https://www.yahoo.com/news/mine-clearing...12470.html
This article in a lot of ways highlights the weaknesses of the Ukraine and the West in this war. Unfortunately, they appear to be deeply embedded. The Ukrainians are facing mine fields that are 3 to 10 miles deep. These minefields took a long time to emplace and both the US and Ukrainian intelligence units watched it being done. Ukraine did not have the combat power at the time to meaningfully interfere. Even a good artillery stonk would make such mine laying operations difficult. It is true however that many of these minefields were laid in areas that were quite far behind the FEBA at the time. It was obvious that Russia intended to retreat behind them, which in many places they have done. Not a novel strategy, and it played out over quite a long time.
NATO promised Ukraine lots of mine clearing gear. However, as the article states
Quote:A Ukrainian official told the Post that it had only received around 15% of the specialist de-mining equipment it had requested from Western allies. A US official responded that it would provide all the equipment requested, but there were problems providing it on the scale requested in a timely way.
Well, we only had about a year to do it. Our efforts in Ukraine have a terminal case of "the slows". We do not operate proactively and plan for likely eventualities so we can respond "in a timely way". Our priorities are elsewhere, and that has and is risking defeat in Ukraine. This isn't a "new" theme in my posts, but unfortunately we just aren't getting better. Would we do a better job if it was our troops at the "pointy end"? Given recent events in Afghanistan, I doubt it. IMO our military is "sick" again. One symptom is the inability to recruit even at the current "minimalist" levels we aim at. This is very much "not pretty".
A second problem is that Ukraine has not yet adapted to the idea that they too need to utilize speed and surprise if they are going to "fight like NATO". Last summer, Ukraine supposedly had "several" armored brigades that were going to conduct an offensive. They didn't exist, apparently. Fortunately for Ukraine, in September some enterprising officers found a "weak spot" in Kharkiv Oblast and received permission to attack. The Russian resistance was totally out-maned and crumbled. Behind it was nothing. Ukraine poured through and captured lots of territory before they met organized resistance. However, even in that success there was a "pause" of about 4 days after the initial advance. Ukraine just wasn't resourced to conduct a continuous, quick advance. They would have accomplished a lot more and gone a lot farther if those four days could have been spent advancing.
The limitations on what Ukraine could do at that time was not their "fault". They were operating with an improvised force that was basically infantry and had little or no organic transport. Most of the troops had no "formal training". All along since the Russian invasion that was the case. It makes Ukraine's successful defense and counter-attacks even more laudable. Recognizing this, a large program was put together to equip and train a Ukrainian striking force that could operate as a combined arms force. That was done, which is good. The Russian response was a "hedgehog" protected by mines. Not a surprise.
Ukraine has not yet been able to operate their "new" combined-arms elements because they are stymied by the minefields and the fear of Russian air. Both factors were foreseeable. In the above article, the Ukrainians complained that the German mine clearance vehicles were "big, noisy, and easily destroyed". Obviously, the plan should be to deny the Russians advance knowledge of where you intend to "break in" to the minefield and to arrive with enough force to suppress the defensive fire while you break through. Yes, the Russians can see and hear you, but you are showering them with so much smoke and explosive that they can't raise their heads to shoot and they can't actually see anything! That is how it has to be done. Get through that field and "on" them before their rear echelon can react and reinforce/counterattack.
That isn't the Russian way and so far it isn't the Ukrainian way. Their DNA tells them to laboriously clear the minefield "by hand". The fact the minefields are very deep makes a "quick" breech difficult. That is why the Russians did it that way. However, Ukraine needs to concentrate their forces to allow it to be done "quickly". That isn't easy, and it takes experience and rehearsals. Hard to do when you are fighting for your existence. Even harder if all your higher-level officers are trained in a different approach. It is even harder if you only have 15% of what you think is needed. Concentrating all your mine clearance capability for one attack may be fine if it works, but what if it doesn't? Who wants to sign up to take that risk? How many Bradley IFVs is "OK" to lose in doing it, if you don't know you can replace them? No wonder Ukraine has reverted to "fighting like Russians". They are culturally adverse to the idea of identifying a "schwerpunkt" and going "all in" on an attack. They want to attack everywhere and reinforce success. Russia, at least in the past, could do that because they had unlimited personnel and artillery. They could also lose a lot of territory and survive it. Ukraine simply is not in that situation.
It may very well be that Ukraine can "break in" someplace and we will see a rapid advance with no pauses. We all hope so, because every pause gives the Russians time to react. Generally, the Russians do not react quickly, so keeping them on the "back foot" is an advantage. Let us hope we will see that, but let us also prepare and plan for what comes next if it doesn't.
