[GK3]

Do have any idea why Turkey continues to prevent Sweden from joining NATO?  I know there is religious event issue, but can't we make the guy an offer he can't refuse?

No, we can't. If you look back through the posts you will see that I have believed this problem would persist at least until well after the election, and possibly beyond that. This was before the "religious event" even happened. Erdoğan did and does receive significant political benefit in Türkiye for his stance. He needed every bit of that he could get to win a very close election. The problem is now that he can't really back away from that position or he will lose that support going into what will undoubtedly be a difficult economic period for Türkiye.

It is undoubtedly also true that he believes that Sweden can stop these demonstrations if they want to, and the fact they do not is a sign they do not respect him or his government. While a lot of that is simply that in Sweden, dissent is somewhat protected by law, there is a grain of truth in Erdoğan's perception. Sweden has tolerated the PKK operating inside their country. These people are not Swedish. They probably could have been deported. They were not, partly because there is sympathy for the Kurds in lots of the NATO countries. Erdoğan really doesn't like that and asks how the alliance can have members that don't respect each other's governments. While he does have a point there, I am pretty sure the US State Department doesn't hold his government in very high esteem either, IMO for good reason.

He seems half in Russia's camp anyway.

Not really. He needs Russian tourists to support his economy, but with the war going on that may be a bit of a depressed market. He needs to play both sides to support his increasingly deteriorating economic situation. The EU has convinced Türkiye that it is not wanted in Europe unless it changes some basic aspects of it's society, which it is unwilling to do. Once that message was received and understood, Türkiye really had to look for a new "niche" in the world. This current straddle is an attempt to do that. Türkiye is in NATO for basically 1.5 reasons. Reason 1 is it's strategic location. It contains Russia's access to the Mediterranean Sea. That is basically "priceless" and got Türkiye into NATO despite the fact the Greeks hated them and they were (at the time of admission) not really a "military asset" to the alliance. The other 0.5 was that the Turks were staunchly anti-communist and had a long history of fighting Russia. They feared and hated a Godless, communist Russia much more than just about anything else. Unfortunately, this is no longer true.

It makes no sense that we let one country out of many dictate membership when it gets its nose in a snit. Seems like we need a better arrangement, but I guess I can say good luck on that.

NATO has always "made sense" only as an alliance of disparate nations, many of which didn't much like each other, who feared the USSR enough to swallow their doubts. Greece put up with Türkiye even though they periodically to this day shoot at each other. France (de Gaulle) pulled out of the "military" wing of NATO because he felt it constrained French policy too much. All the NATO war plans had two scenarios for may years. 1) France fights, 2) France doesn't fight. Made things real complicated for the FRG. The "problem" today is that Sweden now fears Russia enough to want to join NATO, while Türkiye fears Russia too little to swallow their (Erdoğan's) "doubts".

Your points are well taken, but if I were Turkey I would start looking for other sources of natural gas. It will get 25 or 30 percent of its needs from its new field in the Black Sea, it should be able to work out deals with Egypt and its new field in the Med, Israel and its local neighbors.  Being dependent on Russia for anything is in today's day and age is a Fool's Errand.  I would be disturbed by the Russian built and controlled Nuclear facility very close to US Bases in Turkey.  They are letting more than the camel's nose into the tent.
Historically, Turkish control of the water way between the Med and the Black Sea has been their ace in the hole.  Today, I wonder how hard would it really be for the US and its allies to simply close those straights to ship traffic with no help from Turkey?

I am a bit afraid that before this mess is all over with, Turkey may have to decide which way it wants to go.  Plenty of US Companies who want to continue trading with Russia are finding homes in Turkey.

Interesting articles on this complex issue:

https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/06/tur...20security.

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/tu...ssian-gas/

[GK3]

Do have any idea why Turkey continues to prevent Sweden from joining NATO?  I know there is religious event issue, but can't we make the guy an offer he can't refuse?

No, we can't. If you look back through the posts you will see that I have believed this problem would persist at least until well after the election, and possibly beyond that. This was before the "religious event" even happened. Erdoğan did and does receive significant political benefit in Türkiye for his stance. He needed every bit of that he could get to win a very close election. The problem is now that he can't really back away from that position or he will lose that support going into what will undoubtedly be a difficult economic period for Türkiye.

It is undoubtedly also true that he believes that Sweden can stop these demonstrations if they want to, and the fact they do not is a sign they do not respect him or his government. While a lot of that is simply that in Sweden, dissent is somewhat protected by law, there is a grain of truth in Erdoğan's perception. Sweden has tolerated the PKK operating inside their country. These people are not Swedish. They probably could have been deported. They were not, partly because there is sympathy for the Kurds in lots of the NATO countries. Erdoğan really doesn't like that and asks how the alliance can have members that don't respect each other's governments. While he does have a point there, I am pretty sure the US State Department doesn't hold his government in very high esteem either, IMO for good reason.

He seems half in Russia's camp anyway.

Not really. He needs Russian tourists to support his economy, but with the war going on that may be a bit of a depressed market. He needs to play both sides to support his increasingly deteriorating economic situation. The EU has convinced Türkiye that it is not wanted in Europe unless it changes some basic aspects of it's society, which it is unwilling to do. Once that message was received and understood, Türkiye really had to look for a new "niche" in the world. This current straddle is an attempt to do that. Türkiye is in NATO for basically 1.5 reasons. Reason 1 is it's strategic location. It contains Russia's access to the Mediterranean Sea. That is basically "priceless" and got Türkiye into NATO despite the fact the Greeks hated them and they were (at the time of admission) not really a "military asset" to the alliance. The other 0.5 was that the Turks were staunchly anti-communist and had a long history of fighting Russia. They feared and hated a Godless, communist Russia much more than just about anything else. Unfortunately, this is no longer true.

It makes no sense that we let one country out of many dictate membership when it gets its nose in a snit. Seems like we need a better arrangement, but I guess I can say good luck on that.

NATO has always "made sense" only as an alliance of disparate nations, many of which didn't much like each other, who feared the USSR enough to swallow their doubts. Greece put up with Türkiye even though they periodically to this day shoot at each other. France (de Gaulle) pulled out of the "military" wing of NATO because he felt it constrained French policy too much. All the NATO war plans had two scenarios for may years. 1) France fights, 2) France doesn't fight. Made things real complicated for the FRG. The "problem" today is that Sweden now fears Russia enough to want to join NATO, while Türkiye fears Russia too little to swallow their (Erdoğan's) "doubts".

Your points are well taken, but if I were Turkey I would start looking for other sources of natural gas. It will get 25 or 30 percent of its needs from its new field in the Black Sea, it should be able to work out deals with Egypt and its new field in the Med, Israel and its local neighbors.  Being dependent on Russia for anything is in today's day and age is a Fool's Errand.  I would be disturbed by the Russian built and controlled Nuclear facility very close to US Bases in Turkey.  They are letting more than the camel's nose into the tent.
Historically, Turkish control of the water way between the Med and the Black Sea has been their ace in the hole.  Today, I wonder how hard would it really be for the US and its allies to simply close those straights to ship traffic with no help from Turkey?

I am a bit afraid that before this mess is all over with, Turkey may have to decide which way it wants to go.  Plenty of US Companies who want to continue trading with Russia are finding homes in Turkey.

Interesting articles on this complex issue:

https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/06/tur...20security.

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/tu...ssian-gas/

[dabigv13]

Two MICLIC mine clearing rocket charges fired here in this video, north of Bakhmut, apparently by Ukrainian forces.

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/16694...21888?s=20
[/tweet]

An informative thread on Russian employment of mines
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status...64225?s=20
[/tweet]

[dabigv13]

Two MICLIC mine clearing rocket charges fired here in this video, north of Bakhmut, apparently by Ukrainian forces.

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/16694...21888?s=20
[/tweet]

An informative thread on Russian employment of mines
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status...64225?s=20
[/tweet]

[OutsiderFan]

No arms for you Hungary, until you approve Sweden to join NATO:
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-sena...023-06-14/

I don't buy Hungary's act for a minute. Of course they want HIMARS. Jens Stoltenberg is on record saying he expects Sweden to join NATO in July, suggesting Turkey will do the needful. We shall see, but this move to block an arms sale certainly shows seriousness about making it happen by then.

[OutsiderFan]

No arms for you Hungary, until you approve Sweden to join NATO:
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-sena...023-06-14/

I don't buy Hungary's act for a minute. Of course they want HIMARS. Jens Stoltenberg is on record saying he expects Sweden to join NATO in July, suggesting Turkey will do the needful. We shall see, but this move to block an arms sale certainly shows seriousness about making it happen by then.

[Goose]

No arms for you Hungary, until you approve Sweden to join NATO:
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-sena...023-06-14/

I don't buy Hungary's act for a minute. Of course they want HIMARS.

Indeed they do, but they can't afford it. Their financial problems with the EU are ongoing. They probably want the US to foot all or part of the bill. From their point of vew, it makes sense. We are giving them to Ukraine free for nothing, why should Hungary pay? This is a win-win for the current regime. If the US puts up the money, they can declare victory. If the US doesn't, they can claim they "stood on principle" to the anti-US sentiment their political base, which for them is also a "win".

Jens Stoltenberg is on record saying he expects Sweden to join NATO in July, suggesting Turkey will do the needful. We shall see, but this move to block an arms sale certainly shows seriousness about making it happen by then.

Stoltenberg may or may not have a commitment from Turkey, but I would bet he does not. https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-e...ato-hopes/ You are correct, we shall see. On top of that, what is "true" today may not be true on July 11 in Vilnius.

[Goose]

No arms for you Hungary, until you approve Sweden to join NATO:
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-sena...023-06-14/

I don't buy Hungary's act for a minute. Of course they want HIMARS.

Indeed they do, but they can't afford it. Their financial problems with the EU are ongoing. They probably want the US to foot all or part of the bill. From their point of vew, it makes sense. We are giving them to Ukraine free for nothing, why should Hungary pay? This is a win-win for the current regime. If the US puts up the money, they can declare victory. If the US doesn't, they can claim they "stood on principle" to the anti-US sentiment their political base, which for them is also a "win".

Jens Stoltenberg is on record saying he expects Sweden to join NATO in July, suggesting Turkey will do the needful. We shall see, but this move to block an arms sale certainly shows seriousness about making it happen by then.

Stoltenberg may or may not have a commitment from Turkey, but I would bet he does not. https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-e...ato-hopes/ You are correct, we shall see. On top of that, what is "true" today may not be true on July 11 in Vilnius.

[TrumpCard]

With the caveat that the fog of war is thick right now, does it not seem like the front line is largely stalemated?

[TrumpCard]

With the caveat that the fog of war is thick right now, does it not seem like the front line is largely stalemated?

[Goose]

With the caveat that the fog of war is thick right now, does it not seem like the front line is largely stalemated?

I don't think it is "stalemated" as such because Ukraine is still doing things. Supposedly they have committed only 3 of their newly trained combined arms brigades. The question remains, what next? Ukraine has the initiative still. What they do with it is TBD.

[Goose]

With the caveat that the fog of war is thick right now, does it not seem like the front line is largely stalemated?

I don't think it is "stalemated" as such because Ukraine is still doing things. Supposedly they have committed only 3 of their newly trained combined arms brigades. The question remains, what next? Ukraine has the initiative still. What they do with it is TBD.

[gocard14]

With the caveat that the fog of war is thick right now, does it not seem like the front line is largely stalemated?

I don't think it is "stalemated" as such because Ukraine is still doing things. Supposedly they have committed only 3 of their newly trained combined arms brigades. The question remains, what next? Ukraine has the initiative still. What they do with it is TBD.

My guess is that Ukraine is trying to attrit Russian forces in the region as much as possible prior to launching larger pushes. They’ve launched some RIFs, perhaps with the goal of drawing Russian reserves towards the front lines and into artillery/Himars range. This is supported by both Ukraines published Russian casualties (taken with a grain of salt) and videos showing a lot of Russian arty casualties. They may also be hoping to trigger counterattacks with the idea that they’d rather face the enemy while defending newly taken lines then assaulting those same troops while they play defense. 

This could continue for a while, so long as Ukraine feels that time and attrition is on their side. Eventually they may start to feel the ticking clock in the political need to make meaningful progress before winter or in shrinking stockpiles of shells/ammo. 

Lot of chatter today about increasing new Ukrainian EW tech on the front lines disrupting Russian drones. I have to think they wouldn’t deploy that until something is imminent. my limited understanding of EW is that is often a cat a mouse game, with short lived effects due to software based counters. As such, you would think the Ukrainians would save that ace in the hole for an opportune moment.

[gocard14]

With the caveat that the fog of war is thick right now, does it not seem like the front line is largely stalemated?

I don't think it is "stalemated" as such because Ukraine is still doing things. Supposedly they have committed only 3 of their newly trained combined arms brigades. The question remains, what next? Ukraine has the initiative still. What they do with it is TBD.

My guess is that Ukraine is trying to attrit Russian forces in the region as much as possible prior to launching larger pushes. They’ve launched some RIFs, perhaps with the goal of drawing Russian reserves towards the front lines and into artillery/Himars range. This is supported by both Ukraines published Russian casualties (taken with a grain of salt) and videos showing a lot of Russian arty casualties. They may also be hoping to trigger counterattacks with the idea that they’d rather face the enemy while defending newly taken lines then assaulting those same troops while they play defense. 

This could continue for a while, so long as Ukraine feels that time and attrition is on their side. Eventually they may start to feel the ticking clock in the political need to make meaningful progress before winter or in shrinking stockpiles of shells/ammo. 

Lot of chatter today about increasing new Ukrainian EW tech on the front lines disrupting Russian drones. I have to think they wouldn’t deploy that until something is imminent. my limited understanding of EW is that is often a cat a mouse game, with short lived effects due to software based counters. As such, you would think the Ukrainians would save that ace in the hole for an opportune moment.

[Hurlburt88]

https://michaelmcfaul.substack.com/p/con...a-73609993

turning to the strategic versus current/tactical in this article

[Hurlburt88]

https://michaelmcfaul.substack.com/p/con...a-73609993

turning to the strategic versus current/tactical in this article

[Goose]

With the caveat that the fog of war is thick right now, does it not seem like the front line is largely stalemated?

I don't think it is "stalemated" as such because Ukraine is still doing things. Supposedly they have committed only 3 of their newly trained combined arms brigades. The question remains, what next? Ukraine has the initiative still. What they do with it is TBD.

My guess is that Ukraine is trying to attrit Russian forces in the region as much as possible prior to launching larger pushes. They’ve launched some RIFs, perhaps with the goal of drawing Russian reserves towards the front lines and into artillery/Himars range. This is supported by both Ukraines published Russian casualties (taken with a grain of salt) and videos showing a lot of Russian arty casualties. They may also be hoping to trigger counterattacks with the idea that they’d rather face the enemy while defending newly taken lines then assaulting those same troops while they play defense. 

This could continue for a while, so long as Ukraine feels that time and attrition is on their side. Eventually they may start to feel the ticking clock in the political need to make meaningful progress before winter or in shrinking stockpiles of shells/ammo. 

Lot of chatter today about increasing new Ukrainian EW tech on the front lines disrupting Russian drones. I have to think they wouldn’t deploy that until something is imminent. my limited understanding of EW is that is often a cat a mouse game, with short lived effects due to software based counters. As such, you would think the Ukrainians would save that ace in the hole for an opportune moment.

I agree with your analysis of what Ukraine is doing. I wouldn't be surprised to see them rotate their combined arms battalions to give as many as possible a chance to "shake out the kinks" and find out what their strengths and weaknesses are ("blooding" the troops). It will also build their confidence in their new organization and equipment, as well as find out first hand what their equipment doesn't do well. I also agree that the political pressure exists and will become an issue.

One other interesting effect is that Russia has indeed moved some troops from the "south" up towards Donetsk Oblast to "plug some holes in their defense". This is something I think Ukraine wants to see, allowing them to hit moving formations and also to pull troops out of fortified areas into more hastily constructed defensive positions in unfamiliar areas. Getting the Russians to "thrash", if possible, is a good thing.

The EW improvements Ukraine is fielding may or may not indicate they are "close" to major action. Indeed it is a field where one side responds to what the other side does, but the development cycle time is significant. In so far as western sanctions "work", Russia will have a more difficult time fielding new systems in response to Ukrainian activities even if their R&D is "adequate". It often also takes quite a bit of time to build the adequate stock of EW gear required to equip large formations and be effective. On top of that, both sides are always developing their "next gen" systems that will not be affected by what they predict their opponents are building. Often you must deploy your systems while they are still useful because you know the other side is getting  close to their next upgrade :-).

Ukraine has shown much agility in the EW field, so I think they have an advantage in the development cycle. However, they have a lot on their plate and IMO they perhaps got a bit complacent about their drone's successes. The small commercial drones are easy to jam, so it makes sense both sides now have a big problem using them. It should have happened much sooner, but neither side expected desperation would lead to such a level of adaptation. The next "cycle" should take a much longer time because it won't be so much COTS.

IMO this article really nails the current situation:
https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-count...21011.html

Ukraine is clearly still very worried about Russian air and is having trouble with Russian reconnaissance drones. The decision to utilize smaller operational units has been a typical Ukrainian response to these problems but it works against having sufficient mass to break through fortified positions. Ukraine is trying to work out how to do that. It is easier in the Donbas, because there is cover available in the terrain (at least in many areas). In the south, particularly in Kherson Oblast, there is no cover. They can see you, and that is a big problem if Russian Frontal Aviation is working.

[Goose]

With the caveat that the fog of war is thick right now, does it not seem like the front line is largely stalemated?

I don't think it is "stalemated" as such because Ukraine is still doing things. Supposedly they have committed only 3 of their newly trained combined arms brigades. The question remains, what next? Ukraine has the initiative still. What they do with it is TBD.

My guess is that Ukraine is trying to attrit Russian forces in the region as much as possible prior to launching larger pushes. They’ve launched some RIFs, perhaps with the goal of drawing Russian reserves towards the front lines and into artillery/Himars range. This is supported by both Ukraines published Russian casualties (taken with a grain of salt) and videos showing a lot of Russian arty casualties. They may also be hoping to trigger counterattacks with the idea that they’d rather face the enemy while defending newly taken lines then assaulting those same troops while they play defense. 

This could continue for a while, so long as Ukraine feels that time and attrition is on their side. Eventually they may start to feel the ticking clock in the political need to make meaningful progress before winter or in shrinking stockpiles of shells/ammo. 

Lot of chatter today about increasing new Ukrainian EW tech on the front lines disrupting Russian drones. I have to think they wouldn’t deploy that until something is imminent. my limited understanding of EW is that is often a cat a mouse game, with short lived effects due to software based counters. As such, you would think the Ukrainians would save that ace in the hole for an opportune moment.

I agree with your analysis of what Ukraine is doing. I wouldn't be surprised to see them rotate their combined arms battalions to give as many as possible a chance to "shake out the kinks" and find out what their strengths and weaknesses are ("blooding" the troops). It will also build their confidence in their new organization and equipment, as well as find out first hand what their equipment doesn't do well. I also agree that the political pressure exists and will become an issue.

One other interesting effect is that Russia has indeed moved some troops from the "south" up towards Donetsk Oblast to "plug some holes in their defense". This is something I think Ukraine wants to see, allowing them to hit moving formations and also to pull troops out of fortified areas into more hastily constructed defensive positions in unfamiliar areas. Getting the Russians to "thrash", if possible, is a good thing.

The EW improvements Ukraine is fielding may or may not indicate they are "close" to major action. Indeed it is a field where one side responds to what the other side does, but the development cycle time is significant. In so far as western sanctions "work", Russia will have a more difficult time fielding new systems in response to Ukrainian activities even if their R&D is "adequate". It often also takes quite a bit of time to build the adequate stock of EW gear required to equip large formations and be effective. On top of that, both sides are always developing their "next gen" systems that will not be affected by what they predict their opponents are building. Often you must deploy your systems while they are still useful because you know the other side is getting  close to their next upgrade :-).

Ukraine has shown much agility in the EW field, so I think they have an advantage in the development cycle. However, they have a lot on their plate and IMO they perhaps got a bit complacent about their drone's successes. The small commercial drones are easy to jam, so it makes sense both sides now have a big problem using them. It should have happened much sooner, but neither side expected desperation would lead to such a level of adaptation. The next "cycle" should take a much longer time because it won't be so much COTS.

IMO this article really nails the current situation:
https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-count...21011.html

Ukraine is clearly still very worried about Russian air and is having trouble with Russian reconnaissance drones. The decision to utilize smaller operational units has been a typical Ukrainian response to these problems but it works against having sufficient mass to break through fortified positions. Ukraine is trying to work out how to do that. It is easier in the Donbas, because there is cover available in the terrain (at least in many areas). In the south, particularly in Kherson Oblast, there is no cover. They can see you, and that is a big problem if Russian Frontal Aviation is working.

[GK3]

With the caveat that the fog of war is thick right now, does it not seem like the front line is largely stalemated?

I don't think it is "stalemated" as such because Ukraine is still doing things. Supposedly they have committed only 3 of their newly trained combined arms brigades. The question remains, what next? Ukraine has the initiative still. What they do with it is TBD.

My guess is that Ukraine is trying to attrit Russian forces in the region as much as possible prior to launching larger pushes. They’ve launched some RIFs, perhaps with the goal of drawing Russian reserves towards the front lines and into artillery/Himars range. This is supported by both Ukraines published Russian casualties (taken with a grain of salt) and videos showing a lot of Russian arty casualties. They may also be hoping to trigger counterattacks with the idea that they’d rather face the enemy while defending newly taken lines then assaulting those same troops while they play defense. 

This could continue for a while, so long as Ukraine feels that time and attrition is on their side. Eventually they may start to feel the ticking clock in the political need to make meaningful progress before winter or in shrinking stockpiles of shells/ammo. 

Lot of chatter today about increasing new Ukrainian EW tech on the front lines disrupting Russian drones. I have to think they wouldn’t deploy that until something is imminent. my limited understanding of EW is that is often a cat a mouse game, with short lived effects due to software based counters. As such, you would think the Ukrainians would save that ace in the hole for an opportune moment.

I agree with your analysis of what Ukraine is doing. I wouldn't be surprised to see them rotate their combined arms battalions to give as many as possible a chance to "shake out the kinks" and find out what their strengths and weaknesses are ("blooding" the troops). It will also build their confidence in their new organization and equipment, as well as find out first hand what their equipment doesn't do well. I also agree that the political pressure exists and will become an issue.

One other interesting effect is that Russia has indeed moved some troops from the "south" up towards Donetsk Oblast to "plug some holes in their defense". This is something I think Ukraine wants to see, allowing them to hit moving formations and also to pull troops out of fortified areas into more hastily constructed defensive positions in unfamiliar areas. Getting the Russians to "thrash", if possible, is a good thing.

The EW improvements Ukraine is fielding may or may not indicate they are "close" to major action. Indeed it is a field where one side responds to what the other side does, but the development cycle time is significant. In so far as western sanctions "work", Russia will have a more difficult time fielding new systems in response to Ukrainian activities even if their R&D is "adequate". It often also takes quite a bit of time to build the adequate stock of EW gear required to equip large formations and be effective. On top of that, both sides are always developing their "next gen" systems that will not be affected by what they predict their opponents are building. Often you must deploy your systems while they are still useful because you know the other side is getting  close to their next upgrade :-).

Ukraine has shown much agility in the EW field, so I think they have an advantage in the development cycle. However, they have a lot on their plate and IMO they perhaps got a bit complacent about their drone's successes. The small commercial drones are easy to jam, so it makes sense both sides now have a big problem using them. It should have happened much sooner, but neither side expected desperation would lead to such a level of adaptation. The next "cycle" should take a much longer time because it won't be so much COTS.

IMO this article really nails the current situation:
https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-count...21011.html

Ukraine is clearly still very worried about Russian air and is having trouble with Russian reconnaissance drones. The decision to utilize smaller operational units has been a typical Ukrainian response to these problems but it works against having sufficient mass to break through fortified positions. Ukraine is trying to work out how to do that. It is easier in the Donbas, because there is cover available in the terrain (at least in many areas). In the south, particularly in Kherson Oblast, there is no cover. They can see you, and that is a big problem if Russian Frontal Aviation is working.

Ukraine's constant pressure on Bakhmut seems to have caused Russia to move some of its best units to the Bakhmut to prevent furthr advance of Ukrainian units.  This may well play into Ukrainian plans by weakening a section of their defense that will make them more vulnerable to attack.  The more the Ukraine forces can get the Russians to play shuffle the troops, the better off they will be when they make a serious effort at breaking through.  
Putin continues to rattle the Nuclear Threat and seems unwilling to up the draft and declare martial law.  Should Ukraine achieve a breakthrough that threatens their lines of communication with Crimea I wonder what he will do.

[GK3]

With the caveat that the fog of war is thick right now, does it not seem like the front line is largely stalemated?

I don't think it is "stalemated" as such because Ukraine is still doing things. Supposedly they have committed only 3 of their newly trained combined arms brigades. The question remains, what next? Ukraine has the initiative still. What they do with it is TBD.

My guess is that Ukraine is trying to attrit Russian forces in the region as much as possible prior to launching larger pushes. They’ve launched some RIFs, perhaps with the goal of drawing Russian reserves towards the front lines and into artillery/Himars range. This is supported by both Ukraines published Russian casualties (taken with a grain of salt) and videos showing a lot of Russian arty casualties. They may also be hoping to trigger counterattacks with the idea that they’d rather face the enemy while defending newly taken lines then assaulting those same troops while they play defense. 

This could continue for a while, so long as Ukraine feels that time and attrition is on their side. Eventually they may start to feel the ticking clock in the political need to make meaningful progress before winter or in shrinking stockpiles of shells/ammo. 

Lot of chatter today about increasing new Ukrainian EW tech on the front lines disrupting Russian drones. I have to think they wouldn’t deploy that until something is imminent. my limited understanding of EW is that is often a cat a mouse game, with short lived effects due to software based counters. As such, you would think the Ukrainians would save that ace in the hole for an opportune moment.

I agree with your analysis of what Ukraine is doing. I wouldn't be surprised to see them rotate their combined arms battalions to give as many as possible a chance to "shake out the kinks" and find out what their strengths and weaknesses are ("blooding" the troops). It will also build their confidence in their new organization and equipment, as well as find out first hand what their equipment doesn't do well. I also agree that the political pressure exists and will become an issue.

One other interesting effect is that Russia has indeed moved some troops from the "south" up towards Donetsk Oblast to "plug some holes in their defense". This is something I think Ukraine wants to see, allowing them to hit moving formations and also to pull troops out of fortified areas into more hastily constructed defensive positions in unfamiliar areas. Getting the Russians to "thrash", if possible, is a good thing.

The EW improvements Ukraine is fielding may or may not indicate they are "close" to major action. Indeed it is a field where one side responds to what the other side does, but the development cycle time is significant. In so far as western sanctions "work", Russia will have a more difficult time fielding new systems in response to Ukrainian activities even if their R&D is "adequate". It often also takes quite a bit of time to build the adequate stock of EW gear required to equip large formations and be effective. On top of that, both sides are always developing their "next gen" systems that will not be affected by what they predict their opponents are building. Often you must deploy your systems while they are still useful because you know the other side is getting  close to their next upgrade :-).

Ukraine has shown much agility in the EW field, so I think they have an advantage in the development cycle. However, they have a lot on their plate and IMO they perhaps got a bit complacent about their drone's successes. The small commercial drones are easy to jam, so it makes sense both sides now have a big problem using them. It should have happened much sooner, but neither side expected desperation would lead to such a level of adaptation. The next "cycle" should take a much longer time because it won't be so much COTS.

IMO this article really nails the current situation:
https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-count...21011.html

Ukraine is clearly still very worried about Russian air and is having trouble with Russian reconnaissance drones. The decision to utilize smaller operational units has been a typical Ukrainian response to these problems but it works against having sufficient mass to break through fortified positions. Ukraine is trying to work out how to do that. It is easier in the Donbas, because there is cover available in the terrain (at least in many areas). In the south, particularly in Kherson Oblast, there is no cover. They can see you, and that is a big problem if Russian Frontal Aviation is working.

Ukraine's constant pressure on Bakhmut seems to have caused Russia to move some of its best units to the Bakhmut to prevent furthr advance of Ukrainian units.  This may well play into Ukrainian plans by weakening a section of their defense that will make them more vulnerable to attack.  The more the Ukraine forces can get the Russians to play shuffle the troops, the better off they will be when they make a serious effort at breaking through.  
Putin continues to rattle the Nuclear Threat and seems unwilling to up the draft and declare martial law.  Should Ukraine achieve a breakthrough that threatens their lines of communication with Crimea I wonder what he will do.

[TrumpCard]

I had forgotten that Jeff Flake (R-AZ) is the US Ambassador to Turkey. I’m guessing that’s been an interesting gig. Here are some quotes from him on Sweden’s prospects for getting into NATO:

https://www.axios.com/2023/06/15/sweden-...jeff-flake

[TrumpCard]

I had forgotten that Jeff Flake (R-AZ) is the US Ambassador to Turkey. I’m guessing that’s been an interesting gig. Here are some quotes from him on Sweden’s prospects for getting into NATO:

https://www.axios.com/2023/06/15/sweden-...jeff-flake

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-report...54636.html

This was anticipated. It is what Ukraine wants, probably, but IMO it is sooner than Ukraine wants. I think their hope was that the Ukraine would achieve a "larger" break-in that would require Russia to react quickly and therefore put the Russian troops at risk while moving. Russia has moved sooner than Ukraine anticipated IMO. The destruction of the dam may have been a step to ensure Ukraine couldn't quickly exploit the reduction in forces in Kherson Oblast. However, it is always good when your actions are forcing your enemy to re-deploy. Even if he is doing the "right thing", it increases "friction". It requires logistical support, vehicles break down, troops get "lost" (and possibly desert), and partisans blow up the bridges they need to use.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-report...54636.html

This was anticipated. It is what Ukraine wants, probably, but IMO it is sooner than Ukraine wants. I think their hope was that the Ukraine would achieve a "larger" break-in that would require Russia to react quickly and therefore put the Russian troops at risk while moving. Russia has moved sooner than Ukraine anticipated IMO. The destruction of the dam may have been a step to ensure Ukraine couldn't quickly exploit the reduction in forces in Kherson Oblast. However, it is always good when your actions are forcing your enemy to re-deploy. Even if he is doing the "right thing", it increases "friction". It requires logistical support, vehicles break down, troops get "lost" (and possibly desert), and partisans blow up the bridges they need to use.

[OutsiderFan]

I've seen maps of the Russian defense lines in the Z region. If Russia already believes they won't hold without moving assets from East to South, it doesn't augur well for them, IMO.

My question for months has been what does the "RISK board" look like in terms of how many forces are deployed where between Russia and Ukraine. I still have no idea, but it seems clear this move by Russia suggests it isn't very confident its previous distribution was going to hold occupied territory. This doesn't mean a new configuration won't work, but at some point, you are just re-arranging the deck chairs.

Nice to see Congress approving ATACMS for Ukraine but I'm curious how they are going to be needed next year as much as right now?

[OutsiderFan]

I've seen maps of the Russian defense lines in the Z region. If Russia already believes they won't hold without moving assets from East to South, it doesn't augur well for them, IMO.

My question for months has been what does the "RISK board" look like in terms of how many forces are deployed where between Russia and Ukraine. I still have no idea, but it seems clear this move by Russia suggests it isn't very confident its previous distribution was going to hold occupied territory. This doesn't mean a new configuration won't work, but at some point, you are just re-arranging the deck chairs.

Nice to see Congress approving ATACMS for Ukraine but I'm curious how they are going to be needed next year as much as right now?

[Goose]

I've seen maps of the Russian defense lines in the Z region. If Russia already believes they won't hold without moving assets from East to South, it doesn't augur well for them, IMO.

My question for months has been what does the "RISK board" look like in terms of how many forces are deployed where between Russia and Ukraine. I still have no idea, but it seems clear this move by Russia suggests it isn't very confident its previous distribution was going to hold occupied territory. This doesn't mean a new configuration won't work, but at some point, you are just re-arranging the deck chairs.

Ukrainian and Russian military intelligence spends lots of time on this, but their knowledge is imperfect. Unsurprisingly, they don't share this information, and you can rest assured that all of what we see in the press is wrong or incomplete. We just aren't going to know the ORBAT on either side. We also don't know the "reasons" Russia (or Ukraine) is doing what they are doing. It may be the units they are moving have been refitting in a quiet area of Kherson Oblast and were always intended to move about now into their "new" positions. However, the timing is indeed a bit suspicious. So far, Russia is looking "OK" in the south. Ukraine has made some gains but not big ones. The situation hasn't fundamentally changed and Melitopl isn't going to fall tomorrow. Still early days. Ukraine has been "doing things" indicating this is indeed an "axis" of advance.

Nice to see Congress approving ATACMS for Ukraine but I'm curious how they are going to be needed next year as much as right now?

Congress doesn't matter that much. Until the administration is willing to send them, they aren't going. Like many things Congress does, the effects are far enough in the future that things can be quietly changed and nobody will notice. The Congress gets the political credit. Their actions may increase the pressure to actually send them, so it isn't a total waste. However, the odds of Congress's actions actually mattering IMO are low.

[Goose]

I've seen maps of the Russian defense lines in the Z region. If Russia already believes they won't hold without moving assets from East to South, it doesn't augur well for them, IMO.

My question for months has been what does the "RISK board" look like in terms of how many forces are deployed where between Russia and Ukraine. I still have no idea, but it seems clear this move by Russia suggests it isn't very confident its previous distribution was going to hold occupied territory. This doesn't mean a new configuration won't work, but at some point, you are just re-arranging the deck chairs.

Ukrainian and Russian military intelligence spends lots of time on this, but their knowledge is imperfect. Unsurprisingly, they don't share this information, and you can rest assured that all of what we see in the press is wrong or incomplete. We just aren't going to know the ORBAT on either side. We also don't know the "reasons" Russia (or Ukraine) is doing what they are doing. It may be the units they are moving have been refitting in a quiet area of Kherson Oblast and were always intended to move about now into their "new" positions. However, the timing is indeed a bit suspicious. So far, Russia is looking "OK" in the south. Ukraine has made some gains but not big ones. The situation hasn't fundamentally changed and Melitopl isn't going to fall tomorrow. Still early days. Ukraine has been "doing things" indicating this is indeed an "axis" of advance.

Nice to see Congress approving ATACMS for Ukraine but I'm curious how they are going to be needed next year as much as right now?

Congress doesn't matter that much. Until the administration is willing to send them, they aren't going. Like many things Congress does, the effects are far enough in the future that things can be quietly changed and nobody will notice. The Congress gets the political credit. Their actions may increase the pressure to actually send them, so it isn't a total waste. However, the odds of Congress's actions actually mattering IMO are low.

[dabigv13]

We know the Russian ORBAT decently well. Click through the link below for a good article as well. Of course we don't know the actual condition of many of these units. 

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/konrad_muzyka/status/1668999661137403911?s=20[/tweet]

Ukrainian less certain and can shift more quickly due to interior lines. We know at least one of the nine new brigades is operating in Velyka Novosilka axis and one on Mala Tokmachka axis. Haven't seen them really near Bakhmut or Luhansk.

Likely some explanation for relative success for Ukraine on Velyka Novosilka axis is less concentration of Russian forces and being right where the Russian Center and South army groupings responsibilities meet up. The operation where we saw all the destroyed Leopards and Bradleys near Mala Tokmachka involved (per Russian reports) 5 different Russian units including GRU Spetznaz, whereas only two Russian regular units seemed to be in the area of all the villages near Velyka Novosilka that Ukraine reclaimed (the above link lists 4 units but I think there was only 2 initially in area).

Like others I think Ukraine is still in a mostly shaping phase. Lots of FPV drone videos and artillery strikes on Russian artillery, mine laying vehicles, ammo resupply trucks. They have been assaulting Russian positions but not with very large groupings, trying to get Russian reinforcements moving so they can get a sense of Russian defensive plans and find weaker spots for coming larger assaults. 

This was a clear eyed article on the challenge for Ukraine.

https://cepa.org/article/twitter-bubbles...offensive/

In other words, Ukraine is trying what no single NATO country has done since the alliance was created in 1949: to conduct large-scale combined arms maneuver operations against a near-peer or peer adversary. It is no exaggeration to say that, at present, no NATO country, with the exception — perhaps — of the US, possesses sufficient capabilities and resources to conduct an operation like this. To put this in perspective, the only time some NATO members fought a large-scale land campaign against a conventional – albeit much weaker – adversary during Operation Iraqi Freedom against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003, they enjoyed total air supremacy.

Ukraine has substantial advantages in morale and force quality. I think the supply situation for Russian frontline troops will become increasingly an issue and Ukraine will eventually make some big gains.

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/stat...77216?s=20[/tweet]

Would be really great if the railroad was damaged here.

[dabigv13]

We know the Russian ORBAT decently well. Click through the link below for a good article as well. Of course we don't know the actual condition of many of these units. 

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/konrad_muzyka/status/1668999661137403911?s=20[/tweet]

Ukrainian less certain and can shift more quickly due to interior lines. We know at least one of the nine new brigades is operating in Velyka Novosilka axis and one on Mala Tokmachka axis. Haven't seen them really near Bakhmut or Luhansk.

Likely some explanation for relative success for Ukraine on Velyka Novosilka axis is less concentration of Russian forces and being right where the Russian Center and South army groupings responsibilities meet up. The operation where we saw all the destroyed Leopards and Bradleys near Mala Tokmachka involved (per Russian reports) 5 different Russian units including GRU Spetznaz, whereas only two Russian regular units seemed to be in the area of all the villages near Velyka Novosilka that Ukraine reclaimed (the above link lists 4 units but I think there was only 2 initially in area).

Like others I think Ukraine is still in a mostly shaping phase. Lots of FPV drone videos and artillery strikes on Russian artillery, mine laying vehicles, ammo resupply trucks. They have been assaulting Russian positions but not with very large groupings, trying to get Russian reinforcements moving so they can get a sense of Russian defensive plans and find weaker spots for coming larger assaults. 

This was a clear eyed article on the challenge for Ukraine.

https://cepa.org/article/twitter-bubbles...offensive/

In other words, Ukraine is trying what no single NATO country has done since the alliance was created in 1949: to conduct large-scale combined arms maneuver operations against a near-peer or peer adversary. It is no exaggeration to say that, at present, no NATO country, with the exception — perhaps — of the US, possesses sufficient capabilities and resources to conduct an operation like this. To put this in perspective, the only time some NATO members fought a large-scale land campaign against a conventional – albeit much weaker – adversary during Operation Iraqi Freedom against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003, they enjoyed total air supremacy.

Ukraine has substantial advantages in morale and force quality. I think the supply situation for Russian frontline troops will become increasingly an issue and Ukraine will eventually make some big gains.

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/stat...77216?s=20[/tweet]

Would be really great if the railroad was damaged here.

[Goose]

We know the Russian ORBAT decently well. Click through the link below for a good article as well. Of course we don't know the actual condition of many of these units. 

https://twitter.com/konrad_muzyka/status...03911?s=20

It is a pretty good start, but unfortunately things are less certain than it appears. When a reference is made in the (really interesting) later slides to a "Motor Rifle Regiment", what is that exactly? The Russians have abandoned their BTG structure, but the latent effects include the fact that what used to be a "standard" TO for a given kind of unit varies widely. During the Soviet era, we knew what a Motor Rifle Regiment was supposed to include, how many men, how many BMPs etc. The units differed in their military potential based on their state of training and manning, but even that was systematized into A, B, and C units. You could do "apples to apples" evaluations. Today, it is unknown what any given regiment is supposed to have. On top of that, units have been "reconstituted" with replacement units that are of a different organization and state of training. So, even if ostensibly "fully manned" (whatever that is), they may not be able to fight together because of different training. This is in addition to any additional degradation due to less than optimal conditions inside what they do have. So, it is real hard to know what any given unit can actually do. OTOH, there are all sorts of additional units cited in the tweet that aren't part of the official formations but are present. Normally, I would expect to see "+" or "++" or (reinforced) on many of the tactical symbols reflecting what was going on with these "plus-up" units, but we don't see that. I assume that means nobody knows :-).

Ukrainian less certain and can shift more quickly due to interior lines. We know at least one of the nine new brigades is operating in Velyka Novosilka axis and one on Mala Tokmachka axis. Haven't seen them really near Bakhmut or Luhansk.

Likely some explanation for relative success for Ukraine on Velyka Novosilka axis is less concentration of Russian forces and being right where the Russian Center and South army groupings responsibilities meet up. The operation where we saw all the destroyed Leopards and Bradleys near Mala Tokmachka involved (per Russian reports) 5 different Russian units including GRU Spetznaz, whereas only two Russian regular units seemed to be in the area of all the villages near Velyka Novosilka that Ukraine reclaimed (the above link lists 4 units but I think there was only 2 initially in area).

Like others I think Ukraine is still in a mostly shaping phase. Lots of FPV drone videos and artillery strikes on Russian artillery, mine laying vehicles, ammo resupply trucks. They have been assaulting Russian positions but not with very large groupings, trying to get Russian reinforcements moving so they can get a sense of Russian defensive plans and find weaker spots for coming larger assaults. 

This was a clear eyed article on the challenge for Ukraine.
https://cepa.org/article/twitter-bubbles...offensive/

In other words, Ukraine is trying what no single NATO country has done since the alliance was created in 1949: to conduct large-scale combined arms maneuver operations against a near-peer or peer adversary. It is no exaggeration to say that, at present, no NATO country, with the exception — perhaps — of the US, possesses sufficient capabilities and resources to conduct an operation like this. To put this in perspective, the only time some NATO members fought a large-scale land campaign against a conventional – albeit much weaker – adversary during Operation Iraqi Freedom against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003, they enjoyed total air supremacy.

It is a good article, and your previous comments are pretty much spot on IMO. I would only add two things. First, the relatively small size of the Ukrainian groupings is IMO mostly due to a reluctance to give the Russians a lucrative air target. The Ukrainians have the resources to do more, and it is usually a bad idea to use less than overwhelming force if you have that force available. The problem for Ukraine is that if they concentrate to do that, the Russians may inflict major casualties from the air. Keeping the density down mitigates that problem. Second, the US isn't ever intending to execute a combined arms attack where we don't have air superiority and probably supremacy. It is always going to be too costly for the public, if not the troops. Yet, Ukraine is expected to go ahead and execute such an operation anyway. I think the Ukrainians have finally figured out what that means and don't like it one bit :-). They are hoping for a soft spot or that Russian air will under perform. It isn't a welcoming picture I think.

Ukraine has substantial advantages in morale and force quality. I think the supply situation for Russian frontline troops will become increasingly an issue and Ukraine will eventually make some big gains.

We hope so. One question is "Will Ivan fight?" and Ukraine hopes the answer is no. Running out of food, water, and/or ammunition can make one much less belligerent.

---

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-attac...36584.html

This is an example of something that needs to get fixed. These helicopters are difficult targets for SAMs because they stay relatively low and can drop below the radar horizon much more easily that a fixed wing aircraft. One vulnerability they do have is that many of their missiles are laser designated and the helicopter has to remain exposed to illuminate the target. Unfortunately, Ukraine has essentially zero SAM capability that can accompany advancing troops. The US doesn't either, but we have an air force. These helicopters are supposedly based in Berdyansk. That is within Storm Shadow range, but maybe the Russians spread them out so much that you can only kill one or two at a time.

[Goose]

We know the Russian ORBAT decently well. Click through the link below for a good article as well. Of course we don't know the actual condition of many of these units. 

https://twitter.com/konrad_muzyka/status...03911?s=20

It is a pretty good start, but unfortunately things are less certain than it appears. When a reference is made in the (really interesting) later slides to a "Motor Rifle Regiment", what is that exactly? The Russians have abandoned their BTG structure, but the latent effects include the fact that what used to be a "standard" TO for a given kind of unit varies widely. During the Soviet era, we knew what a Motor Rifle Regiment was supposed to include, how many men, how many BMPs etc. The units differed in their military potential based on their state of training and manning, but even that was systematized into A, B, and C units. You could do "apples to apples" evaluations. Today, it is unknown what any given regiment is supposed to have. On top of that, units have been "reconstituted" with replacement units that are of a different organization and state of training. So, even if ostensibly "fully manned" (whatever that is), they may not be able to fight together because of different training. This is in addition to any additional degradation due to less than optimal conditions inside what they do have. So, it is real hard to know what any given unit can actually do. OTOH, there are all sorts of additional units cited in the tweet that aren't part of the official formations but are present. Normally, I would expect to see "+" or "++" or (reinforced) on many of the tactical symbols reflecting what was going on with these "plus-up" units, but we don't see that. I assume that means nobody knows :-).

Ukrainian less certain and can shift more quickly due to interior lines. We know at least one of the nine new brigades is operating in Velyka Novosilka axis and one on Mala Tokmachka axis. Haven't seen them really near Bakhmut or Luhansk.

Likely some explanation for relative success for Ukraine on Velyka Novosilka axis is less concentration of Russian forces and being right where the Russian Center and South army groupings responsibilities meet up. The operation where we saw all the destroyed Leopards and Bradleys near Mala Tokmachka involved (per Russian reports) 5 different Russian units including GRU Spetznaz, whereas only two Russian regular units seemed to be in the area of all the villages near Velyka Novosilka that Ukraine reclaimed (the above link lists 4 units but I think there was only 2 initially in area).

Like others I think Ukraine is still in a mostly shaping phase. Lots of FPV drone videos and artillery strikes on Russian artillery, mine laying vehicles, ammo resupply trucks. They have been assaulting Russian positions but not with very large groupings, trying to get Russian reinforcements moving so they can get a sense of Russian defensive plans and find weaker spots for coming larger assaults. 

This was a clear eyed article on the challenge for Ukraine.
https://cepa.org/article/twitter-bubbles...offensive/

In other words, Ukraine is trying what no single NATO country has done since the alliance was created in 1949: to conduct large-scale combined arms maneuver operations against a near-peer or peer adversary. It is no exaggeration to say that, at present, no NATO country, with the exception — perhaps — of the US, possesses sufficient capabilities and resources to conduct an operation like this. To put this in perspective, the only time some NATO members fought a large-scale land campaign against a conventional – albeit much weaker – adversary during Operation Iraqi Freedom against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003, they enjoyed total air supremacy.

It is a good article, and your previous comments are pretty much spot on IMO. I would only add two things. First, the relatively small size of the Ukrainian groupings is IMO mostly due to a reluctance to give the Russians a lucrative air target. The Ukrainians have the resources to do more, and it is usually a bad idea to use less than overwhelming force if you have that force available. The problem for Ukraine is that if they concentrate to do that, the Russians may inflict major casualties from the air. Keeping the density down mitigates that problem. Second, the US isn't ever intending to execute a combined arms attack where we don't have air superiority and probably supremacy. It is always going to be too costly for the public, if not the troops. Yet, Ukraine is expected to go ahead and execute such an operation anyway. I think the Ukrainians have finally figured out what that means and don't like it one bit :-). They are hoping for a soft spot or that Russian air will under perform. It isn't a welcoming picture I think.

Ukraine has substantial advantages in morale and force quality. I think the supply situation for Russian frontline troops will become increasingly an issue and Ukraine will eventually make some big gains.

We hope so. One question is "Will Ivan fight?" and Ukraine hopes the answer is no. Running out of food, water, and/or ammunition can make one much less belligerent.

---

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-attac...36584.html

This is an example of something that needs to get fixed. These helicopters are difficult targets for SAMs because they stay relatively low and can drop below the radar horizon much more easily that a fixed wing aircraft. One vulnerability they do have is that many of their missiles are laser designated and the helicopter has to remain exposed to illuminate the target. Unfortunately, Ukraine has essentially zero SAM capability that can accompany advancing troops. The US doesn't either, but we have an air force. These helicopters are supposedly based in Berdyansk. That is within Storm Shadow range, but maybe the Russians spread them out so much that you can only kill one or two at a time.

[M T]

BBC has been carrying stories from embedded front-line reporter(s) in their coverage of the war.  For instance, this report.

[M T]

BBC has been carrying stories from embedded front-line reporter(s) in their coverage of the war.  For instance, this report.

[dabigv13]

This is interesting. 

https://www.defensenews.com/industry/202...-with-rtx/

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Air Force has awarded a nearly $1.2 billion contract to the missiles and defense sector of RTX, until recently known as Raytheon Technologies, to produce the next lot of AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles.



Part of the firm-fixed-price deal — the largest ever awarded for AMRAAM weapons — will cover missiles for sale to multiple foreign allies and partners, including Ukraine.

This bit in particular.

RTX said in its own statement the contract will be for the D3 and C8 versions of the AMRAAM, which have the latest F3R — which stands for form, fit, function refresh — upgrades to its software and hardware. Those AMRAAMs also have improved circuit cards and other hardware in their guidance systems.

I don't think it's publicly known what sort of AMRAAMs Ukraine has now for their NASAMS air defense system, but I think many assumed they were maybe earlier variants. Seems the US is comfortable sending out the latest and greatest tech into the field, perhaps Ukraine already has some of the more modern variants in their NASAMS now.

These would presumably be an option for any F16s Ukraine gets as well. While Russia would still likely have some advantage with their longest range AAMs, it would at least extend the F16s range out to give them some safe distance from the Russian ground based air defense system so they could patrol within Ukrainian air space but still pose a danger to Russian aircraft near the front line.


Oh and here's a fun video of a modern Russian Pantsir air defense system taking a couple shots at a Storm Shadow (or maybe MALD).


[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/SmartUACat/status/16...91712?s=20[/tweet]

[dabigv13]

This is interesting. 

https://www.defensenews.com/industry/202...-with-rtx/

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Air Force has awarded a nearly $1.2 billion contract to the missiles and defense sector of RTX, until recently known as Raytheon Technologies, to produce the next lot of AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles.



Part of the firm-fixed-price deal — the largest ever awarded for AMRAAM weapons — will cover missiles for sale to multiple foreign allies and partners, including Ukraine.

This bit in particular.

RTX said in its own statement the contract will be for the D3 and C8 versions of the AMRAAM, which have the latest F3R — which stands for form, fit, function refresh — upgrades to its software and hardware. Those AMRAAMs also have improved circuit cards and other hardware in their guidance systems.

I don't think it's publicly known what sort of AMRAAMs Ukraine has now for their NASAMS air defense system, but I think many assumed they were maybe earlier variants. Seems the US is comfortable sending out the latest and greatest tech into the field, perhaps Ukraine already has some of the more modern variants in their NASAMS now.

These would presumably be an option for any F16s Ukraine gets as well. While Russia would still likely have some advantage with their longest range AAMs, it would at least extend the F16s range out to give them some safe distance from the Russian ground based air defense system so they could patrol within Ukrainian air space but still pose a danger to Russian aircraft near the front line.


Oh and here's a fun video of a modern Russian Pantsir air defense system taking a couple shots at a Storm Shadow (or maybe MALD).


[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/SmartUACat/status/16...91712?s=20[/tweet]

[dabigv13]

Some weird shit is happening with Prigozhin and Wagner. He alleges that Russian MOD shelled a position of theirs, and has basically declared a March on Moscow. Russian security services are on alert in Moscow and other Russian cities, and official sources have said FSB has opened an investigation for treason. 
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/christogrozev/status...42342?s=20
[/Tweet]

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/DAlperovitch/status/1672346642614300673?s=20
[/tweet]

Very cool when your private army and your actual army are openly hostile and shooting at each other.

[dabigv13]

Some weird shit is happening with Prigozhin and Wagner. He alleges that Russian MOD shelled a position of theirs, and has basically declared a March on Moscow. Russian security services are on alert in Moscow and other Russian cities, and official sources have said FSB has opened an investigation for treason. 
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/christogrozev/status...42342?s=20
[/Tweet]

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/DAlperovitch/status/1672346642614300673?s=20
[/tweet]

Very cool when your private army and your actual army are openly hostile and shooting at each other.

[Treefence]

Definitely a wait and see what happens situation, but even if Russia is able to end this fast, it's a horrible look of instability for Russia. At this very least it's likely to force many reserves to protect key locations in Russia and make the public start to wonder, but this could really turn into something serious.  I'm guessing the most likely outcome is Prigozhin being arrested and locked up for the rest of his life or killed.  Couldn't happen at a worse time for Russia too, as Ukraine might get a spark from this and cause some panic in the Russian lines.

[Treefence]

Definitely a wait and see what happens situation, but even if Russia is able to end this fast, it's a horrible look of instability for Russia. At this very least it's likely to force many reserves to protect key locations in Russia and make the public start to wonder, but this could really turn into something serious.  I'm guessing the most likely outcome is Prigozhin being arrested and locked up for the rest of his life or killed.  Couldn't happen at a worse time for Russia too, as Ukraine might get a spark from this and cause some panic in the Russian lines.