[TrumpCard]

What incentive does Prigozhin have to switch sides?  Let’s assume he does switch sides and Ukraine drives Russia out of Ukrainian territory. What can Ukraine even give to Prigozhin at the end?  I guess a pardon for the horrific war crimes?  I can’t imagine Ukraine giving him a position of power.

[TrumpCard]

What incentive does Prigozhin have to switch sides?  Let’s assume he does switch sides and Ukraine drives Russia out of Ukrainian territory. What can Ukraine even give to Prigozhin at the end?  I guess a pardon for the horrific war crimes?  I can’t imagine Ukraine giving him a position of power.

[Goose]

Another very interesting event is  Girkin accusing Wagner of planning a coup against Putin while Wagner's boss states that Russia's leadership faces a revolution unless it puts the country on a "North Korea" type footing.  These kinds of statements coming for people other than Putin himself, makes it look like things are on the verge of coming apart for the Russian leadership.

It is "interesting". There is a question about how much is real and how much is theater. It does distract the masses from the real problems Russia has in this war. Popular unrest, real or imagined, is also a good excuse for full mobilization and dropping living standards. Who knows what is really "true".

All the stuff one reads about the F16 makes it seem that it won't make a big difference, but we are assuming that Russia's air force and air defense systems are in good shape and still very capable.  The invasion of Ukraine has made Russia's military seem far less capable that was originally believed, at least by public.

The politics and sociology of the F-16 to Ukraine is fascinating. You can see the different schools of thought in much of the stuff that emerges on the web. There is a lot of history here being re-examined and affecting people's judgements. You are correct, IMO, that the F-16s won't make a "big" difference, but they could still make a critical contribution. It is true that the Russian IADS has not functioned as such in and near Ukraine. The S-400s/300/BUKs seem to be doing their own acquisition, which is not doctrine. The Mainstays have been generally inactive in the AWACS function. Part of this is probably due to the Ukraine not being able to really mount an offensive threat. The Russian IADS is a primarily defensive asset. If you are not attacking in the air, you don't see much of it.

The Ukrainians are still thinking a bit like Russians in their evaluation of the air situation, which in this case is probably good. Though the PVO no longer exists in the actual force structure, it is indelibly embedded in the Russian air warfare strategy. The F-16s are being supplied mostly to keep Russian air off advancing Ukrainian troops. The F-16s will be flying in friendly air space and their goal will be preventing Russian air from operating at high altitude behind the FEBA and launching standoff weapons (like the "Russian JDAMS") against the Ukrainian troops.

Right now, the Russians can do this in absolute safety because the Ukrainian assets accompanying their advancing troops (which are relatively few by Russian standards) can't reach them. The Ukrainians don't even have S-400s that they could bring forward to threaten these high-altitude strikes (and the S-400 isn't designed for that anyway. Not mobile enough.) The Ukrainians has MANPADS/Avenger/ZSU-23 like systems to keep low altitude strikes by Russian air at significant risk, but they can do nothing against high altitude standoff weapons. The F-16 can operate at high altitudes in Ukrainian territory and be relatively safe from Russian anti-aircraft missiles. The Russian aircraft that launch the standoff weapons do have missiles with greater range than the F-16s AMRAAM missiles, but (importantly) the stand off weapons do not have such range. Thus, to fire these weapons the Russians must enter F-16 missile range. They will suffer losses. They will also have to operate efficiently or they will suffer large losses. They may require escorts, which complicates the Russian situation significantly.

This is what it is "all about". Obviously, the F-16s can be used to attempt more. They certainly can do a better job of firing HARMs than the MIGS do. They can also chase down KH-55 class cruise missiles that they can detect in look-down shoot down mode inside Ukraine. However, all this is secondary. They F-16s are to play the PVO role. Most commentators are thinking they are to be NATO style TAC air. Maybe, to some degree, they can, but that is not why Ukraine wants them and not why they got approved. Ukraine is real good at finding an argument that the "west" can't refute and pounding on it until they get what they want. The Patriot was a great example. They had no defense against high performance missiles. Now they do. The F-16 gives them a defense against Russian air operating near the FEBA at high altitudes which previously they did not possess. Unfortunately, it won't be there soon enough to matter for the upcoming "spring offensive". Yet another example of "great planning" by all involved.

[Goose]

Another very interesting event is  Girkin accusing Wagner of planning a coup against Putin while Wagner's boss states that Russia's leadership faces a revolution unless it puts the country on a "North Korea" type footing.  These kinds of statements coming for people other than Putin himself, makes it look like things are on the verge of coming apart for the Russian leadership.

It is "interesting". There is a question about how much is real and how much is theater. It does distract the masses from the real problems Russia has in this war. Popular unrest, real or imagined, is also a good excuse for full mobilization and dropping living standards. Who knows what is really "true".

All the stuff one reads about the F16 makes it seem that it won't make a big difference, but we are assuming that Russia's air force and air defense systems are in good shape and still very capable.  The invasion of Ukraine has made Russia's military seem far less capable that was originally believed, at least by public.

The politics and sociology of the F-16 to Ukraine is fascinating. You can see the different schools of thought in much of the stuff that emerges on the web. There is a lot of history here being re-examined and affecting people's judgements. You are correct, IMO, that the F-16s won't make a "big" difference, but they could still make a critical contribution. It is true that the Russian IADS has not functioned as such in and near Ukraine. The S-400s/300/BUKs seem to be doing their own acquisition, which is not doctrine. The Mainstays have been generally inactive in the AWACS function. Part of this is probably due to the Ukraine not being able to really mount an offensive threat. The Russian IADS is a primarily defensive asset. If you are not attacking in the air, you don't see much of it.

The Ukrainians are still thinking a bit like Russians in their evaluation of the air situation, which in this case is probably good. Though the PVO no longer exists in the actual force structure, it is indelibly embedded in the Russian air warfare strategy. The F-16s are being supplied mostly to keep Russian air off advancing Ukrainian troops. The F-16s will be flying in friendly air space and their goal will be preventing Russian air from operating at high altitude behind the FEBA and launching standoff weapons (like the "Russian JDAMS") against the Ukrainian troops.

Right now, the Russians can do this in absolute safety because the Ukrainian assets accompanying their advancing troops (which are relatively few by Russian standards) can't reach them. The Ukrainians don't even have S-400s that they could bring forward to threaten these high-altitude strikes (and the S-400 isn't designed for that anyway. Not mobile enough.) The Ukrainians has MANPADS/Avenger/ZSU-23 like systems to keep low altitude strikes by Russian air at significant risk, but they can do nothing against high altitude standoff weapons. The F-16 can operate at high altitudes in Ukrainian territory and be relatively safe from Russian anti-aircraft missiles. The Russian aircraft that launch the standoff weapons do have missiles with greater range than the F-16s AMRAAM missiles, but (importantly) the stand off weapons do not have such range. Thus, to fire these weapons the Russians must enter F-16 missile range. They will suffer losses. They will also have to operate efficiently or they will suffer large losses. They may require escorts, which complicates the Russian situation significantly.

This is what it is "all about". Obviously, the F-16s can be used to attempt more. They certainly can do a better job of firing HARMs than the MIGS do. They can also chase down KH-55 class cruise missiles that they can detect in look-down shoot down mode inside Ukraine. However, all this is secondary. They F-16s are to play the PVO role. Most commentators are thinking they are to be NATO style TAC air. Maybe, to some degree, they can, but that is not why Ukraine wants them and not why they got approved. Ukraine is real good at finding an argument that the "west" can't refute and pounding on it until they get what they want. The Patriot was a great example. They had no defense against high performance missiles. Now they do. The F-16 gives them a defense against Russian air operating near the FEBA at high altitudes which previously they did not possess. Unfortunately, it won't be there soon enough to matter for the upcoming "spring offensive". Yet another example of "great planning" by all involved.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/bayraktar-tb2...08964.html

One shouldn't minimize the contribution these drones can make in a reconnaissance mode. That is really "what they are for". The fact that these kind of vehicles had any kinetic role was indeed due to Russian unpreparedness/incompetence. That period is over. The real question now is why Ukraine isn't able to degrade Russian EW capability. That is, or should be, a relatively "easy" problem, and an entirely foreseeable one. Some of the "cheap" Ukrainian drones need to have nothing but a "home on jam" capability. No data link, no guidance, no GPS. Just kill anything transmitting at 1.57542 GHz. You do need a drone that is big enough to carry enough antennas, which rules out some of the smaller ones, but it still is very "do-able".

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/bayraktar-tb2...08964.html

One shouldn't minimize the contribution these drones can make in a reconnaissance mode. That is really "what they are for". The fact that these kind of vehicles had any kinetic role was indeed due to Russian unpreparedness/incompetence. That period is over. The real question now is why Ukraine isn't able to degrade Russian EW capability. That is, or should be, a relatively "easy" problem, and an entirely foreseeable one. Some of the "cheap" Ukrainian drones need to have nothing but a "home on jam" capability. No data link, no guidance, no GPS. Just kill anything transmitting at 1.57542 GHz. You do need a drone that is big enough to carry enough antennas, which rules out some of the smaller ones, but it still is very "do-able".

[OutsiderFan]

Would have thought Zelensky's announcement that he has approved the start of the offensive would have rated a bit more here...

[tweet]https://twitter.com/MarkHertling/status/1663302433760501760?cxt=HHwWgICz5YewnpUuAAAA[/tweet]

[OutsiderFan]

Would have thought Zelensky's announcement that he has approved the start of the offensive would have rated a bit more here...

[tweet]https://twitter.com/MarkHertling/status/1663302433760501760?cxt=HHwWgICz5YewnpUuAAAA[/tweet]

[Goose]

Would have thought Zelensky's announcement that he has approved the start of the offensive would have rated a bit more here...

https://twitter.com/MarkHertling/status/...ewnpUuAAAA

Approving the dates is not a surprise. Since we don't know what these dates are, said approval may not be immediately significant, therefor not much "buzz". It could be October for all we know :-). Probably not, but what will matter is when we see the commitment of the third armored brigade, we will know it has started. Ukraine could start a fight with one or two brigades as a feint to draw in Russian response, so even seeing some of the NATO supplied armor committed doesn't "prove" the actual offensive has started. It also wouldn't be surprising that Ukraine intends to do their usual strategy of probing for weaknesses and reinforcing success.

[Goose]

Would have thought Zelensky's announcement that he has approved the start of the offensive would have rated a bit more here...

https://twitter.com/MarkHertling/status/...ewnpUuAAAA

Approving the dates is not a surprise. Since we don't know what these dates are, said approval may not be immediately significant, therefor not much "buzz". It could be October for all we know :-). Probably not, but what will matter is when we see the commitment of the third armored brigade, we will know it has started. Ukraine could start a fight with one or two brigades as a feint to draw in Russian response, so even seeing some of the NATO supplied armor committed doesn't "prove" the actual offensive has started. It also wouldn't be surprising that Ukraine intends to do their usual strategy of probing for weaknesses and reinforcing success.

[OutsiderFan]

It does seem safe to assume we won't be seeing some kind of blitz or massive assault, but speed is critical to re-take territory. Would love to see a "RISK board" of where Russian and Ukrainian forces are.

[OutsiderFan]

It does seem safe to assume we won't be seeing some kind of blitz or massive assault, but speed is critical to re-take territory. Would love to see a "RISK board" of where Russian and Ukrainian forces are.

[gocard14]

Would have thought Zelensky's announcement that he has approved the start of the offensive would have rated a bit more here...

https://twitter.com/MarkHertling/status/...ewnpUuAAAA

Approving the dates is not a surprise. Since we don't know what these dates are, said approval may not be immediately significant, therefor not much "buzz". It could be October for all we know :-). Probably not, but what will matter is when we see the commitment of the third armored brigade, we will know it has started. Ukraine could start a fight with one or two brigades as a feint to draw in Russian response, so even seeing some of the NATO supplied armor committed doesn't "prove" the actual offensive has started. It also wouldn't be surprising that Ukraine intends to do their usual strategy of probing for weaknesses and reinforcing success.

At this point the use of western armor has been so built up it would almost make sense to use some of it in a diversionary strike to generate a disproportionate response. 

Fair amount of reporting of uptick of storm-shadow use over the weekend, hitting barracks in Mariupol and Yerivka per report. I can't imagine Ukraine recieved too many of these and seem to be using them at a decent clip, suggesting more offensive action coming up.  It also makes you think that getting even a few F16s active would be big if that allowed the use of our JASSM stockpile.

[gocard14]

Would have thought Zelensky's announcement that he has approved the start of the offensive would have rated a bit more here...

https://twitter.com/MarkHertling/status/...ewnpUuAAAA

Approving the dates is not a surprise. Since we don't know what these dates are, said approval may not be immediately significant, therefor not much "buzz". It could be October for all we know :-). Probably not, but what will matter is when we see the commitment of the third armored brigade, we will know it has started. Ukraine could start a fight with one or two brigades as a feint to draw in Russian response, so even seeing some of the NATO supplied armor committed doesn't "prove" the actual offensive has started. It also wouldn't be surprising that Ukraine intends to do their usual strategy of probing for weaknesses and reinforcing success.

At this point the use of western armor has been so built up it would almost make sense to use some of it in a diversionary strike to generate a disproportionate response. 

Fair amount of reporting of uptick of storm-shadow use over the weekend, hitting barracks in Mariupol and Yerivka per report. I can't imagine Ukraine recieved too many of these and seem to be using them at a decent clip, suggesting more offensive action coming up.  It also makes you think that getting even a few F16s active would be big if that allowed the use of our JASSM stockpile.

[Goose]

Would have thought Zelensky's announcement that he has approved the start of the offensive would have rated a bit more here...



https://twitter.com/MarkHertling/status/...ewnpUuAAAA

Approving the dates is not a surprise. Since we don't know what these dates are, said approval may not be immediately significant, therefor not much "buzz". It could be October for all we know :-). Probably not, but what will matter is when we see the commitment of the third armored brigade, we will know it has started. Ukraine could start a fight with one or two brigades as a feint to draw in Russian response, so even seeing some of the NATO supplied armor committed doesn't "prove" the actual offensive has started. It also wouldn't be surprising that Ukraine intends to do their usual strategy of probing for weaknesses and reinforcing success.

At this point the use of western armor has been so built up it would almost make sense to use some of it in a diversionary strike to generate a disproportionate response.

Agree, and even if the Russians know this, they still have what is hopefully a Hobson's choice.

Fair amount of reporting of uptick of storm-shadow use over the weekend, hitting barracks in Mariupol and Yerivka per report. I can't imagine Ukraine recieved too many of these and seem to be using them at a decent clip, suggesting more offensive action coming up.

Could be, or it could also be that Ukraine has been asking for longer range weapons and finally got them. They have a target-rich environment.

It also makes you think that getting even a few F16s active would be big if that allowed the use of our JASSM stockpile.

True, and it could have happened if the West had prepared by training pilots and support crews starting in the summer. We didn't, and it will be many months, best case, before there are operational F-16s in Ukraine.

[Goose]

Would have thought Zelensky's announcement that he has approved the start of the offensive would have rated a bit more here...



https://twitter.com/MarkHertling/status/...ewnpUuAAAA

Approving the dates is not a surprise. Since we don't know what these dates are, said approval may not be immediately significant, therefor not much "buzz". It could be October for all we know :-). Probably not, but what will matter is when we see the commitment of the third armored brigade, we will know it has started. Ukraine could start a fight with one or two brigades as a feint to draw in Russian response, so even seeing some of the NATO supplied armor committed doesn't "prove" the actual offensive has started. It also wouldn't be surprising that Ukraine intends to do their usual strategy of probing for weaknesses and reinforcing success.

At this point the use of western armor has been so built up it would almost make sense to use some of it in a diversionary strike to generate a disproportionate response.

Agree, and even if the Russians know this, they still have what is hopefully a Hobson's choice.

Fair amount of reporting of uptick of storm-shadow use over the weekend, hitting barracks in Mariupol and Yerivka per report. I can't imagine Ukraine recieved too many of these and seem to be using them at a decent clip, suggesting more offensive action coming up.

Could be, or it could also be that Ukraine has been asking for longer range weapons and finally got them. They have a target-rich environment.

It also makes you think that getting even a few F16s active would be big if that allowed the use of our JASSM stockpile.

True, and it could have happened if the West had prepared by training pilots and support crews starting in the summer. We didn't, and it will be many months, best case, before there are operational F-16s in Ukraine.

[M T]

Would have thought Zelensky's announcement that he has approved the start of the offensive would have rated a bit more here...

Since this is dated yesterday and I don't see this at BBC, SF Chronicle, Mercury News, or CNN, has this report been confirmed by anyone? 

The best source of this seems to be the Kyiv Post.  The timing and their still photo of their report suggest that it is from this video in Zelensky's tweet around 1PM PDT on 5/29.  The English that goes with that tweet doesn't report this.  However, the subtitles (starting 2:00) say

Today I had a meeting of the staff. The reports are very specific.  Supply of the air defense systems and missiles to them, relevant agreements with our partners  The effectiveness of our air defense and what can make our air defense stronger.  Hits that, unfortunately took place. Our defense forces are able to learn and will do everything to make it much more difficult for terrorists.  As usual, the Commander-in-Chief and the commanders of the operational directions reported to the Staff. Not only the supply of ammunition, not only the training of new brigades, not only our tactics, But also the timing. This is what is most important.  The timing of how we will move forward. We will. The decisions have been made.

If you want to believe that this says that the time of the offensive is set, you can.  But I read it as "HOW we will move forward", not "WHEN we will move forward". 

It certainly doesn't say that the start of the offensive is imminent.  (Consider the lead up to D-Day.)  It could just mean that "We will stage probing attacks at these places on day 1. And these on day 3, and then on day 5 we decide which of these targets we send our major attack force."

[M T]

Would have thought Zelensky's announcement that he has approved the start of the offensive would have rated a bit more here...

Since this is dated yesterday and I don't see this at BBC, SF Chronicle, Mercury News, or CNN, has this report been confirmed by anyone? 

The best source of this seems to be the Kyiv Post.  The timing and their still photo of their report suggest that it is from this video in Zelensky's tweet around 1PM PDT on 5/29.  The English that goes with that tweet doesn't report this.  However, the subtitles (starting 2:00) say

Today I had a meeting of the staff. The reports are very specific.  Supply of the air defense systems and missiles to them, relevant agreements with our partners  The effectiveness of our air defense and what can make our air defense stronger.  Hits that, unfortunately took place. Our defense forces are able to learn and will do everything to make it much more difficult for terrorists.  As usual, the Commander-in-Chief and the commanders of the operational directions reported to the Staff. Not only the supply of ammunition, not only the training of new brigades, not only our tactics, But also the timing. This is what is most important.  The timing of how we will move forward. We will. The decisions have been made.

If you want to believe that this says that the time of the offensive is set, you can.  But I read it as "HOW we will move forward", not "WHEN we will move forward". 

It certainly doesn't say that the start of the offensive is imminent.  (Consider the lead up to D-Day.)  It could just mean that "We will stage probing attacks at these places on day 1. And these on day 3, and then on day 5 we decide which of these targets we send our major attack force."

[Goose]

Would have thought Zelensky's announcement that he has approved the start of the offensive would have rated a bit more here...

Since this is dated yesterday and I don't see this at BBC, SF Chronicle, Mercury News, or CNN, has this report been confirmed by anyone? 

The best source of this seems to be the Kyiv Post.  The timing and their still photo of their report suggest that it is from this video in Zelensky's tweet around 1PM PDT on 5/29.  The English that goes with that tweet doesn't report this.  However, the subtitles (starting 2:00) say

Today I had a meeting of the staff. The reports are very specific.  Supply of the air defense systems and missiles to them, relevant agreements with our partners  The effectiveness of our air defense and what can make our air defense stronger.  Hits that, unfortunately took place. Our defense forces are able to learn and will do everything to make it much more difficult for terrorists.  As usual, the Commander-in-Chief and the commanders of the operational directions reported to the Staff. Not only the supply of ammunition, not only the training of new brigades, not only our tactics, But also the timing. This is what is most important.  The timing of how we will move forward. We will. The decisions have been made.

If you want to believe that this says that the time of the offensive is set, you can.  But I read it as "HOW we will move forward", not "WHEN we will move forward". 

It certainly doesn't say that the start of the offensive is imminent.  (Consider the lead up to D-Day.)  It could just mean that "We will stage probing attacks at these places on day 1. And these on day 3, and then on day 5 we decide which of these targets we send our major attack force."

Indeed such a set of probing attacks fits well with the Ukraine's "normal" tactical approach, and we may see it repeated. This approach is however difficult to execute if you intend to use large combined arms forces to make the breakthrough, as these forces require a pretty large "footprint" for their support and follow-on elements. It is more usual to have identified the "schwerpunkt" in advance but to make other attacks to fix the enemy in place and keep him guessing as long as possible. What Ukraine will do is TBD.

[Goose]

Would have thought Zelensky's announcement that he has approved the start of the offensive would have rated a bit more here...

Since this is dated yesterday and I don't see this at BBC, SF Chronicle, Mercury News, or CNN, has this report been confirmed by anyone? 

The best source of this seems to be the Kyiv Post.  The timing and their still photo of their report suggest that it is from this video in Zelensky's tweet around 1PM PDT on 5/29.  The English that goes with that tweet doesn't report this.  However, the subtitles (starting 2:00) say

Today I had a meeting of the staff. The reports are very specific.  Supply of the air defense systems and missiles to them, relevant agreements with our partners  The effectiveness of our air defense and what can make our air defense stronger.  Hits that, unfortunately took place. Our defense forces are able to learn and will do everything to make it much more difficult for terrorists.  As usual, the Commander-in-Chief and the commanders of the operational directions reported to the Staff. Not only the supply of ammunition, not only the training of new brigades, not only our tactics, But also the timing. This is what is most important.  The timing of how we will move forward. We will. The decisions have been made.

If you want to believe that this says that the time of the offensive is set, you can.  But I read it as "HOW we will move forward", not "WHEN we will move forward". 

It certainly doesn't say that the start of the offensive is imminent.  (Consider the lead up to D-Day.)  It could just mean that "We will stage probing attacks at these places on day 1. And these on day 3, and then on day 5 we decide which of these targets we send our major attack force."

Indeed such a set of probing attacks fits well with the Ukraine's "normal" tactical approach, and we may see it repeated. This approach is however difficult to execute if you intend to use large combined arms forces to make the breakthrough, as these forces require a pretty large "footprint" for their support and follow-on elements. It is more usual to have identified the "schwerpunkt" in advance but to make other attacks to fix the enemy in place and keep him guessing as long as possible. What Ukraine will do is TBD.

[Treefence]

Goose, do you think it's possible Ukraine might want to push off the start of the counteroffensive until they are finished training on F-16's and M1A1 Abrams tanks, which might be in the Fall, or do you think it works better for them to start their counter offensive with everything else they have received, and potentially use that second wave of arms supplies as a way of keeping the initiative, assuming they are successful?

[Treefence]

Goose, do you think it's possible Ukraine might want to push off the start of the counteroffensive until they are finished training on F-16's and M1A1 Abrams tanks, which might be in the Fall, or do you think it works better for them to start their counter offensive with everything else they have received, and potentially use that second wave of arms supplies as a way of keeping the initiative, assuming they are successful?

[Goose]

Goose, do you think it's possible Ukraine might want to push off the start of the counteroffensive until they are finished training on F-16's and M1A1 Abrams tanks, which might be in the Fall, or do you think it works better for them to start their counter offensive with everything else they have received, and potentially use that second wave of arms supplies as a way of keeping the initiative, assuming they are successful?

The F-16s aren't going to be even at IOC by Fall. One of the Ukrainian Air Force Cols wrote a good and very balance article about this subject. As he pointed out, you might be able to train a pilot to fly an F-16 safely in 6 months, but then you have to train him how to execute necessary military maneuvers and operate the weapons as "second nature". The Ukrainian pilots don't need to be good at everything but they need to be good at something. Right now, the plan appears to make them good in an air defense role. This is the Ukraine's primary need. Had we trained the pilots speculatively in advance, by now they would have 9-12 months training and be more than ready to fight. That didn't happen. History has shown that war is very, very unkind to pilots who are not adequately trained.

Ukraine is also under a lot of political pressure, both from their own public and from their "fans" in the West. They therefore can't wait 6 months, even forgetting about the weather. I think, FWIW, Ukraine is feeling the heat to "do something", and will in fact do so. The Abrams tanks are a "nice to have", but they have enough NATO standard tanks to "do something". The idea of letting Russia regroup again without significant combat pressure just isn't acceptable to "the public" and probably bad strategically. Russia has, it appears, expended it's forces in an offensive that didn't do much.

A lot of it depends on how good Russian training and morale is, and to what extent Ukraine can adapt to a "Hell on Wheels" type of advance. They have some positive experiences in doing this, so they can. It also depends upon what kind of "frontal aviation" Russia can generate. A lot of different things are possible, but Ukraine can't "stand pat" and wait until summer of 2024.

[Goose]

Goose, do you think it's possible Ukraine might want to push off the start of the counteroffensive until they are finished training on F-16's and M1A1 Abrams tanks, which might be in the Fall, or do you think it works better for them to start their counter offensive with everything else they have received, and potentially use that second wave of arms supplies as a way of keeping the initiative, assuming they are successful?

The F-16s aren't going to be even at IOC by Fall. One of the Ukrainian Air Force Cols wrote a good and very balance article about this subject. As he pointed out, you might be able to train a pilot to fly an F-16 safely in 6 months, but then you have to train him how to execute necessary military maneuvers and operate the weapons as "second nature". The Ukrainian pilots don't need to be good at everything but they need to be good at something. Right now, the plan appears to make them good in an air defense role. This is the Ukraine's primary need. Had we trained the pilots speculatively in advance, by now they would have 9-12 months training and be more than ready to fight. That didn't happen. History has shown that war is very, very unkind to pilots who are not adequately trained.

Ukraine is also under a lot of political pressure, both from their own public and from their "fans" in the West. They therefore can't wait 6 months, even forgetting about the weather. I think, FWIW, Ukraine is feeling the heat to "do something", and will in fact do so. The Abrams tanks are a "nice to have", but they have enough NATO standard tanks to "do something". The idea of letting Russia regroup again without significant combat pressure just isn't acceptable to "the public" and probably bad strategically. Russia has, it appears, expended it's forces in an offensive that didn't do much.

A lot of it depends on how good Russian training and morale is, and to what extent Ukraine can adapt to a "Hell on Wheels" type of advance. They have some positive experiences in doing this, so they can. It also depends upon what kind of "frontal aviation" Russia can generate. A lot of different things are possible, but Ukraine can't "stand pat" and wait until summer of 2024.

[TrumpCard]

I’m curious what the debt ceiling deal means for Ukraine funding. My understanding is that the deal keeps military spending “roughly” the same in real dollars as FY2022. Looking back at news for the past year, it looks like FY2022 funding for Ukraine was well north of $50 billion. Does that mean another $50+ billion is available in FY2024?  Or is this just not known yet?  If someone can answer this without getting into the partisan political nature of budgeting, I’d appreciate it. I’m not trying to get into whether the debt ceiling deal is good or bad, just how much funding will be available for Ukraine, if that’s known. Thanks!

[TrumpCard]

I’m curious what the debt ceiling deal means for Ukraine funding. My understanding is that the deal keeps military spending “roughly” the same in real dollars as FY2022. Looking back at news for the past year, it looks like FY2022 funding for Ukraine was well north of $50 billion. Does that mean another $50+ billion is available in FY2024?  Or is this just not known yet?  If someone can answer this without getting into the partisan political nature of budgeting, I’d appreciate it. I’m not trying to get into whether the debt ceiling deal is good or bad, just how much funding will be available for Ukraine, if that’s known. Thanks!

[Goose]

I’m curious what the debt ceiling deal means for Ukraine funding. My understanding is that the deal keeps military spending “roughly” the same in real dollars as FY2022. Looking back at news for the past year, it looks like FY2022 funding for Ukraine was well north of $50 billion. Does that mean another $50+ billion is available in FY2024?  Or is this just not known yet?  If someone can answer this without getting into the partisan political nature of budgeting, I’d appreciate it. I’m not trying to get into whether the debt ceiling deal is good or bad, just how much funding will be available for Ukraine, if that’s known. Thanks!

I don't think the Ukraine funding and the "military" budget are expressly linked. In the recent past, i.e. the last 30 years (I am old, obviously) the various different administrations have often basically forced the military to fund "extraordinary events" from their existing budgets, but this has not always been the case. While there are indeed many valid questions about the currently proposed defense budgets (in many different ways), I don't think we know for sure how the Ukraine expenses are going to be "charged off". On one hand, much of the equipment counted in the Ukraine cost is equipment from existing US stocks, it is probably being charged off at "book value" and does not represent an actual cash outlay. OTOH, if that equipment needs to be replaced, the replacement cost may be higher than the current book value and money may be needed to do that. Who knows what will eventually be done?

[Goose]

I’m curious what the debt ceiling deal means for Ukraine funding. My understanding is that the deal keeps military spending “roughly” the same in real dollars as FY2022. Looking back at news for the past year, it looks like FY2022 funding for Ukraine was well north of $50 billion. Does that mean another $50+ billion is available in FY2024?  Or is this just not known yet?  If someone can answer this without getting into the partisan political nature of budgeting, I’d appreciate it. I’m not trying to get into whether the debt ceiling deal is good or bad, just how much funding will be available for Ukraine, if that’s known. Thanks!

I don't think the Ukraine funding and the "military" budget are expressly linked. In the recent past, i.e. the last 30 years (I am old, obviously) the various different administrations have often basically forced the military to fund "extraordinary events" from their existing budgets, but this has not always been the case. While there are indeed many valid questions about the currently proposed defense budgets (in many different ways), I don't think we know for sure how the Ukraine expenses are going to be "charged off". On one hand, much of the equipment counted in the Ukraine cost is equipment from existing US stocks, it is probably being charged off at "book value" and does not represent an actual cash outlay. OTOH, if that equipment needs to be replaced, the replacement cost may be higher than the current book value and money may be needed to do that. Who knows what will eventually be done?

[fullmetal]

Goose, do you think it's possible Ukraine might want to push off the start of the counteroffensive until they are finished training on F-16's and M1A1 Abrams tanks, which might be in the Fall, or do you think it works better for them to start their counter offensive with everything else they have received, and potentially use that second wave of arms supplies as a way of keeping the initiative, assuming they are successful?

Whenever they want to start moving, they should do so when the roads are usable, which means starting about now up until any potential heavy autumn rains that might happen.  bezdorizhzhia (Ukr: "roadlessness" mud season) should be an ever-present consideration.

[fullmetal]

Goose, do you think it's possible Ukraine might want to push off the start of the counteroffensive until they are finished training on F-16's and M1A1 Abrams tanks, which might be in the Fall, or do you think it works better for them to start their counter offensive with everything else they have received, and potentially use that second wave of arms supplies as a way of keeping the initiative, assuming they are successful?

Whenever they want to start moving, they should do so when the roads are usable, which means starting about now up until any potential heavy autumn rains that might happen.  bezdorizhzhia (Ukr: "roadlessness" mud season) should be an ever-present consideration.

[GK3]

Goose, do you think it's possible Ukraine might want to push off the start of the counteroffensive until they are finished training on F-16's and M1A1 Abrams tanks, which might be in the Fall, or do you think it works better for them to start their counter offensive with everything else they have received, and potentially use that second wave of arms supplies as a way of keeping the initiative, assuming they are successful?

Whenever they want to start moving, they should do so when the roads are usable, which means starting about now up until any potential heavy autumn rains that might happen.  bezdorizhzhia (Ukr: "roadlessness" mud season) should be an ever-present consideration.

A little more on the Mud Season https://www.dw.com/en/countdown-to-count...a-65204612

It would help if nature was a little more predictable. How long the season lasts and when it starts is only a little predictable I would say. Who would have predicted a year ago that a lake, larger than Lake Tahoe, would reappear in the San Juaquin Valley.
So I would think that the sooner they get started the better.

Note: For those who have any interest in the past history of Lake Tulare, this makes interesting reading. https://californiawaterblog.com/2023/04/...eet%20deep.

[GK3]

Goose, do you think it's possible Ukraine might want to push off the start of the counteroffensive until they are finished training on F-16's and M1A1 Abrams tanks, which might be in the Fall, or do you think it works better for them to start their counter offensive with everything else they have received, and potentially use that second wave of arms supplies as a way of keeping the initiative, assuming they are successful?

Whenever they want to start moving, they should do so when the roads are usable, which means starting about now up until any potential heavy autumn rains that might happen.  bezdorizhzhia (Ukr: "roadlessness" mud season) should be an ever-present consideration.

A little more on the Mud Season https://www.dw.com/en/countdown-to-count...a-65204612

It would help if nature was a little more predictable. How long the season lasts and when it starts is only a little predictable I would say. Who would have predicted a year ago that a lake, larger than Lake Tahoe, would reappear in the San Juaquin Valley.
So I would think that the sooner they get started the better.

Note: For those who have any interest in the past history of Lake Tulare, this makes interesting reading. https://californiawaterblog.com/2023/04/...eet%20deep.

[OutsiderFan]

Fascinating result from Ukraine drone strike on Moscow. As anyone who truly understands war knows, it is always a political exercise. A country cannot engage in war unless its citizenry supports it. Divided countries can’t win. There are many ways to create divisions in a body politic. One of the standards is to create one between the elite and the unwashed masses. The other is to deliver kinetic damage to country. Putin has tried this on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure but Ukrainians are stronger than he assumed and are wise to his tactics. I don’t think Russians are as tough and they deep down don’t like Putin and will not fight or endure pain for him if they have free choice.

Ukraine’s drone strike was targeted to a military facility in an area of Russia that just happens to be populated by the country’s elite. When word got out about this and a few drones running astray in the area, the unwashed masses actually cheered it, revealing a schism between the elite and the unwashed masses. It’s interesting because the elite aren’t being conscripted, being asked to fight in Ukraine, or sacrificing anything for the war like the unwashed are. Ukraine could never have pulled off its drone strike if Russia didn’t stupidly attack Kyiv with one the other day. That gave them justification and Russians know it. Now Ukraine knows it can continue attacking Moscow with not a lot of anger from ordinary Russians. So congratulations to Vlad for bringing the war to the doorsteps of Russians in Russia. I’ve been calling for this since last year because it’s one tried and true way of killing political support for war by countries engaging in it, but I guess better late than never.

You can see the beginnings of a big political problem for Putin. He risks Russians seeing Ukraine as a liberating force against Putin’s regime and a ruling elite they don’t like. Many Russians could side with Ukraine as a faster and maybe better way to end the war. Time for Ukraine - aided by NATO - to ramp up the information warfare in Russia to drive a wedge between Russia’s ruling class and the unwashed masses, telling them how they are all being manipulated and used to keep the bastards in power and you oppressed. The Ukraine drone strike on Moscow revealed a great opportunity to turn the public against Putin. Will it be seized with more attacks in Russia and more information war?

---

ALL of this other than the nitwit interviewer completely ignoring the context of difference between Ukrainians being attacked in Ukraine and Russians attacked in Russia.

https://youtu.be/CwHaZDmcunU

[OutsiderFan]

Fascinating result from Ukraine drone strike on Moscow. As anyone who truly understands war knows, it is always a political exercise. A country cannot engage in war unless its citizenry supports it. Divided countries can’t win. There are many ways to create divisions in a body politic. One of the standards is to create one between the elite and the unwashed masses. The other is to deliver kinetic damage to country. Putin has tried this on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure but Ukrainians are stronger than he assumed and are wise to his tactics. I don’t think Russians are as tough and they deep down don’t like Putin and will not fight or endure pain for him if they have free choice.

Ukraine’s drone strike was targeted to a military facility in an area of Russia that just happens to be populated by the country’s elite. When word got out about this and a few drones running astray in the area, the unwashed masses actually cheered it, revealing a schism between the elite and the unwashed masses. It’s interesting because the elite aren’t being conscripted, being asked to fight in Ukraine, or sacrificing anything for the war like the unwashed are. Ukraine could never have pulled off its drone strike if Russia didn’t stupidly attack Kyiv with one the other day. That gave them justification and Russians know it. Now Ukraine knows it can continue attacking Moscow with not a lot of anger from ordinary Russians. So congratulations to Vlad for bringing the war to the doorsteps of Russians in Russia. I’ve been calling for this since last year because it’s one tried and true way of killing political support for war by countries engaging in it, but I guess better late than never.

You can see the beginnings of a big political problem for Putin. He risks Russians seeing Ukraine as a liberating force against Putin’s regime and a ruling elite they don’t like. Many Russians could side with Ukraine as a faster and maybe better way to end the war. Time for Ukraine - aided by NATO - to ramp up the information warfare in Russia to drive a wedge between Russia’s ruling class and the unwashed masses, telling them how they are all being manipulated and used to keep the bastards in power and you oppressed. The Ukraine drone strike on Moscow revealed a great opportunity to turn the public against Putin. Will it be seized with more attacks in Russia and more information war?

---

ALL of this other than the nitwit interviewer completely ignoring the context of difference between Ukrainians being attacked in Ukraine and Russians attacked in Russia.

https://youtu.be/CwHaZDmcunU

[Goose]

Fascinating result from Ukraine drone strike on Moscow. As anyone who truly understands war knows, it is always a political exercise. A country cannot engage in war unless its citizenry supports it. Divided countries can’t win. There are many ways to create divisions in a body politic. One of the standards is to create one between the elite and the unwashed masses. The other is to deliver kinetic damage to country.

Historically, one of the best ways to unite a divided country is for another country to deliver (or threaten to deliver) "external damage" (real or imagined) to the "target" country.

Putin has tried this on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure but Ukrainians are stronger than he assumed and are wise to his tactics.

Yep, see above. The 2014 invasion of Crimea united Ukraine like nothing before it, and the subsequent actions have merely forged that iron into steel.

I don’t think Russians are as tough and they deep down don’t like Putin and will not fight or endure pain for him if they have free choice.

Many "western" politicians/psychologists/generals throughout history have "gone broke" assuming Russians aren't tough and trying to figure out what their "real" loyalties are. In point of fact, every Russian under about 30 knows that Putin was a "better" alternative than democracy under Yeltsin because Putin brought order and some prosperity out of chaos. Everybody older than that sees Putin as no worse than their communist dictators, and certainly better than their brief experience in a "free" society. You and I may not see it that way, but most Russians do. That said, Russian's idea of loyalty and patriotism is much different than the ones we like to think exists in the "west". They will cheat "the state" while at the same time defending the state. Figuring this out has defied historical explanation and continues to do so. Look at how much is published on exactly this topic. Therefore, assuming that "Russia is divided" and that "Russians won't fight" is probably pretty dangerous.

Bringing the war to their doorsteps is probably one of the best ways to convince Russians (collectively) that Ukraine really IS a threat that must be eliminated. Never mind "they started it". The Russian man in the street simply doesn't care about that. What he does care about is losing. If the man in the street sees Russia in a war it cannot /is not winning, then Putin loses his status as the best available alternative. However, a drone strike on the capital doesn't do that. Lots more body bags and POWs is Ukraine's best bet to accomplish that. The drone strike was the Ukrainian Doolittle Raid. It is great for Ukrainian morale. It does little to collective Russian morale, although it may make some Russian generals very nervous. Hopefully, like the Doolittle Raid, it will cause these generals to dedicate unnecessary numbers of assets to local air defense.

[Goose]

Fascinating result from Ukraine drone strike on Moscow. As anyone who truly understands war knows, it is always a political exercise. A country cannot engage in war unless its citizenry supports it. Divided countries can’t win. There are many ways to create divisions in a body politic. One of the standards is to create one between the elite and the unwashed masses. The other is to deliver kinetic damage to country.

Historically, one of the best ways to unite a divided country is for another country to deliver (or threaten to deliver) "external damage" (real or imagined) to the "target" country.

Putin has tried this on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure but Ukrainians are stronger than he assumed and are wise to his tactics.

Yep, see above. The 2014 invasion of Crimea united Ukraine like nothing before it, and the subsequent actions have merely forged that iron into steel.

I don’t think Russians are as tough and they deep down don’t like Putin and will not fight or endure pain for him if they have free choice.

Many "western" politicians/psychologists/generals throughout history have "gone broke" assuming Russians aren't tough and trying to figure out what their "real" loyalties are. In point of fact, every Russian under about 30 knows that Putin was a "better" alternative than democracy under Yeltsin because Putin brought order and some prosperity out of chaos. Everybody older than that sees Putin as no worse than their communist dictators, and certainly better than their brief experience in a "free" society. You and I may not see it that way, but most Russians do. That said, Russian's idea of loyalty and patriotism is much different than the ones we like to think exists in the "west". They will cheat "the state" while at the same time defending the state. Figuring this out has defied historical explanation and continues to do so. Look at how much is published on exactly this topic. Therefore, assuming that "Russia is divided" and that "Russians won't fight" is probably pretty dangerous.

Bringing the war to their doorsteps is probably one of the best ways to convince Russians (collectively) that Ukraine really IS a threat that must be eliminated. Never mind "they started it". The Russian man in the street simply doesn't care about that. What he does care about is losing. If the man in the street sees Russia in a war it cannot /is not winning, then Putin loses his status as the best available alternative. However, a drone strike on the capital doesn't do that. Lots more body bags and POWs is Ukraine's best bet to accomplish that. The drone strike was the Ukrainian Doolittle Raid. It is great for Ukrainian morale. It does little to collective Russian morale, although it may make some Russian generals very nervous. Hopefully, like the Doolittle Raid, it will cause these generals to dedicate unnecessary numbers of assets to local air defense.

[GK3]

Fascinating result from Ukraine drone strike on Moscow. As anyone who truly understands war knows, it is always a political exercise. A country cannot engage in war unless its citizenry supports it. Divided countries can’t win. There are many ways to create divisions in a body politic. One of the standards is to create one between the elite and the unwashed masses. The other is to deliver kinetic damage to country.

Historically, one of the best ways to unite a divided country is for another country to deliver (or threaten to deliver) "external damage" (real or imagined) to the "target" country.

Putin has tried this on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure but Ukrainians are stronger than he assumed and are wise to his tactics.

Yep, see above. The 2014 invasion of Crimea united Ukraine like nothing before it, and the subsequent actions have merely forged that iron into steel.

I don’t think Russians are as tough and they deep down don’t like Putin and will not fight or endure pain for him if they have free choice.

Many "western" politicians/psychologists/generals throughout history have "gone broke" assuming Russians aren't tough and trying to figure out what their "real" loyalties are. In point of fact, every Russian under about 30 knows that Putin was a "better" alternative than democracy under Yeltsin because Putin brought order and some prosperity out of chaos. Everybody older than that sees Putin as no worse than their communist dictators, and certainly better than their brief experience in a "free" society. You and I may not see it that way, but most Russians do. That said, Russian's idea of loyalty and patriotism is much different than the ones we like to think exists in the "west". They will cheat "the state" while at the same time defending the state. Figuring this out has defied historical explanation and continues to do so. Look at how much is published on exactly this topic. Therefore, assuming that "Russia is divided" and that "Russians won't fight" is probably pretty dangerous.

Bringing the war to their doorsteps is probably one of the best ways to convince Russians (collectively) that Ukraine really IS a threat that must be eliminated. Never mind "they started it". The Russian man in the street simply doesn't care about that. What he does care about is losing. If the man in the street sees Russia in a war it cannot /is not winning, then Putin loses his status as the best available alternative. However, a drone strike on the capital doesn't do that. Lots more body bags and POWs is Ukraine's best bet to accomplish that. The drone strike was the Ukrainian Doolittle Raid. It is great for Ukrainian morale. It does little to collective Russian morale, although it may make some Russian generals very nervous. Hopefully, like the Doolittle Raid, it will cause these generals to dedicate unnecessary numbers of assets to local air defense.

History seems to show as you say that attacks against the "Motherland" result in uniting the Russian People against the invader.  See the French, Germans and Japanese efforts.  Now I wonder is how do Russian Russians see Ukrainians?  The Russian language is broadly spoken and I would think a fair percent of the population are so-called ethnic Russians (exactly what that is I am not sure).  So do the Russia Russians see Ukrainian attacks more as a civil uprising or an attack by a foreign power?  Putin seems to making every effort blame these attacks on the West, the UK, the USA or any foreign power he can find a link to so as to rally the peoples support to his attacks against Ukraine.

[GK3]

Fascinating result from Ukraine drone strike on Moscow. As anyone who truly understands war knows, it is always a political exercise. A country cannot engage in war unless its citizenry supports it. Divided countries can’t win. There are many ways to create divisions in a body politic. One of the standards is to create one between the elite and the unwashed masses. The other is to deliver kinetic damage to country.

Historically, one of the best ways to unite a divided country is for another country to deliver (or threaten to deliver) "external damage" (real or imagined) to the "target" country.

Putin has tried this on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure but Ukrainians are stronger than he assumed and are wise to his tactics.

Yep, see above. The 2014 invasion of Crimea united Ukraine like nothing before it, and the subsequent actions have merely forged that iron into steel.

I don’t think Russians are as tough and they deep down don’t like Putin and will not fight or endure pain for him if they have free choice.

Many "western" politicians/psychologists/generals throughout history have "gone broke" assuming Russians aren't tough and trying to figure out what their "real" loyalties are. In point of fact, every Russian under about 30 knows that Putin was a "better" alternative than democracy under Yeltsin because Putin brought order and some prosperity out of chaos. Everybody older than that sees Putin as no worse than their communist dictators, and certainly better than their brief experience in a "free" society. You and I may not see it that way, but most Russians do. That said, Russian's idea of loyalty and patriotism is much different than the ones we like to think exists in the "west". They will cheat "the state" while at the same time defending the state. Figuring this out has defied historical explanation and continues to do so. Look at how much is published on exactly this topic. Therefore, assuming that "Russia is divided" and that "Russians won't fight" is probably pretty dangerous.

Bringing the war to their doorsteps is probably one of the best ways to convince Russians (collectively) that Ukraine really IS a threat that must be eliminated. Never mind "they started it". The Russian man in the street simply doesn't care about that. What he does care about is losing. If the man in the street sees Russia in a war it cannot /is not winning, then Putin loses his status as the best available alternative. However, a drone strike on the capital doesn't do that. Lots more body bags and POWs is Ukraine's best bet to accomplish that. The drone strike was the Ukrainian Doolittle Raid. It is great for Ukrainian morale. It does little to collective Russian morale, although it may make some Russian generals very nervous. Hopefully, like the Doolittle Raid, it will cause these generals to dedicate unnecessary numbers of assets to local air defense.

History seems to show as you say that attacks against the "Motherland" result in uniting the Russian People against the invader.  See the French, Germans and Japanese efforts.  Now I wonder is how do Russian Russians see Ukrainians?  The Russian language is broadly spoken and I would think a fair percent of the population are so-called ethnic Russians (exactly what that is I am not sure).  So do the Russia Russians see Ukrainian attacks more as a civil uprising or an attack by a foreign power?  Putin seems to making every effort blame these attacks on the West, the UK, the USA or any foreign power he can find a link to so as to rally the peoples support to his attacks against Ukraine.

[OutsiderFan]

I made my post specifically because I saw a report that said Russians basically had no problem with the attack on the elite residence area of Moscow. The point was the Russian people don't seem to be bothered by the elites being targeted, suggesting they feel very much separate from them, and there will be no galvanizing support for Putin and the war as a result of the drone attack on the elite area of Moscow.

Do the elites who now know they are at risk put pressure on Putin to stop the war to protect their own asses?  Or do they pressure Putin to escalate, knowing there isn't much more that can be done to escalate.

My money is on the elite class turning against Putin. It seems a bit untenable to live at risk of being targeted for bombing while also knowing the body politic of your country sheds no tears when you are.

[OutsiderFan]

I made my post specifically because I saw a report that said Russians basically had no problem with the attack on the elite residence area of Moscow. The point was the Russian people don't seem to be bothered by the elites being targeted, suggesting they feel very much separate from them, and there will be no galvanizing support for Putin and the war as a result of the drone attack on the elite area of Moscow.

Do the elites who now know they are at risk put pressure on Putin to stop the war to protect their own asses?  Or do they pressure Putin to escalate, knowing there isn't much more that can be done to escalate.

My money is on the elite class turning against Putin. It seems a bit untenable to live at risk of being targeted for bombing while also knowing the body politic of your country sheds no tears when you are.