[dabigv13]

This all seems relevant to the war in Ukraine and within bounds described by admins in this thread. Hopefully this small but vocal minority of our government will continue to be more noise than action because I really have little desire to talk about any of these people.

[dabigv13]

This all seems relevant to the war in Ukraine and within bounds described by admins in this thread. Hopefully this small but vocal minority of our government will continue to be more noise than action because I really have little desire to talk about any of these people.

[Treefence]

I'm hoping my rehtoric here won't be seen as crossing the line: 

When it comes to military aid for Ukraine, doesn't the US have a solid runway with the recent bill that was passed?  From what I remember, congress was trying to get the full year set before the new congress took over to avoid future issues.  Now, maybe they cannot sustain 3 billion aid packages for a while, but I also wonder if the US is starting to see value in large chunks of aid, because Ukraine can do more with that than trickled in support.  Anyways, given all the news recently, I'm optimistic that Ukraine will have what they need to go on a major offensive in the spring, and maybe sooner, but I've always been extremely optimistic in regards to Ukraine.

[Treefence]

I'm hoping my rehtoric here won't be seen as crossing the line: 

When it comes to military aid for Ukraine, doesn't the US have a solid runway with the recent bill that was passed?  From what I remember, congress was trying to get the full year set before the new congress took over to avoid future issues.  Now, maybe they cannot sustain 3 billion aid packages for a while, but I also wonder if the US is starting to see value in large chunks of aid, because Ukraine can do more with that than trickled in support.  Anyways, given all the news recently, I'm optimistic that Ukraine will have what they need to go on a major offensive in the spring, and maybe sooner, but I've always been extremely optimistic in regards to Ukraine.

[Goose]

Whatever one's political leanings, and whatever has/has not been already approved by Congress, what the US does going forward will be largely determined by the administration's perception of public opinion. If the administration thinks the public will back it, they will do it, just like FDR did in the run-up to WWII. That is why, today as in the past, the administration has to keep "selling" the (very real IMHO) need to ensure Russia does not win in Ukraine. So far, they have done OK at that and have had a fairly receptive audience. If that changes, there will be "trouble". If it doesn't, while there may be to and fro in Congress, the administration can do what they want.

[Goose]

Whatever one's political leanings, and whatever has/has not been already approved by Congress, what the US does going forward will be largely determined by the administration's perception of public opinion. If the administration thinks the public will back it, they will do it, just like FDR did in the run-up to WWII. That is why, today as in the past, the administration has to keep "selling" the (very real IMHO) need to ensure Russia does not win in Ukraine. So far, they have done OK at that and have had a fairly receptive audience. If that changes, there will be "trouble". If it doesn't, while there may be to and fro in Congress, the administration can do what they want.

[TrumpCard]

Switching topics to get away from the funding issue. The NYT has a top of the front page article this morning (which I assume some of you already saw) about the fight for Bakhmut.  It's interesting how this battle went from: "Why are the Russians willing to lose so many troops to take this meaningless village?" to "This is a tremendously important battle for which Ukraine is willing to go toe to toe with the Russians in the Donbas for the first time."  With all the posts here about new weapons and equipment scheduled to arrive in the Spring, I just hope Ukraine can holdout along the current front for the rest of the Winter.  I know Goose's mantra is that Ukraine needs to keep up the momentum it established in the Fall, but I am not sure that's realistic based on the daily news I've seen for the past month or two.

[TrumpCard]

Switching topics to get away from the funding issue. The NYT has a top of the front page article this morning (which I assume some of you already saw) about the fight for Bakhmut.  It's interesting how this battle went from: "Why are the Russians willing to lose so many troops to take this meaningless village?" to "This is a tremendously important battle for which Ukraine is willing to go toe to toe with the Russians in the Donbas for the first time."  With all the posts here about new weapons and equipment scheduled to arrive in the Spring, I just hope Ukraine can holdout along the current front for the rest of the Winter.  I know Goose's mantra is that Ukraine needs to keep up the momentum it established in the Fall, but I am not sure that's realistic based on the daily news I've seen for the past month or two.

[BostonCard]

TrumpCard, I assume you are referring to this NY Times article: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/09/world...ategy.html

I'm not sure I buy it.  Russia is making small gains in the outlying suburbs of Bakhmut, and I suspect will probably eventually take it.  I think a bit like the battle for Severodonetsk/Lyshyshank, Bakhmut represents an opportunity for Ukraine to impose a high cost on Russian troops, so Ukranians holding out as long as possible is a good way to chew up Russian troops (in this case, lots of Wagner troops).  Estimates in December were that Russia was losing 50-100 troops a day there.

BC

[BostonCard]

TrumpCard, I assume you are referring to this NY Times article: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/09/world...ategy.html

I'm not sure I buy it.  Russia is making small gains in the outlying suburbs of Bakhmut, and I suspect will probably eventually take it.  I think a bit like the battle for Severodonetsk/Lyshyshank, Bakhmut represents an opportunity for Ukraine to impose a high cost on Russian troops, so Ukranians holding out as long as possible is a good way to chew up Russian troops (in this case, lots of Wagner troops).  Estimates in December were that Russia was losing 50-100 troops a day there.

BC

[TrumpCard]

TrumpCard, I assume you are referring to this NY Times article: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/09/world...ategy.html

 
Yes

I'm not sure I buy it.  

Buy what?  That it's an important battle?  It seems to me that Ukraine's decision to devote so many troops there inherently makes it an important battle.  Maybe you don't think Bakhmut is a gateway to Russia taking even more land?  If that's your position, I have no clue.

[TrumpCard]

TrumpCard, I assume you are referring to this NY Times article: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/09/world...ategy.html

 
Yes

I'm not sure I buy it.  

Buy what?  That it's an important battle?  It seems to me that Ukraine's decision to devote so many troops there inherently makes it an important battle.  Maybe you don't think Bakhmut is a gateway to Russia taking even more land?  If that's your position, I have no clue.

[BostonCard]

What I mean is that I really don't see the shift in strategy that The NY Times does. This looks like a similar strategy as Ukranians used in Severodonetsk/Lyshyshank, which is to force the Russians to devote a ton of resources and suffer a high casualty rate to take a strategically dubious position, but have a plan in place to eventually pull out once the position becomes untenable.  My guess is that Ukranians will withdraw from Bakhmut in a matter of weeks.  Bakhmut is only important inasmuch as it serves as a good meat grinder.  Recall that the Ukrainian breakthrough in Kharkiv happened after the Russians took Severodonetsk and Lysyshank.  Russians were so focused on taking the city come hell or high water that they sent undertrained and underequipped troops to hold Kharkiv oblast (also in protecting Kherson from the impending Ukranian counter-offensive).

Bakhmut looks similar to me, and one could see Ukraine exhausting Russia in Bakhmut and eventually withdrawing, to redirect troops to a counter-offensive in either Lushank or Zaporizija.

BC

[BostonCard]

What I mean is that I really don't see the shift in strategy that The NY Times does. This looks like a similar strategy as Ukranians used in Severodonetsk/Lyshyshank, which is to force the Russians to devote a ton of resources and suffer a high casualty rate to take a strategically dubious position, but have a plan in place to eventually pull out once the position becomes untenable.  My guess is that Ukranians will withdraw from Bakhmut in a matter of weeks.  Bakhmut is only important inasmuch as it serves as a good meat grinder.  Recall that the Ukrainian breakthrough in Kharkiv happened after the Russians took Severodonetsk and Lysyshank.  Russians were so focused on taking the city come hell or high water that they sent undertrained and underequipped troops to hold Kharkiv oblast (also in protecting Kherson from the impending Ukranian counter-offensive).

Bakhmut looks similar to me, and one could see Ukraine exhausting Russia in Bakhmut and eventually withdrawing, to redirect troops to a counter-offensive in either Lushank or Zaporizija.

BC

[Goose]

Switching topics to get away from the funding issue. The NYT has a top of the front page article this morning (which I assume some of you already saw) about the fight for Bakhmut.  It's interesting how this battle went from: "Why are the Russians willing to lose so many troops to take this meaningless village?" to "This is a tremendously important battle for which Ukraine is willing to go toe to toe with the Russians in the Donbas for the first time."  With all the posts here about new weapons and equipment scheduled to arrive in the Spring, I just hope Ukraine can holdout along the current front for the rest of the Winter.  I know Goose's mantra is that Ukraine needs to keep up the momentum it established in the Fall, but I am not sure that's realistic based on the daily news I've seen for the past month or two.

Bakhmut is not a strategically or tactically critical objective for either Russia or Ukraine. Sievierodonetsk was much more important to Ukraine and they survived losing that city. Bakhmut has become an important symbol. Russia has lost a lot of people there and continue to do so. As long as Ukraine sees continued defense of Bakhmut to be a tactical advantage to them they will continue to do so. Hopefully, if it reaches the point it is not tactically worth continuing to defend Bakhmut Ukraine will stop doing so, as they did Sievierodonetsk. Up to now, they have been tactically ruthless. Hopefully that continues and they don't get sucked into a battle that costs them more that it is worth because of "political" considerations. At present, it seems Russia does not have the artillery superiority required to force Ukraine out. Ukraine has conducted several counter-offensives in the area that have been successful. As long as they fight for the right reasons, I think they should continue. Yes, they want to make the Wagnerites lose the battle, but killing Wagerites is never a bad thing. Just make sure you kill more of them than they do of you. Remain professional.

The area around Kreminna is where Ukraine is keeping up momentum and they are forcing the Russians to redeploy assets to defend that area. If Ukraine prevails there, they can split the Russian defense of the Luhansk Oblast in two, logistically speaking. That matters, and Ukraine has a shot at doing it. They are forcing Russia to react on this front, which keeps the initiative in Ukrainian hands. Ukraine is currently worried about a new major Russian effort in either the North or the North East. I am pretty sure they are holding back significant reserves to counter this threat. Despite not being able to fully commit to the Kreminna offensive, they are doing pretty well.

As we all know (because I said so :-) this is all somewhat of a side show. Kherson Oblast and Crimea, with maybe a shot of Zaporizhzhia Oblast thrown in, is where this war will be decided (if Ukraine is going to win anyway). Russia knows this. They are fortifying and reinforcing this area at full speed. They are building multiple defensive lines to ensure against a major "breakthrough", or so they believe. A "frozen" conflict in the Donbas is possible because both sides have easy access and a very long line of contact. Even a major defeat can be weathered and reversed in that area by either side. Not so in Crimea. If Russia is driven out, getting back in will be real, real hard. Ukraine has much better access, and this fact of geography is what dictates this area as decisive. On top of that, Crimea is a political "hot button" to Russia whose loss probably would have significant political repercussions. This is the Russian "center of gravity" and both side know it.

Ukraine has the problem that both the Union and the Confederacy had during the civil war. The capital of Ukraine is very close to the Belarus border. Russia's initial attempt to exploit that fact failed. However, Ukraine has to always be aware that a repeat performance is possible. It seems probable that the loss of Kiev would have very serious, possibly decisive effects on Ukraine. That is a battle Ukraine can't afford to lose, the definition of "center of gravity". That is where Ukraine has to worry and where they have to keep lots of resources. The problem for Russia is that Belarus is not Russia. If it were, IMO Ukraine would be doomed. As it is, the ability of Russia to attack Kiev by that route is somewhat limited and that is why Ukraine is still in this war.

[Goose]

Switching topics to get away from the funding issue. The NYT has a top of the front page article this morning (which I assume some of you already saw) about the fight for Bakhmut.  It's interesting how this battle went from: "Why are the Russians willing to lose so many troops to take this meaningless village?" to "This is a tremendously important battle for which Ukraine is willing to go toe to toe with the Russians in the Donbas for the first time."  With all the posts here about new weapons and equipment scheduled to arrive in the Spring, I just hope Ukraine can holdout along the current front for the rest of the Winter.  I know Goose's mantra is that Ukraine needs to keep up the momentum it established in the Fall, but I am not sure that's realistic based on the daily news I've seen for the past month or two.

Bakhmut is not a strategically or tactically critical objective for either Russia or Ukraine. Sievierodonetsk was much more important to Ukraine and they survived losing that city. Bakhmut has become an important symbol. Russia has lost a lot of people there and continue to do so. As long as Ukraine sees continued defense of Bakhmut to be a tactical advantage to them they will continue to do so. Hopefully, if it reaches the point it is not tactically worth continuing to defend Bakhmut Ukraine will stop doing so, as they did Sievierodonetsk. Up to now, they have been tactically ruthless. Hopefully that continues and they don't get sucked into a battle that costs them more that it is worth because of "political" considerations. At present, it seems Russia does not have the artillery superiority required to force Ukraine out. Ukraine has conducted several counter-offensives in the area that have been successful. As long as they fight for the right reasons, I think they should continue. Yes, they want to make the Wagnerites lose the battle, but killing Wagerites is never a bad thing. Just make sure you kill more of them than they do of you. Remain professional.

The area around Kreminna is where Ukraine is keeping up momentum and they are forcing the Russians to redeploy assets to defend that area. If Ukraine prevails there, they can split the Russian defense of the Luhansk Oblast in two, logistically speaking. That matters, and Ukraine has a shot at doing it. They are forcing Russia to react on this front, which keeps the initiative in Ukrainian hands. Ukraine is currently worried about a new major Russian effort in either the North or the North East. I am pretty sure they are holding back significant reserves to counter this threat. Despite not being able to fully commit to the Kreminna offensive, they are doing pretty well.

As we all know (because I said so :-) this is all somewhat of a side show. Kherson Oblast and Crimea, with maybe a shot of Zaporizhzhia Oblast thrown in, is where this war will be decided (if Ukraine is going to win anyway). Russia knows this. They are fortifying and reinforcing this area at full speed. They are building multiple defensive lines to ensure against a major "breakthrough", or so they believe. A "frozen" conflict in the Donbas is possible because both sides have easy access and a very long line of contact. Even a major defeat can be weathered and reversed in that area by either side. Not so in Crimea. If Russia is driven out, getting back in will be real, real hard. Ukraine has much better access, and this fact of geography is what dictates this area as decisive. On top of that, Crimea is a political "hot button" to Russia whose loss probably would have significant political repercussions. This is the Russian "center of gravity" and both side know it.

Ukraine has the problem that both the Union and the Confederacy had during the civil war. The capital of Ukraine is very close to the Belarus border. Russia's initial attempt to exploit that fact failed. However, Ukraine has to always be aware that a repeat performance is possible. It seems probable that the loss of Kiev would have very serious, possibly decisive effects on Ukraine. That is a battle Ukraine can't afford to lose, the definition of "center of gravity". That is where Ukraine has to worry and where they have to keep lots of resources. The problem for Russia is that Belarus is not Russia. If it were, IMO Ukraine would be doomed. As it is, the ability of Russia to attack Kiev by that route is somewhat limited and that is why Ukraine is still in this war.

[TrumpCard]

Bakhmut is not a strategically or tactically critical objective for either Russia or Ukraine. 

I don't know whether this assessment is credible, but some folks seem to think Bakhmut has significant value:
https://twitter.com/J_JHelin/status/1603363429594431489

This academic, who has had some good insights into the war, does not buy the full thread above, but does seem to acknowledge the tactical value for Russia to take Bakhmut:
https://twitter.com/kofmanmichael/status...81?lang=en

I'm not saying that Ukraine would be doomed if Bakhmut fell.  I'm just noting the NYT view that Ukraine is putting a lot of troops into the battle for Bakhmut, possibly creating vulnerabilities.  I just hope that Ukraine's leadership has figured out evacuation plans in the event the town falls.  I expect that's true, and if so, then maybe the NYT's point is overblown.

[TrumpCard]

Bakhmut is not a strategically or tactically critical objective for either Russia or Ukraine. 

I don't know whether this assessment is credible, but some folks seem to think Bakhmut has significant value:
https://twitter.com/J_JHelin/status/1603363429594431489

This academic, who has had some good insights into the war, does not buy the full thread above, but does seem to acknowledge the tactical value for Russia to take Bakhmut:
https://twitter.com/kofmanmichael/status...81?lang=en

I'm not saying that Ukraine would be doomed if Bakhmut fell.  I'm just noting the NYT view that Ukraine is putting a lot of troops into the battle for Bakhmut, possibly creating vulnerabilities.  I just hope that Ukraine's leadership has figured out evacuation plans in the event the town falls.  I expect that's true, and if so, then maybe the NYT's point is overblown.

[BostonCard]

I think the value of Bakhmut was much higher before Ukraine recaptured Izium.  Slovyansk is midway between Izium and Bakhmut, and had the Russians held Bakhmut and Izium they would have been able to conduct a pincer maneuver on Slovyansk, potentially collapsing the Ukrainian salient into a cauldron between Slovyansk and Lysyshansk.   That danger has since disappeared.  Russian capture of Bakhmut does potentially give them a gateway to Slovyansk, but I don't think anyone thinks Russia will be much of a threat to Slovyansk even if they have Bakhmut in hand.

BC

[BostonCard]

I think the value of Bakhmut was much higher before Ukraine recaptured Izium.  Slovyansk is midway between Izium and Bakhmut, and had the Russians held Bakhmut and Izium they would have been able to conduct a pincer maneuver on Slovyansk, potentially collapsing the Ukrainian salient into a cauldron between Slovyansk and Lysyshansk.   That danger has since disappeared.  Russian capture of Bakhmut does potentially give them a gateway to Slovyansk, but I don't think anyone thinks Russia will be much of a threat to Slovyansk even if they have Bakhmut in hand.

BC

[Goose]

I'm not saying that Ukraine would be doomed if Bakhmut fell.  I'm just noting the NYT view that Ukraine is putting a lot of troops into the battle for Bakhmut, possibly creating vulnerabilities.  I just hope that Ukraine's leadership has figured out evacuation plans in the event the town falls.  I expect that's true, and if so, then maybe the NYT's point is overblown.

Politically it is pretty important to defend Bakhmut. Tactically is is useful but not essential. The evacuation strategy and the willingness to execute it when/if appropriate is indeed the issue. So far, Ukraine has been real good at this, so lets hope it continues. Right now, I think Ukraine believes Russia is doing something stupid by losing lots of people there and are following the strategy of never getting in the way of your opponent doing something stupid :-).

I think the value of Bakhmut was much higher before Ukraine recaptured Izium.  Slovyansk is midway between Izium and Bakhmut, and had the Russians held Bakhmut and Izium they would have been able to conduct a pincer maneuver on Slovyansk, potentially collapsing the Ukrainian salient into a cauldron between Slovyansk and Lysyshansk.   That danger has since disappeared.  Russian capture of Bakhmut does potentially give them a gateway to Slovyansk, but I don't think anyone thinks Russia will be much of a threat to Slovyansk even if they have Bakhmut in hand.

BC

I think that is exactly the case. Obviously being astride the two roads at Bakhmut is useful, but they are controlled "upstream" anyway.

[Goose]

I'm not saying that Ukraine would be doomed if Bakhmut fell.  I'm just noting the NYT view that Ukraine is putting a lot of troops into the battle for Bakhmut, possibly creating vulnerabilities.  I just hope that Ukraine's leadership has figured out evacuation plans in the event the town falls.  I expect that's true, and if so, then maybe the NYT's point is overblown.

Politically it is pretty important to defend Bakhmut. Tactically is is useful but not essential. The evacuation strategy and the willingness to execute it when/if appropriate is indeed the issue. So far, Ukraine has been real good at this, so lets hope it continues. Right now, I think Ukraine believes Russia is doing something stupid by losing lots of people there and are following the strategy of never getting in the way of your opponent doing something stupid :-).

I think the value of Bakhmut was much higher before Ukraine recaptured Izium.  Slovyansk is midway between Izium and Bakhmut, and had the Russians held Bakhmut and Izium they would have been able to conduct a pincer maneuver on Slovyansk, potentially collapsing the Ukrainian salient into a cauldron between Slovyansk and Lysyshansk.   That danger has since disappeared.  Russian capture of Bakhmut does potentially give them a gateway to Slovyansk, but I don't think anyone thinks Russia will be much of a threat to Slovyansk even if they have Bakhmut in hand.

BC

I think that is exactly the case. Obviously being astride the two roads at Bakhmut is useful, but they are controlled "upstream" anyway.

[BostonCard]

I'm not saying that Ukraine would be doomed if Bakhmut fell.  I'm just noting the NYT view that Ukraine is putting a lot of troops into the battle for Bakhmut, possibly creating vulnerabilities.  I just hope that Ukraine's leadership has figured out evacuation plans in the event the town falls.  I expect that's true, and if so, then maybe the NYT's point is overblown.

Politically it is pretty important to defend Bakhmut. Tactically is is useful but not essential. The evacuation strategy and the willingness to execute it when/if appropriate is indeed the issue. So far, Ukraine has been real good at this, so lets hope it continues. Right now, I think Ukraine believes Russia is doing something stupid by losing lots of people there and are following the strategy of never getting in the way of your opponent doing something stupid :-).

I think the value of Bakhmut was much higher before Ukraine recaptured Izium.  Slovyansk is midway between Izium and Bakhmut, and had the Russians held Bakhmut and Izium they would have been able to conduct a pincer maneuver on Slovyansk, potentially collapsing the Ukrainian salient into a cauldron between Slovyansk and Lysyshansk.   That danger has since disappeared.  Russian capture of Bakhmut does potentially give them a gateway to Slovyansk, but I don't think anyone thinks Russia will be much of a threat to Slovyansk even if they have Bakhmut in hand.

BC

I think that is exactly the case. Obviously being astride the two roads at Bakhmut is useful, but they are controlled "upstream" anyway.

I hope (and think) that Ukranians are willing to have that cold calculus in mind with regard to Bakhmut (and other areas).  In the past, they have shown a remarkable willingness to take the Russian trade of Russian casualties for land, and not gotten overly concerned with symbolism or political concerns.  Russia, on the other hand, has had a rather myopic focus on symbolically important victories.  To me, that suggests that even though Russian commanders have improved tactically (as a Ukrainian commander remarked, "We've killed all the stupid ones"), as long as the primary goal is to curry favor with Putin, Russia will continue to miss the forrest for the trees and forget why it is engaging in certain offensives (such as trying to capture Bakhmut).  Until Russian commanders are willing to tell Putin something he doesn't want to hear, better commanders cannot overcome the problems at the top.

BC

---

This looks like it would be good news, no?

[tweet]https://twitter.com/Blake_Allen13/status/1612573966119604224?s=20&t=oHiQVwt_lr_W5k6sOmoe_Q[/tweet]

At those prices, it is approaching the breakeven point ($30 - $40, per this link: https://news.yahoo.com/us-joins-eu-and-g...59347.html)

BC

[BostonCard]

I'm not saying that Ukraine would be doomed if Bakhmut fell.  I'm just noting the NYT view that Ukraine is putting a lot of troops into the battle for Bakhmut, possibly creating vulnerabilities.  I just hope that Ukraine's leadership has figured out evacuation plans in the event the town falls.  I expect that's true, and if so, then maybe the NYT's point is overblown.

Politically it is pretty important to defend Bakhmut. Tactically is is useful but not essential. The evacuation strategy and the willingness to execute it when/if appropriate is indeed the issue. So far, Ukraine has been real good at this, so lets hope it continues. Right now, I think Ukraine believes Russia is doing something stupid by losing lots of people there and are following the strategy of never getting in the way of your opponent doing something stupid :-).

I think the value of Bakhmut was much higher before Ukraine recaptured Izium.  Slovyansk is midway between Izium and Bakhmut, and had the Russians held Bakhmut and Izium they would have been able to conduct a pincer maneuver on Slovyansk, potentially collapsing the Ukrainian salient into a cauldron between Slovyansk and Lysyshansk.   That danger has since disappeared.  Russian capture of Bakhmut does potentially give them a gateway to Slovyansk, but I don't think anyone thinks Russia will be much of a threat to Slovyansk even if they have Bakhmut in hand.

BC

I think that is exactly the case. Obviously being astride the two roads at Bakhmut is useful, but they are controlled "upstream" anyway.

I hope (and think) that Ukranians are willing to have that cold calculus in mind with regard to Bakhmut (and other areas).  In the past, they have shown a remarkable willingness to take the Russian trade of Russian casualties for land, and not gotten overly concerned with symbolism or political concerns.  Russia, on the other hand, has had a rather myopic focus on symbolically important victories.  To me, that suggests that even though Russian commanders have improved tactically (as a Ukrainian commander remarked, "We've killed all the stupid ones"), as long as the primary goal is to curry favor with Putin, Russia will continue to miss the forrest for the trees and forget why it is engaging in certain offensives (such as trying to capture Bakhmut).  Until Russian commanders are willing to tell Putin something he doesn't want to hear, better commanders cannot overcome the problems at the top.

BC

---

This looks like it would be good news, no?

[tweet]https://twitter.com/Blake_Allen13/status/1612573966119604224?s=20&t=oHiQVwt_lr_W5k6sOmoe_Q[/tweet]

At those prices, it is approaching the breakeven point ($30 - $40, per this link: https://news.yahoo.com/us-joins-eu-and-g...59347.html)

BC

[Goose]

Until Russian commanders are willing to tell Putin something he doesn't want to hear, better commanders cannot overcome the problems at the top.



BC

History is not on your side for this one BC. You better believe Zhukov and Konev didn't tell Stalin much he didn't want to hear. The fact they survived the war proves it. It is unfortunately true that better commanders often DO overcome problems at the top. One could argue that for a long time Hitler's Germany did pretty well too. It isn't wise to assume that can't happen again. Granted, Putin may be so bad he can't recognize competence when/if he finds it, but I wouldn't be sure of that. A few victories go a long way to making you indispensable. Zhukov hated Stalin and Stalin knew it. He pretended he didn't know it because Zhukov was winning.

[Goose]

Until Russian commanders are willing to tell Putin something he doesn't want to hear, better commanders cannot overcome the problems at the top.



BC

History is not on your side for this one BC. You better believe Zhukov and Konev didn't tell Stalin much he didn't want to hear. The fact they survived the war proves it. It is unfortunately true that better commanders often DO overcome problems at the top. One could argue that for a long time Hitler's Germany did pretty well too. It isn't wise to assume that can't happen again. Granted, Putin may be so bad he can't recognize competence when/if he finds it, but I wouldn't be sure of that. A few victories go a long way to making you indispensable. Zhukov hated Stalin and Stalin knew it. He pretended he didn't know it because Zhukov was winning.

[BostonCard]

In other words, win in Bakhmut so that you don't have to fight another Bakhmut?

I think the difference in World War II is that it was a fight for Soviet survival, whereas Ukraine is a war of choice.

In other news, this looks not so good:

https://www.wsj.com/articles/sweden-cant...jem10point

I'd root for Edrogan to be defeated in elections this year (and the economic situation in Turkey is pretty bad), but I wouldn't count on it. 

BC

---

[tweet]https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1612588298509090817?s=20&t=oHiQVwt_lr_W5k6sOmoe_Q[/tweet]

Soledar is about five miles Northeast of Bakhmut, and I think Russian control would leave Bakhmut surrounded on three sides (and the road out vulnerable to Russian attack)

BC

[BostonCard]

In other words, win in Bakhmut so that you don't have to fight another Bakhmut?

I think the difference in World War II is that it was a fight for Soviet survival, whereas Ukraine is a war of choice.

In other news, this looks not so good:

https://www.wsj.com/articles/sweden-cant...jem10point

I'd root for Edrogan to be defeated in elections this year (and the economic situation in Turkey is pretty bad), but I wouldn't count on it. 

BC

---

[tweet]https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1612588298509090817?s=20&t=oHiQVwt_lr_W5k6sOmoe_Q[/tweet]

Soledar is about five miles Northeast of Bakhmut, and I think Russian control would leave Bakhmut surrounded on three sides (and the road out vulnerable to Russian attack)

BC

[Leftcoast]

I'm curious how a future fight for Crimea will play out among the Crimeans - Will they see this as "liberation" with all the inherent advantages that would give Ukraine, neutral, or mixed?  This could have real implications for a coming fight.

[Leftcoast]

I'm curious how a future fight for Crimea will play out among the Crimeans - Will they see this as "liberation" with all the inherent advantages that would give Ukraine, neutral, or mixed?  This could have real implications for a coming fight.

[Goose]

In other words, win in Bakhmut so that you don't have to fight another Bakhmut?

I think the difference in World War II is that it was a fight for Soviet survival, whereas Ukraine is a war of choice.

That is a valid point for people who have access to the "news" without too much spin. How true that is in Russia is debatable. IMO eventually the Russian public will see this as a war of choice, but right now they don't. Russia might win before that happens.

In other news, this looks not so good:

https://www.wsj.com/articles/sweden-cant...jem10point

I'd root for Edrogan to be defeated in elections this year (and the economic situation in Turkey is pretty bad), but I wouldn't count on it. 

BC

---

There is zero chance he will be defeated. If by some miracle he actually was going to lose, they would "find" the votes to make sure he didn't.

https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status...5k6sOmoe_Q

Soledar is about five miles Northeast of Bakhmut, and I think Russian control would leave Bakhmut surrounded on three sides (and the road out vulnerable to Russian attack)

BC

That is correct. Ukraine has been saying that even that threat won't roust them out as long as they are confident they can hold the road. I hope they know what they are doing, but they have so far managed such situations well.

[Goose]

In other words, win in Bakhmut so that you don't have to fight another Bakhmut?

I think the difference in World War II is that it was a fight for Soviet survival, whereas Ukraine is a war of choice.

That is a valid point for people who have access to the "news" without too much spin. How true that is in Russia is debatable. IMO eventually the Russian public will see this as a war of choice, but right now they don't. Russia might win before that happens.

In other news, this looks not so good:

https://www.wsj.com/articles/sweden-cant...jem10point

I'd root for Edrogan to be defeated in elections this year (and the economic situation in Turkey is pretty bad), but I wouldn't count on it. 

BC

---

There is zero chance he will be defeated. If by some miracle he actually was going to lose, they would "find" the votes to make sure he didn't.

https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status...5k6sOmoe_Q

Soledar is about five miles Northeast of Bakhmut, and I think Russian control would leave Bakhmut surrounded on three sides (and the road out vulnerable to Russian attack)

BC

That is correct. Ukraine has been saying that even that threat won't roust them out as long as they are confident they can hold the road. I hope they know what they are doing, but they have so far managed such situations well.

[TrumpCard]

In other news, this looks not so good:

https://www.wsj.com/articles/sweden-cant...jem10point

I doubt there is much chance Erdogan will approve the Swedes before his re-election.  After that, he'll have the freedom to do what he wants if it benefits him.  I remain optimistic that Sweden/Finland and NATO effectively can bribe Erdogan to get his approval.

[TrumpCard]

In other news, this looks not so good:

https://www.wsj.com/articles/sweden-cant...jem10point

I doubt there is much chance Erdogan will approve the Swedes before his re-election.  After that, he'll have the freedom to do what he wants if it benefits him.  I remain optimistic that Sweden/Finland and NATO effectively can bribe Erdogan to get his approval.

[dabigv13]

In other news, this looks not so good:

https://www.wsj.com/articles/sweden-cant...jem10point

I doubt there is much chance Erdogan will approve the Swedes before his re-election.  After that, he'll have the freedom to do what he wants if it benefits him.  I remain optimistic that Sweden/Finland and NATO effectively can bribe Erdogan to get his approval.

Yeah, I think this is right.

[dabigv13]

In other news, this looks not so good:

https://www.wsj.com/articles/sweden-cant...jem10point

I doubt there is much chance Erdogan will approve the Swedes before his re-election.  After that, he'll have the freedom to do what he wants if it benefits him.  I remain optimistic that Sweden/Finland and NATO effectively can bribe Erdogan to get his approval.

Yeah, I think this is right.

[Goose]

In other news, this looks not so good:

https://www.wsj.com/articles/sweden-cant...jem10point

I doubt there is much chance Erdogan will approve the Swedes before his re-election.  After that, he'll have the freedom to do what he wants if it benefits him.  I remain optimistic that Sweden/Finland and NATO effectively can bribe Erdogan to get his approval.

Yeah, I think this is right.

Me too. The amount and nature of the additional "bribery" required is a bit tricky, and I suspect some of it will have to come from the US. This is not new, and has been pretty much expected for some time.

[Goose]

In other news, this looks not so good:

https://www.wsj.com/articles/sweden-cant...jem10point

I doubt there is much chance Erdogan will approve the Swedes before his re-election.  After that, he'll have the freedom to do what he wants if it benefits him.  I remain optimistic that Sweden/Finland and NATO effectively can bribe Erdogan to get his approval.

Yeah, I think this is right.

Me too. The amount and nature of the additional "bribery" required is a bit tricky, and I suspect some of it will have to come from the US. This is not new, and has been pretty much expected for some time.

[TrumpCard]

The announcement that NATO countries would be supplying IFVs may be a precursor to significant additional transfers. The Ramstein meeting coming up next week is one potential event at which NATO may announce any additional transfers. 

This article from last month talks about the potential to transfer 11 MiGs. 

https://www.defensenews.com/global/europ...o-ukraine/

We know that a similar deal was scuttled last year, but maybe things have changed. This article provides an explanation of the last minute change last year that may or may not be accurate:

https://english.nv.ua/nation/us-stopped-...86635.html

And there are numerous articles indicating that tanks may be on the horizon. Like this one:

https://news.sky.com/story/amp/uk-consid...s-12783107

Question for those with military knowledge:
Are the 100 IFVs coming enough for a armored brigade combat team? How many tanks would be required? Are jets needed as well, and if so, would Slovakia’s 11 be sufficient?

[TrumpCard]

The announcement that NATO countries would be supplying IFVs may be a precursor to significant additional transfers. The Ramstein meeting coming up next week is one potential event at which NATO may announce any additional transfers. 

This article from last month talks about the potential to transfer 11 MiGs. 

https://www.defensenews.com/global/europ...o-ukraine/

We know that a similar deal was scuttled last year, but maybe things have changed. This article provides an explanation of the last minute change last year that may or may not be accurate:

https://english.nv.ua/nation/us-stopped-...86635.html

And there are numerous articles indicating that tanks may be on the horizon. Like this one:

https://news.sky.com/story/amp/uk-consid...s-12783107

Question for those with military knowledge:
Are the 100 IFVs coming enough for a armored brigade combat team? How many tanks would be required? Are jets needed as well, and if so, would Slovakia’s 11 be sufficient?