[dabigv13]

The Paveways are probably not going to be using laser designation very often if at all. More likely they will be using their GPS/IMS guidance similar to the JDAM and AASM bombs they have.

Here's the article I read about them yesterday.

https://www.twz.com/news-features/dual-m...to-ukraine

[dabigv13]

The Paveways are probably not going to be using laser designation very often if at all. More likely they will be using their GPS/IMS guidance similar to the JDAM and AASM bombs they have.

Here's the article I read about them yesterday.

https://www.twz.com/news-features/dual-m...to-ukraine

[Goose]

Here are some articles from the last year or so discussing this issue directly.

https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/ukraines-co...ake-crimea
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2...e-00083857
https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/202...ht-be.html
This link which is in one of the above articles is also well worth a read and some thought
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2...y-00083683

I find all of the articles very interesting, particularly the last one. Naturally, I have some comments :-).

IMO the Rand article regarding blockade is relevant and accurate as far as it goes. If Ukraine can sustain an "effective" blockade around Crimea they can undoubtedly make things difficult for Russia. This activity would be part of any attempt to occupy Crimea by Ukrainian forces. There is more than one way to do that. If the blockade is very effective, it will not simply make the Russians "uncomfortable". It will make the military forces in Crimea untenable and will force their evacuation. That is one outcome. Another one, which I believe to be more within Ukraine's capabilities, is to create a situation where Russia can keep her troops supplied with either food (and water) or bullets, but not both. The severely constrained Russian troops will then be unable to effectively resist a Ukrainian attack. It is obviously better if Russia evacuates on their own, but that IMO is unlikely. They will need to be pushed.

The similarities to Poland are indeed present. Ironically Ukraine voted for independence from the Russian Federation partly because the population believed they would receive US aid along the same lines Poland did. This was despite the fact Bush tried to tell them in his "Chicken Kiev" speech that was not the case. The US simply didn't have the money to do that and Congress wouldn't have approved it if we did.

There are also some important differences. One of them is that Russia is a much more "natural" trading partner with Ukraine than Poland is/ever was. The rivers run mostly north south. There was also in the past synergy with steel production/coal mining in Ukraine (Donbas) using some raw materials from Russia with Russia being the main customer for the finished products. Less important today but still a factor. The ports in Ukraine are also closer to European Russian than the alternatives are and the alternatives are not particularly good ports. The rail links between Russia and Ukraine are also very good, partly because of history, but it is true even today. Both Russia and Ukraine would have been better off if these common interests had allowed them to work together peacefully. Unfortunately, Putin can't allow free movement of goods and people to/from Ukraine because his totalitarian policies would quickly come under challenge.

---

The Paveways are probably not going to be using laser designation very often if at all. More likely they will be using their GPS/IMS guidance similar to the JDAM and AASM bombs they have.

Here's the article I read about them yesterday.

https://www.twz.com/news-features/dual-m...to-ukraine

The serious problem with the GPS/INS mode of operation in Ukraine is that Russian GPS jammers have rendered precision weapons using GPS either useless or seriously degraded. If it is really true that the Paveways supplied by the UK do not arm in the absence of GPS guidance, they will have a big problem in Ukraine. One of the virtues of the ATACMS is that targets located that far behind the FEBA are not at present protected by GPS jammers. The Paveways would be the same except to get that deep into Russian territory with a weapon of 18 miles range would be quite dangerous. Can be done in many cases, but only with SEAD accompanying the strike.

That is why I hope Ukraine actually has a way to use the laser targeting mode. Otherwise, the Paveways will have the same problem Ukraine has with the JDAM-ERs we already gave them, only worse (18 mile standoff range vs 45). Drone designators were not "a thing" when these weapons were designed, but today it is eminently practical. Ideally, all the stand-off weapons in Ukraine would use imaging infrared target scene matching to recognize the target. This allows the INS to get the weapon "close" and then it can "see" the target and home in on it. Unfortunately that is too new for general use in Ukraine. It also unfortunately has a history of not working nearly as well in practice as advertised. Let's see if the French one does (although we might never actually know). A drone with a laser designator can accomplish the same thing reliably.

[Goose]

Here are some articles from the last year or so discussing this issue directly.

https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/ukraines-co...ake-crimea
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2...e-00083857
https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/202...ht-be.html
This link which is in one of the above articles is also well worth a read and some thought
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2...y-00083683

I find all of the articles very interesting, particularly the last one. Naturally, I have some comments :-).

IMO the Rand article regarding blockade is relevant and accurate as far as it goes. If Ukraine can sustain an "effective" blockade around Crimea they can undoubtedly make things difficult for Russia. This activity would be part of any attempt to occupy Crimea by Ukrainian forces. There is more than one way to do that. If the blockade is very effective, it will not simply make the Russians "uncomfortable". It will make the military forces in Crimea untenable and will force their evacuation. That is one outcome. Another one, which I believe to be more within Ukraine's capabilities, is to create a situation where Russia can keep her troops supplied with either food (and water) or bullets, but not both. The severely constrained Russian troops will then be unable to effectively resist a Ukrainian attack. It is obviously better if Russia evacuates on their own, but that IMO is unlikely. They will need to be pushed.

The similarities to Poland are indeed present. Ironically Ukraine voted for independence from the Russian Federation partly because the population believed they would receive US aid along the same lines Poland did. This was despite the fact Bush tried to tell them in his "Chicken Kiev" speech that was not the case. The US simply didn't have the money to do that and Congress wouldn't have approved it if we did.

There are also some important differences. One of them is that Russia is a much more "natural" trading partner with Ukraine than Poland is/ever was. The rivers run mostly north south. There was also in the past synergy with steel production/coal mining in Ukraine (Donbas) using some raw materials from Russia with Russia being the main customer for the finished products. Less important today but still a factor. The ports in Ukraine are also closer to European Russian than the alternatives are and the alternatives are not particularly good ports. The rail links between Russia and Ukraine are also very good, partly because of history, but it is true even today. Both Russia and Ukraine would have been better off if these common interests had allowed them to work together peacefully. Unfortunately, Putin can't allow free movement of goods and people to/from Ukraine because his totalitarian policies would quickly come under challenge.

---

The Paveways are probably not going to be using laser designation very often if at all. More likely they will be using their GPS/IMS guidance similar to the JDAM and AASM bombs they have.

Here's the article I read about them yesterday.

https://www.twz.com/news-features/dual-m...to-ukraine

The serious problem with the GPS/INS mode of operation in Ukraine is that Russian GPS jammers have rendered precision weapons using GPS either useless or seriously degraded. If it is really true that the Paveways supplied by the UK do not arm in the absence of GPS guidance, they will have a big problem in Ukraine. One of the virtues of the ATACMS is that targets located that far behind the FEBA are not at present protected by GPS jammers. The Paveways would be the same except to get that deep into Russian territory with a weapon of 18 miles range would be quite dangerous. Can be done in many cases, but only with SEAD accompanying the strike.

That is why I hope Ukraine actually has a way to use the laser targeting mode. Otherwise, the Paveways will have the same problem Ukraine has with the JDAM-ERs we already gave them, only worse (18 mile standoff range vs 45). Drone designators were not "a thing" when these weapons were designed, but today it is eminently practical. Ideally, all the stand-off weapons in Ukraine would use imaging infrared target scene matching to recognize the target. This allows the INS to get the weapon "close" and then it can "see" the target and home in on it. Unfortunately that is too new for general use in Ukraine. It also unfortunately has a history of not working nearly as well in practice as advertised. Let's see if the French one does (although we might never actually know). A drone with a laser designator can accomplish the same thing reliably.

[dabigv13]

Interesting analysis on Russian MTLBs in storage, based on open source images.

https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1783556507407151579

TLDR, they had thousands in storage prewar, but are likely very depleted now.

More here on the vehicles being sent in the latest package. 1000 Humvees, 500 MRAPs (doubling number sent), at least 14 Bradleys (exact number not specified).

https://en.defence-ua.com/news/the_us_gi...10294.html

[dabigv13]

Interesting analysis on Russian MTLBs in storage, based on open source images.

https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1783556507407151579

TLDR, they had thousands in storage prewar, but are likely very depleted now.

More here on the vehicles being sent in the latest package. 1000 Humvees, 500 MRAPs (doubling number sent), at least 14 Bradleys (exact number not specified).

https://en.defence-ua.com/news/the_us_gi...10294.html

[Goose]

Interesting analysis on Russian MTLBs in storage, based on open source images.

https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1783556507407151579

TLDR, they had thousands in storage prewar, but are likely very depleted now.

More here on the vehicles being sent in the latest package. 1000 Humvees, 500 MRAPs (doubling number sent), at least 14 Bradleys (exact number not specified).

https://en.defence-ua.com/news/the_us_gi...10294.html

Thanks for the links! The sending of so many Humvees and MRAPS is interesting. One wonders if Ukraine specifically asked for them or that that is what we had near at hand to send. Hopefully the former. These vehicles can be used to move lots of troops in permissive enough environments.

Not sure exactly what to make of the AFV data. What is presented is "credible" but not necessarily complete. No question Russia has dipped deeply into their reserve stocks. No telling how many they pulled from  storage actually could be used without major repairs. Possibly that is where lots of them are at present.

[Goose]

Interesting analysis on Russian MTLBs in storage, based on open source images.

https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1783556507407151579

TLDR, they had thousands in storage prewar, but are likely very depleted now.

More here on the vehicles being sent in the latest package. 1000 Humvees, 500 MRAPs (doubling number sent), at least 14 Bradleys (exact number not specified).

https://en.defence-ua.com/news/the_us_gi...10294.html

Thanks for the links! The sending of so many Humvees and MRAPS is interesting. One wonders if Ukraine specifically asked for them or that that is what we had near at hand to send. Hopefully the former. These vehicles can be used to move lots of troops in permissive enough environments.

Not sure exactly what to make of the AFV data. What is presented is "credible" but not necessarily complete. No question Russia has dipped deeply into their reserve stocks. No telling how many they pulled from  storage actually could be used without major repairs. Possibly that is where lots of them are at present.

[Treefence]

I think this is a good sign, the US is going to frontload a lot of the longer term contracts for Ukraine under the USAI fund, which will include Patriot systems, and all types of artillery among other things.  I wonder how many batteries this gets Ukraine, and what the timeline is.  I heard a report that one system can be produced per month, and only 5 are currently in the queue going to Switzerland.  I'm guessing it's not that simple though, and I'm not holding my breath that 3 batteries or so could be going to Ukraine by the end of the year.  Anyone have insight on this?  

https://www.politico.com/news/2024/04/25...e-00154450

I wouldn't mind if we just allocated all 13+ billion in USAI now, to get the ball rolling on everything, but maybe it's better to leave a reserve for new technologies or needs down the line?  

I believe there is also 13+ billion in presidential draw down, about a billion committed in the first aid package.  I wonder if Ukraine wants hundreds or even over a thousand IFV's (Strykers and Bradleys).  The US has a lot in storage, it would be nice to get those going, but maybe Ukraine isn't asking for that many right now?  I'd love to see more bulk packages, giving Ukraine the armor needed for a serious offensive.  I really do wish Ukraine had started their major mobilization months, or years ago.  I get the political balance, but from what I hear from the people who know things, they can't believe it didn't happen a long time ago.

[Treefence]

I think this is a good sign, the US is going to frontload a lot of the longer term contracts for Ukraine under the USAI fund, which will include Patriot systems, and all types of artillery among other things.  I wonder how many batteries this gets Ukraine, and what the timeline is.  I heard a report that one system can be produced per month, and only 5 are currently in the queue going to Switzerland.  I'm guessing it's not that simple though, and I'm not holding my breath that 3 batteries or so could be going to Ukraine by the end of the year.  Anyone have insight on this?  

https://www.politico.com/news/2024/04/25...e-00154450

I wouldn't mind if we just allocated all 13+ billion in USAI now, to get the ball rolling on everything, but maybe it's better to leave a reserve for new technologies or needs down the line?  

I believe there is also 13+ billion in presidential draw down, about a billion committed in the first aid package.  I wonder if Ukraine wants hundreds or even over a thousand IFV's (Strykers and Bradleys).  The US has a lot in storage, it would be nice to get those going, but maybe Ukraine isn't asking for that many right now?  I'd love to see more bulk packages, giving Ukraine the armor needed for a serious offensive.  I really do wish Ukraine had started their major mobilization months, or years ago.  I get the political balance, but from what I hear from the people who know things, they can't believe it didn't happen a long time ago.

[Goose]

I believe there is also 13+ billion in presidential draw down, about a billion committed in the first aid package.  I wonder if Ukraine wants hundreds or even over a thousand IFV's (Strykers and Bradleys).  The US has a lot in storage, it would be nice to get those going, but maybe Ukraine isn't asking for that many right now?  I'd love to see more bulk packages, giving Ukraine the armor needed for a serious offensive.

I obviously don't know for sure what Ukraine's priorities are, but I suspect they are in no position to field additional armored units. They are running low on personnel and sending lots of people to Grafenwöhr for training right now just isn't in the cards. Ukraine's most critical need right now in terms of material is IMO F-16s to rebuild the Air Force. Obviously artillery and small arms ammunition is most critical immediate need, but these are "expendables".

I really do wish Ukraine had started their major mobilization months, or years ago.  I get the political balance, but from what I hear from the people who know things, they can't believe it didn't happen a long time ago.

The approach Ukraine uses for their draft is indeed very different than the one the the US used in the past. IMO the Ukrainian approach, originally drafting people in the  27-60(!) years old, isn't "logical". The 18-21 range is generally less disruptive to the individual and delivers people who are easier to "train". Russia has a draft age (for "mobilization", aka fighting ) of 18-30. The "normal" age for Russian UMT is the low end of the range, i.e. 18 unless you somehow get out of it. Why Ukraine has such high age limits seems strange in a full scale existential war that is disrupting everybody's life.

FWIW, this Quora link shows a big demographic "hole" in the 18-25 age range. This is one reason lowering the draft age doesn't bring the much larger pool that one might expect.
https://www.quora.com/Why-is-lowering-th...-is-at-all

---

https://www.yahoo.com/news/100-mile-us-g...41583.html

Not a surprise. A new weapons system having problems is pretty normal. The reference to "mud" as a problem is too cryptic to know what it actually means. I suspect the real problem is that GPS jamming makes these weapons relatively useless. Calling intentional interference "EMI", while not semantically incorrect, is unusual. This term is normally used  for unintentional interference created by normal operation of other systems. This article may be overstated, but IMO is substantially correct.

I find it amazingly "brain dead" that neither NATO, Ukraine, or the US military has deployed weapons to destroy GPS jammers. These things are sitting there continuously screaming "hit me".  That wish should be honored. These jammers are rendering many weapons either totally ineffective or less effective than they should be. One can easily design from scratch a drone-based anti-radiation weapon that flies to the largest signal on 1575.42 MHz and/or 1227.6 MHz and blows it up. Granted, it may be only the antenna that gets hit, but that does take down the jammer until it is replaced. This situation is very strange to me.

[Goose]

I believe there is also 13+ billion in presidential draw down, about a billion committed in the first aid package.  I wonder if Ukraine wants hundreds or even over a thousand IFV's (Strykers and Bradleys).  The US has a lot in storage, it would be nice to get those going, but maybe Ukraine isn't asking for that many right now?  I'd love to see more bulk packages, giving Ukraine the armor needed for a serious offensive.

I obviously don't know for sure what Ukraine's priorities are, but I suspect they are in no position to field additional armored units. They are running low on personnel and sending lots of people to Grafenwöhr for training right now just isn't in the cards. Ukraine's most critical need right now in terms of material is IMO F-16s to rebuild the Air Force. Obviously artillery and small arms ammunition is most critical immediate need, but these are "expendables".

I really do wish Ukraine had started their major mobilization months, or years ago.  I get the political balance, but from what I hear from the people who know things, they can't believe it didn't happen a long time ago.

The approach Ukraine uses for their draft is indeed very different than the one the the US used in the past. IMO the Ukrainian approach, originally drafting people in the  27-60(!) years old, isn't "logical". The 18-21 range is generally less disruptive to the individual and delivers people who are easier to "train". Russia has a draft age (for "mobilization", aka fighting ) of 18-30. The "normal" age for Russian UMT is the low end of the range, i.e. 18 unless you somehow get out of it. Why Ukraine has such high age limits seems strange in a full scale existential war that is disrupting everybody's life.

FWIW, this Quora link shows a big demographic "hole" in the 18-25 age range. This is one reason lowering the draft age doesn't bring the much larger pool that one might expect.
https://www.quora.com/Why-is-lowering-th...-is-at-all

---

https://www.yahoo.com/news/100-mile-us-g...41583.html

Not a surprise. A new weapons system having problems is pretty normal. The reference to "mud" as a problem is too cryptic to know what it actually means. I suspect the real problem is that GPS jamming makes these weapons relatively useless. Calling intentional interference "EMI", while not semantically incorrect, is unusual. This term is normally used  for unintentional interference created by normal operation of other systems. This article may be overstated, but IMO is substantially correct.

I find it amazingly "brain dead" that neither NATO, Ukraine, or the US military has deployed weapons to destroy GPS jammers. These things are sitting there continuously screaming "hit me".  That wish should be honored. These jammers are rendering many weapons either totally ineffective or less effective than they should be. One can easily design from scratch a drone-based anti-radiation weapon that flies to the largest signal on 1575.42 MHz and/or 1227.6 MHz and blows it up. Granted, it may be only the antenna that gets hit, but that does take down the jammer until it is replaced. This situation is very strange to me.

[GK3]

I believe there is also 13+ billion in presidential draw down, about a billion committed in the first aid package.  I wonder if Ukraine wants hundreds or even over a thousand IFV's (Strykers and Bradleys).  The US has a lot in storage, it would be nice to get those going, but maybe Ukraine isn't asking for that many right now?  I'd love to see more bulk packages, giving Ukraine the armor needed for a serious offensive.

I obviously don't know for sure what Ukraine's priorities are, but I suspect they are in no position to field additional armored units. They are running low on personnel and sending lots of people to Grafenwöhr for training right now just isn't in the cards. Ukraine's most critical need right now in terms of material is IMO F-16s to rebuild the Air Force. Obviously artillery and small arms ammunition is most critical immediate need, but these are "expendables".

I really do wish Ukraine had started their major mobilization months, or years ago.  I get the political balance, but from what I hear from the people who know things, they can't believe it didn't happen a long time ago.

The approach Ukraine uses for their draft is indeed very different than the one the the US used in the past. IMO the Ukrainian approach, originally drafting people in the  27-60(!) years old, isn't "logical". The 18-21 range is generally less disruptive to the individual and delivers people who are easier to "train". Russia has a draft age (for "mobilization", aka fighting ) of 18-30. The "normal" age for Russian UMT is the low end of the range, i.e. 18 unless you somehow get out of it. Why Ukraine has such high age limits seems strange in a full scale existential war that is disrupting everybody's life.

FWIW, this Quora link shows a big demographic "hole" in the 18-25 age range. This is one reason lowering the draft age doesn't bring the much larger pool that one might expect.
https://www.quora.com/Why-is-lowering-th...-is-at-all

---

https://www.yahoo.com/news/100-mile-us-g...41583.html

Not a surprise. A new weapons system having problems is pretty normal. The reference to "mud" as a problem is too cryptic to know what it actually means. I suspect the real problem is that GPS jamming makes these weapons relatively useless. Calling intentional interference "EMI", while not semantically incorrect, is unusual. This term is normally used  for unintentional interference created by normal operation of other systems. This article may be overstated, but IMO is substantially correct.

I find it amazingly "brain dead" that neither NATO, Ukraine, or the US military has deployed weapons to destroy GPS jammers. These things are sitting there continuously screaming "hit me".  That wish should be honored. These jammers are rendering many weapons either totally ineffective or less effective than they should be. One can easily design from scratch a drone-based anti-radiation weapon that flies to the largest signal on 1575.42 MHz and/or 1227.6 MHz and blows it up. Granted, it may be only the antenna that gets hit, but that does take down the jammer until it is replaced. This situation is very strange to me.

Indeed!  Ukraine has been so inventive in their drone operations, but seeimngly brain dead when it comes to this.   Why wouldn't you focus on the defensive pieces that cause your offensive weapon to be far less effective?  Now I also read that Ukraine is losing some M1A1 tanks because they parked them and made them artillery pieces and were soon hit by little drones.  I wonder where the Russians learned how to do that?  Of course, being short of artillery, maybe it was necessary.
While drones have been used in past conflicts, I think this is the first where basically you can be very effective by just making hundreds of cheap drones with small pay loads.  The skies of Ukrained must be filled with them.  I wonder what the big, high powered radars see, anything?

[GK3]

I believe there is also 13+ billion in presidential draw down, about a billion committed in the first aid package.  I wonder if Ukraine wants hundreds or even over a thousand IFV's (Strykers and Bradleys).  The US has a lot in storage, it would be nice to get those going, but maybe Ukraine isn't asking for that many right now?  I'd love to see more bulk packages, giving Ukraine the armor needed for a serious offensive.

I obviously don't know for sure what Ukraine's priorities are, but I suspect they are in no position to field additional armored units. They are running low on personnel and sending lots of people to Grafenwöhr for training right now just isn't in the cards. Ukraine's most critical need right now in terms of material is IMO F-16s to rebuild the Air Force. Obviously artillery and small arms ammunition is most critical immediate need, but these are "expendables".

I really do wish Ukraine had started their major mobilization months, or years ago.  I get the political balance, but from what I hear from the people who know things, they can't believe it didn't happen a long time ago.

The approach Ukraine uses for their draft is indeed very different than the one the the US used in the past. IMO the Ukrainian approach, originally drafting people in the  27-60(!) years old, isn't "logical". The 18-21 range is generally less disruptive to the individual and delivers people who are easier to "train". Russia has a draft age (for "mobilization", aka fighting ) of 18-30. The "normal" age for Russian UMT is the low end of the range, i.e. 18 unless you somehow get out of it. Why Ukraine has such high age limits seems strange in a full scale existential war that is disrupting everybody's life.

FWIW, this Quora link shows a big demographic "hole" in the 18-25 age range. This is one reason lowering the draft age doesn't bring the much larger pool that one might expect.
https://www.quora.com/Why-is-lowering-th...-is-at-all

---

https://www.yahoo.com/news/100-mile-us-g...41583.html

Not a surprise. A new weapons system having problems is pretty normal. The reference to "mud" as a problem is too cryptic to know what it actually means. I suspect the real problem is that GPS jamming makes these weapons relatively useless. Calling intentional interference "EMI", while not semantically incorrect, is unusual. This term is normally used  for unintentional interference created by normal operation of other systems. This article may be overstated, but IMO is substantially correct.

I find it amazingly "brain dead" that neither NATO, Ukraine, or the US military has deployed weapons to destroy GPS jammers. These things are sitting there continuously screaming "hit me".  That wish should be honored. These jammers are rendering many weapons either totally ineffective or less effective than they should be. One can easily design from scratch a drone-based anti-radiation weapon that flies to the largest signal on 1575.42 MHz and/or 1227.6 MHz and blows it up. Granted, it may be only the antenna that gets hit, but that does take down the jammer until it is replaced. This situation is very strange to me.

Indeed!  Ukraine has been so inventive in their drone operations, but seeimngly brain dead when it comes to this.   Why wouldn't you focus on the defensive pieces that cause your offensive weapon to be far less effective?  Now I also read that Ukraine is losing some M1A1 tanks because they parked them and made them artillery pieces and were soon hit by little drones.  I wonder where the Russians learned how to do that?  Of course, being short of artillery, maybe it was necessary.
While drones have been used in past conflicts, I think this is the first where basically you can be very effective by just making hundreds of cheap drones with small pay loads.  The skies of Ukrained must be filled with them.  I wonder what the big, high powered radars see, anything?

[Goose]

While drones have been used in past conflicts, I think this is the first where basically you can be very effective by just making hundreds of cheap drones with small pay loads.  The skies of Ukrained must be filled with them.  I wonder what the big, high powered radars see, anything?

Part of the reason for the success of drones is that much of the conflict is fairly static and the forces are in close proximity to each other. That makes drone warfare much more effective, if you can fly them. They are vulnerable to ECM and going forward I expect that will also become ubiquitous. It is also inevitable that anti-drone suicide drones will become very common eventually. Lasers are in the wings but IMO simpler approaches will become more common.

There are many different sizes of drones. Generally, the bigger the drone the higher it flies (because it can). The drones that are blowing up tanks and the like generally operate at low altitudes. They also have lots of non-metal parts. This makes them relatively "stealthy". The big, powerful ground based radars can't see anything at low altitude unless it is "close". The radar cross sections of the mostly plastic drones are low enough they are hard to see even best case. On top of that, nobody seems to be using these types of radars very much. I doubt large radars are playing a significant role in the drone war.

[Goose]

While drones have been used in past conflicts, I think this is the first where basically you can be very effective by just making hundreds of cheap drones with small pay loads.  The skies of Ukrained must be filled with them.  I wonder what the big, high powered radars see, anything?

Part of the reason for the success of drones is that much of the conflict is fairly static and the forces are in close proximity to each other. That makes drone warfare much more effective, if you can fly them. They are vulnerable to ECM and going forward I expect that will also become ubiquitous. It is also inevitable that anti-drone suicide drones will become very common eventually. Lasers are in the wings but IMO simpler approaches will become more common.

There are many different sizes of drones. Generally, the bigger the drone the higher it flies (because it can). The drones that are blowing up tanks and the like generally operate at low altitudes. They also have lots of non-metal parts. This makes them relatively "stealthy". The big, powerful ground based radars can't see anything at low altitude unless it is "close". The radar cross sections of the mostly plastic drones are low enough they are hard to see even best case. On top of that, nobody seems to be using these types of radars very much. I doubt large radars are playing a significant role in the drone war.

[GK3]

While drones have been used in past conflicts, I think this is the first where basically you can be very effective by just making hundreds of cheap drones with small pay loads.  The skies of Ukrained must be filled with them.  I wonder what the big, high powered radars see, anything?

Part of the reason for the success of drones is that much of the conflict is fairly static and the forces are in close proximity to each other. That makes drone warfare much more effective, if you can fly them. They are vulnerable to ECM and going forward I expect that will also become ubiquitous. It is also inevitable that anti-drone suicide drones will become very common eventually. Lasers are in the wings but IMO simpler approaches will become more common.

There are many different sizes of drones. Generally, the bigger the drone the higher it flies (because it can). The drones that are blowing up tanks and the like generally operate at low altitudes. They also have lots of non-metal parts. This makes them relatively "stealthy". The big, powerful ground based radars can't see anything at low altitude unless it is "close". The radar cross sections of the mostly plastic drones are low enough they are hard to see even best case. On top of that, nobody seems to be using these types of radars very much. I doubt large radars are playing a significant role in the drone war.

I would assume from your information, that you would not put any kind of expensive piece of equipment close enough to the enemies MLR that its little drones can find it.  From what I have read they have a range of 5 to  20 Km.  I don't know if those figures are one way or return.  I would also assume that if you had decent cameras, including IR, and flew at night or dusk/dawn it would be very hard for the other side to hide much of what it is doing.  Of course things change a bit if  you are in heavy cover, which I think is limited in Ukraine.

[GK3]

While drones have been used in past conflicts, I think this is the first where basically you can be very effective by just making hundreds of cheap drones with small pay loads.  The skies of Ukrained must be filled with them.  I wonder what the big, high powered radars see, anything?

Part of the reason for the success of drones is that much of the conflict is fairly static and the forces are in close proximity to each other. That makes drone warfare much more effective, if you can fly them. They are vulnerable to ECM and going forward I expect that will also become ubiquitous. It is also inevitable that anti-drone suicide drones will become very common eventually. Lasers are in the wings but IMO simpler approaches will become more common.

There are many different sizes of drones. Generally, the bigger the drone the higher it flies (because it can). The drones that are blowing up tanks and the like generally operate at low altitudes. They also have lots of non-metal parts. This makes them relatively "stealthy". The big, powerful ground based radars can't see anything at low altitude unless it is "close". The radar cross sections of the mostly plastic drones are low enough they are hard to see even best case. On top of that, nobody seems to be using these types of radars very much. I doubt large radars are playing a significant role in the drone war.

I would assume from your information, that you would not put any kind of expensive piece of equipment close enough to the enemies MLR that its little drones can find it.  From what I have read they have a range of 5 to  20 Km.  I don't know if those figures are one way or return.  I would also assume that if you had decent cameras, including IR, and flew at night or dusk/dawn it would be very hard for the other side to hide much of what it is doing.  Of course things change a bit if  you are in heavy cover, which I think is limited in Ukraine.

[Goose]

I would assume from your information, that you would not put any kind of expensive piece of equipment close enough to the enemies MLR that its little drones can find it.  From what I have read they have a range of 5 to  20 Km.  I don't know if those figures are one way or return.  I would also assume that if you had decent cameras, including IR, and flew at night or dusk/dawn it would be very hard for the other side to hide much of what it is doing.  Of course things change a bit if  you are in heavy cover, which I think is limited in Ukraine.

I would spread out any important pieces of equipment as much as practical and not leave them in one place very long if I can avoid it. The drones searching for targets don't just fly straight to the target, hit it, and fly back. They are often performing recon and fly a grid or some other pattern the operator "likes". They don't necessarily even know there are targets present. Thus a drone with a 20 km range probably can't search much at ranges beyond 5 km. It has to turn a lot :-). 

Indeed you are correct, drones with cameras, especially IR cameras, can see a lot. It is very hard to hide anything, particularly things that are "bright" in infrared, like engines that have run recently or people in the open. The recon drone finds things and then armed drones know where to go directly to kill it. Moving things around helps because 1) the probability of it being found on any given recon mission isn't unity, and 2) the armed drones will go to the wrong place if the target moved.  Obviously both sides try very hard to minimize the time between detection and ordinance on target, but that is never as easy as it sounds. This is especially true if the organizations doing the work are pretty "ad-hoc", as seems to be the case in Ukraine.

Cover in Ukraine varies a lot, based on what part of the country and how close you are to the rivers. In the south Kherson Oblast, there is virtually no cover from air observation anywhere. In areas near the rivers and marshes (of which there are many in the north east) there is some cover, and in many agricultural areas things are treeline to treeline across open fields. You can also have "cover" from ground observation that doesn't provide cover from the air.

[Goose]

I would assume from your information, that you would not put any kind of expensive piece of equipment close enough to the enemies MLR that its little drones can find it.  From what I have read they have a range of 5 to  20 Km.  I don't know if those figures are one way or return.  I would also assume that if you had decent cameras, including IR, and flew at night or dusk/dawn it would be very hard for the other side to hide much of what it is doing.  Of course things change a bit if  you are in heavy cover, which I think is limited in Ukraine.

I would spread out any important pieces of equipment as much as practical and not leave them in one place very long if I can avoid it. The drones searching for targets don't just fly straight to the target, hit it, and fly back. They are often performing recon and fly a grid or some other pattern the operator "likes". They don't necessarily even know there are targets present. Thus a drone with a 20 km range probably can't search much at ranges beyond 5 km. It has to turn a lot :-). 

Indeed you are correct, drones with cameras, especially IR cameras, can see a lot. It is very hard to hide anything, particularly things that are "bright" in infrared, like engines that have run recently or people in the open. The recon drone finds things and then armed drones know where to go directly to kill it. Moving things around helps because 1) the probability of it being found on any given recon mission isn't unity, and 2) the armed drones will go to the wrong place if the target moved.  Obviously both sides try very hard to minimize the time between detection and ordinance on target, but that is never as easy as it sounds. This is especially true if the organizations doing the work are pretty "ad-hoc", as seems to be the case in Ukraine.

Cover in Ukraine varies a lot, based on what part of the country and how close you are to the rivers. In the south Kherson Oblast, there is virtually no cover from air observation anywhere. In areas near the rivers and marshes (of which there are many in the north east) there is some cover, and in many agricultural areas things are treeline to treeline across open fields. You can also have "cover" from ground observation that doesn't provide cover from the air.

[dabigv13]

On the tablets allowing integration of Western weapons with Soviet aircraft

https://www.twz.com/air/ukrainian-fighte...rn-weapons

[dabigv13]

On the tablets allowing integration of Western weapons with Soviet aircraft

https://www.twz.com/air/ukrainian-fighte...rn-weapons

[GK3]

On the tablets allowing integration of Western weapons with Soviet aircraft

https://www.twz.com/air/ukrainian-fighte...rn-weapons

Thanks, very interesting.  "Necessity is the Mother of Invention" and Ukraine seems quite creative.

[GK3]

On the tablets allowing integration of Western weapons with Soviet aircraft

https://www.twz.com/air/ukrainian-fighte...rn-weapons

Thanks, very interesting.  "Necessity is the Mother of Invention" and Ukraine seems quite creative.

[GK3]

Ukraine supposedly destroyed a Russian helicopter at a Moscow airport by apparently setting a fire in the cockpit.  Stretches my crudulity a bit, but it true, my hat is off to the guys running Ukranian special ops.  Wonder if they had inside help if it actually happened.
https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-destroy...eo-1894567

[GK3]

Ukraine supposedly destroyed a Russian helicopter at a Moscow airport by apparently setting a fire in the cockpit.  Stretches my crudulity a bit, but it true, my hat is off to the guys running Ukranian special ops.  Wonder if they had inside help if it actually happened.
https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-destroy...eo-1894567

[Goose]

On the tablets allowing integration of Western weapons with Soviet aircraft

https://www.twz.com/air/ukrainian-fighte...rn-weapons

Interesting article. Lots of what it says "makes sense". In order to avoid wiring modifications to the aircraft it would at least theoretically be possible to use a Bluetooth or Wifi interface in the tablet computer and a small Bluetooth/Wifi to MIL-1553 adapter attached to the wing pylon. The main problem with this approach is that the location of the pylon is mostly under the wing. That, coupled with with the location of the ipad inside the cockpit (where the fuselage is above and between the Wifi and the pylon) shields the  adapter from the ipad. The relatively short distance involved may allow it to work anyway. As an experiment I can reliably ping my phone when it is physically an inch or so under my car located about 20 feet from my Wifi router. If it is about a foot under, I get 50% packet loss. Obviously, how well that simulates the situation in Ukraine is very open to question :-). So, YMMV. As stated previously, it isn't impossible that Ukraine threaded a 1553 cable through the fuselage to the wing pylon. Motivated technicians can do it relatively quickly. Either way, this level of integration is much better than just a "launch" button, even if the tablet means the pilots have to cut the ends of their glove fingers off :-).

It would also be "easy" to provide pitch and roll (and yaw if anyone cares :-) displays/indicators from the inertial sensors inside the "ipad", without modification or tapping into the aircraft's systems. The data wouldn't be absolutely accurate, but it would be "good enough" to fly the airplane. Hopefully the "ipad" doesn't obscure any other important indicators. It appears the HUD probably will still work which is very important. I also notice a hand-held GPS appears to be present in the cockpit (upper RHS).

IMO this article has lots of problems. These problems don't minimize the resourcefulness and ingenuity of those who developed these modifications, but unfortunately they do minimize its military effectiveness. First and foremost, as we know from Ukrainian sources, the Russians are effectively jamming GPS in many (most?) areas of the FEBA and also around certain high-value targets. This has rendered JDAMs and any such weapons relying on GPS navigation ineffective. Therefore all the wonderful weapons launch capabilities don't amount to anything for weapons that rely on GPS. Even GPS navigation of the aircraft itself in forward areas doesn't work under these conditions.

The second big problem is the questionable statement attributed to Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Dr. William LaPlante.

but they have a lot of the Russian and Soviet-era aircraft

If he means a lot of different types, I think he is correct. If he means a large number of available aircraft, he is not. Ukraine didn't have a large number of aircraft when the war started. According to https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/03/...ff-russia/ Ukraine had "69 jets at most". Ukraine suffered significant losses of aircraft on the ground at the start of the war. They have also suffered significant losses due to casualties and operations during the years of war. Some of the available jets were SU-25 ground attack planes which as far as we know have not been fitted with "western" weapons capability (if there are indeed any such aircraft remaining). Ukraine has received transfers of aircraft from former Warsaw Pact members, but not in very large numbers. Obtaining spare and replacement parts for these aircraft is difficult in general.  Some of the parts were only made in Russia and that source is not available. It is therefore almost certain Ukraine has aircraft that are "hanger queens" valuable only for parts. We don't know how many combat capable aircraft Ukraine has available and ready to go on any given day (nor should we). However, given what we do know, the number is probably "not many".

These two factors put the Ukrainian air fore in a real bind. In any case, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. We did not see "a lot" of Ukrainian aircraft pounding the concrete fortifications being assaulted by Ukrainian ground troops last summer. Similarly when Ukraine this winter/spring started running  critically low on artillery shells we didn't see the Ukrainian air force bombing the Russian artillery to suppress it. Even more "strange" is that we don't see/hear about Ukrainian aircraft blowing up GPS jammers with HARMS. Properly coordinated air strikes will allow the HARMs to take out the jammers and allow JDAMs launched by the inbound strike to hit their targets precisely. Hasn't even been tried AFAIK and if it has, it hasn't "worked". Sorry to be such a "downer" but this is the situation on the ground.

IMO the article also doesn't get the situation with HARMs "right". It was correct to in saying that the HARMs operating in "preprogrammed" mode rely on GPS to strike a previously geolocated target. In Ukraine with all the GPS jamming that mode generally won't work. Unlike a JDAM, the HARM carries a relatively small warhead. Its destructive radius is quite limited. It has to "hit" its target. The HARM itself contains a receiver that can locate and to some degree determine the approximate bearing of the target radar. In US use there is a "coincidence gate" that allows the pilot to designate a target on his RWR as the target for the HARM. When the HARM receives a signal that is "in sync" with the coincidence gate, it "knows" that it has targeted the correct radar and it can be launched.

Unfortunately some US aircraft in the past had RWRs that were so bad that the HARM itself actually acquired the threat radars first and pilots would use the "search by HARM" capability to find them. Ukraine can, with the tablet interfaced to the 1553 bus, use this mode, locate radars, and launch the HARM. HARM stands for "Homing Anti-radiation Missile". In this mode it can determine the unambiguous relative bearing of the target continuously and fly "in the right direction" until it "passes overhead". Not quite that simple but almost. The missile in that mode was so lethal that many radar operators would shut down when the weapon was detected by their radar. Now the HARM has nothing to "home" on and "goes stupid". However, that is still a win because the radar is useless when shut off. If the radar was guiding/illuminating etc. for a SAM, the SAM also goes stupid. The vast majority of HARM missiles launched in combat didn't hit anything. They did force the radars to shut down if they wanted to "survive". Russia eventually responded by (allegedly) giving their SAM systems the ability to leave the radar on and shoot down anti-radiation missiles. How well that works in practice I do not know, but I have my doubts.

The AARGM was developed to defeat the tactic of the radar shutting down. The US got tired of spending lots of money for missiles that never hit anything :-). The AARGM has an infrared CCD array and a W-band radar that can search for and recognize the target radar by "looking" at it. (this is open source). If the radar shuts down, the AARGM can fly the last line of bearing it had looking for the target. The AARGM can also go into a "search" mode if it flies far enough that "it should have seen it by now". The AARGM sometimes "works" if the radar shuts down, but not always. From what I hear it is now much better at recognizing targets than it used to be.

Note that in this mode GPS is not required AT ALL. The SAM radars can operate intermittently, being on for a "short time" (less than a minute) and off for several minutes. This can cause the HARM to miss because it gets no steering updates during that time and it may get far enough off course it can't hear the radar even if it comes back on.  If it has flown past and isn't an AARGM, there is no chance of a hit. SAM radars can do this if they are guiding an ARH missile. It only needs "periodic" updates. They cannot if they are illuminating for a SARH missile.

HARM also works in L band, so GPS jammers are detectable and targetable. GPS jammers must operate nearly continuously to be effective. A very high duty cycle is absolutely mandatory. If they shut off for even a short time the GPS on the precision guided munitions can get a series of good "fixes" and operate almost normally. The GPS jammers also have no way of detecting an inbound anti-radiation missile (like a SAM radar probably can) and therefore cannot shut down until it is "safe". The HARMs should eat them up. Therefore, if the Ukrainians have this capability available at scale, why aren't they using it? My conclusion is that they have it but not "at scale".

Continued in next post, but may be very TL;DR :-).

[Goose]

On the tablets allowing integration of Western weapons with Soviet aircraft

https://www.twz.com/air/ukrainian-fighte...rn-weapons

Interesting article. Lots of what it says "makes sense". In order to avoid wiring modifications to the aircraft it would at least theoretically be possible to use a Bluetooth or Wifi interface in the tablet computer and a small Bluetooth/Wifi to MIL-1553 adapter attached to the wing pylon. The main problem with this approach is that the location of the pylon is mostly under the wing. That, coupled with with the location of the ipad inside the cockpit (where the fuselage is above and between the Wifi and the pylon) shields the  adapter from the ipad. The relatively short distance involved may allow it to work anyway. As an experiment I can reliably ping my phone when it is physically an inch or so under my car located about 20 feet from my Wifi router. If it is about a foot under, I get 50% packet loss. Obviously, how well that simulates the situation in Ukraine is very open to question :-). So, YMMV. As stated previously, it isn't impossible that Ukraine threaded a 1553 cable through the fuselage to the wing pylon. Motivated technicians can do it relatively quickly. Either way, this level of integration is much better than just a "launch" button, even if the tablet means the pilots have to cut the ends of their glove fingers off :-).

It would also be "easy" to provide pitch and roll (and yaw if anyone cares :-) displays/indicators from the inertial sensors inside the "ipad", without modification or tapping into the aircraft's systems. The data wouldn't be absolutely accurate, but it would be "good enough" to fly the airplane. Hopefully the "ipad" doesn't obscure any other important indicators. It appears the HUD probably will still work which is very important. I also notice a hand-held GPS appears to be present in the cockpit (upper RHS).

IMO this article has lots of problems. These problems don't minimize the resourcefulness and ingenuity of those who developed these modifications, but unfortunately they do minimize its military effectiveness. First and foremost, as we know from Ukrainian sources, the Russians are effectively jamming GPS in many (most?) areas of the FEBA and also around certain high-value targets. This has rendered JDAMs and any such weapons relying on GPS navigation ineffective. Therefore all the wonderful weapons launch capabilities don't amount to anything for weapons that rely on GPS. Even GPS navigation of the aircraft itself in forward areas doesn't work under these conditions.

The second big problem is the questionable statement attributed to Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Dr. William LaPlante.

but they have a lot of the Russian and Soviet-era aircraft

If he means a lot of different types, I think he is correct. If he means a large number of available aircraft, he is not. Ukraine didn't have a large number of aircraft when the war started. According to https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/03/...ff-russia/ Ukraine had "69 jets at most". Ukraine suffered significant losses of aircraft on the ground at the start of the war. They have also suffered significant losses due to casualties and operations during the years of war. Some of the available jets were SU-25 ground attack planes which as far as we know have not been fitted with "western" weapons capability (if there are indeed any such aircraft remaining). Ukraine has received transfers of aircraft from former Warsaw Pact members, but not in very large numbers. Obtaining spare and replacement parts for these aircraft is difficult in general.  Some of the parts were only made in Russia and that source is not available. It is therefore almost certain Ukraine has aircraft that are "hanger queens" valuable only for parts. We don't know how many combat capable aircraft Ukraine has available and ready to go on any given day (nor should we). However, given what we do know, the number is probably "not many".

These two factors put the Ukrainian air fore in a real bind. In any case, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. We did not see "a lot" of Ukrainian aircraft pounding the concrete fortifications being assaulted by Ukrainian ground troops last summer. Similarly when Ukraine this winter/spring started running  critically low on artillery shells we didn't see the Ukrainian air force bombing the Russian artillery to suppress it. Even more "strange" is that we don't see/hear about Ukrainian aircraft blowing up GPS jammers with HARMS. Properly coordinated air strikes will allow the HARMs to take out the jammers and allow JDAMs launched by the inbound strike to hit their targets precisely. Hasn't even been tried AFAIK and if it has, it hasn't "worked". Sorry to be such a "downer" but this is the situation on the ground.

IMO the article also doesn't get the situation with HARMs "right". It was correct to in saying that the HARMs operating in "preprogrammed" mode rely on GPS to strike a previously geolocated target. In Ukraine with all the GPS jamming that mode generally won't work. Unlike a JDAM, the HARM carries a relatively small warhead. Its destructive radius is quite limited. It has to "hit" its target. The HARM itself contains a receiver that can locate and to some degree determine the approximate bearing of the target radar. In US use there is a "coincidence gate" that allows the pilot to designate a target on his RWR as the target for the HARM. When the HARM receives a signal that is "in sync" with the coincidence gate, it "knows" that it has targeted the correct radar and it can be launched.

Unfortunately some US aircraft in the past had RWRs that were so bad that the HARM itself actually acquired the threat radars first and pilots would use the "search by HARM" capability to find them. Ukraine can, with the tablet interfaced to the 1553 bus, use this mode, locate radars, and launch the HARM. HARM stands for "Homing Anti-radiation Missile". In this mode it can determine the unambiguous relative bearing of the target continuously and fly "in the right direction" until it "passes overhead". Not quite that simple but almost. The missile in that mode was so lethal that many radar operators would shut down when the weapon was detected by their radar. Now the HARM has nothing to "home" on and "goes stupid". However, that is still a win because the radar is useless when shut off. If the radar was guiding/illuminating etc. for a SAM, the SAM also goes stupid. The vast majority of HARM missiles launched in combat didn't hit anything. They did force the radars to shut down if they wanted to "survive". Russia eventually responded by (allegedly) giving their SAM systems the ability to leave the radar on and shoot down anti-radiation missiles. How well that works in practice I do not know, but I have my doubts.

The AARGM was developed to defeat the tactic of the radar shutting down. The US got tired of spending lots of money for missiles that never hit anything :-). The AARGM has an infrared CCD array and a W-band radar that can search for and recognize the target radar by "looking" at it. (this is open source). If the radar shuts down, the AARGM can fly the last line of bearing it had looking for the target. The AARGM can also go into a "search" mode if it flies far enough that "it should have seen it by now". The AARGM sometimes "works" if the radar shuts down, but not always. From what I hear it is now much better at recognizing targets than it used to be.

Note that in this mode GPS is not required AT ALL. The SAM radars can operate intermittently, being on for a "short time" (less than a minute) and off for several minutes. This can cause the HARM to miss because it gets no steering updates during that time and it may get far enough off course it can't hear the radar even if it comes back on.  If it has flown past and isn't an AARGM, there is no chance of a hit. SAM radars can do this if they are guiding an ARH missile. It only needs "periodic" updates. They cannot if they are illuminating for a SARH missile.

HARM also works in L band, so GPS jammers are detectable and targetable. GPS jammers must operate nearly continuously to be effective. A very high duty cycle is absolutely mandatory. If they shut off for even a short time the GPS on the precision guided munitions can get a series of good "fixes" and operate almost normally. The GPS jammers also have no way of detecting an inbound anti-radiation missile (like a SAM radar probably can) and therefore cannot shut down until it is "safe". The HARMs should eat them up. Therefore, if the Ukrainians have this capability available at scale, why aren't they using it? My conclusion is that they have it but not "at scale".

Continued in next post, but may be very TL;DR :-).

[GK3]

On the tablets allowing integration of Western weapons with Soviet aircraft

https://www.twz.com/air/ukrainian-fighte...rn-weapons

Interesting article. Lots of what it says "makes sense". In order to avoid wiring modifications to the aircraft it would at least theoretically be possible to use a Bluetooth or Wifi interface in the tablet computer and a small Bluetooth/Wifi to MIL-1553 adapter attached to the wing pylon. The main problem with this approach is that the location of the pylon is mostly under the wing. That, coupled with with the location of the ipad inside the cockpit (where the fuselage is above and between the Wifi and the pylon) shields the  adapter from the ipad. The relatively short distance involved may allow it to work anyway. As an experiment I can reliably ping my phone when it is physically an inch or so under my car located about 20 feet from my Wifi router. If it is about a foot under, I get 50% packet loss. Obviously, how well that simulates the situation in Ukraine is very open to question :-). So, YMMV. As stated previously, it isn't impossible that Ukraine threaded a 1553 cable through the fuselage to the wing pylon. Motivated technicians can do it relatively quickly. Either way, this level of integration is much better than just a "launch" button, even if the tablet means the pilots have to cut the ends of their glove fingers off :-).

It would also be "easy" to provide pitch and roll (and yaw if anyone cares :-) displays/indicators from the inertial sensors inside the "ipad", without modification or tapping into the aircraft's systems. The data wouldn't be absolutely accurate, but it would be "good enough" to fly the airplane. Hopefully the "ipad" doesn't obscure any other important indicators. It appears the HUD probably will still work which is very important. I also notice a hand-held GPS appears to be present in the cockpit (upper RHS).

IMO this article has lots of problems. These problems don't minimize the resourcefulness and ingenuity of those who developed these modifications, but unfortunately they do minimize its military effectiveness. First and foremost, as we know from Ukrainian sources, the Russians are effectively jamming GPS in many (most?) areas of the FEBA and also around certain high-value targets. This has rendered JDAMs and any such weapons relying on GPS navigation ineffective. Therefore all the wonderful weapons launch capabilities don't amount to anything for weapons that rely on GPS. Even GPS navigation of the aircraft itself in forward areas doesn't work under these conditions.

The second big problem is the questionable statement attributed to Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Dr. William LaPlante.

but they have a lot of the Russian and Soviet-era aircraft

If he means a lot of different types, I think he is correct. If he means a large number of available aircraft, he is not. Ukraine didn't have a large number of aircraft when the war started. According to https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/03/...ff-russia/ Ukraine had "69 jets at most". Ukraine suffered significant losses of aircraft on the ground at the start of the war. They have also suffered significant losses due to casualties and operations during the years of war. Some of the available jets were SU-25 ground attack planes which as far as we know have not been fitted with "western" weapons capability (if there are indeed any such aircraft remaining). Ukraine has received transfers of aircraft from former Warsaw Pact members, but not in very large numbers. Obtaining spare and replacement parts for these aircraft is difficult in general.  Some of the parts were only made in Russia and that source is not available. It is therefore almost certain Ukraine has aircraft that are "hanger queens" valuable only for parts. We don't know how many combat capable aircraft Ukraine has available and ready to go on any given day (nor should we). However, given what we do know, the number is probably "not many".

These two factors put the Ukrainian air fore in a real bind. In any case, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. We did not see "a lot" of Ukrainian aircraft pounding the concrete fortifications being assaulted by Ukrainian ground troops last summer. Similarly when Ukraine this winter/spring started running  critically low on artillery shells we didn't see the Ukrainian air force bombing the Russian artillery to suppress it. Even more "strange" is that we don't see/hear about Ukrainian aircraft blowing up GPS jammers with HARMS. Properly coordinated air strikes will allow the HARMs to take out the jammers and allow JDAMs launched by the inbound strike to hit their targets precisely. Hasn't even been tried AFAIK and if it has, it hasn't "worked". Sorry to be such a "downer" but this is the situation on the ground.

IMO the article also doesn't get the situation with HARMs "right". It was correct to in saying that the HARMs operating in "preprogrammed" mode rely on GPS to strike a previously geolocated target. In Ukraine with all the GPS jamming that mode generally won't work. Unlike a JDAM, the HARM carries a relatively small warhead. Its destructive radius is quite limited. It has to "hit" its target. The HARM itself contains a receiver that can locate and to some degree determine the approximate bearing of the target radar. In US use there is a "coincidence gate" that allows the pilot to designate a target on his RWR as the target for the HARM. When the HARM receives a signal that is "in sync" with the coincidence gate, it "knows" that it has targeted the correct radar and it can be launched.

Unfortunately some US aircraft in the past had RWRs that were so bad that the HARM itself actually acquired the threat radars first and pilots would use the "search by HARM" capability to find them. Ukraine can, with the tablet interfaced to the 1553 bus, use this mode, locate radars, and launch the HARM. HARM stands for "Homing Anti-radiation Missile". In this mode it can determine the unambiguous relative bearing of the target continuously and fly "in the right direction" until it "passes overhead". Not quite that simple but almost. The missile in that mode was so lethal that many radar operators would shut down when the weapon was detected by their radar. Now the HARM has nothing to "home" on and "goes stupid". However, that is still a win because the radar is useless when shut off. If the radar was guiding/illuminating etc. for a SAM, the SAM also goes stupid. The vast majority of HARM missiles launched in combat didn't hit anything. They did force the radars to shut down if they wanted to "survive". Russia eventually responded by (allegedly) giving their SAM systems the ability to leave the radar on and shoot down anti-radiation missiles. How well that works in practice I do not know, but I have my doubts.

The AARGM was developed to defeat the tactic of the radar shutting down. The US got tired of spending lots of money for missiles that never hit anything :-). The AARGM has an infrared CCD array and a W-band radar that can search for and recognize the target radar by "looking" at it. (this is open source). If the radar shuts down, the AARGM can fly the last line of bearing it had looking for the target. The AARGM can also go into a "search" mode if it flies far enough that "it should have seen it by now". The AARGM sometimes "works" if the radar shuts down, but not always. From what I hear it is now much better at recognizing targets than it used to be.

Note that in this mode GPS is not required AT ALL. The SAM radars can operate intermittently, being on for a "short time" (less than a minute) and off for several minutes. This can cause the HARM to miss because it gets no steering updates during that time and it may get far enough off course it can't hear the radar even if it comes back on.  If it has flown past and isn't an AARGM, there is no chance of a hit. SAM radars can do this if they are guiding an ARH missile. It only needs "periodic" updates. They cannot if they are illuminating for a SARH missile.

HARM also works in L band, so GPS jammers are detectable and targetable. GPS jammers must operate nearly continuously to be effective. A very high duty cycle is absolutely mandatory. If they shut off for even a short time the GPS on the precision guided munitions can get a series of good "fixes" and operate almost normally. The GPS jammers also have no way of detecting an inbound anti-radiation missile (like a SAM radar probably can) and therefore cannot shut down until it is "safe". The HARMs should eat them up. Therefore, if the Ukrainians have this capability available at scale, why aren't they using it? My conclusion is that they have it but not "at scale".

Continued in next post, but may be very TL;DR :-).

Thank you for your usual comprehensive and informative reply.  Here is another article on what they call the Drone Dileman

https://www.usatoday.com/story/graphics/...347448007/

I wish I had a better background in this kinid of stuff, but back in the day my focus was on another aspect of warfare.

[GK3]

On the tablets allowing integration of Western weapons with Soviet aircraft

https://www.twz.com/air/ukrainian-fighte...rn-weapons

Interesting article. Lots of what it says "makes sense". In order to avoid wiring modifications to the aircraft it would at least theoretically be possible to use a Bluetooth or Wifi interface in the tablet computer and a small Bluetooth/Wifi to MIL-1553 adapter attached to the wing pylon. The main problem with this approach is that the location of the pylon is mostly under the wing. That, coupled with with the location of the ipad inside the cockpit (where the fuselage is above and between the Wifi and the pylon) shields the  adapter from the ipad. The relatively short distance involved may allow it to work anyway. As an experiment I can reliably ping my phone when it is physically an inch or so under my car located about 20 feet from my Wifi router. If it is about a foot under, I get 50% packet loss. Obviously, how well that simulates the situation in Ukraine is very open to question :-). So, YMMV. As stated previously, it isn't impossible that Ukraine threaded a 1553 cable through the fuselage to the wing pylon. Motivated technicians can do it relatively quickly. Either way, this level of integration is much better than just a "launch" button, even if the tablet means the pilots have to cut the ends of their glove fingers off :-).

It would also be "easy" to provide pitch and roll (and yaw if anyone cares :-) displays/indicators from the inertial sensors inside the "ipad", without modification or tapping into the aircraft's systems. The data wouldn't be absolutely accurate, but it would be "good enough" to fly the airplane. Hopefully the "ipad" doesn't obscure any other important indicators. It appears the HUD probably will still work which is very important. I also notice a hand-held GPS appears to be present in the cockpit (upper RHS).

IMO this article has lots of problems. These problems don't minimize the resourcefulness and ingenuity of those who developed these modifications, but unfortunately they do minimize its military effectiveness. First and foremost, as we know from Ukrainian sources, the Russians are effectively jamming GPS in many (most?) areas of the FEBA and also around certain high-value targets. This has rendered JDAMs and any such weapons relying on GPS navigation ineffective. Therefore all the wonderful weapons launch capabilities don't amount to anything for weapons that rely on GPS. Even GPS navigation of the aircraft itself in forward areas doesn't work under these conditions.

The second big problem is the questionable statement attributed to Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Dr. William LaPlante.

but they have a lot of the Russian and Soviet-era aircraft

If he means a lot of different types, I think he is correct. If he means a large number of available aircraft, he is not. Ukraine didn't have a large number of aircraft when the war started. According to https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/03/...ff-russia/ Ukraine had "69 jets at most". Ukraine suffered significant losses of aircraft on the ground at the start of the war. They have also suffered significant losses due to casualties and operations during the years of war. Some of the available jets were SU-25 ground attack planes which as far as we know have not been fitted with "western" weapons capability (if there are indeed any such aircraft remaining). Ukraine has received transfers of aircraft from former Warsaw Pact members, but not in very large numbers. Obtaining spare and replacement parts for these aircraft is difficult in general.  Some of the parts were only made in Russia and that source is not available. It is therefore almost certain Ukraine has aircraft that are "hanger queens" valuable only for parts. We don't know how many combat capable aircraft Ukraine has available and ready to go on any given day (nor should we). However, given what we do know, the number is probably "not many".

These two factors put the Ukrainian air fore in a real bind. In any case, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. We did not see "a lot" of Ukrainian aircraft pounding the concrete fortifications being assaulted by Ukrainian ground troops last summer. Similarly when Ukraine this winter/spring started running  critically low on artillery shells we didn't see the Ukrainian air force bombing the Russian artillery to suppress it. Even more "strange" is that we don't see/hear about Ukrainian aircraft blowing up GPS jammers with HARMS. Properly coordinated air strikes will allow the HARMs to take out the jammers and allow JDAMs launched by the inbound strike to hit their targets precisely. Hasn't even been tried AFAIK and if it has, it hasn't "worked". Sorry to be such a "downer" but this is the situation on the ground.

IMO the article also doesn't get the situation with HARMs "right". It was correct to in saying that the HARMs operating in "preprogrammed" mode rely on GPS to strike a previously geolocated target. In Ukraine with all the GPS jamming that mode generally won't work. Unlike a JDAM, the HARM carries a relatively small warhead. Its destructive radius is quite limited. It has to "hit" its target. The HARM itself contains a receiver that can locate and to some degree determine the approximate bearing of the target radar. In US use there is a "coincidence gate" that allows the pilot to designate a target on his RWR as the target for the HARM. When the HARM receives a signal that is "in sync" with the coincidence gate, it "knows" that it has targeted the correct radar and it can be launched.

Unfortunately some US aircraft in the past had RWRs that were so bad that the HARM itself actually acquired the threat radars first and pilots would use the "search by HARM" capability to find them. Ukraine can, with the tablet interfaced to the 1553 bus, use this mode, locate radars, and launch the HARM. HARM stands for "Homing Anti-radiation Missile". In this mode it can determine the unambiguous relative bearing of the target continuously and fly "in the right direction" until it "passes overhead". Not quite that simple but almost. The missile in that mode was so lethal that many radar operators would shut down when the weapon was detected by their radar. Now the HARM has nothing to "home" on and "goes stupid". However, that is still a win because the radar is useless when shut off. If the radar was guiding/illuminating etc. for a SAM, the SAM also goes stupid. The vast majority of HARM missiles launched in combat didn't hit anything. They did force the radars to shut down if they wanted to "survive". Russia eventually responded by (allegedly) giving their SAM systems the ability to leave the radar on and shoot down anti-radiation missiles. How well that works in practice I do not know, but I have my doubts.

The AARGM was developed to defeat the tactic of the radar shutting down. The US got tired of spending lots of money for missiles that never hit anything :-). The AARGM has an infrared CCD array and a W-band radar that can search for and recognize the target radar by "looking" at it. (this is open source). If the radar shuts down, the AARGM can fly the last line of bearing it had looking for the target. The AARGM can also go into a "search" mode if it flies far enough that "it should have seen it by now". The AARGM sometimes "works" if the radar shuts down, but not always. From what I hear it is now much better at recognizing targets than it used to be.

Note that in this mode GPS is not required AT ALL. The SAM radars can operate intermittently, being on for a "short time" (less than a minute) and off for several minutes. This can cause the HARM to miss because it gets no steering updates during that time and it may get far enough off course it can't hear the radar even if it comes back on.  If it has flown past and isn't an AARGM, there is no chance of a hit. SAM radars can do this if they are guiding an ARH missile. It only needs "periodic" updates. They cannot if they are illuminating for a SARH missile.

HARM also works in L band, so GPS jammers are detectable and targetable. GPS jammers must operate nearly continuously to be effective. A very high duty cycle is absolutely mandatory. If they shut off for even a short time the GPS on the precision guided munitions can get a series of good "fixes" and operate almost normally. The GPS jammers also have no way of detecting an inbound anti-radiation missile (like a SAM radar probably can) and therefore cannot shut down until it is "safe". The HARMs should eat them up. Therefore, if the Ukrainians have this capability available at scale, why aren't they using it? My conclusion is that they have it but not "at scale".

Continued in next post, but may be very TL;DR :-).

Thank you for your usual comprehensive and informative reply.  Here is another article on what they call the Drone Dileman

https://www.usatoday.com/story/graphics/...347448007/

I wish I had a better background in this kinid of stuff, but back in the day my focus was on another aspect of warfare.

[Goose]

(Continued from previous post)
I would strongly suggest reading https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AGM-88_HARM, at least the Ukraine section. It describes how Ukraine should be hunting SAM site with HARMs. Random targets of opportunity that NATO sigint doesn't know about exist, but are rare. A fighter would have to "stumble across" them.
 
The idea of "just adding another ESM receiver" to a Russian fighter and using it to geolocate Radars using triangulation is basically a total fantasy. The reasons why are many.  Very few fighter aircraft carry "ESM grade" receiving systems at all, and certainly not "ESM grade" DF systems. Their RWRs bearing accuracy is approximate at best. Much money spent optimizing the antenna placement and calibration of these RWRs. Lots of time is spent in anechoic chambers doing this. The idea that you can easily add another antenna and receiver somewhere on the aircraft and get good results is so improbable as to frankly be laughable.

In order to generate an "ESM grade" line of bearing that use useful in triangulating anything at many km range, that line of bearing (LOB) has to be quite accurate. You also may need a way to compensate for "cone error" due to the fact you are in the air at altitude and the radar is on the ground. The further away you are, the more accurate your "LOB" needs to be. In addition you need a "cross bearing" for even a simple triangulated solution. Where do you get the "second" bearing? Well, you can just fly for a while and get another measurement. How far do you have to fly? Well, that depends. If you are a long way from the radar, you have to fly a long way. You also have to fly "in the right direction", which you don't know. There is a thing called Geographic Distortion of Position (GDOP) If you take two bearing measurements from positions that are "close" together, you get two lines of bearing that intersect each other at a very acute angle. The Circular Error Probability (CEP) ellipse has a very, very long major axis. You have nothing approaching a firing solution. OK, fly for "a few" minutes. Make another measurement. However, since the problem we are trying to solve is locating an emitter that shuts down quickly, it will probably be gone before you fly far enough to beat the GDOP. It also may well be that the "best" direction to fly takes you into locations that are distinctly "unsafe" for your aircraft.

When one adds in the fact this notional target is a "radar target of opportunity", choosing to  prosecute it with a JDAM means you aren't doing your "original" mission. If you are "hunting" radars, you are going to need to fly to where you can see the radar. The JDAM range of 45 km from altitude is well within the range of S-X00 missile systems. You probably cannot survive flying around for minutes trying to get a geolocated solution to program into your "ipad", even if you had a DF system that could do that and software to help you. If you have a HARM, launch it and get out of Dodge or get low enough you can't "see" the radar on your RWR any more.

There are sigint aircraft that do have "precision" DF systems that can geolocate radars. These aircraft fly in areas where they are "safe" from threats (they hope), so they can stay there for a long time. Radars can shut down and come back on later. These aircraft have software that processes the many thousands of LOBs collected and "makes sense" of a lot of them, yielding good targeting solutions. These solutions are available (at least to US consumers) in time frames from hours to a day or so, depending.This is very "old" technology, but it works. The US also has high-flying elint drones that can do precision DF measurements. These drones use antenna technologies that have been perfected for this task. The data is uplinked and can be used to geolocate "pop up" targets relatively quickly. The drone may take a while to fly far enough to beat the GDOP, but generally it isn't going to get shot down, we hope. It also can fly over hostile territory more easily. If it gets targeted, it is much less of a loss than an RC-135. The P-8 also contains systems that can do a similar task. Presumably Ukraine has access to much of this capability.

It should be noted that the best way to geolocate emitting targets in today's world is almost always NOT "triangulation". There are other methods, including some "old" ones (TDOA) that work well and don't require LOBs. Nearly all these methods involve flying some distance in order to generate a good "solution" and they work better if the aircraft maneuvers while doing so. These approaches mostly don't require a LOB measurement as such. This turns out to be a big advantage as it removes lots of physical limitations on the antennas. An example can be found here, but it is one of many. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA452783.pdf In so far as I know, this particular research never led to a deployed system, but other similar ones have.

It also should be noted that if several sensors make simultaneous measurements of the same emitter at different geographic locations very accurate emitter location is possible. It can be done "after the fact" by post-mission processing of data collected from different platforms. It can also be done in "real time" by consumers who receive all the data via a satellite link or other means. This includes the various "sensors" themselves. It also should be noted that the F-35 has the capability to do this sort of thing, both as a sensor and as a consumer. It also has the ability to persist in a high threat airspace much longer that any SU-24 can. All that money did indeed buy us something :-).

Obviously, Ukraine has no F-35s, but there is no reason they can't have sigint aircraft of their own if they need them and it is a high enough priority. The equipment required to do it is mostly available COTS and that which isn't is easily within Ukraine's ability to procure from defense contractors. This makes much more sense and bang for the buck than trying to hang an ESM system on a MIG.

[Goose]

(Continued from previous post)
I would strongly suggest reading https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AGM-88_HARM, at least the Ukraine section. It describes how Ukraine should be hunting SAM site with HARMs. Random targets of opportunity that NATO sigint doesn't know about exist, but are rare. A fighter would have to "stumble across" them.
 
The idea of "just adding another ESM receiver" to a Russian fighter and using it to geolocate Radars using triangulation is basically a total fantasy. The reasons why are many.  Very few fighter aircraft carry "ESM grade" receiving systems at all, and certainly not "ESM grade" DF systems. Their RWRs bearing accuracy is approximate at best. Much money spent optimizing the antenna placement and calibration of these RWRs. Lots of time is spent in anechoic chambers doing this. The idea that you can easily add another antenna and receiver somewhere on the aircraft and get good results is so improbable as to frankly be laughable.

In order to generate an "ESM grade" line of bearing that use useful in triangulating anything at many km range, that line of bearing (LOB) has to be quite accurate. You also may need a way to compensate for "cone error" due to the fact you are in the air at altitude and the radar is on the ground. The further away you are, the more accurate your "LOB" needs to be. In addition you need a "cross bearing" for even a simple triangulated solution. Where do you get the "second" bearing? Well, you can just fly for a while and get another measurement. How far do you have to fly? Well, that depends. If you are a long way from the radar, you have to fly a long way. You also have to fly "in the right direction", which you don't know. There is a thing called Geographic Distortion of Position (GDOP) If you take two bearing measurements from positions that are "close" together, you get two lines of bearing that intersect each other at a very acute angle. The Circular Error Probability (CEP) ellipse has a very, very long major axis. You have nothing approaching a firing solution. OK, fly for "a few" minutes. Make another measurement. However, since the problem we are trying to solve is locating an emitter that shuts down quickly, it will probably be gone before you fly far enough to beat the GDOP. It also may well be that the "best" direction to fly takes you into locations that are distinctly "unsafe" for your aircraft.

When one adds in the fact this notional target is a "radar target of opportunity", choosing to  prosecute it with a JDAM means you aren't doing your "original" mission. If you are "hunting" radars, you are going to need to fly to where you can see the radar. The JDAM range of 45 km from altitude is well within the range of S-X00 missile systems. You probably cannot survive flying around for minutes trying to get a geolocated solution to program into your "ipad", even if you had a DF system that could do that and software to help you. If you have a HARM, launch it and get out of Dodge or get low enough you can't "see" the radar on your RWR any more.

There are sigint aircraft that do have "precision" DF systems that can geolocate radars. These aircraft fly in areas where they are "safe" from threats (they hope), so they can stay there for a long time. Radars can shut down and come back on later. These aircraft have software that processes the many thousands of LOBs collected and "makes sense" of a lot of them, yielding good targeting solutions. These solutions are available (at least to US consumers) in time frames from hours to a day or so, depending.This is very "old" technology, but it works. The US also has high-flying elint drones that can do precision DF measurements. These drones use antenna technologies that have been perfected for this task. The data is uplinked and can be used to geolocate "pop up" targets relatively quickly. The drone may take a while to fly far enough to beat the GDOP, but generally it isn't going to get shot down, we hope. It also can fly over hostile territory more easily. If it gets targeted, it is much less of a loss than an RC-135. The P-8 also contains systems that can do a similar task. Presumably Ukraine has access to much of this capability.

It should be noted that the best way to geolocate emitting targets in today's world is almost always NOT "triangulation". There are other methods, including some "old" ones (TDOA) that work well and don't require LOBs. Nearly all these methods involve flying some distance in order to generate a good "solution" and they work better if the aircraft maneuvers while doing so. These approaches mostly don't require a LOB measurement as such. This turns out to be a big advantage as it removes lots of physical limitations on the antennas. An example can be found here, but it is one of many. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA452783.pdf In so far as I know, this particular research never led to a deployed system, but other similar ones have.

It also should be noted that if several sensors make simultaneous measurements of the same emitter at different geographic locations very accurate emitter location is possible. It can be done "after the fact" by post-mission processing of data collected from different platforms. It can also be done in "real time" by consumers who receive all the data via a satellite link or other means. This includes the various "sensors" themselves. It also should be noted that the F-35 has the capability to do this sort of thing, both as a sensor and as a consumer. It also has the ability to persist in a high threat airspace much longer that any SU-24 can. All that money did indeed buy us something :-).

Obviously, Ukraine has no F-35s, but there is no reason they can't have sigint aircraft of their own if they need them and it is a high enough priority. The equipment required to do it is mostly available COTS and that which isn't is easily within Ukraine's ability to procure from defense contractors. This makes much more sense and bang for the buck than trying to hang an ESM system on a MIG.

[gocard14]

Well timed for your last post:

https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-buys-81-so...nd%201980s.

We just bought 81 Soviet jets from Kazakhstan. Presumably these will be sent to Ukraine. No comments on their air worthiness but suspect these will just be for parts.

[gocard14]

Well timed for your last post:

https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-buys-81-so...nd%201980s.

We just bought 81 Soviet jets from Kazakhstan. Presumably these will be sent to Ukraine. No comments on their air worthiness but suspect these will just be for parts.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-buys-81-so...27753.html

One of the Stans doing something Russia doesn't like much. IMO the most "interesting part is at the end of the article.

Some of Russia's outspoken propagandists have suggested that Russia should look to Kazakhstan next following its invasion of Ukraine.
One notable Russian TV commentator, Vladimir Solovyov, said that his country "must pay attention to the fact that Kazakhstan is the next problem because the same Nazi processes can start there as in Ukraine."

Obviously a message there, and one that won't be ignored if Ukraine is defeated. Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin believed the Stans were all more trouble than they were worth. Putin may not agree. Even if he doesn't want them as part of the Russian Federation, he most definitely wants to be able to control them. One big reason now is that he needs them to host pipelines to people willing to buy Russian oil and gas. Sea transport isn't guaranteed in these days of sanctions. The Stans know this.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-buys-81-so...27753.html

One of the Stans doing something Russia doesn't like much. IMO the most "interesting part is at the end of the article.

Some of Russia's outspoken propagandists have suggested that Russia should look to Kazakhstan next following its invasion of Ukraine.
One notable Russian TV commentator, Vladimir Solovyov, said that his country "must pay attention to the fact that Kazakhstan is the next problem because the same Nazi processes can start there as in Ukraine."

Obviously a message there, and one that won't be ignored if Ukraine is defeated. Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin believed the Stans were all more trouble than they were worth. Putin may not agree. Even if he doesn't want them as part of the Russian Federation, he most definitely wants to be able to control them. One big reason now is that he needs them to host pipelines to people willing to buy Russian oil and gas. Sea transport isn't guaranteed in these days of sanctions. The Stans know this.

[BostonCard]

https://x.com/ralee85/status/1783972910333407356?s=46

https://x.com/tatarigami_ua/status/17842...60441?s=46

A couple of sobering assessments of the current situation.

BC

[BostonCard]

https://x.com/ralee85/status/1783972910333407356?s=46

https://x.com/tatarigami_ua/status/17842...60441?s=46

A couple of sobering assessments of the current situation.

BC

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-retre...17492.html

I guess those C-17s are waiting to clear customs. Seriously, once again, we fail to move at the speed of war. It kills people. Lots of things in war are "difficult" and in many cases you can't move as fast as you want to. I fully appreciate that. This case definitely should not be one of them. We control the material and we control the transport.  How that is done is completely on us, and we have failed to meet the high standard that we expect of our military. If the aid was in Ukraine and was not being distributed effectively, that would be "bad" but to some degree not in our control. It appears that is not the problem however.

UPDATE:
https://www.yahoo.com/news/nato-chief-un...14175.html

Riiiiight. Things are different now exactly how?

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-retre...17492.html

I guess those C-17s are waiting to clear customs. Seriously, once again, we fail to move at the speed of war. It kills people. Lots of things in war are "difficult" and in many cases you can't move as fast as you want to. I fully appreciate that. This case definitely should not be one of them. We control the material and we control the transport.  How that is done is completely on us, and we have failed to meet the high standard that we expect of our military. If the aid was in Ukraine and was not being distributed effectively, that would be "bad" but to some degree not in our control. It appears that is not the problem however.

UPDATE:
https://www.yahoo.com/news/nato-chief-un...14175.html

Riiiiight. Things are different now exactly how?