executing SEAD while other F-16s are defending against the SU-35s and their glide bombs. The F-16 can carry six AIM-120s, although four is much more common. To carry six requires the wingtip rails where the sidewinders normally go. One F-16 can make a lot of SU-35s abort their mission even if all the AIM-120s miss. Some probably won't which will make the next mission much less probable. F-16s can carry up to four HARMs, but usually carry only two. An F-16 with four HARMS and a targeting pod was the USAF attempt at preserving something akin to the "Wild Weasel" capability, but it didn't last. https://www.military.com/defensetech/201...es-destroy Ukraine undoubtedly isn't getting the targeting pod in any case.

So far in this war the VKS has been very conservative. The did essentially nothing until they had a weapon (the glide-bombs) they could use from a standoff range that was perfectly safe. When they lost a few planes they stood down for awhile. The F-16s will ensure that no place is "perfectly safe". Some places near or in Ukraine will become markedly less safe for Russian air. That is an important improvement, especially if the VKS simply quits attempting to go there

[GK3]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-prove...01670.html

Interesting article but I am posting it mostly for a paragraph that IMO is totally incorrect.

Even with American-made F-16 fighters arriving soon, Ukraine's air force probably can't drive off Russian jets lobbing glide bombs from 50 miles behind Russian lines, safe behind ground-based air defenses.

1.  The maximum range of the Russian glide bombs is (supposedly) 40-60 km https://understandingwar.org/backgrounde...ng-russias (21.6-32.4 Nautical miles (Nm), 24.9-37.3 Statue miles). No matter which kind of miles one uses, it isn't "50 miles".
   
2. In order to achieve that range the Russian SU-35 aircraft has to be at relatively high altitude (say 30,000 ft) and flying relatively fast, not supersonic, but "fast". At a speed of 500 Nm/hr the SU-35 executes a maximum-rate (22.5 degres/sec) 180 degree turn in 8 seconds. This requires pulling lots of Gs and puts a big strain on the airframe. That turn takes the SU-35 at least 1 Nm beyond the place it released the bomb.  At 30,000 ft and that speed the SU-35 is very visible to both ground based and airborne radars.
   
3. The range of an AIM-120D-3 AMRAAM is 86-97 Nm, 3 times that of the Russian glide bombs the SU-35 carries. The older AIM-120C has a range of 57-65 Nm, 2 times that of the Russian glide bombs.
   

Given the above facts, one must conclude that if the SU-35 can be "lobbing glide bombs from 32.4 miles behind Russian lines, safe behind ground-based air defenses." the Ukrainian F-16s can be "lobbing AMRAAMs from 32.4 miles behind Ukrainian lines, safe behind ground-based air defenses." and thereby blow up the SU-35s. One may say "Wait, Ukraine doesn't have enough Patriots to closely defend the entire airspace". That is true. Russia also doesn't have enough S-400s to closely defend their side either.

Realistically the situation is much more complex than the article posits, and F-16s will make it even more complicated. Right now the SU-35s don't launch from maximum range. There is no point in doing so. If Ukraine moves a Patriot to the area the SU-35s are probably dead anyway. If there isn't one, they are safe because Ukraine has nothing else that can hit them. Often the targets of the strike aren't right at the furthest forward point of Ukrainian controlled territory. The SU-35s have to "get closer".  Obviously there is no line on the ground saying where is safe and where is not.

When Ukrainian F-16s show up, the SU-35s at a minimum will have to be more professional and "honor the threat". So will the F-16s. The "ground-based air defenses" are themselves targets as the title of the article demonstrates. Some F-16s can be executing SEAD while other F-16s are defending against the SU-35s and their glide bombs. The F-16 can carry six AIM-120s, although four is much more common. To carry six requires the wingtip rails where the sidewinders normally go. One F-16 can make a lot of SU-35s abort their mission even if all the AIM-120s miss. Some probably won't which will make the next mission much less probable. F-16s can carry up to four HARMs, but usually carry only two. An F-16 with four HARMS and a targeting pod was the USAF attempt at preserving something akin to the "Wild Weasel" capability, but it didn't last. https://www.military.com/defensetech/201...es-destroy Ukraine undoubtedly isn't getting the targeting pod in any case.

So far in this war the VKS has been very conservative. The did essentially nothing until they had a weapon (the glide-bombs) they could use from a standoff range that was perfectly safe. When they lost a few planes they stood down for awhile. The F-16s will ensure that no place is "perfectly safe". Some places near or in Ukraine will become markedly less safe for Russian air. That is an important improvement, especially if the VKS simply quits attempting to go there

Just wondering why we would not give Ukraine the targeting pods?  We are giving them Patriot systems.  Are the electronics in the targeting pod even more highly classified than the Patriot system?
From what I have read the range of the S400 radar system is 250 miles and can control up to 160 missles fired at 80 targets.  I think they can also be slaved to other systems for shorter range missles.  So how close to the border is Russia willing to install the radar system?  It seems that Ukraine has been fairly effective  in destroying ones that get too close.  I believe Russia has roughly 70 of these systems left, and certainly a good number of those have to be spread along the Russian border from Finland to Ukraine and defending major urban targets.  This I would think would reduce the number that have to be dealt with to a much more reasonable number.  So if we give the targeting pod to Ukraine and they combine the F16 "wild weasal" configured aircraft together with a volley of ground launched drones at a S400 array would put the S400 in a between a rock and a hard place situation.  I would think that the Wild Weasals could stay in the weeds until the S400 is busy with drones, then pop up and launch their own missles and leave.  I had never considered that the fact that radar systems have a finite number of targets they can track and attack.  If true, then a large volley of cheap drones seems like a great way to make the system much more vulnerable to a Wild Weasal kind of attack.
Based on Wikipedia info, a S400 battery and missles costs roughly 500 million dollars.  How many drones can you make for 500 million?  I would think a combined attack of drones and an F16 with targeting pod and appropriate missles would be a handful to deal with.

[GK3]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-prove...01670.html

Interesting article but I am posting it mostly for a paragraph that IMO is totally incorrect.

Even with American-made F-16 fighters arriving soon, Ukraine's air force probably can't drive off Russian jets lobbing glide bombs from 50 miles behind Russian lines, safe behind ground-based air defenses.

1.  The maximum range of the Russian glide bombs is (supposedly) 40-60 km https://understandingwar.org/backgrounde...ng-russias (21.6-32.4 Nautical miles (Nm), 24.9-37.3 Statue miles). No matter which kind of miles one uses, it isn't "50 miles".
   
2. In order to achieve that range the Russian SU-35 aircraft has to be at relatively high altitude (say 30,000 ft) and flying relatively fast, not supersonic, but "fast". At a speed of 500 Nm/hr the SU-35 executes a maximum-rate (22.5 degres/sec) 180 degree turn in 8 seconds. This requires pulling lots of Gs and puts a big strain on the airframe. That turn takes the SU-35 at least 1 Nm beyond the place it released the bomb.  At 30,000 ft and that speed the SU-35 is very visible to both ground based and airborne radars.
   
3. The range of an AIM-120D-3 AMRAAM is 86-97 Nm, 3 times that of the Russian glide bombs the SU-35 carries. The older AIM-120C has a range of 57-65 Nm, 2 times that of the Russian glide bombs.
   

Given the above facts, one must conclude that if the SU-35 can be "lobbing glide bombs from 32.4 miles behind Russian lines, safe behind ground-based air defenses." the Ukrainian F-16s can be "lobbing AMRAAMs from 32.4 miles behind Ukrainian lines, safe behind ground-based air defenses." and thereby blow up the SU-35s. One may say "Wait, Ukraine doesn't have enough Patriots to closely defend the entire airspace". That is true. Russia also doesn't have enough S-400s to closely defend their side either.

Realistically the situation is much more complex than the article posits, and F-16s will make it even more complicated. Right now the SU-35s don't launch from maximum range. There is no point in doing so. If Ukraine moves a Patriot to the area the SU-35s are probably dead anyway. If there isn't one, they are safe because Ukraine has nothing else that can hit them. Often the targets of the strike aren't right at the furthest forward point of Ukrainian controlled territory. The SU-35s have to "get closer".  Obviously there is no line on the ground saying where is safe and where is not.

When Ukrainian F-16s show up, the SU-35s at a minimum will have to be more professional and "honor the threat". So will the F-16s. The "ground-based air defenses" are themselves targets as the title of the article demonstrates. Some F-16s can be executing SEAD while other F-16s are defending against the SU-35s and their glide bombs. The F-16 can carry six AIM-120s, although four is much more common. To carry six requires the wingtip rails where the sidewinders normally go. One F-16 can make a lot of SU-35s abort their mission even if all the AIM-120s miss. Some probably won't which will make the next mission much less probable. F-16s can carry up to four HARMs, but usually carry only two. An F-16 with four HARMS and a targeting pod was the USAF attempt at preserving something akin to the "Wild Weasel" capability, but it didn't last. https://www.military.com/defensetech/201...es-destroy Ukraine undoubtedly isn't getting the targeting pod in any case.

So far in this war the VKS has been very conservative. The did essentially nothing until they had a weapon (the glide-bombs) they could use from a standoff range that was perfectly safe. When they lost a few planes they stood down for awhile. The F-16s will ensure that no place is "perfectly safe". Some places near or in Ukraine will become markedly less safe for Russian air. That is an important improvement, especially if the VKS simply quits attempting to go there

Just wondering why we would not give Ukraine the targeting pods?  We are giving them Patriot systems.  Are the electronics in the targeting pod even more highly classified than the Patriot system?
From what I have read the range of the S400 radar system is 250 miles and can control up to 160 missles fired at 80 targets.  I think they can also be slaved to other systems for shorter range missles.  So how close to the border is Russia willing to install the radar system?  It seems that Ukraine has been fairly effective  in destroying ones that get too close.  I believe Russia has roughly 70 of these systems left, and certainly a good number of those have to be spread along the Russian border from Finland to Ukraine and defending major urban targets.  This I would think would reduce the number that have to be dealt with to a much more reasonable number.  So if we give the targeting pod to Ukraine and they combine the F16 "wild weasal" configured aircraft together with a volley of ground launched drones at a S400 array would put the S400 in a between a rock and a hard place situation.  I would think that the Wild Weasals could stay in the weeds until the S400 is busy with drones, then pop up and launch their own missles and leave.  I had never considered that the fact that radar systems have a finite number of targets they can track and attack.  If true, then a large volley of cheap drones seems like a great way to make the system much more vulnerable to a Wild Weasal kind of attack.
Based on Wikipedia info, a S400 battery and missles costs roughly 500 million dollars.  How many drones can you make for 500 million?  I would think a combined attack of drones and an F16 with targeting pod and appropriate missles would be a handful to deal with.

[Maple Leaf]

Opinion | Ukraine’s naval drone success holds a brobdingnagian lesson for the U.S. Navy - The Washington Post

Ukraine's development of naval drones is very impressive to say the least.

[Maple Leaf]

Opinion | Ukraine’s naval drone success holds a brobdingnagian lesson for the U.S. Navy - The Washington Post

Ukraine's development of naval drones is very impressive to say the least.

[Goose]

Just wondering why we would not give Ukraine the targeting pods?  We are giving them Patriot systems.  Are the electronics in the targeting pod even more highly classified than the Patriot system?

It isn't a matter of classification, although an F-16 is much more likely than a Patriot battery to crash in Russian territory :-). The pod problem is twofold. First, it never worked all that well. It "worked" (after a fashion) but it required a lot of care and feeding both by the pilots and the mission planners to make it do so. These were all highly trained specialists. Since we don't use these pods anymore, we don't have those specialists around to train the Ukrainians. Maintenance (and target list loading) also required specialists that are no longer around. All in all, it is just too hard to do for too little benefit. Second, after trying to make the single aviator "wild weasel" concept work, the USAF finally accepted the fact it couldn't be done. The workload for the single aviator is just way too high. He becomes a danger to his aircraft.

The F-35s have inherited the mission, but nobody actually knows how well they can do it. Their big advantage is that they don't constantly have to avoid being shot down by SAMs. The SAMS can't guide on them even if by some miracle the ground based MG radar could "see" them. They also have a much better computers and a much better integral ESM system. We shall see, maybe sooner than we want to do so :-). Since the target radars can't see them, they will need some 4th gen targets to "wake them up". These aircraft can also function as "missile trucks" for the F-35. The F-35 can designate and launch missiles from F-16s and F-15s. This has been demonstrated repeatedly and known to work. If Russia was operating their IADS as it was designed to be the S-400s would be in EMCON until given a target by the designated command post. Today the S-400s aren't operating that way, which makes them even more vulnerable.

From what I have read the range of the S400 radar system is 250 miles and can control up to 160 missles fired at 80 targets.

Yes, if that target is just flying straight and level at 30,000 and is also unaware they are targeted and takes no countermeasures. The very long range of the S-400 and the Patriot are generally not tactically useful against anything but missiles operating at high altitude or intelligence collectors/AWACS that are sound asleep. Physics and the radar horizon operate on both Patriots and S-400s (and everything else for that matter).

I think they can also be slaved to other systems for shorter range missles.

Not shorter range, but longer range. In theory an A-50 at high altitude can detect targets at low altitude that are below the radar horizon for the S-400. The A-50 can, in theory, command launch a missile from an S-400 battery, take control of the missile and get it close enough to the long range target that the ARH in the missile can take over and hit the target. This only works with S-400 missiles that are ARH. SARH missiles, which are much more common in Russian stocks, cannot do this. The Russians advertise this capability but it has never been seen in "real life".
Short range self defense of S-400 systems is either "do it yourself" or use a Pantsir colocated with the S-400. Pantsirs have not been covering themselves with glory in this war, at least so far.

So how close to the border is Russia willing to install the radar system?  It seems that Ukraine has been fairly effective  in destroying ones that get too close.  I believe Russia has roughly 70 of these systems left, and certainly a good number of those have to be spread along the Russian border from Finland to Ukraine and defending major urban targets.  This I would think would reduce the number that have to be dealt with to a much more reasonable number.  So if we give the targeting pod to Ukraine and they combine the F16 "wild weasal" configured aircraft together with a volley of ground launched drones at a S400 array would put the S400 in a between a rock and a hard place situation.  I would think that the Wild Weasals could stay in the weeds until the S400 is busy with drones, then pop up and launch their own missles and leave.

The part about staying in the weeds, popping up and firing works if the F-16 already knows where the S-400 is. Down in the weeds the S-400 can't see the F-16 to kill it but conversely the F-16 can't see the S-400 either, either by a targeting pod, the F-16 RWR, or the HARM seeker itself.  If the F-16 knows where the S-400 (or any SAM for that matter) is located, it doesn't need a pod. It just takes a pilot with lots of courage and some skill.

Wild Weasels OTOH make their kills of "targets of opportunity" by trolling for SAMs. They need to be illuminated by the target radar. You need to be very, very good, have eyes in the back of your head, and have a feel for the anti-SAM game. The casualty rate of weasels was always high. Ukraine doesn't have the personnel to do this, and growing them is costly in men and aircraft. It also takes a two-place aircraft if one is not talking 5th generation hardware. Ukraine isn't getting any.

As far as how close to the FEBA the Russians will put an S-400, the answer is "Who knows, but don't bet your life the answer is X". The Patriot that shot down the A-50 was undoubtedly much further forward than the US would EVER place it. That's why the German Patriot launchers are permanently mounted on trucks (as are the S-400s). They planned to be more "aggressive". Ukraine was probably more aggressive still.

The small, really inexpensive drones in general can't be used against an S-400 because they don't have the range. It takes larger, more expensive drones to reach them. Obviously the notional "drone swarm" has to know where the S-400 is located in order to fly there. If one can create such a drone swarm, it can indeed be used to saturate and overwhelm the SAM system's targeting ability. It can also provide cover for cruise missiles and F-16s launching small diameter bombs. Presumably GPS is working or the drones can't find the S-400 either. You don't even need HARMs to do this.

I had never considered that the fact that radar systems have a finite number of targets they can track and attack.  If true, then a large volley of cheap drones seems like a great way to make the system much more vulnerable to a Wild Weasal kind of attack.
Based on Wikipedia info, a S400 battery and missles costs roughly 500 million dollars.  How many drones can you make for 500 million?  I would think a combined attack of drones and an F16 with targeting pod and appropriate missles would be a handful to deal with.

The drone swarm is indeed a great tool if you know where the SAM is. All by itself it is a hand-full. Drones also have a much smaller radar cross section than F-16s do. They can fly low and get closer than F-16s can. Add cruise missiles and/or F-16s the S-400 is in deep yogurt. However generating big drone streams of fairly large drones and getting them to all arrive at the same time isn't easy. It is a tool, and a good one.

[Goose]

Just wondering why we would not give Ukraine the targeting pods?  We are giving them Patriot systems.  Are the electronics in the targeting pod even more highly classified than the Patriot system?

It isn't a matter of classification, although an F-16 is much more likely than a Patriot battery to crash in Russian territory :-). The pod problem is twofold. First, it never worked all that well. It "worked" (after a fashion) but it required a lot of care and feeding both by the pilots and the mission planners to make it do so. These were all highly trained specialists. Since we don't use these pods anymore, we don't have those specialists around to train the Ukrainians. Maintenance (and target list loading) also required specialists that are no longer around. All in all, it is just too hard to do for too little benefit. Second, after trying to make the single aviator "wild weasel" concept work, the USAF finally accepted the fact it couldn't be done. The workload for the single aviator is just way too high. He becomes a danger to his aircraft.

The F-35s have inherited the mission, but nobody actually knows how well they can do it. Their big advantage is that they don't constantly have to avoid being shot down by SAMs. The SAMS can't guide on them even if by some miracle the ground based MG radar could "see" them. They also have a much better computers and a much better integral ESM system. We shall see, maybe sooner than we want to do so :-). Since the target radars can't see them, they will need some 4th gen targets to "wake them up". These aircraft can also function as "missile trucks" for the F-35. The F-35 can designate and launch missiles from F-16s and F-15s. This has been demonstrated repeatedly and known to work. If Russia was operating their IADS as it was designed to be the S-400s would be in EMCON until given a target by the designated command post. Today the S-400s aren't operating that way, which makes them even more vulnerable.

From what I have read the range of the S400 radar system is 250 miles and can control up to 160 missles fired at 80 targets.

Yes, if that target is just flying straight and level at 30,000 and is also unaware they are targeted and takes no countermeasures. The very long range of the S-400 and the Patriot are generally not tactically useful against anything but missiles operating at high altitude or intelligence collectors/AWACS that are sound asleep. Physics and the radar horizon operate on both Patriots and S-400s (and everything else for that matter).

I think they can also be slaved to other systems for shorter range missles.

Not shorter range, but longer range. In theory an A-50 at high altitude can detect targets at low altitude that are below the radar horizon for the S-400. The A-50 can, in theory, command launch a missile from an S-400 battery, take control of the missile and get it close enough to the long range target that the ARH in the missile can take over and hit the target. This only works with S-400 missiles that are ARH. SARH missiles, which are much more common in Russian stocks, cannot do this. The Russians advertise this capability but it has never been seen in "real life".
Short range self defense of S-400 systems is either "do it yourself" or use a Pantsir colocated with the S-400. Pantsirs have not been covering themselves with glory in this war, at least so far.

So how close to the border is Russia willing to install the radar system?  It seems that Ukraine has been fairly effective  in destroying ones that get too close.  I believe Russia has roughly 70 of these systems left, and certainly a good number of those have to be spread along the Russian border from Finland to Ukraine and defending major urban targets.  This I would think would reduce the number that have to be dealt with to a much more reasonable number.  So if we give the targeting pod to Ukraine and they combine the F16 "wild weasal" configured aircraft together with a volley of ground launched drones at a S400 array would put the S400 in a between a rock and a hard place situation.  I would think that the Wild Weasals could stay in the weeds until the S400 is busy with drones, then pop up and launch their own missles and leave.

The part about staying in the weeds, popping up and firing works if the F-16 already knows where the S-400 is. Down in the weeds the S-400 can't see the F-16 to kill it but conversely the F-16 can't see the S-400 either, either by a targeting pod, the F-16 RWR, or the HARM seeker itself.  If the F-16 knows where the S-400 (or any SAM for that matter) is located, it doesn't need a pod. It just takes a pilot with lots of courage and some skill.

Wild Weasels OTOH make their kills of "targets of opportunity" by trolling for SAMs. They need to be illuminated by the target radar. You need to be very, very good, have eyes in the back of your head, and have a feel for the anti-SAM game. The casualty rate of weasels was always high. Ukraine doesn't have the personnel to do this, and growing them is costly in men and aircraft. It also takes a two-place aircraft if one is not talking 5th generation hardware. Ukraine isn't getting any.

As far as how close to the FEBA the Russians will put an S-400, the answer is "Who knows, but don't bet your life the answer is X". The Patriot that shot down the A-50 was undoubtedly much further forward than the US would EVER place it. That's why the German Patriot launchers are permanently mounted on trucks (as are the S-400s). They planned to be more "aggressive". Ukraine was probably more aggressive still.

The small, really inexpensive drones in general can't be used against an S-400 because they don't have the range. It takes larger, more expensive drones to reach them. Obviously the notional "drone swarm" has to know where the S-400 is located in order to fly there. If one can create such a drone swarm, it can indeed be used to saturate and overwhelm the SAM system's targeting ability. It can also provide cover for cruise missiles and F-16s launching small diameter bombs. Presumably GPS is working or the drones can't find the S-400 either. You don't even need HARMs to do this.

I had never considered that the fact that radar systems have a finite number of targets they can track and attack.  If true, then a large volley of cheap drones seems like a great way to make the system much more vulnerable to a Wild Weasal kind of attack.
Based on Wikipedia info, a S400 battery and missles costs roughly 500 million dollars.  How many drones can you make for 500 million?  I would think a combined attack of drones and an F16 with targeting pod and appropriate missles would be a handful to deal with.

The drone swarm is indeed a great tool if you know where the SAM is. All by itself it is a hand-full. Drones also have a much smaller radar cross section than F-16s do. They can fly low and get closer than F-16s can. Add cruise missiles and/or F-16s the S-400 is in deep yogurt. However generating big drone streams of fairly large drones and getting them to all arrive at the same time isn't easy. It is a tool, and a good one.

[BostonCard]

A Stanford connection; Alexei Navalny’s daughter just graduated:

https://x.com/annanemtsova/status/180269...32140?s=46

BC

[BostonCard]

A Stanford connection; Alexei Navalny’s daughter just graduated:

https://x.com/annanemtsova/status/180269...32140?s=46

BC

[dabigv13]

AMRAAM and Patriot interceptor production will be diverted to Ukraine. 

BREAKING: The U.S. "has made the difficult but necessary decision to reprioritize near-term planned deliveries of foreign military sales" to other countries of Patriot and NASAM missiles to go to Ukraine instead, per John Kirby

To date Ukraine has received AIM120B AMRAAMs for use in the NASAMS air defense system. These newer missiles have significant upgrades that give them longer range and improved maneuverability. It was previously known that Ukraine would receive newly produced AMRAAMs. Still not public if Ukraine will receive C or D versions, most commentators have suggested the C, slightly lesser ranged, is more likely.

https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1803822630950113652

[dabigv13]

AMRAAM and Patriot interceptor production will be diverted to Ukraine. 

BREAKING: The U.S. "has made the difficult but necessary decision to reprioritize near-term planned deliveries of foreign military sales" to other countries of Patriot and NASAM missiles to go to Ukraine instead, per John Kirby

To date Ukraine has received AIM120B AMRAAMs for use in the NASAMS air defense system. These newer missiles have significant upgrades that give them longer range and improved maneuverability. It was previously known that Ukraine would receive newly produced AMRAAMs. Still not public if Ukraine will receive C or D versions, most commentators have suggested the C, slightly lesser ranged, is more likely.

https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1803822630950113652

[Goose]

AMRAAM and Patriot interceptor production will be diverted to Ukraine. 

BREAKING: The U.S. "has made the difficult but necessary decision to reprioritize near-term planned deliveries of foreign military sales" to other countries of Patriot and NASAM missiles to go to Ukraine instead, per John Kirby

To date Ukraine has received AIM120B AMRAAMs for use in the NASAMS air defense system. These newer missiles have significant upgrades that give them longer range and improved maneuverability. It was previously known that Ukraine would receive newly produced AMRAAMs. Still not public if Ukraine will receive C or D versions, most commentators have suggested the C, slightly lesser ranged, is more likely.

https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1803822630950113652

Good this is happening. Having a longer reach for NASAMS can be very useful. I am fine with the vast majority of the AMRAAMs being AIM-120C models. The number of targets an NASAMS can detect and reach at the 100 mile range is probably minimal. Cruise missiles and Iranian drones fly low so the range isn't an issue at all. However it would be nice to have a few D models that in some cases may be able to reach SU-35s dropping glide bombs from a relatively long range. If one or two are shot down it can change the VKS's approach. They can't just assume they are "safe" and will have to transit below the radar horizon, zoom up to high altitude, salvo their load, and dive for the deck. That is harder on planes and pilots. Also, it isn't absolutely safe.

When the F-16s arrive having some D models will IMO be almost mandatory. The R-77 and the AIM-120C are comparable in range, subject to some uncertainty about both missiles "real" range. The AIM-120D is certainly longer range. He who can fire first wins, all other things being equal.

[Goose]

AMRAAM and Patriot interceptor production will be diverted to Ukraine. 

BREAKING: The U.S. "has made the difficult but necessary decision to reprioritize near-term planned deliveries of foreign military sales" to other countries of Patriot and NASAM missiles to go to Ukraine instead, per John Kirby

To date Ukraine has received AIM120B AMRAAMs for use in the NASAMS air defense system. These newer missiles have significant upgrades that give them longer range and improved maneuverability. It was previously known that Ukraine would receive newly produced AMRAAMs. Still not public if Ukraine will receive C or D versions, most commentators have suggested the C, slightly lesser ranged, is more likely.

https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1803822630950113652

Good this is happening. Having a longer reach for NASAMS can be very useful. I am fine with the vast majority of the AMRAAMs being AIM-120C models. The number of targets an NASAMS can detect and reach at the 100 mile range is probably minimal. Cruise missiles and Iranian drones fly low so the range isn't an issue at all. However it would be nice to have a few D models that in some cases may be able to reach SU-35s dropping glide bombs from a relatively long range. If one or two are shot down it can change the VKS's approach. They can't just assume they are "safe" and will have to transit below the radar horizon, zoom up to high altitude, salvo their load, and dive for the deck. That is harder on planes and pilots. Also, it isn't absolutely safe.

When the F-16s arrive having some D models will IMO be almost mandatory. The R-77 and the AIM-120C are comparable in range, subject to some uncertainty about both missiles "real" range. The AIM-120D is certainly longer range. He who can fire first wins, all other things being equal.

[TrumpCard]

For those following the news closely, has Ukraine stabilized the front line in the Donbas or does Russia still have momentum there as a result of Ukraine's ammunition shortage this winter/spring?  Thanks for any input you all may have.

[TrumpCard]

For those following the news closely, has Ukraine stabilized the front line in the Donbas or does Russia still have momentum there as a result of Ukraine's ammunition shortage this winter/spring?  Thanks for any input you all may have.

[dabigv13]

The newer Russian offensive near Kharkiv has petered out and Ukraine has made some limited gains in counter attacks.

Russia has made very small advances near Chasiv Yar in the east but overall the last few weeks have been pretty stable, though Russia has still been trying small piecemeal assaults. This past weekend marked the 3000th Russian IFV destroyed in open sources since the start of the war.

[dabigv13]

The newer Russian offensive near Kharkiv has petered out and Ukraine has made some limited gains in counter attacks.

Russia has made very small advances near Chasiv Yar in the east but overall the last few weeks have been pretty stable, though Russia has still been trying small piecemeal assaults. This past weekend marked the 3000th Russian IFV destroyed in open sources since the start of the war.