[dabigv13]

*eyes emoji*

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/no_itsmyturn/status/...QZgq6m6Ulg[/tweet]

[dabigv13]

*eyes emoji*

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/no_itsmyturn/status/...QZgq6m6Ulg[/tweet]

[dabigv13]

Pretty impressive, Ukraine has a long reach. North Korea next?

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/hrome2/status/1619496187081691137?s=20&t=TYJB1bkTsZ4Clc2Nb5MW_g[/tweet]

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/Tendar/status/161948...lc2Nb5MW_g[/tweet]

[dabigv13]

Pretty impressive, Ukraine has a long reach. North Korea next?

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/hrome2/status/1619496187081691137?s=20&t=TYJB1bkTsZ4Clc2Nb5MW_g[/tweet]

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/Tendar/status/161948...lc2Nb5MW_g[/tweet]

[BostonCard]

Dunno if the reference to Ukrainian reach was meant to be ironic.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/sentdefender/status/1619491311991812096?s=61&t=Lh2ncZfXVAl9k9u-RFG5Sw[/tweet]

Israel’s capabilities obviously vastly exceed those of Ukraine.

BC

[BostonCard]

Dunno if the reference to Ukrainian reach was meant to be ironic.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/sentdefender/status/1619491311991812096?s=61&t=Lh2ncZfXVAl9k9u-RFG5Sw[/tweet]

Israel’s capabilities obviously vastly exceed those of Ukraine.

BC

[Goose]

Dunno if the reference to Ukrainian reach was meant to be ironic.

https://twitter.com/sentdefender/status/...k9u-RFG5Sw

Israel’s capabilities obviously vastly exceed those of Ukraine.

BC

On top of that Israel can justify attacks on Iran based on their support of Hezbollah. The fact it happens to help Ukraine might just also get them some "goodwill" points from the US. Talk about a "win-win".

[Goose]

Dunno if the reference to Ukrainian reach was meant to be ironic.

https://twitter.com/sentdefender/status/...k9u-RFG5Sw

Israel’s capabilities obviously vastly exceed those of Ukraine.

BC

On top of that Israel can justify attacks on Iran based on their support of Hezbollah. The fact it happens to help Ukraine might just also get them some "goodwill" points from the US. Talk about a "win-win".

[dabigv13]

No, I was presuming this was Ukraine. Hadn't heard anything about Israel.

Doesn't seem like anything firm is known and neither Ukraine or Israel has claimed responsibility, but Iran would likely prefer to paint this as an Israeli operation.

Wouldn't put it past Ukraine's capabilities though, and the munitions were seemingly pretty small...Israel could make bigger bangs I'd think if they wanted.

[dabigv13]

No, I was presuming this was Ukraine. Hadn't heard anything about Israel.

Doesn't seem like anything firm is known and neither Ukraine or Israel has claimed responsibility, but Iran would likely prefer to paint this as an Israeli operation.

Wouldn't put it past Ukraine's capabilities though, and the munitions were seemingly pretty small...Israel could make bigger bangs I'd think if they wanted.

[fullmetal]

Honestly, I'm hoping it was internal sabotage related to the women's rights protests and civil unrest.  What Iran has been doing to its own people over the last year has been unconscionable.

[fullmetal]

Honestly, I'm hoping it was internal sabotage related to the women's rights protests and civil unrest.  What Iran has been doing to its own people over the last year has been unconscionable.

[Goose]

Honestly, I'm hoping it was internal sabotage related to the women's rights protests and civil unrest.  What Iran has been doing to its own people over the last year has been unconscionable.

The beauty of this situation is it could be any or all of the above, Ukraine, Israel, or domestic insurgents. Getting willing cooperation for an action against the government from local people is probably easier than ever these days.

[Goose]

Honestly, I'm hoping it was internal sabotage related to the women's rights protests and civil unrest.  What Iran has been doing to its own people over the last year has been unconscionable.

The beauty of this situation is it could be any or all of the above, Ukraine, Israel, or domestic insurgents. Getting willing cooperation for an action against the government from local people is probably easier than ever these days.

[OutsiderFan]

Iran has quite the dilemma on its hands, doesn't it?

Do you blame Israel, Ukraine, the United States. perhaps Saudi Arabia?

Given the seemingly very bad impact this will have on gas prices, I don't think too many global powers would be keen on attacking Iran like this. And if Ukraine did it, the U.S. and allies would be none too pleased I would imagine. Israel probably did this in response to the mass shooting on the synagogue in Jerusalem?

[OutsiderFan]

Iran has quite the dilemma on its hands, doesn't it?

Do you blame Israel, Ukraine, the United States. perhaps Saudi Arabia?

Given the seemingly very bad impact this will have on gas prices, I don't think too many global powers would be keen on attacking Iran like this. And if Ukraine did it, the U.S. and allies would be none too pleased I would imagine. Israel probably did this in response to the mass shooting on the synagogue in Jerusalem?

[TreesAndBirds]

WSJ reports Israel behind the attack on Iranian facility.


https://www.wsj.com/articles/israel-stri...lead_pos10

[TreesAndBirds]

WSJ reports Israel behind the attack on Iranian facility.


https://www.wsj.com/articles/israel-stri...lead_pos10

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/crimea-shapin...00203.html

IMO this article is a good summary of the current "state of play". I admit I am showing confirmation bias about Crimea :-). It is going to be very interesting to see what Russia comes up with for a "spring offensive". If it is a "robust" effort that is fairly well led, Ukraine can lose this war because they still lack (apparently) mobile forces that can be used to "stop the bleeding". If they had such a force, I would have expected it to have been used to blunt the offensive around Bakhmut. It wouldn't be a "head on" confrontation but rather an attempt to outflank the Russian effort and make them change front. Force Russia to fight "somewhere else". Then pull back the mobile force after it has allowed the defense around  Bakhmut to recover. The mobile force can be replaced with a defensive force if that appears feasible, or just let Russia have the area back. The mission goal to take the pressure off Bakhmut will have been accomplished. The offensive around Kreminna could have done this but it is moving way too slowly to do so.

Fortunately Russia has yet to execute a rapid offensive that is well led and well resourced in this war. This has allowed a Ukraine who can't move real fast either block the offensives that could isolate their forces and lead to a strategic defeat from which they can't recover. The cost to both sides has been immense. OTOH, if Ukraine can hold in the Donbas and in June or thereabouts execute a successful offensive that threatens to isolate Crimea (or actually does do so), Russia will be in deep, deep trouble. That seems to be the plan, but Ukraine has to 1) hold on until the attempt in the South is ready, and 2) execute it with speed and violence. Neither is obviously a simple task.

Russia OTOH can continue to just pound away, but they must contain any attempt by Ukraine to cut off Crimea. They are doing that by creating a defense in depth with significant fortification and troop resources. However, it is a big area to defend. Fixed defenses against a mobile enemy can have serious problems if that enemy can sustain itself while flanking/bypassing strongpoints. The ability of the Russian air force to prevent a Ukrainian breakthrough could be the key in Crimea. I am sure lots of "war games" are and have been going on inside NATO to try and figure this one out.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/crimea-shapin...00203.html

IMO this article is a good summary of the current "state of play". I admit I am showing confirmation bias about Crimea :-). It is going to be very interesting to see what Russia comes up with for a "spring offensive". If it is a "robust" effort that is fairly well led, Ukraine can lose this war because they still lack (apparently) mobile forces that can be used to "stop the bleeding". If they had such a force, I would have expected it to have been used to blunt the offensive around Bakhmut. It wouldn't be a "head on" confrontation but rather an attempt to outflank the Russian effort and make them change front. Force Russia to fight "somewhere else". Then pull back the mobile force after it has allowed the defense around  Bakhmut to recover. The mobile force can be replaced with a defensive force if that appears feasible, or just let Russia have the area back. The mission goal to take the pressure off Bakhmut will have been accomplished. The offensive around Kreminna could have done this but it is moving way too slowly to do so.

Fortunately Russia has yet to execute a rapid offensive that is well led and well resourced in this war. This has allowed a Ukraine who can't move real fast either block the offensives that could isolate their forces and lead to a strategic defeat from which they can't recover. The cost to both sides has been immense. OTOH, if Ukraine can hold in the Donbas and in June or thereabouts execute a successful offensive that threatens to isolate Crimea (or actually does do so), Russia will be in deep, deep trouble. That seems to be the plan, but Ukraine has to 1) hold on until the attempt in the South is ready, and 2) execute it with speed and violence. Neither is obviously a simple task.

Russia OTOH can continue to just pound away, but they must contain any attempt by Ukraine to cut off Crimea. They are doing that by creating a defense in depth with significant fortification and troop resources. However, it is a big area to defend. Fixed defenses against a mobile enemy can have serious problems if that enemy can sustain itself while flanking/bypassing strongpoints. The ability of the Russian air force to prevent a Ukrainian breakthrough could be the key in Crimea. I am sure lots of "war games" are and have been going on inside NATO to try and figure this one out.

[TrumpCard]

A pretty well-sourced article on the possibility of supplying F-16s and other military equipment: https://www.politico.com/news/2023/01/28...ce=Twitter

Spoiler, Goose is going to be upset that, apparently, training won’t start until a decision is made to supply the jets.

[TrumpCard]

A pretty well-sourced article on the possibility of supplying F-16s and other military equipment: https://www.politico.com/news/2023/01/28...ce=Twitter

Spoiler, Goose is going to be upset that, apparently, training won’t start until a decision is made to supply the jets.

[Goose]

A pretty well-sourced article on the possibility of supplying F-16s and other military equipment: https://www.politico.com/news/2023/01/28...ce=Twitter

Spoiler, Goose is going to be upset that, apparently, training won’t start until a decision is made to supply the jets.

Goose is too not surprised to be upset. The idea of preparing contingent plans seems to be beyond everyone's pay grade. I guess it could be argued that training pilots would create momentum to supply planes, which is undoubtedly true. However, weighing that against the problem of making a decision, publicizing it, training for a year (which gives Russia plenty of time to react/prepare), and then deploying it, I think it is obvious starting the training early is the "right way to go". The way things are today, the war could easily be over before a plane is delivered.

It appears that almost everybody has finally realized that time is NOT on Ukraine's side. https://news.yahoo.com/zelenskyy-russia-...p_catchall Their economy is a shambles, their cities are attacked by missiles constantly, and Russia seems willing to lose an arbitrarily large number of it's citizens to "win" this conflict. Ukraine can win, but they can't take 5 years to do it. IMO they can't take 3 years to do it, but there are a lot of variables in that assessment. For months "everybody" has been estimating that Russia is "almost" out of missiles and "almost" out of artillery ammunition. Russia isn't going to run out of artillery ammunition. They may be firing stuff that won't go of half the time, but 50% of a big number is still a big number. They are still building missiles and are now using newer S-400 vintage missiles as ground attack weapons. It is a poor weapon for this application, and very expensive for what it does. However, if you have thousands of them, which Russia does, that isn't a problem. Throw in a few KH-22s for a good measure. This bombardment  isn't going to stop. It may ebb and flow, but Russia is doing everything it can to make sure it continues.

From the beginning, Ukraine has operated under the handicap that nobody realistically believes Ukraine can invade Russia and dictate terms in the Kremlin. This war can only end when Russia stops fighting, and Ukraine (even with NATO "help") can't compel them to stop fighting. NATO has applied economic sanctions to "compel" Russia to stop fighting. Russia applies "sanctions" to Ukraine daily at mach 3+. NATO has hopes that the Russian nation will in some form realize this war just isn't worth it. It is unclear this will ever happen, and even if it would (eventually) Ukraine has to endure that long. For that reason, Ukraine needs to inflict a defeat on Russia that has the potential to make it obvious to everybody, even in a tightly controlled society, that they are going to suffer grievous losses if they continue this war. Take back Crimea. Russia can't ignore that, and that is at least something Ukraine can possibly do.

As food for thought on this subject, consider that Russia can fire older S-300 missiles into Ukraine from occupied territory in Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia proper with impunity. No existing Ukrainian anti-missile defense can even track these missiles, let alone engage them. Patriots can, but the number of batteries available isn't going to be near enough to "plug all the holes". NASAMS doesn't have the range and it's missiles are too slow unless they are sitting on the target. Even if the Patriots shoot down all the missiles today, Russia can do it again tomorrow. If the US allowed Ukraine to fire HIMARS into Russia proper, the S-300 missiles would still be out of range. Give them ATACMS and let them fire it into Russia/Belarus (fat chance), they can destroy the S-300 launchers (if they can target them). Fine, but the S-400 missiles go further and therefore the launchers are out of even ATACMS range.

Please don't take this screed as pessimistic. The point is that 1) Ukraine can't physically compel Russia to stop firing missiles into it's territory and 2) such missiles make it impossible to have a "normal" economy or a "safe" existence. These facts alone mean that the war stops only when Russia decides to quit. How can Ukraine make that happen? The only way I see is for Ukraine to take back Crimea, which Russia views as an "essential" possession. That has a good chance at making Russia at least pause for a few years this insanity.

[Goose]

A pretty well-sourced article on the possibility of supplying F-16s and other military equipment: https://www.politico.com/news/2023/01/28...ce=Twitter

Spoiler, Goose is going to be upset that, apparently, training won’t start until a decision is made to supply the jets.

Goose is too not surprised to be upset. The idea of preparing contingent plans seems to be beyond everyone's pay grade. I guess it could be argued that training pilots would create momentum to supply planes, which is undoubtedly true. However, weighing that against the problem of making a decision, publicizing it, training for a year (which gives Russia plenty of time to react/prepare), and then deploying it, I think it is obvious starting the training early is the "right way to go". The way things are today, the war could easily be over before a plane is delivered.

It appears that almost everybody has finally realized that time is NOT on Ukraine's side. https://news.yahoo.com/zelenskyy-russia-...p_catchall Their economy is a shambles, their cities are attacked by missiles constantly, and Russia seems willing to lose an arbitrarily large number of it's citizens to "win" this conflict. Ukraine can win, but they can't take 5 years to do it. IMO they can't take 3 years to do it, but there are a lot of variables in that assessment. For months "everybody" has been estimating that Russia is "almost" out of missiles and "almost" out of artillery ammunition. Russia isn't going to run out of artillery ammunition. They may be firing stuff that won't go of half the time, but 50% of a big number is still a big number. They are still building missiles and are now using newer S-400 vintage missiles as ground attack weapons. It is a poor weapon for this application, and very expensive for what it does. However, if you have thousands of them, which Russia does, that isn't a problem. Throw in a few KH-22s for a good measure. This bombardment  isn't going to stop. It may ebb and flow, but Russia is doing everything it can to make sure it continues.

From the beginning, Ukraine has operated under the handicap that nobody realistically believes Ukraine can invade Russia and dictate terms in the Kremlin. This war can only end when Russia stops fighting, and Ukraine (even with NATO "help") can't compel them to stop fighting. NATO has applied economic sanctions to "compel" Russia to stop fighting. Russia applies "sanctions" to Ukraine daily at mach 3+. NATO has hopes that the Russian nation will in some form realize this war just isn't worth it. It is unclear this will ever happen, and even if it would (eventually) Ukraine has to endure that long. For that reason, Ukraine needs to inflict a defeat on Russia that has the potential to make it obvious to everybody, even in a tightly controlled society, that they are going to suffer grievous losses if they continue this war. Take back Crimea. Russia can't ignore that, and that is at least something Ukraine can possibly do.

As food for thought on this subject, consider that Russia can fire older S-300 missiles into Ukraine from occupied territory in Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia proper with impunity. No existing Ukrainian anti-missile defense can even track these missiles, let alone engage them. Patriots can, but the number of batteries available isn't going to be near enough to "plug all the holes". NASAMS doesn't have the range and it's missiles are too slow unless they are sitting on the target. Even if the Patriots shoot down all the missiles today, Russia can do it again tomorrow. If the US allowed Ukraine to fire HIMARS into Russia proper, the S-300 missiles would still be out of range. Give them ATACMS and let them fire it into Russia/Belarus (fat chance), they can destroy the S-300 launchers (if they can target them). Fine, but the S-400 missiles go further and therefore the launchers are out of even ATACMS range.

Please don't take this screed as pessimistic. The point is that 1) Ukraine can't physically compel Russia to stop firing missiles into it's territory and 2) such missiles make it impossible to have a "normal" economy or a "safe" existence. These facts alone mean that the war stops only when Russia decides to quit. How can Ukraine make that happen? The only way I see is for Ukraine to take back Crimea, which Russia views as an "essential" possession. That has a good chance at making Russia at least pause for a few years this insanity.

[TrumpCard]

Russia has not continuously attacked Georgia since taking control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It’s not clear to me that Russia will keep attacking until it takes most/all of Ukraine. Would that make Russia more defensible against NATO?  Would it help Russia’s economy?  Other than a notch in someone’s belt, what does it do for Russia?  Given the enormous losses Russia has suffered to date, I assume Russia would be content to have another frozen conflict. Ukraine obviously is not okay with giving up 20% of its territory. But is there a smaller percentage, along with NATO membership and significant long-term military aid to deter future attacks, where Ukraine is willing to compromise? With the casualties Russia has suffered, and the additional deterrents right on its border, would Russia consider the invasion enough of a success to warrant a repeat event in the near future?

[TrumpCard]

Russia has not continuously attacked Georgia since taking control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It’s not clear to me that Russia will keep attacking until it takes most/all of Ukraine. Would that make Russia more defensible against NATO?  Would it help Russia’s economy?  Other than a notch in someone’s belt, what does it do for Russia?  Given the enormous losses Russia has suffered to date, I assume Russia would be content to have another frozen conflict. Ukraine obviously is not okay with giving up 20% of its territory. But is there a smaller percentage, along with NATO membership and significant long-term military aid to deter future attacks, where Ukraine is willing to compromise? With the casualties Russia has suffered, and the additional deterrents right on its border, would Russia consider the invasion enough of a success to warrant a repeat event in the near future?

[fullmetal]

Spoiler, Goose is going to be upset that, apparently, training won’t start until a decision is made to supply the jets.

Well, thankfully there's plausible deniability about the ability of NATO/EU partners equipped with F-16s to train Ukrainians right now or ahead of a future US decision to supply those fighters and training.  The sooner, the better.

Also, it's probably well-known that the Iranian munitions plant attack was caused by drones, which likely rules out domestic disturbance.

[fullmetal]

Spoiler, Goose is going to be upset that, apparently, training won’t start until a decision is made to supply the jets.

Well, thankfully there's plausible deniability about the ability of NATO/EU partners equipped with F-16s to train Ukrainians right now or ahead of a future US decision to supply those fighters and training.  The sooner, the better.

Also, it's probably well-known that the Iranian munitions plant attack was caused by drones, which likely rules out domestic disturbance.

[Goose]

Russia has not continuously attacked Georgia since taking control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

True, but consider Georgia 2008 (small), Ukraine I 2014 (medium), Ukraine II 2022. Russia can take all of Georgia it wants anytime it wants. The Georgians know it, NATO knows it, and Russia knows it.

It’s not clear to me that Russia will keep attacking until it takes most/all of Ukraine.

Me either, but if you look at this whole war for a "rational" explanation, I doubt you find one. So far, Russia has been unwilling to just stop. From that, I would conclude they won't stop until there are internal reasons that compel them to stop.

Would that make Russia more defensible against NATO?

In a "classical" military sense, absolutely. There is the military geographic argument that the path from Europe to Russia starts in the narrow Fulda Gap and gets wider the farther east one goes. Defending a wider boundary is obviously more difficult than a narrower one. Having to defend Belarus and Russia with a NATO aligned nation to the south also would be a nightmare. The western border of Ukraine is much shorter, is further west so it is in a narrower part of the "geographic path" and has the advantage that it sits on the flank of any NATO advance toward Moscow. Is this worth a war like exists now? Not in my opinion, but there are definitely advantages. Poland would be better. Maybe that is why they are worried.

Would it help Russia’s economy?  Other than a notch in someone’s belt, what does it do for Russia?

If the invasion had been met with flowers, one can make an argument that Ukraine and Belarus are both "better together" within the Russian Federation. Obviously that didn't happen, and after 2014 was certainly not going to happen. The "why" of all this is just unknowable, just like the "why" of WW I is unknowable. A major miscalculation probably.

Given the enormous losses Russia has suffered to date, I assume Russia would be content to have another frozen conflict. Ukraine obviously is not okay with giving up 20% of its territory. But is there a smaller percentage, along with NATO membership and significant long-term military aid to deter future attacks, where Ukraine is willing to compromise? With the casualties Russia has suffered, and the additional deterrents right on its border, would Russia consider the invasion enough of a success to warrant a repeat event in the near future?

IMO it is difficult to envision Russia will be content with a frozen conflict exactly because of the enormous losses Russia has suffered to date. The leadership is going to have to justify its actions, maybe not immediately, but relatively soon. They had a frozen conflict. Spending all that blood and treasure without tangible result is going to be a real problem. Similarly, politically and economically Ukraine absolutely can't justify giving up part of their country to "freeze" a conflict that can "thaw" at Russia's discretion. I would attempt to answer your question "would Russia consider the invasion enough of a success to warrant a repeat event in the near future?" when you can answer the question of why they considered the original invasion warranted. I really don't know, but it doesn't much matter. Nobody is going to invest in Ukraine if it is in the midst of a "frozen" conflict. Ukraine has lots of other problems. Adding a potential invasion at Russia's discretion is pretty much a deal-breaker. The collapse of oil exploitation in Ukraine after 2014 basically demonstrates that. Would Russia allow a truncated Ukraine with which it has a "frozen" war join NATO? Would NATO accept Ukraine in such a situation. I suspect the answers are Hell No and Probably Not.

[Goose]

Russia has not continuously attacked Georgia since taking control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

True, but consider Georgia 2008 (small), Ukraine I 2014 (medium), Ukraine II 2022. Russia can take all of Georgia it wants anytime it wants. The Georgians know it, NATO knows it, and Russia knows it.

It’s not clear to me that Russia will keep attacking until it takes most/all of Ukraine.

Me either, but if you look at this whole war for a "rational" explanation, I doubt you find one. So far, Russia has been unwilling to just stop. From that, I would conclude they won't stop until there are internal reasons that compel them to stop.

Would that make Russia more defensible against NATO?

In a "classical" military sense, absolutely. There is the military geographic argument that the path from Europe to Russia starts in the narrow Fulda Gap and gets wider the farther east one goes. Defending a wider boundary is obviously more difficult than a narrower one. Having to defend Belarus and Russia with a NATO aligned nation to the south also would be a nightmare. The western border of Ukraine is much shorter, is further west so it is in a narrower part of the "geographic path" and has the advantage that it sits on the flank of any NATO advance toward Moscow. Is this worth a war like exists now? Not in my opinion, but there are definitely advantages. Poland would be better. Maybe that is why they are worried.

Would it help Russia’s economy?  Other than a notch in someone’s belt, what does it do for Russia?

If the invasion had been met with flowers, one can make an argument that Ukraine and Belarus are both "better together" within the Russian Federation. Obviously that didn't happen, and after 2014 was certainly not going to happen. The "why" of all this is just unknowable, just like the "why" of WW I is unknowable. A major miscalculation probably.

Given the enormous losses Russia has suffered to date, I assume Russia would be content to have another frozen conflict. Ukraine obviously is not okay with giving up 20% of its territory. But is there a smaller percentage, along with NATO membership and significant long-term military aid to deter future attacks, where Ukraine is willing to compromise? With the casualties Russia has suffered, and the additional deterrents right on its border, would Russia consider the invasion enough of a success to warrant a repeat event in the near future?

IMO it is difficult to envision Russia will be content with a frozen conflict exactly because of the enormous losses Russia has suffered to date. The leadership is going to have to justify its actions, maybe not immediately, but relatively soon. They had a frozen conflict. Spending all that blood and treasure without tangible result is going to be a real problem. Similarly, politically and economically Ukraine absolutely can't justify giving up part of their country to "freeze" a conflict that can "thaw" at Russia's discretion. I would attempt to answer your question "would Russia consider the invasion enough of a success to warrant a repeat event in the near future?" when you can answer the question of why they considered the original invasion warranted. I really don't know, but it doesn't much matter. Nobody is going to invest in Ukraine if it is in the midst of a "frozen" conflict. Ukraine has lots of other problems. Adding a potential invasion at Russia's discretion is pretty much a deal-breaker. The collapse of oil exploitation in Ukraine after 2014 basically demonstrates that. Would Russia allow a truncated Ukraine with which it has a "frozen" war join NATO? Would NATO accept Ukraine in such a situation. I suspect the answers are Hell No and Probably Not.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/austria-hunga...09830.html

This event is "important" not because either nation really has much military aid to provide, but rather as a reminder that there are currents in the EU that are not in favor of involvement in Ukraine. Hungary and Austria reach this state by very different paths and for very different reasons, which shows both the "residual" fear and admiration that Russia wields in many parts of Europe. It is not nearly as simple there as we in the US view it.

Hungary, as a member of the EU and NATO, is at the very least a "nuisance" and in terms of EU military aid a significant impediment. For me personally it is difficult to imagine how a former Warsaw Pact nation could view the possibility of Russia once again being on their border with equanimity. This is doubly true if Russia accomplishes that by invading a sovereign nation many times your size. However, that appears to be the case.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/austria-hunga...09830.html

This event is "important" not because either nation really has much military aid to provide, but rather as a reminder that there are currents in the EU that are not in favor of involvement in Ukraine. Hungary and Austria reach this state by very different paths and for very different reasons, which shows both the "residual" fear and admiration that Russia wields in many parts of Europe. It is not nearly as simple there as we in the US view it.

Hungary, as a member of the EU and NATO, is at the very least a "nuisance" and in terms of EU military aid a significant impediment. For me personally it is difficult to imagine how a former Warsaw Pact nation could view the possibility of Russia once again being on their border with equanimity. This is doubly true if Russia accomplishes that by invading a sovereign nation many times your size. However, that appears to be the case.

[BostonCard]

Ukraine: Boris Johnson says Putin threatened him with missile strike

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-64397745

While of course “it would only take a minute” is true, the fact that Putin is alleged to have said it is extraordinary.

BC

[BostonCard]

Ukraine: Boris Johnson says Putin threatened him with missile strike

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-64397745

While of course “it would only take a minute” is true, the fact that Putin is alleged to have said it is extraordinary.

BC

[dabigv13]

Maybe, finally, longer range rockets (GLSDB) going to Ukraine, eventually.

https://www.reuters.com/world/us-readies...023-01-31/

WASHINGTON, Jan 31 (Reuters) - The United States is readying more than $2 billion worth of military aid for Ukraine that is expected to include longer-range rockets for the first time and other munitions and weapons, two U.S. officials briefed on the matter told Reuters on Tuesday.
...
One of the officials said that a portion of the package, $1.725 billion, would come from a fund known as the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), which allows President Joe Biden's administration to get weapons from industry rather than from existing U.S. weapons stocks.

The USAI funds would go toward the purchase of a new weapon, Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB), which have a range of 94 miles (150 km). The United States has rebuffed requests for the 185-mile (297-km) range ATACMS missile.

If we gave Ukraine ATACMS in appreciable numbers, an assault on Crimea could probably be successfully prosecuted, and pretty quickly. Kerch bridge would be dropped day one of an assault (and if we do ever send ATACMS I don't think it would be announced ahead of time).

GLSDBs could eventually be in range of Kerch bridge if Ukraine retakes all of their territory to the Azov coast, but would be at very limit of range, likely making it possible to intercept. And would need to use a lot to appreciably damage the bridge.

It seems to me the US is giving Ukraine the tools that could enable them to eventually win back most of their territory, but not the tools that could enable a quick rout.

[dabigv13]

Maybe, finally, longer range rockets (GLSDB) going to Ukraine, eventually.

https://www.reuters.com/world/us-readies...023-01-31/

WASHINGTON, Jan 31 (Reuters) - The United States is readying more than $2 billion worth of military aid for Ukraine that is expected to include longer-range rockets for the first time and other munitions and weapons, two U.S. officials briefed on the matter told Reuters on Tuesday.
...
One of the officials said that a portion of the package, $1.725 billion, would come from a fund known as the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), which allows President Joe Biden's administration to get weapons from industry rather than from existing U.S. weapons stocks.

The USAI funds would go toward the purchase of a new weapon, Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB), which have a range of 94 miles (150 km). The United States has rebuffed requests for the 185-mile (297-km) range ATACMS missile.

If we gave Ukraine ATACMS in appreciable numbers, an assault on Crimea could probably be successfully prosecuted, and pretty quickly. Kerch bridge would be dropped day one of an assault (and if we do ever send ATACMS I don't think it would be announced ahead of time).

GLSDBs could eventually be in range of Kerch bridge if Ukraine retakes all of their territory to the Azov coast, but would be at very limit of range, likely making it possible to intercept. And would need to use a lot to appreciably damage the bridge.

It seems to me the US is giving Ukraine the tools that could enable them to eventually win back most of their territory, but not the tools that could enable a quick rout.

[TrumpCard]

It seems to me the US is giving Ukraine the tools that could enable them to eventually win back most of their territory, but not the tools that could enable a quick rout.

Against a Russia that doesn't produce more weapons, doesn't acquire more weapons from rogue states like Iran, doesn't break the current sanctions regime, and doesn't mobilize more troops?  If those are the assumptions, maybe the U.S. should consider a less-than-rosy scenario in deciding what weapons are sufficient for Ukraine to retake most of its territory.

[TrumpCard]

It seems to me the US is giving Ukraine the tools that could enable them to eventually win back most of their territory, but not the tools that could enable a quick rout.

Against a Russia that doesn't produce more weapons, doesn't acquire more weapons from rogue states like Iran, doesn't break the current sanctions regime, and doesn't mobilize more troops?  If those are the assumptions, maybe the U.S. should consider a less-than-rosy scenario in deciding what weapons are sufficient for Ukraine to retake most of its territory.

[dabigv13]

It's plausible that we are already planning to send ATACMS to really shape the battlefield before a spring or summer offensive, and if we do send it then probably John Q Public wouldn't know ahead of time.

It's also plausible to me that if circumstances change on the battlefield for the negative we could also supply ATACMS to help stave off a big Russian attack, though I think it's very unlikely Russia can reconstitute a force capable of maneuver warfare that would threaten a big breakthrough. Mobilized conscripts and a surplus of ancient artillery ammo can enable slow grinding assaults but nothing that will blitzkrieg Ukraine and catch them off guard IMHO.

[dabigv13]

It's plausible that we are already planning to send ATACMS to really shape the battlefield before a spring or summer offensive, and if we do send it then probably John Q Public wouldn't know ahead of time.

It's also plausible to me that if circumstances change on the battlefield for the negative we could also supply ATACMS to help stave off a big Russian attack, though I think it's very unlikely Russia can reconstitute a force capable of maneuver warfare that would threaten a big breakthrough. Mobilized conscripts and a surplus of ancient artillery ammo can enable slow grinding assaults but nothing that will blitzkrieg Ukraine and catch them off guard IMHO.