[BostonCard]

I can’t offer anymore clarity because I don’t know the rules any more than any of you.  I was just asked by a member to request people not post info that is classified, even if it is publicly available.  Just use your judgment.

BC

[BostonCard]

I can’t offer anymore clarity because I don’t know the rules any more than any of you.  I was just asked by a member to request people not post info that is classified, even if it is publicly available.  Just use your judgment.

BC

[GK3]

I can’t offer anymore clarity because I don’t know the rules any more than any of you.  I was just asked by a member to request people not post info that is classified, even if it is publicly available.  Just use your judgment.

BC

I interpret that just as don't post copies of any of the documents or excerpts from them. 

ISW is reporting that Ukrainian troops have gotten units across the river near Kehrson.  Their most recent report is well worth a read.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgro...il-23-2023

[GK3]

I can’t offer anymore clarity because I don’t know the rules any more than any of you.  I was just asked by a member to request people not post info that is classified, even if it is publicly available.  Just use your judgment.

BC

I interpret that just as don't post copies of any of the documents or excerpts from them. 

ISW is reporting that Ukrainian troops have gotten units across the river near Kehrson.  Their most recent report is well worth a read.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgro...il-23-2023

[M T]

ISW is reporting that Ukrainian troops have gotten units across the river near Kehrson.  Their most recent report is well worth a read.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgro...il-23-2023

Note that ISW's report of the Ukranian operations on the East (left) bank is based on Russian milbloggers. 

It was an interesting read.  This concerned me

A Belarusian military news outlet claimed that Belarusian forces plan to deploy Russian tactical nuclear weapons to bases where mobile launch complexes were previously located before the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Belarus from 1993 to 1996.

[M T]

ISW is reporting that Ukrainian troops have gotten units across the river near Kehrson.  Their most recent report is well worth a read.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgro...il-23-2023

Note that ISW's report of the Ukranian operations on the East (left) bank is based on Russian milbloggers. 

It was an interesting read.  This concerned me

A Belarusian military news outlet claimed that Belarusian forces plan to deploy Russian tactical nuclear weapons to bases where mobile launch complexes were previously located before the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Belarus from 1993 to 1996.

[GK3]

ISW is reporting that Ukrainian troops have gotten units across the river near Kehrson.  Their most recent report is well worth a read.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgro...il-23-2023

Note that ISW's report of the Ukranian operations on the East (left) bank is based on Russian milbloggers. 

It was an interesting read.  This concerned me

A Belarusian military news outlet claimed that Belarusian forces plan to deploy Russian tactical nuclear weapons to bases where mobile launch complexes were previously located before the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Belarus from 1993 to 1996.

All of ISW's stuff is based information gleaned from Russian Mil Bloggers and enough of it to allow them to confirm the approximate gps locations.  
I think their stuff is fairly accurate which about as good as it gets I think. The big question about Nuclear Weapons in Belarus is who will control them.  I am pretty certain Putin is not giving the keys to Belarus. 

Big question though is Putin willing to take things to the brink of Nuclear war to avoid losing?  Would his military launch the weapons?  They would know that is probably the last thing they would ever do and their country would basically disappear.  Is he willing to use tactical nuclear weapons?
Questions I hope we never get the answers to.

[GK3]

ISW is reporting that Ukrainian troops have gotten units across the river near Kehrson.  Their most recent report is well worth a read.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgro...il-23-2023

Note that ISW's report of the Ukranian operations on the East (left) bank is based on Russian milbloggers. 

It was an interesting read.  This concerned me

A Belarusian military news outlet claimed that Belarusian forces plan to deploy Russian tactical nuclear weapons to bases where mobile launch complexes were previously located before the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Belarus from 1993 to 1996.

All of ISW's stuff is based information gleaned from Russian Mil Bloggers and enough of it to allow them to confirm the approximate gps locations.  
I think their stuff is fairly accurate which about as good as it gets I think. The big question about Nuclear Weapons in Belarus is who will control them.  I am pretty certain Putin is not giving the keys to Belarus. 

Big question though is Putin willing to take things to the brink of Nuclear war to avoid losing?  Would his military launch the weapons?  They would know that is probably the last thing they would ever do and their country would basically disappear.  Is he willing to use tactical nuclear weapons?
Questions I hope we never get the answers to.

[dabigv13]

Long and technical but interesting report on the Russian Air Force and lessons going forward for NATO. The PDF is linked at site below. 

https://www.cna.org/reports/2023/04/russ...imitations

The author of the above report, Justin Bronk, was recently on this podcast, which I also found informative

Geopolitics Decanted Podcast-  How Ukraine Can Survive the Exhaustion of Its Air Defense Stocks

https://open.spotify.com/episode/7d8W9yx...SBMvmtLaQQ


Some takeaways for me- replenishing Ukrainian air defense missiles far and away more important than getting Ukraine fighter jets. But no easy solution for replenishing Ukrainian stocks, as while Patriot is a good system, there are not nearly enough of them to replace S300 like for like. We will be better able to supply medium range systems with RIM7 for their Buks and AMRAAMs for NASAMS, but will be a different more distributed air defense system with less long range layered backup. NATO has operated with air superiority for decades and so air defense stocks are low and more focused on ballistic missile defense, so it's good that Ukraine had such a robust and deep stock of air defenses, though we are now reaching their limit.

VKS would obviously be better able to operate if there is no Ukrainian air defense system or a fragmentary one, but even then they would not be able to be as devastating as a NATO style air force. Would primarily see more dumb bomb usage from altitude, which could be a problem for cities and massed formations. But Russia has probably suffered very high casualties in their ground based air spotting forces for laser guided munitions and Russia is pretty much already doing what they can with precision guided munitions, which are in short supply anyway. And their close air support has never been good, as doctrinally they rely more on ground based fires. Even in Syria with total air superiority, they rarely flew sorties with more than one or two aircraft, usually using dumb bombs from high up or guided bombs with spotters.

[dabigv13]

Long and technical but interesting report on the Russian Air Force and lessons going forward for NATO. The PDF is linked at site below. 

https://www.cna.org/reports/2023/04/russ...imitations

The author of the above report, Justin Bronk, was recently on this podcast, which I also found informative

Geopolitics Decanted Podcast-  How Ukraine Can Survive the Exhaustion of Its Air Defense Stocks

https://open.spotify.com/episode/7d8W9yx...SBMvmtLaQQ


Some takeaways for me- replenishing Ukrainian air defense missiles far and away more important than getting Ukraine fighter jets. But no easy solution for replenishing Ukrainian stocks, as while Patriot is a good system, there are not nearly enough of them to replace S300 like for like. We will be better able to supply medium range systems with RIM7 for their Buks and AMRAAMs for NASAMS, but will be a different more distributed air defense system with less long range layered backup. NATO has operated with air superiority for decades and so air defense stocks are low and more focused on ballistic missile defense, so it's good that Ukraine had such a robust and deep stock of air defenses, though we are now reaching their limit.

VKS would obviously be better able to operate if there is no Ukrainian air defense system or a fragmentary one, but even then they would not be able to be as devastating as a NATO style air force. Would primarily see more dumb bomb usage from altitude, which could be a problem for cities and massed formations. But Russia has probably suffered very high casualties in their ground based air spotting forces for laser guided munitions and Russia is pretty much already doing what they can with precision guided munitions, which are in short supply anyway. And their close air support has never been good, as doctrinally they rely more on ground based fires. Even in Syria with total air superiority, they rarely flew sorties with more than one or two aircraft, usually using dumb bombs from high up or guided bombs with spotters.

[Goose]

Long and technical but interesting report on the Russian Air Force and lessons going forward for NATO. The PDF is linked at site below. 

https://www.cna.org/reports/2023/04/russ...imitations

The author of the above report, Justin Bronk, was recently on this podcast, which I also found informative

Geopolitics Decanted Podcast-  How Ukraine Can Survive the Exhaustion of Its Air Defense Stocks

https://open.spotify.com/episode/7d8W9yx...SBMvmtLaQQ


Some takeaways for me- replenishing Ukrainian air defense missiles far and away more important than getting Ukraine fighter jets. But no easy solution for replenishing Ukrainian stocks, as while Patriot is a good system, there are not nearly enough of them to replace S300 like for like. We will be better able to supply medium range systems with RIM7 for their Buks and AMRAAMs for NASAMS, but will be a different more distributed air defense system with less long range layered backup. NATO has operated with air superiority for decades and so air defense stocks are low and more focused on ballistic missile defense, so it's good that Ukraine had such a robust and deep stock of air defenses, though we are now reaching their limit.

VKS would obviously be better able to operate if there is no Ukrainian air defense system or a fragmentary one, but even then they would not be able to be as devastating as a NATO style air force. Would primarily see more dumb bomb usage from altitude, which could be a problem for cities and massed formations. But Russia has probably suffered very high casualties in their ground based air spotting forces for laser guided munitions and Russia is pretty much already doing what they can with precision guided munitions, which are in short supply anyway. And their close air support has never been good, as doctrinally they rely more on ground based fires. Even in Syria with total air superiority, they rarely flew sorties with more than one or two aircraft, usually using dumb bombs from high up or guided bombs with spotters.

IMO a GREAT post. The documents referenced are good and your summary of the conclusions to be drawn is excellent! The one area where I believe the implications are not clearly stated is the effect of Russian air on the Ukrainian proposed offensive.

If Ukrainian ground based long range air defenses are unable to "cover" the advance of the Ukrainian forces, either due to expending all their S-300 missiles or simply lack of numbers, the Russians can stay up at medium/high altitude with impunity. Their ability to drop bombs that provide "Grad-like" coverage against advancing troops in the open will be a big problem for Ukraine. The Russians can just sit there and bang away. Fast moving armored formations can probably weather this level of opposition (with non-zero but manageable losses), but their soft-skinned logistics and support train cannot. Ukraine will also need to transfer lots of their "leg" infantry into the territory their armored brigades capture in order to mop up / surround cut off and bypassed Russian fixed defenses. These units cannot sustain themselves against Russian air operating at high/medium altitudes, even with it's limitations.

The Ukrainians (finally) realize NATO simply doesn't have the missile systems to replicate the previously existing Ukrainian IADS, let alone expand it to cover advancing troops. NATO uses their air force to do that. Therefore, Ukraine wants F-16s to build a "NATO" air force. Ukraine sees it as "equalizing" the technology advantage Russian air currently has and giving Ukraine the ability to drive off Russian air. However, as the article points out, just being able to fly the plane doesn't give you a NATO air force. Ukraine probably doesn't "get" that. They just want to keep the Russians off their advancing troops. Having F-16s they can fly would do that, but the attrition would be significant. NATO wouldn't suffer that attrition because they would attack the Russian air force as part of the SEAD/DEAD mission. Ukraine can't do that without the "full Monty" NATO air force, and you can't build that in a year.

This situation leaves the following possible strategic options to Ukraine going forward: 1) Hold off on any offensive and play defense. Hope your missile supplies hold out and/or Russia runs out of missiles/troops/artillery ammunition/morale and just quits. Probably not a good option. 2) Start an offensive with the newly trained and armed armored brigades. Hope to make enough progress to break the land bridge and/or threaten Crimea. Best case, Russian morale fails and a rout ensues. Endure what Russian air can be thrown at the advance. This isn't a crazy option and this is what I expect to see. The downside is that if Ukraine doesn't make substantial progress, it becomes unclear how Ukraine can go forward. It becomes option 1 without a hope of near term victory. 3) Convince the US/NATO to give Ukraine F-16s. Wait till next year when you have enough pilots and planes to actually protect an offensive. Obvious downside is Russia gets time to retool and improve their forces, which everybody, including Ukraine, agrees they have been doing ("learning"). Not a good option, as there is no certainty Ukraine will ever get F-16s and even less certainty they can hold together playing defense for another year waiting to try their offensive.

IMO "the west" has been very short-sighted in how we have approached this war. As the articles point out, most of what we see here regarding Russian air and the Ukrainian IADS was predictable. The Ukrainians actually have done better than most expected in preserving their IADS. However, we knew they only had a finite number of S-300s, which are really what is needed to keep Russian aircraft at stand-off ranges from operating at high altitudes. The BUK systems are useful, but not at high altitude/long range, and are also a finite resource. We should have been training Ukrainian pilots from very early on, even if we were unsure we would ever give them planes. Even if we decide to give them planes now, they are a year away from a counter air capability. Could be too little too late at this point.

[Goose]

Long and technical but interesting report on the Russian Air Force and lessons going forward for NATO. The PDF is linked at site below. 

https://www.cna.org/reports/2023/04/russ...imitations

The author of the above report, Justin Bronk, was recently on this podcast, which I also found informative

Geopolitics Decanted Podcast-  How Ukraine Can Survive the Exhaustion of Its Air Defense Stocks

https://open.spotify.com/episode/7d8W9yx...SBMvmtLaQQ


Some takeaways for me- replenishing Ukrainian air defense missiles far and away more important than getting Ukraine fighter jets. But no easy solution for replenishing Ukrainian stocks, as while Patriot is a good system, there are not nearly enough of them to replace S300 like for like. We will be better able to supply medium range systems with RIM7 for their Buks and AMRAAMs for NASAMS, but will be a different more distributed air defense system with less long range layered backup. NATO has operated with air superiority for decades and so air defense stocks are low and more focused on ballistic missile defense, so it's good that Ukraine had such a robust and deep stock of air defenses, though we are now reaching their limit.

VKS would obviously be better able to operate if there is no Ukrainian air defense system or a fragmentary one, but even then they would not be able to be as devastating as a NATO style air force. Would primarily see more dumb bomb usage from altitude, which could be a problem for cities and massed formations. But Russia has probably suffered very high casualties in their ground based air spotting forces for laser guided munitions and Russia is pretty much already doing what they can with precision guided munitions, which are in short supply anyway. And their close air support has never been good, as doctrinally they rely more on ground based fires. Even in Syria with total air superiority, they rarely flew sorties with more than one or two aircraft, usually using dumb bombs from high up or guided bombs with spotters.

IMO a GREAT post. The documents referenced are good and your summary of the conclusions to be drawn is excellent! The one area where I believe the implications are not clearly stated is the effect of Russian air on the Ukrainian proposed offensive.

If Ukrainian ground based long range air defenses are unable to "cover" the advance of the Ukrainian forces, either due to expending all their S-300 missiles or simply lack of numbers, the Russians can stay up at medium/high altitude with impunity. Their ability to drop bombs that provide "Grad-like" coverage against advancing troops in the open will be a big problem for Ukraine. The Russians can just sit there and bang away. Fast moving armored formations can probably weather this level of opposition (with non-zero but manageable losses), but their soft-skinned logistics and support train cannot. Ukraine will also need to transfer lots of their "leg" infantry into the territory their armored brigades capture in order to mop up / surround cut off and bypassed Russian fixed defenses. These units cannot sustain themselves against Russian air operating at high/medium altitudes, even with it's limitations.

The Ukrainians (finally) realize NATO simply doesn't have the missile systems to replicate the previously existing Ukrainian IADS, let alone expand it to cover advancing troops. NATO uses their air force to do that. Therefore, Ukraine wants F-16s to build a "NATO" air force. Ukraine sees it as "equalizing" the technology advantage Russian air currently has and giving Ukraine the ability to drive off Russian air. However, as the article points out, just being able to fly the plane doesn't give you a NATO air force. Ukraine probably doesn't "get" that. They just want to keep the Russians off their advancing troops. Having F-16s they can fly would do that, but the attrition would be significant. NATO wouldn't suffer that attrition because they would attack the Russian air force as part of the SEAD/DEAD mission. Ukraine can't do that without the "full Monty" NATO air force, and you can't build that in a year.

This situation leaves the following possible strategic options to Ukraine going forward: 1) Hold off on any offensive and play defense. Hope your missile supplies hold out and/or Russia runs out of missiles/troops/artillery ammunition/morale and just quits. Probably not a good option. 2) Start an offensive with the newly trained and armed armored brigades. Hope to make enough progress to break the land bridge and/or threaten Crimea. Best case, Russian morale fails and a rout ensues. Endure what Russian air can be thrown at the advance. This isn't a crazy option and this is what I expect to see. The downside is that if Ukraine doesn't make substantial progress, it becomes unclear how Ukraine can go forward. It becomes option 1 without a hope of near term victory. 3) Convince the US/NATO to give Ukraine F-16s. Wait till next year when you have enough pilots and planes to actually protect an offensive. Obvious downside is Russia gets time to retool and improve their forces, which everybody, including Ukraine, agrees they have been doing ("learning"). Not a good option, as there is no certainty Ukraine will ever get F-16s and even less certainty they can hold together playing defense for another year waiting to try their offensive.

IMO "the west" has been very short-sighted in how we have approached this war. As the articles point out, most of what we see here regarding Russian air and the Ukrainian IADS was predictable. The Ukrainians actually have done better than most expected in preserving their IADS. However, we knew they only had a finite number of S-300s, which are really what is needed to keep Russian aircraft at stand-off ranges from operating at high altitudes. The BUK systems are useful, but not at high altitude/long range, and are also a finite resource. We should have been training Ukrainian pilots from very early on, even if we were unsure we would ever give them planes. Even if we decide to give them planes now, they are a year away from a counter air capability. Could be too little too late at this point.

[dabigv13]

My understanding is that F16s would be an upgrade over the Migs and Flankers, but as long as Russia has extensive long range air defense coverage it probably doesn't matter what or how many jets Ukraine is flying. And unfortunately there is no realistic way of getting Ukraine the capability to eliminate those long range air defenses.


Any jet, F16s included, would still be limited to very low level flying near the front, which would put them at a severe disadvantage to Russian jets, which could likely keep out of range of Ukrainian jets even with AMRAAMs, while being in range for their R77 missiles.

In scenario where Ukraine is very low on air defense missiles, maybe having more and better fighters would be nice but they would still only be able to operate at altitude pretty far from the front lines, and would not be able to deny air superiority comparable to ground based air defenses, or they would be quickly destroyed.

If there is an original sin to NATO planning for this war, to me it's that it took too long to start replenishing Ukrainian air defense systems- either by finding a way to manufacture S300 missiles or by getting industry to ramp up production of Patriots. I think it would be nice for Ukraine to have F16s, and I agree that we should be training their pilots already for this transition, but the ultimate outcome of the war I don't think will be affected by their presence or absence.

My guess is that Ukraine still has enough ground based air defense to cover an offensive across most of the front. Later in the summer or fall, they may only be able to cover specific points, which could limit their strategic flexibility. However even if Ukrainian air defenses become spottier in their coverage, seems unlikely VKS and Russian ground forces would be really able to take advantage and regain initiative.

And I'm pretty confident the number of soldiers killed by drone dropped weapons will be much much more than those killed by munitions from conventional aircraft, no matter what happens to Ukrainian air defenses.

.....

Here's an interesting article from the Economist on F16s and Gripens.


https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/04...in-the-war

[dabigv13]

My understanding is that F16s would be an upgrade over the Migs and Flankers, but as long as Russia has extensive long range air defense coverage it probably doesn't matter what or how many jets Ukraine is flying. And unfortunately there is no realistic way of getting Ukraine the capability to eliminate those long range air defenses.


Any jet, F16s included, would still be limited to very low level flying near the front, which would put them at a severe disadvantage to Russian jets, which could likely keep out of range of Ukrainian jets even with AMRAAMs, while being in range for their R77 missiles.

In scenario where Ukraine is very low on air defense missiles, maybe having more and better fighters would be nice but they would still only be able to operate at altitude pretty far from the front lines, and would not be able to deny air superiority comparable to ground based air defenses, or they would be quickly destroyed.

If there is an original sin to NATO planning for this war, to me it's that it took too long to start replenishing Ukrainian air defense systems- either by finding a way to manufacture S300 missiles or by getting industry to ramp up production of Patriots. I think it would be nice for Ukraine to have F16s, and I agree that we should be training their pilots already for this transition, but the ultimate outcome of the war I don't think will be affected by their presence or absence.

My guess is that Ukraine still has enough ground based air defense to cover an offensive across most of the front. Later in the summer or fall, they may only be able to cover specific points, which could limit their strategic flexibility. However even if Ukrainian air defenses become spottier in their coverage, seems unlikely VKS and Russian ground forces would be really able to take advantage and regain initiative.

And I'm pretty confident the number of soldiers killed by drone dropped weapons will be much much more than those killed by munitions from conventional aircraft, no matter what happens to Ukrainian air defenses.

.....

Here's an interesting article from the Economist on F16s and Gripens.


https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/04...in-the-war

[Goose]

My understanding is that F16s would be an upgrade over the Migs and Flankers, but as long as Russia has extensive long range air defense coverage it probably doesn't matter what or how many jets Ukraine is flying. And unfortunately there is no realistic way of getting Ukraine the capability to eliminate those long range air defenses.

Any jet, F16s included, would still be limited to very low level flying near the front, which would put them at a severe disadvantage to Russian jets, which could likely keep out of range of Ukrainian jets even with AMRAAMs, while being in range for their R77 missiles.

I think you are unquestionably correct that the Ukrainian F-16s could not operate at altitude near the FEBA both because of the Russian jets longer range air-to-air missiles and because of Russian IADS located well behind the FEBA. However, the Ukrainian F-16s could stay well behind the FEBA at high altitude and hold Russian jets operating near the FEBA or, more importantly, behind Ukrainian lines "at risk". The F-16 radars, being much better than what they have in their MIGS at present, would allow them to target the Russian jets. The Russians would therefore have to fly "escort missions" at higher altitude to chase the Ukrainians away. Both sides would then be in a position that if their radars (or other sensors) detect a SAM missile launch, they both have to go low to avoid the missile. However, the Russians would be "going low" over Ukrainian forces, not like now where they are inside Russian lines. Assuming that IFF could work out (which it should as the F-16s have NATO IFF), the Russians would be at risk of low altitude Ukrainian air defense and, being low, couldn't target any other high altitude Ukrainians that show up.
Granted, that isn't an ideal situation. Ideally, Ukraine would have the "high perch" and deny it to Russia. Next best thing is that neither side can claim it and it is a furball. Russian jets have a history of not doing well in that situation. I think Ukraine would take that.

In scenario where Ukraine is very low on air defense missiles, maybe having more and better fighters would be nice but they would still only be able to operate at altitude pretty far from the front lines, and would not be able to deny air superiority comparable to ground based air defenses, or they would be quickly destroyed.

Disagree on two counts. Ground based air defenses near the front lines are almost exclusively oriented toward low altitude threats. Aircraft operating at high altitude fear two things: 1) Long range ground based air defense and 2) Other aircraft with adequate missiles and radar. Both can be lethal. However, aircraft are MUCH deadlier.

If an aircraft is targeted by a ground-based site at long range, it can avoid the hit by going low. The long-range air defense can't see it because it is below the radar horizon. It is "safe" from the long range launch, but at least temporarily out of the fight. However, it may now be targeted by short range air defense missiles if it is over enemy territory. If over friendly territory, it can reengage "as soon as possible". Long-range air defense isn't very mobile. Once the RWR detects the SAM site searching, an AARGM can be on the way. The F-16 can launch those in "full steer" mode. Makes them lots deadlier. Does the "long range" SAM operator stay on the air? Often he does not and the F-16 can stay high. On top of that, other F-16s that are closer to the SAM can launch too and now he has a real problem. He can't run, so he better hide. That may not work either because AARGMs can "hunt" with their IR and W band sensors. That is SEAD. If an F-16 goes full weasel on them it can be even more interesting and become DEAD, although I don't think anybody expects that to happen.

As the article you cited discussed, the Russian ECM did a number on the Ukrainian IADS when the war started. The F-16 can carry various jamming pods that can jam both the SAM missiles and the SAM launcher. At long range, "burn-through" isn't much of a problem. Done properly, all the SAM operator sees is rotating strobes on his acquisition radar. I am sure the F-16 can do at least as good a job as the Russians did, probably better. If the F-16 intended to cross into Russian territory, it could get messier. However, if it is "only" trying to keep Russians off it's own troops, it isn't going to do that.

Once SAM sites have been identified and geolocated, in many cases they can simply be avoided. Lots of work goes into doing this. I strongly suspect the US could "help" with this to make the Ukrainian F-16 CAP more survivable and more effective.

Aircraft OTOH are much deadlier in a "counter air" role because their high altitude prevents evading their radar by "going low". The F-16 and the Russian fighters are both good in look-down shoot-down operations. You can't avoid them by hiding in ground clutter and the radar horizon exceeds their missile range. AARGMs aren't particularly effective either because they have trouble with (and are not designed for) rapidly moving targets (although they can hit B-52-s :-). ECM can work against the acquisition mode of fighter radar. However, it will certainly fail if the opponent gets "close" to the F-16, where the definition of "close" is an unknown risk. It can also work against the missile itself, but home-on-jam then becomes a possibility. Everything happens faster than against a SAM. You have less defensive options and no way to evade the acquisition radar by using the radar horizon. Much deadlier (to both parties). 

If there is an original sin to NATO planning for this war, to me it's that it took too long to start replenishing Ukrainian air defense systems- either by finding a way to manufacture S300 missiles or by getting industry to ramp up production of Patriots.

In two or three years maybe we would get some results with Patriots. SA-12s and up, probably not possible no matter how long we had. Kludges like the "frankenmissile" system might work, but AFAIK we haven't seen any results. We are unfortunately incapable of doing much here (IMO).

I think it would be nice for Ukraine to have F16s, and I agree that we should be training their pilots already for this transition, but the ultimate outcome of the war I don't think will be affected by their presence or absence.

My guess is that Ukraine still has enough ground based air defense to cover an offensive across most of the front. Later in the summer or fall, they may only be able to cover specific points, which could limit their strategic flexibility. However even if Ukrainian air defenses become spottier in their coverage, seems unlikely VKS and Russian ground forces would be really able to take advantage and regain initiative.

Hope you are correct. Judging by their actions I don't think they are very sanguine about their missile status. It also depends on to what extent Russia can mount a cruise missile threat at the same time. Lots of Ukrainian missiles go into defending against that.

And I'm pretty confident the number of soldiers killed by drone dropped weapons will be much much more than those killed by munitions from conventional aircraft, no matter what happens to Ukrainian air defenses.

Really? I guess we don't have any solid numbers, but I would wager heavily that more Ukrainian civilians have already been killed by Russian air (including ALCMs) than Russian soldiers have been killed by drone dropped weapons. Drone dropped weapons are shown on u-tube all out of proportion to their frequency of use. Of course, both numbers absolutely pale compared to the numbers killed on both sides by the Queen of Battles.

[Goose]

My understanding is that F16s would be an upgrade over the Migs and Flankers, but as long as Russia has extensive long range air defense coverage it probably doesn't matter what or how many jets Ukraine is flying. And unfortunately there is no realistic way of getting Ukraine the capability to eliminate those long range air defenses.

Any jet, F16s included, would still be limited to very low level flying near the front, which would put them at a severe disadvantage to Russian jets, which could likely keep out of range of Ukrainian jets even with AMRAAMs, while being in range for their R77 missiles.

I think you are unquestionably correct that the Ukrainian F-16s could not operate at altitude near the FEBA both because of the Russian jets longer range air-to-air missiles and because of Russian IADS located well behind the FEBA. However, the Ukrainian F-16s could stay well behind the FEBA at high altitude and hold Russian jets operating near the FEBA or, more importantly, behind Ukrainian lines "at risk". The F-16 radars, being much better than what they have in their MIGS at present, would allow them to target the Russian jets. The Russians would therefore have to fly "escort missions" at higher altitude to chase the Ukrainians away. Both sides would then be in a position that if their radars (or other sensors) detect a SAM missile launch, they both have to go low to avoid the missile. However, the Russians would be "going low" over Ukrainian forces, not like now where they are inside Russian lines. Assuming that IFF could work out (which it should as the F-16s have NATO IFF), the Russians would be at risk of low altitude Ukrainian air defense and, being low, couldn't target any other high altitude Ukrainians that show up.
Granted, that isn't an ideal situation. Ideally, Ukraine would have the "high perch" and deny it to Russia. Next best thing is that neither side can claim it and it is a furball. Russian jets have a history of not doing well in that situation. I think Ukraine would take that.

In scenario where Ukraine is very low on air defense missiles, maybe having more and better fighters would be nice but they would still only be able to operate at altitude pretty far from the front lines, and would not be able to deny air superiority comparable to ground based air defenses, or they would be quickly destroyed.

Disagree on two counts. Ground based air defenses near the front lines are almost exclusively oriented toward low altitude threats. Aircraft operating at high altitude fear two things: 1) Long range ground based air defense and 2) Other aircraft with adequate missiles and radar. Both can be lethal. However, aircraft are MUCH deadlier.

If an aircraft is targeted by a ground-based site at long range, it can avoid the hit by going low. The long-range air defense can't see it because it is below the radar horizon. It is "safe" from the long range launch, but at least temporarily out of the fight. However, it may now be targeted by short range air defense missiles if it is over enemy territory. If over friendly territory, it can reengage "as soon as possible". Long-range air defense isn't very mobile. Once the RWR detects the SAM site searching, an AARGM can be on the way. The F-16 can launch those in "full steer" mode. Makes them lots deadlier. Does the "long range" SAM operator stay on the air? Often he does not and the F-16 can stay high. On top of that, other F-16s that are closer to the SAM can launch too and now he has a real problem. He can't run, so he better hide. That may not work either because AARGMs can "hunt" with their IR and W band sensors. That is SEAD. If an F-16 goes full weasel on them it can be even more interesting and become DEAD, although I don't think anybody expects that to happen.

As the article you cited discussed, the Russian ECM did a number on the Ukrainian IADS when the war started. The F-16 can carry various jamming pods that can jam both the SAM missiles and the SAM launcher. At long range, "burn-through" isn't much of a problem. Done properly, all the SAM operator sees is rotating strobes on his acquisition radar. I am sure the F-16 can do at least as good a job as the Russians did, probably better. If the F-16 intended to cross into Russian territory, it could get messier. However, if it is "only" trying to keep Russians off it's own troops, it isn't going to do that.

Once SAM sites have been identified and geolocated, in many cases they can simply be avoided. Lots of work goes into doing this. I strongly suspect the US could "help" with this to make the Ukrainian F-16 CAP more survivable and more effective.

Aircraft OTOH are much deadlier in a "counter air" role because their high altitude prevents evading their radar by "going low". The F-16 and the Russian fighters are both good in look-down shoot-down operations. You can't avoid them by hiding in ground clutter and the radar horizon exceeds their missile range. AARGMs aren't particularly effective either because they have trouble with (and are not designed for) rapidly moving targets (although they can hit B-52-s :-). ECM can work against the acquisition mode of fighter radar. However, it will certainly fail if the opponent gets "close" to the F-16, where the definition of "close" is an unknown risk. It can also work against the missile itself, but home-on-jam then becomes a possibility. Everything happens faster than against a SAM. You have less defensive options and no way to evade the acquisition radar by using the radar horizon. Much deadlier (to both parties). 

If there is an original sin to NATO planning for this war, to me it's that it took too long to start replenishing Ukrainian air defense systems- either by finding a way to manufacture S300 missiles or by getting industry to ramp up production of Patriots.

In two or three years maybe we would get some results with Patriots. SA-12s and up, probably not possible no matter how long we had. Kludges like the "frankenmissile" system might work, but AFAIK we haven't seen any results. We are unfortunately incapable of doing much here (IMO).

I think it would be nice for Ukraine to have F16s, and I agree that we should be training their pilots already for this transition, but the ultimate outcome of the war I don't think will be affected by their presence or absence.

My guess is that Ukraine still has enough ground based air defense to cover an offensive across most of the front. Later in the summer or fall, they may only be able to cover specific points, which could limit their strategic flexibility. However even if Ukrainian air defenses become spottier in their coverage, seems unlikely VKS and Russian ground forces would be really able to take advantage and regain initiative.

Hope you are correct. Judging by their actions I don't think they are very sanguine about their missile status. It also depends on to what extent Russia can mount a cruise missile threat at the same time. Lots of Ukrainian missiles go into defending against that.

And I'm pretty confident the number of soldiers killed by drone dropped weapons will be much much more than those killed by munitions from conventional aircraft, no matter what happens to Ukrainian air defenses.

Really? I guess we don't have any solid numbers, but I would wager heavily that more Ukrainian civilians have already been killed by Russian air (including ALCMs) than Russian soldiers have been killed by drone dropped weapons. Drone dropped weapons are shown on u-tube all out of proportion to their frequency of use. Of course, both numbers absolutely pale compared to the numbers killed on both sides by the Queen of Battles.

[GK3]

A rather thought provoking article.  Maybe behind a paywall, but I was able to get one article free.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-f...sia-defeat

[GK3]

A rather thought provoking article.  Maybe behind a paywall, but I was able to get one article free.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-f...sia-defeat

[dabigv13]

FWIW all of these articles reference leaked documents

https://www.csis.org/analysis/will-russi...er-ukraine

Another interesting analysis of how Ukraine proceeds with depleted air defenses. In this piece discussion is about how Ukraine will likely prioritize their air defense missiles to protect military assets, while letting previously intercepted cruise missiles and drones get through to cities and civilian infrastructure. The podcast I linked yesterday discussed this a bit too. Western air defenses systems may be able to pick up some of this slack but probably only for large cities and very important infrastructure. The assessment is that in the near term Ukraine should be able to cover its military assets and protect a counteroffensive, but civilians and infrastructure will probably be less protected than previously.

NYT on the coming offensive
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/24/us/po...nsive.html

At the same time, 12 Ukrainian combat brigades of about 4,000 soldiers each are expected to be ready at the end of April, according to leaked Pentagon documents that offer a hint of Kyiv’s timetable. The United States and NATO allies are training and supplying nine of those brigades, the documents said.

....

Ukraine built the new combat brigades by pairing raw recruits with a small core of experienced veteran soldiers. Beginning in January, the units went to American training grounds in Germany to learn how to use their new equipment and how to conduct what the American army calls combined arms maneuvers — using effective communication to coordinate advancing troops with supporting units such as tanks and artillery.

This is from last week. Abrams deliveries being bumped up.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/21/world...-jets.html

Ukrainian troops will begin training on American M1 Abrams tanks in Germany in the next few weeks, U.S. defense officials say, in what would be a major step in arming Kyiv as it seeks to seize back territory from Russia.

Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III announced the timeline on Friday during a meeting with allies at Ramstein Air Base. Defense officials said that about 31 tanks were expected to arrive in Germany to begin a training program for Ukrainian troops that is expected to take 10 weeks. Combat-ready tanks could reach the battlefields in Ukraine by the fall, said the officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss security matters.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/26/world...icles.html

Nearly all the combat vehicles Ukraine’s Western allies promised to deliver in time for Kyiv’s expected spring counteroffensive have arrived, NATO’s top military commander said on Wednesday.

“Over 98 percent of the combat vehicles are already there,” said the officer, Gen. Christopher G. Cavoli, who is also the top commander of U.S. forces in Europe. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, he said, “I am very confident that we have delivered the matériel that they need and we’ll continue a pipeline to sustain their operations as well.”
....
Asked why the Biden administration had not rushed the delivery of advanced U.S. fighter jets, like Air Force F-16s, to Ukraine, General Cavoli said that Ukrainian forces had other more urgent requirements for the offensive, which U.S. officials now expect to start as early as next month.

Celeste A. Wallander, the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, told the lawmakers that advanced Western fighter aircraft ranked only “about eighth” on Ukraine’s priority list.

Finally, sometimes Russian planes decide to blow up without any assistance from Ukrainian air defenses 

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1651290795033362442?s=20[/tweet]

[dabigv13]

FWIW all of these articles reference leaked documents

https://www.csis.org/analysis/will-russi...er-ukraine

Another interesting analysis of how Ukraine proceeds with depleted air defenses. In this piece discussion is about how Ukraine will likely prioritize their air defense missiles to protect military assets, while letting previously intercepted cruise missiles and drones get through to cities and civilian infrastructure. The podcast I linked yesterday discussed this a bit too. Western air defenses systems may be able to pick up some of this slack but probably only for large cities and very important infrastructure. The assessment is that in the near term Ukraine should be able to cover its military assets and protect a counteroffensive, but civilians and infrastructure will probably be less protected than previously.

NYT on the coming offensive
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/24/us/po...nsive.html

At the same time, 12 Ukrainian combat brigades of about 4,000 soldiers each are expected to be ready at the end of April, according to leaked Pentagon documents that offer a hint of Kyiv’s timetable. The United States and NATO allies are training and supplying nine of those brigades, the documents said.

....

Ukraine built the new combat brigades by pairing raw recruits with a small core of experienced veteran soldiers. Beginning in January, the units went to American training grounds in Germany to learn how to use their new equipment and how to conduct what the American army calls combined arms maneuvers — using effective communication to coordinate advancing troops with supporting units such as tanks and artillery.

This is from last week. Abrams deliveries being bumped up.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/21/world...-jets.html

Ukrainian troops will begin training on American M1 Abrams tanks in Germany in the next few weeks, U.S. defense officials say, in what would be a major step in arming Kyiv as it seeks to seize back territory from Russia.

Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III announced the timeline on Friday during a meeting with allies at Ramstein Air Base. Defense officials said that about 31 tanks were expected to arrive in Germany to begin a training program for Ukrainian troops that is expected to take 10 weeks. Combat-ready tanks could reach the battlefields in Ukraine by the fall, said the officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss security matters.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/26/world...icles.html

Nearly all the combat vehicles Ukraine’s Western allies promised to deliver in time for Kyiv’s expected spring counteroffensive have arrived, NATO’s top military commander said on Wednesday.

“Over 98 percent of the combat vehicles are already there,” said the officer, Gen. Christopher G. Cavoli, who is also the top commander of U.S. forces in Europe. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, he said, “I am very confident that we have delivered the matériel that they need and we’ll continue a pipeline to sustain their operations as well.”
....
Asked why the Biden administration had not rushed the delivery of advanced U.S. fighter jets, like Air Force F-16s, to Ukraine, General Cavoli said that Ukrainian forces had other more urgent requirements for the offensive, which U.S. officials now expect to start as early as next month.

Celeste A. Wallander, the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, told the lawmakers that advanced Western fighter aircraft ranked only “about eighth” on Ukraine’s priority list.

Finally, sometimes Russian planes decide to blow up without any assistance from Ukrainian air defenses 

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1651290795033362442?s=20[/tweet]

[OutsiderFan]

I've seen reporting that Ukraine will have over 800 tanks and 1,500 armored vehicles to power its counteroffensive.

How does this compare to the numbers Russia has of both?  My assumption is because Ukraine is better trained and will use smarter tactics, even if Ukraine has fewer of both, as long as the gap isn't too large, Ukraine will prevail.  I just don't have much of an idea where the remaining inventories are now after Russia's armor and vehicles have been massively diminished since its invasion.

And even if Russia technically has more numbers, the equipment it has is inferior and can be hit before Ukraine's western equipment is in firing range for Russia's outdated crap.

[OutsiderFan]

I've seen reporting that Ukraine will have over 800 tanks and 1,500 armored vehicles to power its counteroffensive.

How does this compare to the numbers Russia has of both?  My assumption is because Ukraine is better trained and will use smarter tactics, even if Ukraine has fewer of both, as long as the gap isn't too large, Ukraine will prevail.  I just don't have much of an idea where the remaining inventories are now after Russia's armor and vehicles have been massively diminished since its invasion.

And even if Russia technically has more numbers, the equipment it has is inferior and can be hit before Ukraine's western equipment is in firing range for Russia's outdated crap.

[Goose]

FWIW all of these articles reference leaked documents

https://www.csis.org/analysis/will-russi...er-ukraine

Another interesting analysis of how Ukraine proceeds with depleted air defenses. In this piece discussion is about how Ukraine will likely prioritize their air defense missiles to protect military assets, while letting previously intercepted cruise missiles and drones get through to cities and civilian infrastructure. The podcast I linked yesterday discussed this a bit too. Western air defenses systems may be able to pick up some of this slack but probably only for large cities and very important infrastructure. The assessment is that in the near term Ukraine should be able to cover its military assets and protect a counteroffensive, but civilians and infrastructure will probably be less protected than previously.

IMO the assessment that Ukraine can protect it's notional offensive from Russian air contains a logical flaw. The article asserts that Russian air will not be able to freely operate inside Ukrainian airspace. There will be enough air defense to prevent that, possibly at the expense of not defending some civilian assets. However, the article does admit that Russian air can operate pretty much with impunity inside Russian air space. As the Ukrainian air force repeatedly and stridently points out, those Russian aircraft in Russian airspace can do two things. First, they can target Ukrainian aircraft operating in Ukrainian air space or over the FEBA because they have superior radars and vastly longer range missiles than the Ukrainian air force does. Second, the Russians can launch KH-55 style air-to-surface missiles as well as KAB-500S-E style guided bombs. These weapons can easily reach the FEBA and beyond even when launched from Russian airspace. Ukraine cannot defend against these threats, by their own statements.

One could take some solace in the idea that Russia has not yet mounted an effective air campaign of this type in the war, although they have recently been more active. However, there is no question they have the weapons to do so. It is also relatively "safe", as Ukraine basically can't reach them. Keep in mind that Ukraine will be executing a combined arms attack most probably in the south, which is open country. They won't be dug in or occupying fortified positions in a city. They will be relatively easy to "find". Those riding in tanks and IFVs will be relatively safe from anything but a direct hit/very near miss (unless Russia has a guided cluster bomb available), but their fuel trucks and support units will not be. Anything "thin skinned" will be at risk at all times, and even armored vehicles will suffer attrition. The KH-59 is TV guided, so direct hits are possible to generate. If the combined arms operation has significantly penetrated Russian lines, it will be completely inside the Russian ADZ, which means these standoff weapons can be used with impunity.

In short, Russia has standoff weapons. If they use them anywhere near competently they can do a lot of damage. Ukraine really doesn't have an answer for them. We can hope the Russians will perform poorly, but it isn't good to "trust to luck".

[Goose]

FWIW all of these articles reference leaked documents

https://www.csis.org/analysis/will-russi...er-ukraine

Another interesting analysis of how Ukraine proceeds with depleted air defenses. In this piece discussion is about how Ukraine will likely prioritize their air defense missiles to protect military assets, while letting previously intercepted cruise missiles and drones get through to cities and civilian infrastructure. The podcast I linked yesterday discussed this a bit too. Western air defenses systems may be able to pick up some of this slack but probably only for large cities and very important infrastructure. The assessment is that in the near term Ukraine should be able to cover its military assets and protect a counteroffensive, but civilians and infrastructure will probably be less protected than previously.

IMO the assessment that Ukraine can protect it's notional offensive from Russian air contains a logical flaw. The article asserts that Russian air will not be able to freely operate inside Ukrainian airspace. There will be enough air defense to prevent that, possibly at the expense of not defending some civilian assets. However, the article does admit that Russian air can operate pretty much with impunity inside Russian air space. As the Ukrainian air force repeatedly and stridently points out, those Russian aircraft in Russian airspace can do two things. First, they can target Ukrainian aircraft operating in Ukrainian air space or over the FEBA because they have superior radars and vastly longer range missiles than the Ukrainian air force does. Second, the Russians can launch KH-55 style air-to-surface missiles as well as KAB-500S-E style guided bombs. These weapons can easily reach the FEBA and beyond even when launched from Russian airspace. Ukraine cannot defend against these threats, by their own statements.

One could take some solace in the idea that Russia has not yet mounted an effective air campaign of this type in the war, although they have recently been more active. However, there is no question they have the weapons to do so. It is also relatively "safe", as Ukraine basically can't reach them. Keep in mind that Ukraine will be executing a combined arms attack most probably in the south, which is open country. They won't be dug in or occupying fortified positions in a city. They will be relatively easy to "find". Those riding in tanks and IFVs will be relatively safe from anything but a direct hit/very near miss (unless Russia has a guided cluster bomb available), but their fuel trucks and support units will not be. Anything "thin skinned" will be at risk at all times, and even armored vehicles will suffer attrition. The KH-59 is TV guided, so direct hits are possible to generate. If the combined arms operation has significantly penetrated Russian lines, it will be completely inside the Russian ADZ, which means these standoff weapons can be used with impunity.

In short, Russia has standoff weapons. If they use them anywhere near competently they can do a lot of damage. Ukraine really doesn't have an answer for them. We can hope the Russians will perform poorly, but it isn't good to "trust to luck".

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/heavy-losses-...00859.html

It is totally understandable that different levels of training and different philosophies exist in the Ukrainian military, given the extreme stress of a war that started while they were in the midst of a major philosophical change in their armed forces. The recent significant training in NATO nations will help greatly, and I expect the tip of the spear will be pretty sharp. However, if Ukraine generates significant success in their next offensives, they are going to need lots of "follow on" infantry to secure the territory and immobilize any Russian forces that were bypassed (hopefully lots of these :-). This was a big problem for Germany even in WWII where their combined arms spearhead would get so far ahead of their supports that they had to pause and wait for the supports to "catch up". At a minimum, AFVs/Tanks need fuel. On a "modern" battlefield, pausing without adequate air cover can be very hazardous to your health. Let's hope Ukraine has the wherewithal to keep these less-NATOIzed forces on the move to fill the gap.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/heavy-losses-...00859.html

It is totally understandable that different levels of training and different philosophies exist in the Ukrainian military, given the extreme stress of a war that started while they were in the midst of a major philosophical change in their armed forces. The recent significant training in NATO nations will help greatly, and I expect the tip of the spear will be pretty sharp. However, if Ukraine generates significant success in their next offensives, they are going to need lots of "follow on" infantry to secure the territory and immobilize any Russian forces that were bypassed (hopefully lots of these :-). This was a big problem for Germany even in WWII where their combined arms spearhead would get so far ahead of their supports that they had to pause and wait for the supports to "catch up". At a minimum, AFVs/Tanks need fuel. On a "modern" battlefield, pausing without adequate air cover can be very hazardous to your health. Let's hope Ukraine has the wherewithal to keep these less-NATOIzed forces on the move to fill the gap.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russians-call...47360.html

Ukraine has shown great ability to improvise methodology to cause Russia at least annoying and in some cases significant damage in the Sevastopol area. The "low observable" drone ships and now this attack on oil storage facilities are just a sample of what Ukraine can continue to do. Russia has deployed considerable forces to defend against the drone ships, and are doing a credible job of it. However, it isn't a "perfect" screen and uses up considerable force. Now Ukraine has shown it can hit individual high-value targets, although oil storage tanks are at least a "large" target.

The question of the moment is what methodology is Ukraine using to control these drones? It is possible that a GPS/GLONASS based approach would work. However, I assume that GPS is being jammed all the time in Sevastopol, and I am guessing GLONASS has the equivalent of the GPS Selective Availability and that it is functioning in that mode when "near" Ukraine. Supposedly Ukraine can't use the SpaceX StarLink system any more to locate and control drones at this distance. They must be doing something, and Russia hasn't yet figured it out. Very interesting. Are they buying bandwidth from somebody else?

UPDATE: GLONASS broadcasts two navigation signals all the time, one civil and one military. The civil version is not precise enough to use as a navigation/targeting system for drones, at least in theory. It will get you close, like maybe within 10 meters or so. That is probably "good enough" to hit an oil tank most of the time, but not e.g. a car or an IFV. That is also "best case". The military one is encrypted and is precise. How precise "we" don't know. Presumably, Ukraine can't decode the military one.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russians-call...47360.html

Ukraine has shown great ability to improvise methodology to cause Russia at least annoying and in some cases significant damage in the Sevastopol area. The "low observable" drone ships and now this attack on oil storage facilities are just a sample of what Ukraine can continue to do. Russia has deployed considerable forces to defend against the drone ships, and are doing a credible job of it. However, it isn't a "perfect" screen and uses up considerable force. Now Ukraine has shown it can hit individual high-value targets, although oil storage tanks are at least a "large" target.

The question of the moment is what methodology is Ukraine using to control these drones? It is possible that a GPS/GLONASS based approach would work. However, I assume that GPS is being jammed all the time in Sevastopol, and I am guessing GLONASS has the equivalent of the GPS Selective Availability and that it is functioning in that mode when "near" Ukraine. Supposedly Ukraine can't use the SpaceX StarLink system any more to locate and control drones at this distance. They must be doing something, and Russia hasn't yet figured it out. Very interesting. Are they buying bandwidth from somebody else?

UPDATE: GLONASS broadcasts two navigation signals all the time, one civil and one military. The civil version is not precise enough to use as a navigation/targeting system for drones, at least in theory. It will get you close, like maybe within 10 meters or so. That is probably "good enough" to hit an oil tank most of the time, but not e.g. a car or an IFV. That is also "best case". The military one is encrypted and is precise. How precise "we" don't know. Presumably, Ukraine can't decode the military one.

[Treefence]

Goose, based on everything you know, how does Ukraine win this war?  Is it even possible, and if so, how can it be done, with the resources they have, and know everything we know about the Russians?  

Is it possible that a very successful counter offensive by Ukraine, leads to massive Russian route?  Can Crimea be retaken before next winter, or is that a pipedream?   

What would happen if Ukraine captured the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk, would the sham republics fall, leading to brobdingnagian military units surrendering, or would they just move their political capital further back?   

I just wonder how this will end in a total victory for Ukraine, without a drastic change in Western support....

[Treefence]

Goose, based on everything you know, how does Ukraine win this war?  Is it even possible, and if so, how can it be done, with the resources they have, and know everything we know about the Russians?  

Is it possible that a very successful counter offensive by Ukraine, leads to massive Russian route?  Can Crimea be retaken before next winter, or is that a pipedream?   

What would happen if Ukraine captured the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk, would the sham republics fall, leading to brobdingnagian military units surrendering, or would they just move their political capital further back?   

I just wonder how this will end in a total victory for Ukraine, without a drastic change in Western support....

[Goose]

Goose, based on everything you know, how does Ukraine win this war?  Is it even possible, and if so, how can it be done, with the resources they have, and know everything we know about the Russians?  

Is it possible that a very successful counter offensive by Ukraine, leads to massive Russian route?  Can Crimea be retaken before next winter, or is that a pipedream?   

What would happen if Ukraine captured the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk, would the sham republics fall, leading to of immense proportions military units surrendering, or would they just move their political capital further back?   

I just wonder how this will end in a total victory for Ukraine, without a drastic change in Western support....

Obviously, I don't know nearly as much about this whole mess as many people in the military and intelligence communities in "the west" do. What I can say i do "know" is pretty obvious, and won't actually answer the questions :-). This war ends only when either Russia decides to stop fighting or Ukraine is unable to continue fighting. We have known all along that Ukraine doesn't have the military or economic power to bring Russia to it's knees and dictate terms from the Kremlin, western aid or not. This war is however an existential one for Ukraine. If they quit fighting, they are done. Russia will absorb their country. Under those conditions, the question is what does it take to make Russia decide to quit fighting? Nobody really knows, because a "rational" Russia wouldn't have done all this to begin with.

Ukraine will have about 35K troops organized in "several" battalions as a striking force. These troops will have NATO training and equipment. The troops will have experienced leaders, although many of the troops themselves have little or no combat experience. The leaders have some training in NATO tactics, but many of them have much more training/experience in Soviet-era tactics. What combat power these units can provide is basically unknown. We will know when they are tested, and even then maybe not for a while. Getting the "kinks" out of any new military unit is sometimes an iterative operation. Nobody wants to do that in the middle of a battle, but Ukraine has no choice. We know they will fight hard.

The Russians have put together somewhat of a hodgepodge defensive structure in many places in Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblast. It isn't a continuous front line, as the total number of troops required to do that is beyond anything Russia or Ukraine could do. Particularly in Kherson, where their are fewer natural terrain defenses, Russia is exposed. If Ukraine is "any good", they should be able to penetrate these defenses by bypassing strong points and masking them with infantry. These strong points are not mutually supporting and will quickly run out of ammunition and other supplies. Russia appears to be aware of this and is preparing to also defend in northern Crimea. Terrain is better for them there, but still not "great". There are big opportunities for Ukraine here. Their problem is no air cover. How big of a problem that will be depends on what Russia can generate in terms of tac air. Ukraine is worried. I would be too. OTOH, they have opportunities, potentially big ones. A second Riga would be very nice.

Zaporizhia Oblast is important because if Ukraine can cut the road and rail transport to Crimea, it is a big operational blow to Russia. Supplying/reinforcing Kherson/Crimea becomes a big problem. Ukraine doesn't need to go all they way to Berdiansk. Melitopol is far enough :-). If I were a betting man, I think this area is where Ukraine will start their offensive. They don't have too far to go to make a big difference. I obviously don't know the "correlation of forces" in that area, but Russia is quite aware of the issues. The question is, given their fighting in the Donbas, do they have the necessary troops to defend in Zaporizhia?

It all comes down to how well Ukraine fights and how well the Russians in their defensive positions fight. Lots of the Russian units are not in good shape. Supposedly, there are lots of conscripts with little/no training and no combat experience. If these units fold up quickly, Ukraine can take back lots of ground and at least enter Crimea, if not take it back. If Russia musters a large tactical air attack on the moving Ukraine combined arms units, Ukraine could be stopped literally dead in its tracks. Either are possible, along with many variations in between. It may also depend on leadership. If the Ukrainian battalion commanders can make the "right" decisions they can have effects out of all proportions to their numbers. It seems the Russians in the south are already jittery. Ukrainians showing up in unexpected places can indeed provoke a rout. The question is, if that happens, does Russia quit fighting? If it doesn't, how discouraged will Ukraine be? What is the "minimum acceptable" result that keeps the West on the side of a "military" solution? I don't know.

So, my "best case" is Ukraine enters Crimea and Putin is ousted. Russia then descends into a leadership crisis for long enough that Ukraine gets most of their land back. Donbas remains a problem, as Russia is physically too close for them to fold completely. This is how it ends, if it is to end soon. If Ukraine is less successful than this and Putin survives, it could be a long war. OTOH I am not sure how many more offensives Ukraine has in them. 8 months from now they might be the ones who collapse. We all hope not, but it is eminently possible if the citizens decide they can't win. In war, nothing is certain.

As far as the Donbas goes, that is the area Ukraine has the biggest problem. It is just too close to Russia. Russia can fight there much easier than they can in Crimea. The terrain is just too well suited to defense by entrenched infantry, as Ukraine has valiantly demonstrated. Russia was able to advance there only slowly via massed artillery. If the Russian troops will stand and fight, Ukraine is going to have big problems taking anything back. Their armored formations will be relatively useless in this terrain, as Russia keeps finding out the hard way. If the Russian troops don't want to fight, Ukraine has a good chance. Otherwise, forget it.

[Goose]

Goose, based on everything you know, how does Ukraine win this war?  Is it even possible, and if so, how can it be done, with the resources they have, and know everything we know about the Russians?  

Is it possible that a very successful counter offensive by Ukraine, leads to massive Russian route?  Can Crimea be retaken before next winter, or is that a pipedream?   

What would happen if Ukraine captured the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk, would the sham republics fall, leading to of immense proportions military units surrendering, or would they just move their political capital further back?   

I just wonder how this will end in a total victory for Ukraine, without a drastic change in Western support....

Obviously, I don't know nearly as much about this whole mess as many people in the military and intelligence communities in "the west" do. What I can say i do "know" is pretty obvious, and won't actually answer the questions :-). This war ends only when either Russia decides to stop fighting or Ukraine is unable to continue fighting. We have known all along that Ukraine doesn't have the military or economic power to bring Russia to it's knees and dictate terms from the Kremlin, western aid or not. This war is however an existential one for Ukraine. If they quit fighting, they are done. Russia will absorb their country. Under those conditions, the question is what does it take to make Russia decide to quit fighting? Nobody really knows, because a "rational" Russia wouldn't have done all this to begin with.

Ukraine will have about 35K troops organized in "several" battalions as a striking force. These troops will have NATO training and equipment. The troops will have experienced leaders, although many of the troops themselves have little or no combat experience. The leaders have some training in NATO tactics, but many of them have much more training/experience in Soviet-era tactics. What combat power these units can provide is basically unknown. We will know when they are tested, and even then maybe not for a while. Getting the "kinks" out of any new military unit is sometimes an iterative operation. Nobody wants to do that in the middle of a battle, but Ukraine has no choice. We know they will fight hard.

The Russians have put together somewhat of a hodgepodge defensive structure in many places in Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblast. It isn't a continuous front line, as the total number of troops required to do that is beyond anything Russia or Ukraine could do. Particularly in Kherson, where their are fewer natural terrain defenses, Russia is exposed. If Ukraine is "any good", they should be able to penetrate these defenses by bypassing strong points and masking them with infantry. These strong points are not mutually supporting and will quickly run out of ammunition and other supplies. Russia appears to be aware of this and is preparing to also defend in northern Crimea. Terrain is better for them there, but still not "great". There are big opportunities for Ukraine here. Their problem is no air cover. How big of a problem that will be depends on what Russia can generate in terms of tac air. Ukraine is worried. I would be too. OTOH, they have opportunities, potentially big ones. A second Riga would be very nice.

Zaporizhia Oblast is important because if Ukraine can cut the road and rail transport to Crimea, it is a big operational blow to Russia. Supplying/reinforcing Kherson/Crimea becomes a big problem. Ukraine doesn't need to go all they way to Berdiansk. Melitopol is far enough :-). If I were a betting man, I think this area is where Ukraine will start their offensive. They don't have too far to go to make a big difference. I obviously don't know the "correlation of forces" in that area, but Russia is quite aware of the issues. The question is, given their fighting in the Donbas, do they have the necessary troops to defend in Zaporizhia?

It all comes down to how well Ukraine fights and how well the Russians in their defensive positions fight. Lots of the Russian units are not in good shape. Supposedly, there are lots of conscripts with little/no training and no combat experience. If these units fold up quickly, Ukraine can take back lots of ground and at least enter Crimea, if not take it back. If Russia musters a large tactical air attack on the moving Ukraine combined arms units, Ukraine could be stopped literally dead in its tracks. Either are possible, along with many variations in between. It may also depend on leadership. If the Ukrainian battalion commanders can make the "right" decisions they can have effects out of all proportions to their numbers. It seems the Russians in the south are already jittery. Ukrainians showing up in unexpected places can indeed provoke a rout. The question is, if that happens, does Russia quit fighting? If it doesn't, how discouraged will Ukraine be? What is the "minimum acceptable" result that keeps the West on the side of a "military" solution? I don't know.

So, my "best case" is Ukraine enters Crimea and Putin is ousted. Russia then descends into a leadership crisis for long enough that Ukraine gets most of their land back. Donbas remains a problem, as Russia is physically too close for them to fold completely. This is how it ends, if it is to end soon. If Ukraine is less successful than this and Putin survives, it could be a long war. OTOH I am not sure how many more offensives Ukraine has in them. 8 months from now they might be the ones who collapse. We all hope not, but it is eminently possible if the citizens decide they can't win. In war, nothing is certain.

As far as the Donbas goes, that is the area Ukraine has the biggest problem. It is just too close to Russia. Russia can fight there much easier than they can in Crimea. The terrain is just too well suited to defense by entrenched infantry, as Ukraine has valiantly demonstrated. Russia was able to advance there only slowly via massed artillery. If the Russian troops will stand and fight, Ukraine is going to have big problems taking anything back. Their armored formations will be relatively useless in this terrain, as Russia keeps finding out the hard way. If the Russian troops don't want to fight, Ukraine has a good chance. Otherwise, forget it.

[Treefence]

Thanks Goose, as per usual I appreciate your insight.  It seems a lot is riding on the upcoming Ukrainian offensive, hopefully it's extremely successful.  

It seems Russia attempted a major rocket barrage tonight, but extremely early reports are that no missiles actually made impact, with new sounding air defense systems in the Kyiv region.  It sounds like the Patriot systems have made an impact, but again this is all unconfirmed.  Hopefully Russian missile barrages continue to be less effective.

[Treefence]

Thanks Goose, as per usual I appreciate your insight.  It seems a lot is riding on the upcoming Ukrainian offensive, hopefully it's extremely successful.  

It seems Russia attempted a major rocket barrage tonight, but extremely early reports are that no missiles actually made impact, with new sounding air defense systems in the Kyiv region.  It sounds like the Patriot systems have made an impact, but again this is all unconfirmed.  Hopefully Russian missile barrages continue to be less effective.

[dabigv13]

Hopefully they weren't using Patriots (I suspect mostly not because they don't have many) because they're 3 million a pop!

[dabigv13]

Hopefully they weren't using Patriots (I suspect mostly not because they don't have many) because they're 3 million a pop!

[Goose]

Hopefully they weren't using Patriots (I suspect mostly not because they don't have many) because they're 3 million a pop!

Yes, that can get expensive fast. The Patriot batteries do have several choices of what missiles to use (assuming the US supplied all the variants, which I think is probable). Some are more expensive than others. Like you, I expect Ukraine will use their Patriot batteries only when "necessary", in particular against KH-22/KH-32 family. The S-300 apparently won't "lock up" on these high speed targets. Ukraine also may be using the radar of the Patriot system to hand off targets to other systems that won't acquire in time otherwise. The newer NASAMS can network with the Patriot batteries to get earlier warning of missiles they cannot yet detect because of geometry. This allows using "cheaper" missiles when appropriate. The NASAMS acquisition radar need not even be on, the initial and mid-course steering can come from the Patriot via data link as I understand it. Unfortunately Ukraine only has 2 NASAMS ATM, and I am not sure they are "new enough" to have the network capability. They also may be spread across the country so it is not applicable.

Using the Patriot radar that way is a mixed blessing because it exposes the Patriots location more easily. It may be Ukraine figures the Russians will find it anyway if it emits at all and is worth the risk. They then have to move more often and defend the Patriot itself more aggressively, but maybe that is better that than the alternatives.

[Goose]

Hopefully they weren't using Patriots (I suspect mostly not because they don't have many) because they're 3 million a pop!

Yes, that can get expensive fast. The Patriot batteries do have several choices of what missiles to use (assuming the US supplied all the variants, which I think is probable). Some are more expensive than others. Like you, I expect Ukraine will use their Patriot batteries only when "necessary", in particular against KH-22/KH-32 family. The S-300 apparently won't "lock up" on these high speed targets. Ukraine also may be using the radar of the Patriot system to hand off targets to other systems that won't acquire in time otherwise. The newer NASAMS can network with the Patriot batteries to get earlier warning of missiles they cannot yet detect because of geometry. This allows using "cheaper" missiles when appropriate. The NASAMS acquisition radar need not even be on, the initial and mid-course steering can come from the Patriot via data link as I understand it. Unfortunately Ukraine only has 2 NASAMS ATM, and I am not sure they are "new enough" to have the network capability. They also may be spread across the country so it is not applicable.

Using the Patriot radar that way is a mixed blessing because it exposes the Patriots location more easily. It may be Ukraine figures the Russians will find it anyway if it emits at all and is worth the risk. They then have to move more often and defend the Patriot itself more aggressively, but maybe that is better that than the alternatives.

[Treefence]

In the end the missile barrage last night wasn't as massive as people expected, with Ukraine reporting they shot down 15 of 18 missiles launched.  With the amount of strategic bombers that were in the air and the naval vessels, that's a relatively lighter load.  I'm sure there are many ways to read into that, but it seems the night could've been much worse.

[Treefence]

In the end the missile barrage last night wasn't as massive as people expected, with Ukraine reporting they shot down 15 of 18 missiles launched.  With the amount of strategic bombers that were in the air and the naval vessels, that's a relatively lighter load.  I'm sure there are many ways to read into that, but it seems the night could've been much worse.