[dabigv13]

Great article from WSJ (their articles, with nice graphics, on the conflict have been really good) on Ukrainian air operations

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-allies-...es-32bb104

Some bits I found interesting

The U.S. is working with seven countries, including Sweden and Spain, to provide the U.S.-made I-HAWK air defense system to Ukraine. 
The U.S. has also improvised by providing Sea Sparrow antiship missiles for Ukraine’s Soviet-era Buk launchers, a contrivance that U.S. officials have dubbed the “FrankenSAM.” 
Some of the air defenses have been “MacGyvered” with parts from a variety of systems, William LaPlante, the Pentagon’s acquisitions chief, told the Council on Foreign Relations Wednesday, referring to the process of improvisation. “That’s the word of the year.”

....
The U.S., Norway and Denmark are also sending AMRAAM air-to-air missiles for use in Ukraine’s NASAMs air defense launchers, according to the leaked documents.

The Patriot air defense battery that the U.S. has provided to Ukraine is being held back from combat, along with other military equipment, while Kyiv prepares for the counteroffensive, a U.S. official said.

......
As the battle unfolded, satellites and surveillance aircraft controlled by Western militaries and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization supplied Ukraine with early warning of Russian flights and missile launches. This enabled Kyiv’s air-defense batteries to switch their radar systems on and off as needed, further frustrating Russian attempts to detect and eliminate them, Mr. Charap said.

The Ukrainians also benefited from the Russian Air Force’s poor tactics and training.

......
Despite the risks, the Ukrainian Air Force continues to fly about 10 missions a day, focusing principally on the country’s east and south, according to Ukrainian pilots and officials.

In groups of up to four aircraft, Ukrainian fighters have launched U.S.-made anti-radar missiles at Russian antiaircraft systems, freeing up other planes to strike Russian ground troops.

Another interesting article

https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/05/politics/...index.html

Russia has been thwarting US-made mobile rocket systems in Ukraine more frequently in recent months, using electronic jammers to throw off its GPS guided targeting system to cause rockets to miss their targets, multiple people briefed on the matter told CNN.

Ukrainian military officials, with the US' help, have had to come up with a variety of different workarounds as it continues to use the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) which has been perhaps the most revered and feared piece of weaponry in Ukraine's fight.

......
"It is a constant cat-and-mouse game" of finding a countermeasure to the jamming, a Pentagon official said, only to then have the Russians counteract that countermeasure. And it is not clear how sustainable that game is in the long term.
......
GPS jamming can affect other "smart" US munitions like the precision-guided Excalibur artillery shells fired from Howitzers and air-dropped bombs called JDAMs. The leaked Pentagon document described the JDAMS as being particularly susceptible to the disruption.

A US official confirmed that the US has been advising the Ukrainians on how to identify and destroy Russian jammers since there are a limited number of ways to modify HIMARS and their rockets.
.......
A senior Pentagon official downplayed the impact of the interference, telling CNN that on Monday Ukrainian forces fired 18 rockets without issue, about the daily rate of the past few weeks. The official declined to comment on the broader impact of the jamming. HIMARS are manufactured by Lockheed Martin, which deferred questions on jamming to the US government.

Electronic warfare is carried out by both sides, up and down the front line where there is heavy drone activity used for surveillance and in partnership with artillery targeting. The hardware can also be mounted on or around whatever might be targeted.

Depending on the location and strength of the jamming, a rocket can still launch and result in a successful strike with significant damage. In addition to GPS guidance, the rockets have inertial navigation systems that are not susceptible and remain accurate, though not as precise as when guided by GPS coordinates.

[dabigv13]

Great article from WSJ (their articles, with nice graphics, on the conflict have been really good) on Ukrainian air operations

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-allies-...es-32bb104

Some bits I found interesting

The U.S. is working with seven countries, including Sweden and Spain, to provide the U.S.-made I-HAWK air defense system to Ukraine. 
The U.S. has also improvised by providing Sea Sparrow antiship missiles for Ukraine’s Soviet-era Buk launchers, a contrivance that U.S. officials have dubbed the “FrankenSAM.” 
Some of the air defenses have been “MacGyvered” with parts from a variety of systems, William LaPlante, the Pentagon’s acquisitions chief, told the Council on Foreign Relations Wednesday, referring to the process of improvisation. “That’s the word of the year.”

....
The U.S., Norway and Denmark are also sending AMRAAM air-to-air missiles for use in Ukraine’s NASAMs air defense launchers, according to the leaked documents.

The Patriot air defense battery that the U.S. has provided to Ukraine is being held back from combat, along with other military equipment, while Kyiv prepares for the counteroffensive, a U.S. official said.

......
As the battle unfolded, satellites and surveillance aircraft controlled by Western militaries and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization supplied Ukraine with early warning of Russian flights and missile launches. This enabled Kyiv’s air-defense batteries to switch their radar systems on and off as needed, further frustrating Russian attempts to detect and eliminate them, Mr. Charap said.

The Ukrainians also benefited from the Russian Air Force’s poor tactics and training.

......
Despite the risks, the Ukrainian Air Force continues to fly about 10 missions a day, focusing principally on the country’s east and south, according to Ukrainian pilots and officials.

In groups of up to four aircraft, Ukrainian fighters have launched U.S.-made anti-radar missiles at Russian antiaircraft systems, freeing up other planes to strike Russian ground troops.

Another interesting article

https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/05/politics/...index.html

Russia has been thwarting US-made mobile rocket systems in Ukraine more frequently in recent months, using electronic jammers to throw off its GPS guided targeting system to cause rockets to miss their targets, multiple people briefed on the matter told CNN.

Ukrainian military officials, with the US' help, have had to come up with a variety of different workarounds as it continues to use the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) which has been perhaps the most revered and feared piece of weaponry in Ukraine's fight.

......
"It is a constant cat-and-mouse game" of finding a countermeasure to the jamming, a Pentagon official said, only to then have the Russians counteract that countermeasure. And it is not clear how sustainable that game is in the long term.
......
GPS jamming can affect other "smart" US munitions like the precision-guided Excalibur artillery shells fired from Howitzers and air-dropped bombs called JDAMs. The leaked Pentagon document described the JDAMS as being particularly susceptible to the disruption.

A US official confirmed that the US has been advising the Ukrainians on how to identify and destroy Russian jammers since there are a limited number of ways to modify HIMARS and their rockets.
.......
A senior Pentagon official downplayed the impact of the interference, telling CNN that on Monday Ukrainian forces fired 18 rockets without issue, about the daily rate of the past few weeks. The official declined to comment on the broader impact of the jamming. HIMARS are manufactured by Lockheed Martin, which deferred questions on jamming to the US government.

Electronic warfare is carried out by both sides, up and down the front line where there is heavy drone activity used for surveillance and in partnership with artillery targeting. The hardware can also be mounted on or around whatever might be targeted.

Depending on the location and strength of the jamming, a rocket can still launch and result in a successful strike with significant damage. In addition to GPS guidance, the rockets have inertial navigation systems that are not susceptible and remain accurate, though not as precise as when guided by GPS coordinates.

[Goose]

Interesting info. My read on the Improved Hawk is that it is taking so long it probably won't matter. The condition of the systems must be real bad if it is taking this long to get them ready, and lots of the parts are so obsolete finding them is going to be difficult. I will believe it when I see it. Obviously the Sea Sparrow isn't an anti-ship missile. It is a SAM that operates from ships, or anywhere else it can. How many BUKs will get FrankenSAMed is unknown. The Sea Sparrow is SARAH, as are the native missiles for the BUK. Most things that are “MacGyvered” don't work very well, especially things that are complex to begin with. It will be interesting to see if this is an exception.

The main reason the I HAWK was declared obsolete and the BUK deprecated in Russian service is that conventional wisdom says any ground-based SARAH system with an illuminator won't survive in action for a week, if that long. The migration toward fire and forget missiles with their own illuminators was the result. Obviously that isn't the case in Ukraine. The capabilities available to both countries are so substandard that the "rules" don't apply.

The problems with Russian GPS jamming OTOH is larger than the US was prepared for. This has evolved over the course of the war to be more of a problem than anticipated. It was known and expected that Russia had a relatively large number of high powered GPS jammers that could provide wide area coverage. What was not expected was the even larger number of low to medium power jammers that have come online in response to the drone threat. The expectation was that our active SEAD would destroy most of these jammers in short order. The Ukrainians don't really have the weapons to do that. They also don't have the ESM aircraft to locate these jammers in real time and task other aircraft with eliminating them. The current improvised system in Ukraine isn't working all that effectively it appears. The USAF tacitly assumes their ESM aircraft can locate these jammers and F-35s can get close enough to destroy them without being targeted. The Ukraine has neither.

The performance of the INS in the US munitions has not been at a premium, as the GPS performance was always going to be "better". As a result, the INS performance isn't the "latest and greatest". It is also true that INS cost money, typically more than a GPS receiver. Both are "consumable" in the weapon, so there is a tradeoff. That said, the INS performance is normally "good enough", especially for HIMARS use.

The JDAMS being more susceptible to this problem is probably (IMO) partly due to a "bad fix" at launch. Since they are dropped from altitude, they may well be in the jammer effective field at launch. The INS is only as good as it's initial fix. If that fix is "bad" and there are no subsequent GPS updates, it is going to miss by at least the error in the initial fix. We also don't know to what degree the Ukraine's aircraft can supply an initial fix via the control bus to the weapon(s). MIGs don't come from the factory with a GPS and a 1553 bus :-). If the JDAM needs to acquire a fix after launch, things just get worse in the presence of jamming. It may not happen at all and the weapon "goes stupid". The JDAMS also have a longer flight time, in general, because they "fly" slower. This gives the INS more time to accumulate error.

The HARM missile does have the ability to target GPS jammers. This has been true for many years and is not classified. How well it works is not publicly known, one way or another. To what degree this is available to Ukrainian users, I do not know.

[Goose]

Interesting info. My read on the Improved Hawk is that it is taking so long it probably won't matter. The condition of the systems must be real bad if it is taking this long to get them ready, and lots of the parts are so obsolete finding them is going to be difficult. I will believe it when I see it. Obviously the Sea Sparrow isn't an anti-ship missile. It is a SAM that operates from ships, or anywhere else it can. How many BUKs will get FrankenSAMed is unknown. The Sea Sparrow is SARAH, as are the native missiles for the BUK. Most things that are “MacGyvered” don't work very well, especially things that are complex to begin with. It will be interesting to see if this is an exception.

The main reason the I HAWK was declared obsolete and the BUK deprecated in Russian service is that conventional wisdom says any ground-based SARAH system with an illuminator won't survive in action for a week, if that long. The migration toward fire and forget missiles with their own illuminators was the result. Obviously that isn't the case in Ukraine. The capabilities available to both countries are so substandard that the "rules" don't apply.

The problems with Russian GPS jamming OTOH is larger than the US was prepared for. This has evolved over the course of the war to be more of a problem than anticipated. It was known and expected that Russia had a relatively large number of high powered GPS jammers that could provide wide area coverage. What was not expected was the even larger number of low to medium power jammers that have come online in response to the drone threat. The expectation was that our active SEAD would destroy most of these jammers in short order. The Ukrainians don't really have the weapons to do that. They also don't have the ESM aircraft to locate these jammers in real time and task other aircraft with eliminating them. The current improvised system in Ukraine isn't working all that effectively it appears. The USAF tacitly assumes their ESM aircraft can locate these jammers and F-35s can get close enough to destroy them without being targeted. The Ukraine has neither.

The performance of the INS in the US munitions has not been at a premium, as the GPS performance was always going to be "better". As a result, the INS performance isn't the "latest and greatest". It is also true that INS cost money, typically more than a GPS receiver. Both are "consumable" in the weapon, so there is a tradeoff. That said, the INS performance is normally "good enough", especially for HIMARS use.

The JDAMS being more susceptible to this problem is probably (IMO) partly due to a "bad fix" at launch. Since they are dropped from altitude, they may well be in the jammer effective field at launch. The INS is only as good as it's initial fix. If that fix is "bad" and there are no subsequent GPS updates, it is going to miss by at least the error in the initial fix. We also don't know to what degree the Ukraine's aircraft can supply an initial fix via the control bus to the weapon(s). MIGs don't come from the factory with a GPS and a 1553 bus :-). If the JDAM needs to acquire a fix after launch, things just get worse in the presence of jamming. It may not happen at all and the weapon "goes stupid". The JDAMS also have a longer flight time, in general, because they "fly" slower. This gives the INS more time to accumulate error.

The HARM missile does have the ability to target GPS jammers. This has been true for many years and is not classified. How well it works is not publicly known, one way or another. To what degree this is available to Ukrainian users, I do not know.

[gocard14]

Interesting info. My read on the Improved Hawk is that it is taking so long it probably won't matter. The condition of the systems must be real bad if it is taking this long to get them ready, and lots of the parts are so obsolete finding them is going to be difficult. I will believe it when I see it. Obviously the Sea Sparrow isn't an anti-ship missile. It is a SAM that operates from ships, or anywhere else it can. How many BUKs will get FrankenSAMed is unknown. The Sea Sparrow is SARAH, as are the native missiles for the BUK. Most things that are “MacGyvered” don't work very well, especially things that are complex to begin with. It will be interesting to see if this is an exception.

The main reason the I HAWK was declared obsolete and the BUK deprecated in Russian service is that conventional wisdom says any ground-based SARAH system with an illuminator won't survive in action for a week, if that long. The migration toward fire and forget missiles with their own illuminators was the result. Obviously that isn't the case in Ukraine. The capabilities available to both countries are so substandard that the "rules" don't apply.

The problems with Russian GPS jamming OTOH is larger than the US was prepared for. This has evolved over the course of the war to be more of a problem than anticipated. It was known and expected that Russia had a relatively large number of high powered GPS jammers that could provide wide area coverage. What was not expected was the even larger number of low to medium power jammers that have come online in response to the drone threat. The expectation was that our active SEAD would destroy most of these jammers in short order. The Ukrainians don't really have the weapons to do that. They also don't have the ESM aircraft to locate these jammers in real time and task other aircraft with eliminating them. The current improvised system in Ukraine isn't working all that effectively it appears. The USAF tacitly assumes their ESM aircraft can locate these jammers and F-35s can get close enough to destroy them without being targeted. The Ukraine has neither.

The performance of the INS in the US munitions has not been at a premium, as the GPS performance was always going to be "better". As a result, the INS performance isn't the "latest and greatest". It is also true that INS cost money, typically more than a GPS receiver. Both are "consumable" in the weapon, so there is a tradeoff. That said, the INS performance is normally "good enough", especially for HIMARS use.

The JDAMS being more susceptible to this problem is probably (IMO) partly due to a "bad fix" at launch. Since they are dropped from altitude, they may well be in the jammer effective field at launch. The INS is only as good as it's initial fix. If that fix is "bad" and there are no subsequent GPS updates, it is going to miss by at least the error in the initial fix. We also don't know to what degree the Ukraine's aircraft can supply an initial fix via the control bus to the weapon(s). MIGs don't come from the factory with a GPS and a 1553 bus :-). If the JDAM needs to acquire a fix after launch, things just get worse in the presence of jamming. It may not happen at all and the weapon "goes stupid". The JDAMS also have a longer flight time, in general, because they "fly" slower. This gives the INS more time to accumulate error.

The HARM missile does have the ability to target GPS jammers. This has been true for many years and is not classified. How well it works is not publicly known, one way or another. To what degree this is available to Ukrainian users, I do not know.

Seems to me the widespread use of anti-radiation drones would be a game changer. It seems like a perfect use case for them, as they can loiter/wait for radar or jamming sites to turn on and then home in, as opposed to needing an aircraft in position to launch a HARM. 

There look to be several available. The Harpy made by Israel. Turkish KARGI. Chinese ASN301 (copy of the harpy). Taiwanese Chien Hsaing. Sadly no US option I could see.

[gocard14]

Interesting info. My read on the Improved Hawk is that it is taking so long it probably won't matter. The condition of the systems must be real bad if it is taking this long to get them ready, and lots of the parts are so obsolete finding them is going to be difficult. I will believe it when I see it. Obviously the Sea Sparrow isn't an anti-ship missile. It is a SAM that operates from ships, or anywhere else it can. How many BUKs will get FrankenSAMed is unknown. The Sea Sparrow is SARAH, as are the native missiles for the BUK. Most things that are “MacGyvered” don't work very well, especially things that are complex to begin with. It will be interesting to see if this is an exception.

The main reason the I HAWK was declared obsolete and the BUK deprecated in Russian service is that conventional wisdom says any ground-based SARAH system with an illuminator won't survive in action for a week, if that long. The migration toward fire and forget missiles with their own illuminators was the result. Obviously that isn't the case in Ukraine. The capabilities available to both countries are so substandard that the "rules" don't apply.

The problems with Russian GPS jamming OTOH is larger than the US was prepared for. This has evolved over the course of the war to be more of a problem than anticipated. It was known and expected that Russia had a relatively large number of high powered GPS jammers that could provide wide area coverage. What was not expected was the even larger number of low to medium power jammers that have come online in response to the drone threat. The expectation was that our active SEAD would destroy most of these jammers in short order. The Ukrainians don't really have the weapons to do that. They also don't have the ESM aircraft to locate these jammers in real time and task other aircraft with eliminating them. The current improvised system in Ukraine isn't working all that effectively it appears. The USAF tacitly assumes their ESM aircraft can locate these jammers and F-35s can get close enough to destroy them without being targeted. The Ukraine has neither.

The performance of the INS in the US munitions has not been at a premium, as the GPS performance was always going to be "better". As a result, the INS performance isn't the "latest and greatest". It is also true that INS cost money, typically more than a GPS receiver. Both are "consumable" in the weapon, so there is a tradeoff. That said, the INS performance is normally "good enough", especially for HIMARS use.

The JDAMS being more susceptible to this problem is probably (IMO) partly due to a "bad fix" at launch. Since they are dropped from altitude, they may well be in the jammer effective field at launch. The INS is only as good as it's initial fix. If that fix is "bad" and there are no subsequent GPS updates, it is going to miss by at least the error in the initial fix. We also don't know to what degree the Ukraine's aircraft can supply an initial fix via the control bus to the weapon(s). MIGs don't come from the factory with a GPS and a 1553 bus :-). If the JDAM needs to acquire a fix after launch, things just get worse in the presence of jamming. It may not happen at all and the weapon "goes stupid". The JDAMS also have a longer flight time, in general, because they "fly" slower. This gives the INS more time to accumulate error.

The HARM missile does have the ability to target GPS jammers. This has been true for many years and is not classified. How well it works is not publicly known, one way or another. To what degree this is available to Ukrainian users, I do not know.

Seems to me the widespread use of anti-radiation drones would be a game changer. It seems like a perfect use case for them, as they can loiter/wait for radar or jamming sites to turn on and then home in, as opposed to needing an aircraft in position to launch a HARM. 

There look to be several available. The Harpy made by Israel. Turkish KARGI. Chinese ASN301 (copy of the harpy). Taiwanese Chien Hsaing. Sadly no US option I could see.

[dabigv13]

Ukraine says they used Patriot to down the Kinzhal. No note of interceptors type. PAC3 does have some sort of "lethality enhancer" which is a bunch of metal balls that explode out right before impact, perhaps caught it with that, or maybe it was PAC2.

https://www.npr.org/2023/05/06/117450561...le-kinzhal

[dabigv13]

Ukraine says they used Patriot to down the Kinzhal. No note of interceptors type. PAC3 does have some sort of "lethality enhancer" which is a bunch of metal balls that explode out right before impact, perhaps caught it with that, or maybe it was PAC2.

https://www.npr.org/2023/05/06/117450561...le-kinzhal

[Goose]

Seems to me the widespread use of anti-radiation drones would be a game changer. It seems like a perfect use case for them, as they can loiter/wait for radar or jamming sites to turn on and then home in, as opposed to needing an aircraft in position to launch a HARM. 


There look to be several available. The Harpy made by Israel. Turkish KARGI. Chinese ASN301 (copy of the harpy). Taiwanese Chien Hsaing. Sadly no US option I could see.

As far as I can tell, these loitering drones are unsuited to attack GPS jammers. GPS jammers need to be on all the time, or close to it, to be effective. The potential targets can't know when they will be attacked, so they have to assume it can be at any time. By the time the HIMARS/JDAM is inbound, it is basically too late, even assuming you can detect the threat at all. These drones are listed as targeting SAM radars, which can operate intermittently. The radars that are SAM associated operate at 2 GHz or above (a few exceptions like the P-15 and successors). Radars also are generally high peak power. GPS jammers are almost exclusively continuous signals (CW) with lower peak power. Since they are "always on", loitering is unnecessary. If the drone can receive the signal, there is no reason to wait. If it can't receive and DF the signal, it will never find the jammer anyway, except by chance.

The problem with "small" drones is that getting a "good" initial line of bearing to the target becomes more difficult as the frequency gets lower. The antenna gain is lower and the beamwidths are wider. The HARM operates against 1.5 GHz GPS jammers, but it has similar (or worse) limitations. The HARM however can be targeted to a particular location by either the launch platform or based on prior ESM data. It only has to use it's on-board antennas when it is already close to the target. However, it can tune to 1.5 GHz and have antennas that work. Unlikely these drones can, given their original purpose. Certainly the original HARMs could not.

It is easily possible to build a drone that would be able to receive and DF GPS jammers. However it needs to be a purpose-built device. It would be nice to have the ability to launch it along a basic target vector provided by prior ESM work, as otherwise most missions would come up empty. Such a drone would undoubtedly have the ability to use an adaptive antenna assembly to "null out" the GPS jammer from the drone's own GPS receiver. A real small drone/missile will have trouble doing this, but something of the size of Chien Hsaing drone could.

[Goose]

Seems to me the widespread use of anti-radiation drones would be a game changer. It seems like a perfect use case for them, as they can loiter/wait for radar or jamming sites to turn on and then home in, as opposed to needing an aircraft in position to launch a HARM. 


There look to be several available. The Harpy made by Israel. Turkish KARGI. Chinese ASN301 (copy of the harpy). Taiwanese Chien Hsaing. Sadly no US option I could see.

As far as I can tell, these loitering drones are unsuited to attack GPS jammers. GPS jammers need to be on all the time, or close to it, to be effective. The potential targets can't know when they will be attacked, so they have to assume it can be at any time. By the time the HIMARS/JDAM is inbound, it is basically too late, even assuming you can detect the threat at all. These drones are listed as targeting SAM radars, which can operate intermittently. The radars that are SAM associated operate at 2 GHz or above (a few exceptions like the P-15 and successors). Radars also are generally high peak power. GPS jammers are almost exclusively continuous signals (CW) with lower peak power. Since they are "always on", loitering is unnecessary. If the drone can receive the signal, there is no reason to wait. If it can't receive and DF the signal, it will never find the jammer anyway, except by chance.

The problem with "small" drones is that getting a "good" initial line of bearing to the target becomes more difficult as the frequency gets lower. The antenna gain is lower and the beamwidths are wider. The HARM operates against 1.5 GHz GPS jammers, but it has similar (or worse) limitations. The HARM however can be targeted to a particular location by either the launch platform or based on prior ESM data. It only has to use it's on-board antennas when it is already close to the target. However, it can tune to 1.5 GHz and have antennas that work. Unlikely these drones can, given their original purpose. Certainly the original HARMs could not.

It is easily possible to build a drone that would be able to receive and DF GPS jammers. However it needs to be a purpose-built device. It would be nice to have the ability to launch it along a basic target vector provided by prior ESM work, as otherwise most missions would come up empty. Such a drone would undoubtedly have the ability to use an adaptive antenna assembly to "null out" the GPS jammer from the drone's own GPS receiver. A real small drone/missile will have trouble doing this, but something of the size of Chien Hsaing drone could.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/merce...05841.html

If this guy doesn't fall out of a window pretty soon, one might wonder to what degree Putin is still "the boss". Of course, this is Russia, so, wheels within wheels.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/merce...05841.html

If this guy doesn't fall out of a window pretty soon, one might wonder to what degree Putin is still "the boss". Of course, this is Russia, so, wheels within wheels.

[Treefence]

It sounds like the UK will give Ukraine Storm Shadow cruise missiles.  It looks like there are two versions, one version has a range of 350 miles, while the export version has a range of 155 miles.  The UK has as many as 1000 of these, and France also has stocks of them, but given they cost over a million each, I'd assume supplies will be limited.  

Goose, do you have any thoughts on these, will they make a big difference?  I'd assume there's a way to put these on Ukrainian airframes, otherwise there would be no point.  I doubt these will be used to take out the Kerch bridge, but they could come in handy taking out known high value targets out of HIMARS range, especially in the lead up to the counter offensive, if they arrive on time.

[Treefence]

It sounds like the UK will give Ukraine Storm Shadow cruise missiles.  It looks like there are two versions, one version has a range of 350 miles, while the export version has a range of 155 miles.  The UK has as many as 1000 of these, and France also has stocks of them, but given they cost over a million each, I'd assume supplies will be limited.  

Goose, do you have any thoughts on these, will they make a big difference?  I'd assume there's a way to put these on Ukrainian airframes, otherwise there would be no point.  I doubt these will be used to take out the Kerch bridge, but they could come in handy taking out known high value targets out of HIMARS range, especially in the lead up to the counter offensive, if they arrive on time.

[Goose]

It sounds like the UK will give Ukraine Storm Shadow cruise missiles.  It looks like there are two versions, one version has a range of 350 miles, while the export version has a range of 155 miles.  The UK has as many as 1000 of these, and France also has stocks of them, but given they cost over a million each, I'd assume supplies will be limited.  

Goose, do you have any thoughts on these, will they make a big difference?  I'd assume there's a way to put these on Ukrainian airframes, otherwise there would be no point.  I doubt these will be used to take out the Kerch bridge, but they could come in handy taking out known high value targets out of HIMARS range, especially in the lead up to the counter offensive, if they arrive on time.

I don't expect any of them will arrive "soon". It would be nice to be wrong about that, but I expect it to be the case. I am also less than impressed with the results obtained by grafting on NATO weapons to MIGs. It isn't easy to do and appears to have resulted in significantly lower performance from the weapons. I am sure this isn't due to misuse, but rather the limitations of the weapon's integration into the platform. Neither JDAMs nor HARMs have really "jumped out" as success stories.

The Storm Shadow can be ground launched, which may allow for more launchers and a fully end-to-end weapons system. Not sure the intent here by the UK. The ability to hold at risk Russian logistics and C3I locations further behind the front would help a lot. Potentially equally important it could hold at risk time-sensitive targets, like trains unloading troops/material in rear areas. Ukraine has lots of HUMINT to help with this. However, the gorilla in the room may become GPS denial by the Russians. If the missiles aren't accurate, they won't help nearly as much.

My personal opinion is that a Storm Shadow may never actually be used in Ukraine, BUT what it does do is apply pressure/give a rationale for the US to deliver ATACMS. If Storm Shadow is already on the way, we aren't "changing the game". Challenger tanks all over again. It worked once, so why not try it again? Makes lots more sense to provide a missile that already has launchers integrated into the Ukrainian ORBAT than to do an entire parallel universe. We shall see.

[Goose]

It sounds like the UK will give Ukraine Storm Shadow cruise missiles.  It looks like there are two versions, one version has a range of 350 miles, while the export version has a range of 155 miles.  The UK has as many as 1000 of these, and France also has stocks of them, but given they cost over a million each, I'd assume supplies will be limited.  

Goose, do you have any thoughts on these, will they make a big difference?  I'd assume there's a way to put these on Ukrainian airframes, otherwise there would be no point.  I doubt these will be used to take out the Kerch bridge, but they could come in handy taking out known high value targets out of HIMARS range, especially in the lead up to the counter offensive, if they arrive on time.

I don't expect any of them will arrive "soon". It would be nice to be wrong about that, but I expect it to be the case. I am also less than impressed with the results obtained by grafting on NATO weapons to MIGs. It isn't easy to do and appears to have resulted in significantly lower performance from the weapons. I am sure this isn't due to misuse, but rather the limitations of the weapon's integration into the platform. Neither JDAMs nor HARMs have really "jumped out" as success stories.

The Storm Shadow can be ground launched, which may allow for more launchers and a fully end-to-end weapons system. Not sure the intent here by the UK. The ability to hold at risk Russian logistics and C3I locations further behind the front would help a lot. Potentially equally important it could hold at risk time-sensitive targets, like trains unloading troops/material in rear areas. Ukraine has lots of HUMINT to help with this. However, the gorilla in the room may become GPS denial by the Russians. If the missiles aren't accurate, they won't help nearly as much.

My personal opinion is that a Storm Shadow may never actually be used in Ukraine, BUT what it does do is apply pressure/give a rationale for the US to deliver ATACMS. If Storm Shadow is already on the way, we aren't "changing the game". Challenger tanks all over again. It worked once, so why not try it again? Makes lots more sense to provide a missile that already has launchers integrated into the Ukrainian ORBAT than to do an entire parallel universe. We shall see.

[dabigv13]

Always hard to know with Prigozhin, but he says Wagner is out of ammo again and again is talking about leaving Bakhmut after reversing himself before when he was apparently promised more ammo. He is upset about performance of Russian regular units who are being defeated on their flanks. Ukrainian and Russian sources both describe some limited successful Ukrainian attacks.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukr...023-05-10/

Video from 3rd Assault Brigade of the Bakhmut counter

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/IAPonomarenko/status...38118?s=20
[/tweet]

Interesting video of a Russian surrendering to a drone

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/Teoyaomiquu/status/1...71041?s=20[/tweet]

Pentagon confirming Ukraine's successful intercept of a Kinzhal missile with Patriot. Something of a first for the system.
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/shashj/status/165601...82345?s=20[/tweet]

[dabigv13]

Always hard to know with Prigozhin, but he says Wagner is out of ammo again and again is talking about leaving Bakhmut after reversing himself before when he was apparently promised more ammo. He is upset about performance of Russian regular units who are being defeated on their flanks. Ukrainian and Russian sources both describe some limited successful Ukrainian attacks.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukr...023-05-10/

Video from 3rd Assault Brigade of the Bakhmut counter

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/IAPonomarenko/status...38118?s=20
[/tweet]

Interesting video of a Russian surrendering to a drone

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/Teoyaomiquu/status/1...71041?s=20[/tweet]

Pentagon confirming Ukraine's successful intercept of a Kinzhal missile with Patriot. Something of a first for the system.
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/shashj/status/165601...82345?s=20[/tweet]

[gocard14]

Czech Republic president quoted as saying they are considering providing L159 light fighters to Ukraine
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/cze...023-05-10/

Hadn't heard much about this airframe but seems it could make some sense. It is the newer version of the L59, which Ukraine already operates as a trainer, so their pilots and maintainence crews should have some familiarity. It is compatible with some NATO weapons, including Aim9s, AGM-65 Mavericks which should be plentiful, though don't have the range to be true game changers. There are reports it was designed to be AMRAAM compatible, but unclear if this was implemented. 

The main limitation would be numbers, only 72 were ever made and many of those were exported. Czech republic reportedly operates 24 currently.

[gocard14]

Czech Republic president quoted as saying they are considering providing L159 light fighters to Ukraine
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/cze...023-05-10/

Hadn't heard much about this airframe but seems it could make some sense. It is the newer version of the L59, which Ukraine already operates as a trainer, so their pilots and maintainence crews should have some familiarity. It is compatible with some NATO weapons, including Aim9s, AGM-65 Mavericks which should be plentiful, though don't have the range to be true game changers. There are reports it was designed to be AMRAAM compatible, but unclear if this was implemented. 

The main limitation would be numbers, only 72 were ever made and many of those were exported. Czech republic reportedly operates 24 currently.

[dabigv13]

Storm Shadow is already in Ukraine! From below thread it seems they are indeed being launched from Ukrainian aircraft. Has not yet been used/tested it sounds like.

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/haynesdeborah/status/1656633906173472768?s=20[/tweet]

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1656631937203847169?s=20[/tweet]

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/KyleJGlen/status/1656616435639111682?s=20[/tweet]

One way to mitigate air defense weakness is to attack your opponent's air force on the ground....

[dabigv13]

Storm Shadow is already in Ukraine! From below thread it seems they are indeed being launched from Ukrainian aircraft. Has not yet been used/tested it sounds like.

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/haynesdeborah/status/1656633906173472768?s=20[/tweet]

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1656631937203847169?s=20[/tweet]

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/KyleJGlen/status/1656616435639111682?s=20[/tweet]

One way to mitigate air defense weakness is to attack your opponent's air force on the ground....

[dabigv13]

Good thread on storm shadows capabilities
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/FRHoffmann1/status/1...31264?s=20[/tweet]

[dabigv13]

Good thread on storm shadows capabilities
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/FRHoffmann1/status/1...31264?s=20[/tweet]

[GK3]

I can understand the desire to hit Russian Military Air Installations, but I would think that interdiction of supply transshipment points, potential transportation bottle necks like bridges and tunnels that Russian Forces need to keep their units supplied would be more significant targets.  Once the offensive starts, assuming it does in fact start, restricting Russian abilities to resupply and reinforce would be most important.

[GK3]

I can understand the desire to hit Russian Military Air Installations, but I would think that interdiction of supply transshipment points, potential transportation bottle necks like bridges and tunnels that Russian Forces need to keep their units supplied would be more significant targets.  Once the offensive starts, assuming it does in fact start, restricting Russian abilities to resupply and reinforce would be most important.

[dabigv13]

Well, there almost certainly will be more plausible targets than missiles. Perhaps the reason this is being publicized before their first use is to freak out the Russians and make them move high value targets, complicating their logistics before the counter offensive. A "missile fleet in being" was one good descriptor I saw.

[dabigv13]

Well, there almost certainly will be more plausible targets than missiles. Perhaps the reason this is being publicized before their first use is to freak out the Russians and make them move high value targets, complicating their logistics before the counter offensive. A "missile fleet in being" was one good descriptor I saw.

[gocard14]

Agreed. The biggest impact will be to hold targets “at risk” and complicate Russian logistics, which were already complicated by the range of HIMARS. It also is a good option against hard targets like command bunkers in advance of an offensive if it is true the JDAMs are struggling. 

Despite the talk about the Kerch bridge, I have trouble believing that Ukraine is receiving enough storm shadows to risk throwing them at an area with such concentrated air defense and jamming. Maybe they could coordinate something with a drone swarm to keep SAMs busy, but a smart SAM operator would ignore the drones which can’t harm a hard target and focus on the missle

[gocard14]

Agreed. The biggest impact will be to hold targets “at risk” and complicate Russian logistics, which were already complicated by the range of HIMARS. It also is a good option against hard targets like command bunkers in advance of an offensive if it is true the JDAMs are struggling. 

Despite the talk about the Kerch bridge, I have trouble believing that Ukraine is receiving enough storm shadows to risk throwing them at an area with such concentrated air defense and jamming. Maybe they could coordinate something with a drone swarm to keep SAMs busy, but a smart SAM operator would ignore the drones which can’t harm a hard target and focus on the missle

[Goose]

Storm Shadow is already in Ukraine! From below thread it seems they are indeed being launched from Ukrainian aircraft. Has not yet been used/tested it sounds like.

https://twitter.com/haynesdeborah/status...72768?s=20

https://twitter.com/John_A_Ridge/status/...47169?s=20

https://twitter.com/KyleJGlen/status/165...11682?s=20

One way to mitigate air defense weakness is to attack your opponent's air force on the ground....

Good news that it is moving this fast. Hopefully this means they had been working on this for a while and the time to operational use will be relatively short. There are lots of defensive fortifications/logistics targets in the Donbas and all along the "land bridge" that could be attacked by this missile. Obviously there are very lucrative targets in Crimea as well.

I am still skeptical about how well this is all going to play together, but at the very least it complicates the Russian air defense task greatly. Right now, they really don't have to worry much about Ukraine attacking deeply into the occupied parts of the country because the Ukrainians have too few aircraft and they can't afford the losses that would result. The cruise missiles don't have that issue, can take a planned, circuitous path, and fly low all the way.

It seems improbable that the UK would give Ukraine the "go ahead" to hit air bases in Russia proper using a UK supplied weapon. I guess it is not impossible they would do so, but I do think it would arguably constitute a large escalation. It would be "nice", because allowing Russia to bang away at Ukraine with ALCMs from aircraft at these bases is a "real big problem". It is a walk in the park for Russian air and a nightmare for Ukraine. Even if the UK was of the opinion that allowing Ukraine to do the same to Russia was indeed a symmetrical action by "the west", I am pretty sure they would have needed to tell everybody in NATO, and I can't IMAGINE that getting buy-in. Even if they just told the US, I don't think it would fly :-). If they didn't tell the US and it happens, I don't want to think about the consequences. OTOH, maybe I am wrong and the US has bought in to the idea. Seems hard to belive to me, what do other's think? I guess it doesn't matter until they fly.

Good thread on storm shadows capabilities
https://twitter.com/FRHoffmann1/status/1...31264?s=20

Indeed a good source of info. I also think it relevant that the accuracy of the Storm Shadow as an ALCM is nominally better than that of an ATACMs is correct. However, there is a lot of uncertainty in the current open source literature about the actual accuracy of the "current" version of the ATACMs missile. What is undoubtedly true however is that the US doesn't have a lot of these missiles and IMO that has really increased the army's reluctance to part with them. The Precision Strike Missile program (and the associated requirements back and forth) has "overhung" the existing ATACMs for way too long. This is an example of, among other things, "the prefect being the enemy of good enough".

There are a couple of things that do need to be considered for both longer range weapons. One that I have mentioned before is the effect of GPS jamming on accuracy. What the real situation in Ukraine is in this regard I don't know but it does sound like this is a big problem that can get bigger. You can bet that all significant Russian air bases have GPS jammers. The second is that ALCMs are not very good against time-sensitive targets unless you have aircraft "stacked" for such tasking.

The time it takes to plan the mission, fuel and arm the aircraft, get in the air and launch the missile is much greater than communicating the target coordinates to the ATACMs battery who then shoots. The US found this to be true in Iraq. The first takes a few hours, the second less than 15 minutes. In many cases, that matters. Of course, the USAF "solved" that by stacking aircraft that could be tasked in "near real time". It was still slower than the ATACMs, but not as much. Of course, they couldn't do this 24/7. Consumed too many assets that often didn't do anything. OTOH, if there was no ATACMs within range of the target of opportunity, the air launched missile was the only option. Thus the need for the extended range precision strike missile.

[Goose]

Storm Shadow is already in Ukraine! From below thread it seems they are indeed being launched from Ukrainian aircraft. Has not yet been used/tested it sounds like.

https://twitter.com/haynesdeborah/status...72768?s=20

https://twitter.com/John_A_Ridge/status/...47169?s=20

https://twitter.com/KyleJGlen/status/165...11682?s=20

One way to mitigate air defense weakness is to attack your opponent's air force on the ground....

Good news that it is moving this fast. Hopefully this means they had been working on this for a while and the time to operational use will be relatively short. There are lots of defensive fortifications/logistics targets in the Donbas and all along the "land bridge" that could be attacked by this missile. Obviously there are very lucrative targets in Crimea as well.

I am still skeptical about how well this is all going to play together, but at the very least it complicates the Russian air defense task greatly. Right now, they really don't have to worry much about Ukraine attacking deeply into the occupied parts of the country because the Ukrainians have too few aircraft and they can't afford the losses that would result. The cruise missiles don't have that issue, can take a planned, circuitous path, and fly low all the way.

It seems improbable that the UK would give Ukraine the "go ahead" to hit air bases in Russia proper using a UK supplied weapon. I guess it is not impossible they would do so, but I do think it would arguably constitute a large escalation. It would be "nice", because allowing Russia to bang away at Ukraine with ALCMs from aircraft at these bases is a "real big problem". It is a walk in the park for Russian air and a nightmare for Ukraine. Even if the UK was of the opinion that allowing Ukraine to do the same to Russia was indeed a symmetrical action by "the west", I am pretty sure they would have needed to tell everybody in NATO, and I can't IMAGINE that getting buy-in. Even if they just told the US, I don't think it would fly :-). If they didn't tell the US and it happens, I don't want to think about the consequences. OTOH, maybe I am wrong and the US has bought in to the idea. Seems hard to belive to me, what do other's think? I guess it doesn't matter until they fly.

Good thread on storm shadows capabilities
https://twitter.com/FRHoffmann1/status/1...31264?s=20

Indeed a good source of info. I also think it relevant that the accuracy of the Storm Shadow as an ALCM is nominally better than that of an ATACMs is correct. However, there is a lot of uncertainty in the current open source literature about the actual accuracy of the "current" version of the ATACMs missile. What is undoubtedly true however is that the US doesn't have a lot of these missiles and IMO that has really increased the army's reluctance to part with them. The Precision Strike Missile program (and the associated requirements back and forth) has "overhung" the existing ATACMs for way too long. This is an example of, among other things, "the prefect being the enemy of good enough".

There are a couple of things that do need to be considered for both longer range weapons. One that I have mentioned before is the effect of GPS jamming on accuracy. What the real situation in Ukraine is in this regard I don't know but it does sound like this is a big problem that can get bigger. You can bet that all significant Russian air bases have GPS jammers. The second is that ALCMs are not very good against time-sensitive targets unless you have aircraft "stacked" for such tasking.

The time it takes to plan the mission, fuel and arm the aircraft, get in the air and launch the missile is much greater than communicating the target coordinates to the ATACMs battery who then shoots. The US found this to be true in Iraq. The first takes a few hours, the second less than 15 minutes. In many cases, that matters. Of course, the USAF "solved" that by stacking aircraft that could be tasked in "near real time". It was still slower than the ATACMs, but not as much. Of course, they couldn't do this 24/7. Consumed too many assets that often didn't do anything. OTOH, if there was no ATACMs within range of the target of opportunity, the air launched missile was the only option. Thus the need for the extended range precision strike missile.

[Treefence]

Adding on to what Goose was saying, it sounds like UK has given the okay for the missiles, but only to attack Russians on Ukrainian sovereign territory, per this article.  So Russian airbases in Russia (and Belarus) would be off limits.  

Technically a decent portion of the Kerch bridge is within the Ukrainian border, but I wouldn't be surprised if it was also off limits, but who knows.  

https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/11/polit...es-ukraine

[Treefence]

Adding on to what Goose was saying, it sounds like UK has given the okay for the missiles, but only to attack Russians on Ukrainian sovereign territory, per this article.  So Russian airbases in Russia (and Belarus) would be off limits.  

Technically a decent portion of the Kerch bridge is within the Ukrainian border, but I wouldn't be surprised if it was also off limits, but who knows.  

https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/11/polit...es-ukraine

[dabigv13]

Russian military bloggers are talking about successful Ukrainian breakthroughs in multiple areas of the front, near the flanks of Bakhmut and in the north near Soledar and Kupyansk, with concern that a larger attack is about to come in the south. The Russian MOD issued a statement denying all this, but the feel is similar to Kharkiv and Kherson counterattacks.
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/16567...47457?s=20[/tweet]

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status...90146?s=20[/tweet]

It strikes me that at this point in the war, Russia's more elite units that have the capability and morale to go on counter attacks against advancing Ukrainian forces will have been heavily degraded. Hard to say whether these are just successful probing attacks or the actual beginning of Ukraine's full offensive. However if Ukraine does succeed in getting multiple breakthroughs on separate fronts Russia will struggle to plug the gaps.

[dabigv13]

Russian military bloggers are talking about successful Ukrainian breakthroughs in multiple areas of the front, near the flanks of Bakhmut and in the north near Soledar and Kupyansk, with concern that a larger attack is about to come in the south. The Russian MOD issued a statement denying all this, but the feel is similar to Kharkiv and Kherson counterattacks.
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/16567...47457?s=20[/tweet]

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status...90146?s=20[/tweet]

It strikes me that at this point in the war, Russia's more elite units that have the capability and morale to go on counter attacks against advancing Ukrainian forces will have been heavily degraded. Hard to say whether these are just successful probing attacks or the actual beginning of Ukraine's full offensive. However if Ukraine does succeed in getting multiple breakthroughs on separate fronts Russia will struggle to plug the gaps.

[Goose]

Russian military bloggers are talking about successful Ukrainian breakthroughs in multiple areas of the front, near the flanks of Bakhmut and in the north near Soledar and Kupyansk, with concern that a larger attack is about to come in the south. The Russian MOD issued a statement denying all this, but the feel is similar to Kharkiv and Kherson counterattacks.

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/16567...47457?s=20
https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status...90146?s=20

I think this situation is indeed somewhat like Kharkiv/Kupiansk. The Russians just don't have the forces in place to do what they are trying to do. Ukraine has intelligently found a weak link and exploited it. It remains to be seen if the Russians have indeed again left a hollow shell behind them that Ukraine can really exploit, but if they did, Russia is in a lot of trouble. I would bet with high confidence this is NOT Ukraine's intended Schwerpunkt. It is a "bonus", which is always good.

It strikes me that at this point in the war, Russia's more elite units that have the capability and morale to go on counter attacks against advancing Ukrainian forces will have been heavily degraded. Hard to say whether these are just successful probing attacks or the actual beginning of Ukraine's full offensive. However if Ukraine does succeed in getting multiple breakthroughs on separate fronts Russia will struggle to plug the gaps.

IMO you are exactly correct. The last thing Russia needs is a requirement to rapidly shuttle forces around to contain breakthroughs. The have shown a marked inability to do anything fast. This will be doubly true if Ukraine can create this problem without using the main striking forces it has accumulated for the "spring offensive". Russia could be massively "wrong footed" here.

https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/uk-gi...09496.html

Not too much new here but a good summary. IMO the most important point is that this has been the wettest spring in may years and the mud is still bad. Even if Ukraine has already got everything in place, they may need to wait "a bit" before they start the main effort. They really don't want to start making progress (but lose the element of surprise) and then get stuck in the mud. It would be different if they were trying to preempt a Russian offensive, but there is no such thing in the cards. They can pick their time.

I am betting something in Zaporizhia Oblast followed by (if things are going "ok" in the first effort) something 10-14 days later in Kherson Oblast directed at isolating a large segment of the Russian defense and threatening Crimea. If things go badly/slowly in Zaporizhia the Kherson action will become a diversionary effort. Russia is paranoid there (and needs to be), so such a diversion can be effective. If Russia is already committing reserves in Donbas because of setbacks there, even better!

[Goose]

Russian military bloggers are talking about successful Ukrainian breakthroughs in multiple areas of the front, near the flanks of Bakhmut and in the north near Soledar and Kupyansk, with concern that a larger attack is about to come in the south. The Russian MOD issued a statement denying all this, but the feel is similar to Kharkiv and Kherson counterattacks.

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/16567...47457?s=20
https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status...90146?s=20

I think this situation is indeed somewhat like Kharkiv/Kupiansk. The Russians just don't have the forces in place to do what they are trying to do. Ukraine has intelligently found a weak link and exploited it. It remains to be seen if the Russians have indeed again left a hollow shell behind them that Ukraine can really exploit, but if they did, Russia is in a lot of trouble. I would bet with high confidence this is NOT Ukraine's intended Schwerpunkt. It is a "bonus", which is always good.

It strikes me that at this point in the war, Russia's more elite units that have the capability and morale to go on counter attacks against advancing Ukrainian forces will have been heavily degraded. Hard to say whether these are just successful probing attacks or the actual beginning of Ukraine's full offensive. However if Ukraine does succeed in getting multiple breakthroughs on separate fronts Russia will struggle to plug the gaps.

IMO you are exactly correct. The last thing Russia needs is a requirement to rapidly shuttle forces around to contain breakthroughs. The have shown a marked inability to do anything fast. This will be doubly true if Ukraine can create this problem without using the main striking forces it has accumulated for the "spring offensive". Russia could be massively "wrong footed" here.

https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/uk-gi...09496.html

Not too much new here but a good summary. IMO the most important point is that this has been the wettest spring in may years and the mud is still bad. Even if Ukraine has already got everything in place, they may need to wait "a bit" before they start the main effort. They really don't want to start making progress (but lose the element of surprise) and then get stuck in the mud. It would be different if they were trying to preempt a Russian offensive, but there is no such thing in the cards. They can pick their time.

I am betting something in Zaporizhia Oblast followed by (if things are going "ok" in the first effort) something 10-14 days later in Kherson Oblast directed at isolating a large segment of the Russian defense and threatening Crimea. If things go badly/slowly in Zaporizhia the Kherson action will become a diversionary effort. Russia is paranoid there (and needs to be), so such a diversion can be effective. If Russia is already committing reserves in Donbas because of setbacks there, even better!

[gocard14]

Russian military bloggers are talking about successful Ukrainian breakthroughs in multiple areas of the front, near the flanks of Bakhmut and in the north near Soledar and Kupyansk, with concern that a larger attack is about to come in the south. The Russian MOD issued a statement denying all this, but the feel is similar to Kharkiv and Kherson counterattacks.

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/16567...47457?s=20
https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status...90146?s=20

I think this situation is indeed somewhat like Kharkiv/Kupiansk. The Russians just don't have the forces in place to do what they are trying to do. Ukraine has intelligently found a weak link and exploited it. It remains to be seen if the Russians have indeed again left a hollow shell behind them that Ukraine can really exploit, but if they did, Russia is in a lot of trouble. I would bet with high confidence this is NOT Ukraine's intended Schwerpunkt. It is a "bonus", which is always good.

It strikes me that at this point in the war, Russia's more elite units that have the capability and morale to go on counter attacks against advancing Ukrainian forces will have been heavily degraded. Hard to say whether these are just successful probing attacks or the actual beginning of Ukraine's full offensive. However if Ukraine does succeed in getting multiple breakthroughs on separate fronts Russia will struggle to plug the gaps.

IMO you are exactly correct. The last thing Russia needs is a requirement to rapidly shuttle forces around to contain breakthroughs. The have shown a marked inability to do anything fast. This will be doubly true if Ukraine can create this problem without using the main striking forces it has accumulated for the "spring offensive". Russia could be massively "wrong footed" here.

https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/uk-gi...09496.html

Not too much new here but a good summary. IMO the most important point is that this has been the wettest spring in may years and the mud is still bad. Even if Ukraine has already got everything in place, they may need to wait "a bit" before they start the main effort. They really don't want to start making progress (but lose the element of surprise) and then get stuck in the mud. It would be different if they were trying to preempt a Russian offensive, but there is no such thing in the cards. They can pick their time.

I am betting something in Zaporizhia Oblast followed by (if things are going "ok" in the first effort) something 10-14 days later in Kherson Oblast directed at isolating a large segment of the Russian defense and threatening Crimea. If things go badly/slowly in Zaporizhia the Kherson action will become a diversionary effort. Russia is paranoid there (and needs to be), so such a diversion can be effective. If Russia is already committing reserves in Donbas because of setbacks there, even better!

Just armchair generaling here, but it seems like given the relative lack of strategic significance of a Bakhmut advance, the main goal would be to force Russia to commit their reserves to that axis prior to a more aggressive offensive further south. The political importance of Bakhmut at this point could be a tool to force Russia to commit more forces there then is wise.

If they can gain a lot of ground on the flanks and encircle forces within the city, all the better.  I wouldn’t expect a big push within the city itself due to the attrition involved.

[gocard14]

Russian military bloggers are talking about successful Ukrainian breakthroughs in multiple areas of the front, near the flanks of Bakhmut and in the north near Soledar and Kupyansk, with concern that a larger attack is about to come in the south. The Russian MOD issued a statement denying all this, but the feel is similar to Kharkiv and Kherson counterattacks.

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/16567...47457?s=20
https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status...90146?s=20

I think this situation is indeed somewhat like Kharkiv/Kupiansk. The Russians just don't have the forces in place to do what they are trying to do. Ukraine has intelligently found a weak link and exploited it. It remains to be seen if the Russians have indeed again left a hollow shell behind them that Ukraine can really exploit, but if they did, Russia is in a lot of trouble. I would bet with high confidence this is NOT Ukraine's intended Schwerpunkt. It is a "bonus", which is always good.

It strikes me that at this point in the war, Russia's more elite units that have the capability and morale to go on counter attacks against advancing Ukrainian forces will have been heavily degraded. Hard to say whether these are just successful probing attacks or the actual beginning of Ukraine's full offensive. However if Ukraine does succeed in getting multiple breakthroughs on separate fronts Russia will struggle to plug the gaps.

IMO you are exactly correct. The last thing Russia needs is a requirement to rapidly shuttle forces around to contain breakthroughs. The have shown a marked inability to do anything fast. This will be doubly true if Ukraine can create this problem without using the main striking forces it has accumulated for the "spring offensive". Russia could be massively "wrong footed" here.

https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/uk-gi...09496.html

Not too much new here but a good summary. IMO the most important point is that this has been the wettest spring in may years and the mud is still bad. Even if Ukraine has already got everything in place, they may need to wait "a bit" before they start the main effort. They really don't want to start making progress (but lose the element of surprise) and then get stuck in the mud. It would be different if they were trying to preempt a Russian offensive, but there is no such thing in the cards. They can pick their time.

I am betting something in Zaporizhia Oblast followed by (if things are going "ok" in the first effort) something 10-14 days later in Kherson Oblast directed at isolating a large segment of the Russian defense and threatening Crimea. If things go badly/slowly in Zaporizhia the Kherson action will become a diversionary effort. Russia is paranoid there (and needs to be), so such a diversion can be effective. If Russia is already committing reserves in Donbas because of setbacks there, even better!

Just armchair generaling here, but it seems like given the relative lack of strategic significance of a Bakhmut advance, the main goal would be to force Russia to commit their reserves to that axis prior to a more aggressive offensive further south. The political importance of Bakhmut at this point could be a tool to force Russia to commit more forces there then is wise.

If they can gain a lot of ground on the flanks and encircle forces within the city, all the better.  I wouldn’t expect a big push within the city itself due to the attrition involved.