[TrumpCard]

https://twitter.com/Aviation_Intel/statu...ng-in-days

The link above points out many of the limitations associated with these kinds of systems. It is great Ukraine is getting these missiles, but their effects will be very limited. While Israel has had some luck defending their very small country against various missile threats, even they still have problems. Ukraine is a much bigger country.

It's not realistic for Ukraine to be able to develop an Iron Dome over its entire country, but air defense systems still would be mighty useful.  We previously talked about the population and geographic size of Ukrainian cities.  The top 8 cities in Ukrainian control right now had a pre-war population in the range of 500k-3MM (which is obviously much lower now due to all the refugees leaving).  Those cities are what you'd want to protect, mainly, because they have essential infrastructure and dense population.  Fortunately, those cities are geographically small, so they could be defended reasonably well.  After those somewhat dense areas, there are a dozen or two dozen towns of 100k-300k, which probably are not realistic for Ukraine to defend with SAMs.  But it's also not very efficient for Russia to target civilian structures in such towns, which consist mostly of single family homes and low rise commercial/industrial buildings.

Edit:  Unfortunately, you may be too optimistic about the delivery date.  According to John Kirby, it's likely going to be "a year or more" for the remaining NASAMS systems after the first two.  https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/202...734USFJFPA

[TrumpCard]

https://twitter.com/Aviation_Intel/statu...ng-in-days

The link above points out many of the limitations associated with these kinds of systems. It is great Ukraine is getting these missiles, but their effects will be very limited. While Israel has had some luck defending their very small country against various missile threats, even they still have problems. Ukraine is a much bigger country.

It's not realistic for Ukraine to be able to develop an Iron Dome over its entire country, but air defense systems still would be mighty useful.  We previously talked about the population and geographic size of Ukrainian cities.  The top 8 cities in Ukrainian control right now had a pre-war population in the range of 500k-3MM (which is obviously much lower now due to all the refugees leaving).  Those cities are what you'd want to protect, mainly, because they have essential infrastructure and dense population.  Fortunately, those cities are geographically small, so they could be defended reasonably well.  After those somewhat dense areas, there are a dozen or two dozen towns of 100k-300k, which probably are not realistic for Ukraine to defend with SAMs.  But it's also not very efficient for Russia to target civilian structures in such towns, which consist mostly of single family homes and low rise commercial/industrial buildings.

Edit:  Unfortunately, you may be too optimistic about the delivery date.  According to John Kirby, it's likely going to be "a year or more" for the remaining NASAMS systems after the first two.  https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/202...734USFJFPA

[dabigv13]

Ukraine is claiming to shoot down over 50% of the missiles/drones launched at it. Not sure how credible that is though I don't think any hard evidence exists to dispute it. It does seem that as Russian PGM stocks decline more of the attacks will be with drones which are likely easier to defend against.

Pretty astounding that Ukraine still apparently has plenty of S300 launchers and missiles this far along in the war.

[dabigv13]

Ukraine is claiming to shoot down over 50% of the missiles/drones launched at it. Not sure how credible that is though I don't think any hard evidence exists to dispute it. It does seem that as Russian PGM stocks decline more of the attacks will be with drones which are likely easier to defend against.

Pretty astounding that Ukraine still apparently has plenty of S300 launchers and missiles this far along in the war.

[M T]

Here's the damage I was talking about:


The gravel(?) between the cement ties is missing.  I'd think this means that something under the gravel burned through to some void.   This would allow the burning fuel to get down to the span's main structural component.  I presume that is some sort of steel structure.  The damage to that might not be as obvious as the deformed rail, but the heat could alter the strength of the steel. (Fire effects on steel;  fire effects on concrete)

[M T]

Here's the damage I was talking about:


The gravel(?) between the cement ties is missing.  I'd think this means that something under the gravel burned through to some void.   This would allow the burning fuel to get down to the span's main structural component.  I presume that is some sort of steel structure.  The damage to that might not be as obvious as the deformed rail, but the heat could alter the strength of the steel. (Fire effects on steel;  fire effects on concrete)

[Goose]

Here's the damage I was talking about:


The gravel(?) between the cement ties is missing.  I'd think this means that something under the gravel burned through to some void.   This would allow the burning fuel to get down to the span's main structural component.  I presume that is some sort of steel structure.  The damage to that might not be as obvious as the deformed rail, but the heat could alter the strength of the steel. (Fire effects on steel;  fire effects on concrete)

I see what you mean, but that to me just looks like a bad tamping job near that tie. I agree the ballast doesn't reach the top of the tie, but I think it is still present. The ballast is about foot thick. There is no place for it to go. It is gravel, but it is pretty well packed (tamped) down. Underneath that there is a full deck wide concrete slab. That slab is rigid end to end. There are no voids. That is before you hit the so called "Ballast Deck" which is where the steel starts. I doubt much heat, let alone fire, got through there. This is from https://www.arema.org/files/pubs/pgre/PGChapter8.pdf. Take a look at figure 8-7 on page 333.

Obviously, it needs inspecting, but if they are running trains on the other track they have presumably done that and didn't see anything serious.

[Goose]

Here's the damage I was talking about:


The gravel(?) between the cement ties is missing.  I'd think this means that something under the gravel burned through to some void.   This would allow the burning fuel to get down to the span's main structural component.  I presume that is some sort of steel structure.  The damage to that might not be as obvious as the deformed rail, but the heat could alter the strength of the steel. (Fire effects on steel;  fire effects on concrete)

I see what you mean, but that to me just looks like a bad tamping job near that tie. I agree the ballast doesn't reach the top of the tie, but I think it is still present. The ballast is about foot thick. There is no place for it to go. It is gravel, but it is pretty well packed (tamped) down. Underneath that there is a full deck wide concrete slab. That slab is rigid end to end. There are no voids. That is before you hit the so called "Ballast Deck" which is where the steel starts. I doubt much heat, let alone fire, got through there. This is from https://www.arema.org/files/pubs/pgre/PGChapter8.pdf. Take a look at figure 8-7 on page 333.

Obviously, it needs inspecting, but if they are running trains on the other track they have presumably done that and didn't see anything serious.

[Maple Leaf]

Here's the damage I was talking about:


The gravel(?) between the cement ties is missing.  I'd think this means that something under the gravel burned through to some void.   This would allow the burning fuel to get down to the span's main structural component.  I presume that is some sort of steel structure.  The damage to that might not be as obvious as the deformed rail, but the heat could alter the strength of the steel. (Fire effects on steel;  fire effects on concrete)

Steel Reinforcement in concrete known as "re-bar" will crystalized when exposed to heat (like welding) and become brittle.  There is a special grade of re-bar specifically designed for welding. The heat generated by fuel in the rail cars could have very well reach temperatures that could spald the concrete and thereby lessen the bond between the concrete and the re-bar.

[Maple Leaf]

Here's the damage I was talking about:


The gravel(?) between the cement ties is missing.  I'd think this means that something under the gravel burned through to some void.   This would allow the burning fuel to get down to the span's main structural component.  I presume that is some sort of steel structure.  The damage to that might not be as obvious as the deformed rail, but the heat could alter the strength of the steel. (Fire effects on steel;  fire effects on concrete)

Steel Reinforcement in concrete known as "re-bar" will crystalized when exposed to heat (like welding) and become brittle.  There is a special grade of re-bar specifically designed for welding. The heat generated by fuel in the rail cars could have very well reach temperatures that could spald the concrete and thereby lessen the bond between the concrete and the re-bar.

[Goose]

It's not realistic for Ukraine to be able to develop an Iron Dome over its entire country, but air defense systems still would be mighty useful.  We previously talked about the population and geographic size of Ukrainian cities.  The top 8 cities in Ukrainian control right now had a pre-war population in the range of 500k-3MM (which is obviously much lower now due to all the refugees leaving).  Those cities are what you'd want to protect, mainly, because they have essential infrastructure and dense population.  Fortunately, those cities are geographically small, so they could be defended reasonably well.  After those somewhat dense areas, there are a dozen or two dozen towns of 100k-300k, which probably are not realistic for Ukraine to defend with SAMs.  But it's also not very efficient for Russia to target civilian structures in such towns, which consist mostly of single family homes and low rise commercial/industrial buildings.


Edit:  Unfortunately, you may be too optimistic about the delivery date.  According to John Kirby, it's likely going to be "a year or more" for the remaining NASAMS systems after the first two.  https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/202...734USFJFPA

I do agree the two NASAMS will be useful. Against Kalibr and similar missile types they can provide a big help. However, as I have pointed out they are virtually useless against KH-22 (and derivative) missiles. Russia's recent big attach featured Kalibr type missiles, of which they may have not many. Whatever cities get the two NASAMS will simply not be targeted that way in the future. KH-22s are fine for basically "area attacks". Not very accurate, but who cares?

Russia is also using missiles of the S-300 family type 9M96 and derivatives. These missiles are relatively short range and are probably not a big threat. How well an NASAMS performs against these missiles I don't know.

One has to consider there are many significant infrastructure targets, such as power plants, rail and road bridges, and industrial facilities that are outside metropolitan areas. These are the targets that Kalibr missiles should be hitting, if Russia has any left. NASAMS will not be useful in those cases for the reasons you mention.

The IRIS-t systems are to me a question mark. Do they include the TRML-4D radar or not? If not, they won't do much good as their target acquisition performance will be lacking. If so, how well does that radar actually work? These are somewhat untried systems so we really don't know how well they work. The missile itself is higher performance but shorter range than an AMRAAM-ER. It used an infrared optical tracker to "lock on" to the target and has a radar based fusing system. How well does that combination work against the various Russian missiles? How was that tested? I don't know, so I can't say much about how this will work. I also don't know if the Ukrainian operators are trained yet or if that will occur now. The lack of information doesn't make me feel warm and fuzzy. We will just have to see what happens.

The lack of any more NASAMS for a year is just a travesty. I wonder when we told the Ukrainians that? I would imagine they were quite disappointed. Well, at least we delivered four more HIMARS today.

[Goose]

It's not realistic for Ukraine to be able to develop an Iron Dome over its entire country, but air defense systems still would be mighty useful.  We previously talked about the population and geographic size of Ukrainian cities.  The top 8 cities in Ukrainian control right now had a pre-war population in the range of 500k-3MM (which is obviously much lower now due to all the refugees leaving).  Those cities are what you'd want to protect, mainly, because they have essential infrastructure and dense population.  Fortunately, those cities are geographically small, so they could be defended reasonably well.  After those somewhat dense areas, there are a dozen or two dozen towns of 100k-300k, which probably are not realistic for Ukraine to defend with SAMs.  But it's also not very efficient for Russia to target civilian structures in such towns, which consist mostly of single family homes and low rise commercial/industrial buildings.


Edit:  Unfortunately, you may be too optimistic about the delivery date.  According to John Kirby, it's likely going to be "a year or more" for the remaining NASAMS systems after the first two.  https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/202...734USFJFPA

I do agree the two NASAMS will be useful. Against Kalibr and similar missile types they can provide a big help. However, as I have pointed out they are virtually useless against KH-22 (and derivative) missiles. Russia's recent big attach featured Kalibr type missiles, of which they may have not many. Whatever cities get the two NASAMS will simply not be targeted that way in the future. KH-22s are fine for basically "area attacks". Not very accurate, but who cares?

Russia is also using missiles of the S-300 family type 9M96 and derivatives. These missiles are relatively short range and are probably not a big threat. How well an NASAMS performs against these missiles I don't know.

One has to consider there are many significant infrastructure targets, such as power plants, rail and road bridges, and industrial facilities that are outside metropolitan areas. These are the targets that Kalibr missiles should be hitting, if Russia has any left. NASAMS will not be useful in those cases for the reasons you mention.

The IRIS-t systems are to me a question mark. Do they include the TRML-4D radar or not? If not, they won't do much good as their target acquisition performance will be lacking. If so, how well does that radar actually work? These are somewhat untried systems so we really don't know how well they work. The missile itself is higher performance but shorter range than an AMRAAM-ER. It used an infrared optical tracker to "lock on" to the target and has a radar based fusing system. How well does that combination work against the various Russian missiles? How was that tested? I don't know, so I can't say much about how this will work. I also don't know if the Ukrainian operators are trained yet or if that will occur now. The lack of information doesn't make me feel warm and fuzzy. We will just have to see what happens.

The lack of any more NASAMS for a year is just a travesty. I wonder when we told the Ukrainians that? I would imagine they were quite disappointed. Well, at least we delivered four more HIMARS today.

[TrumpCard]

Why could the US not use Patriots at Andrews and for “high value” targets in DC?  If they could, that would free up the NASAMS to go to Ukraine where they are needed more urgently.

[TrumpCard]

Why could the US not use Patriots at Andrews and for “high value” targets in DC?  If they could, that would free up the NASAMS to go to Ukraine where they are needed more urgently.

[Goose]

Why could the US not use Patriots at Andrews and for “high value” targets in DC?  If they could, that would free up the NASAMS to go to Ukraine where they are needed more urgently.

They could. However, we don't exactly have any spare Patriot batteries lying around either. Norway actually has quite a few NASAMS batteries, but I think they are older versions that wouldn't work well against Kalibr missiles. That is actually a rather large problem in this attempt to supply NASAMS to Ukraine. There are many versions out there, but not very many of any given version. For all we know, the two at Andrews have significant obsolescence problems and/or maintenance problems. Since we don't have many, we can't cobble together a few working ones from the parts of non-working ones. Not a good situation to be in.

REVISION: There is one other issue to consider. I don't know who "owns" the NASAMS at Andrews Joint Base, but I think it is the Air Force. This is a bit unusual, as the Army generally is responsible for SAMs. However, this case may be an exception. I don't know this for sure, but I couldn't find an Army unit assigned to operate them.

The contract to deliver NASAMS to Ukraine went through the Army, but since it took so long it seems improbable there was a previous contract (or a BOA) that could be used as a model. This ownership issue, petty as it should be, may actually stand in the way of moving assets from Andrews to Ukraine. If it isn't an Army asset, they can't control it's use. If anybody has more insight, speak up please.

[Goose]

Why could the US not use Patriots at Andrews and for “high value” targets in DC?  If they could, that would free up the NASAMS to go to Ukraine where they are needed more urgently.

They could. However, we don't exactly have any spare Patriot batteries lying around either. Norway actually has quite a few NASAMS batteries, but I think they are older versions that wouldn't work well against Kalibr missiles. That is actually a rather large problem in this attempt to supply NASAMS to Ukraine. There are many versions out there, but not very many of any given version. For all we know, the two at Andrews have significant obsolescence problems and/or maintenance problems. Since we don't have many, we can't cobble together a few working ones from the parts of non-working ones. Not a good situation to be in.

REVISION: There is one other issue to consider. I don't know who "owns" the NASAMS at Andrews Joint Base, but I think it is the Air Force. This is a bit unusual, as the Army generally is responsible for SAMs. However, this case may be an exception. I don't know this for sure, but I couldn't find an Army unit assigned to operate them.

The contract to deliver NASAMS to Ukraine went through the Army, but since it took so long it seems improbable there was a previous contract (or a BOA) that could be used as a model. This ownership issue, petty as it should be, may actually stand in the way of moving assets from Andrews to Ukraine. If it isn't an Army asset, they can't control it's use. If anybody has more insight, speak up please.

[jonnyss]

Here's the damage I was talking about:


The gravel(?) between the cement ties is missing.  I'd think this means that something under the gravel burned through to some void.   This would allow the burning fuel to get down to the span's main structural component.  I presume that is some sort of steel structure.  The damage to that might not be as obvious as the deformed rail, but the heat could alter the strength of the steel. (Fire effects on steel;  fire effects on concrete)

Steel Reinforcement in concrete known as "re-bar" will crystalized when exposed to heat (like welding) and become brittle.  There is a special grade of re-bar specifically designed for welding. The heat generated by fuel in the rail cars could have very well reach temperatures that could spald the concrete and thereby lessen the bond between the concrete and the re-bar.

like what led to the collapse of the twin towers?

[jonnyss]

Here's the damage I was talking about:


The gravel(?) between the cement ties is missing.  I'd think this means that something under the gravel burned through to some void.   This would allow the burning fuel to get down to the span's main structural component.  I presume that is some sort of steel structure.  The damage to that might not be as obvious as the deformed rail, but the heat could alter the strength of the steel. (Fire effects on steel;  fire effects on concrete)

Steel Reinforcement in concrete known as "re-bar" will crystalized when exposed to heat (like welding) and become brittle.  There is a special grade of re-bar specifically designed for welding. The heat generated by fuel in the rail cars could have very well reach temperatures that could spald the concrete and thereby lessen the bond between the concrete and the re-bar.

like what led to the collapse of the twin towers?

[BostonCard]

Russia is not using its missiles tactically to degrade Ukraine’s ability to fight a war; the Russians are attacking in anger, which is to their long-term detriment.

BC

[BostonCard]

Russia is not using its missiles tactically to degrade Ukraine’s ability to fight a war; the Russians are attacking in anger, which is to their long-term detriment.

BC

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraines-air-...41851.html

From the above:
"In total, the enemy launched 83 missiles, not including the S-300. We are talking about Kalibrs, Kh-101 and Iskanders. We cannot shoot down Iskander-M because they are ballistic missiles. On the other hand, Iskander-K flies along a [certain] trajectory like a cruise missile."

These missiles apparently destroyed about 1/3 of Ukraine's remaining electricity supply capability. While a good deal of that can be fixed, this is a type of warfare that can really cripple Ukraine. It remains to be seen how much of this Russia can do in the future. They may be running out of these weapons, but we really don't know how many they have remaining. This type of attack does require highly accurate weapons. As the Ukrainian General said, they can shoot down these type of weapons. NASAMS can help them do that. However, they will need more than two "soon" and six more in a year.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraines-air-...41851.html

From the above:
"In total, the enemy launched 83 missiles, not including the S-300. We are talking about Kalibrs, Kh-101 and Iskanders. We cannot shoot down Iskander-M because they are ballistic missiles. On the other hand, Iskander-K flies along a [certain] trajectory like a cruise missile."

These missiles apparently destroyed about 1/3 of Ukraine's remaining electricity supply capability. While a good deal of that can be fixed, this is a type of warfare that can really cripple Ukraine. It remains to be seen how much of this Russia can do in the future. They may be running out of these weapons, but we really don't know how many they have remaining. This type of attack does require highly accurate weapons. As the Ukrainian General said, they can shoot down these type of weapons. NASAMS can help them do that. However, they will need more than two "soon" and six more in a year.

[jonnyss]

Here's the damage I was talking about:


The gravel(?) between the cement ties is missing.  I'd think this means that something under the gravel burned through to some void.   This would allow the burning fuel to get down to the span's main structural component.  I presume that is some sort of steel structure.  The damage to that might not be as obvious as the deformed rail, but the heat could alter the strength of the steel. (Fire effects on steel;  fire effects on concrete)

Steel Reinforcement in concrete known as "re-bar" will crystalized when exposed to heat (like welding) and become brittle.  There is a special grade of re-bar specifically designed for welding. The heat generated by fuel in the rail cars could have very well reach temperatures that could spald the concrete and thereby lessen the bond between the concrete and the re-bar.

like what led to the collapse of the twin towers?

[jonnyss]

Here's the damage I was talking about:


The gravel(?) between the cement ties is missing.  I'd think this means that something under the gravel burned through to some void.   This would allow the burning fuel to get down to the span's main structural component.  I presume that is some sort of steel structure.  The damage to that might not be as obvious as the deformed rail, but the heat could alter the strength of the steel. (Fire effects on steel;  fire effects on concrete)

Steel Reinforcement in concrete known as "re-bar" will crystalized when exposed to heat (like welding) and become brittle.  There is a special grade of re-bar specifically designed for welding. The heat generated by fuel in the rail cars could have very well reach temperatures that could spald the concrete and thereby lessen the bond between the concrete and the re-bar.

like what led to the collapse of the twin towers?

[BostonCard]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/noahpinion/status/1580054762933825537?s=61&t=q_FJQeT3cwfmsvTu2H7pxA[/tweet]

Of course, Russia has a gazillion tanks in storage, but hot damned.

BC

[BostonCard]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/noahpinion/status/1580054762933825537?s=61&t=q_FJQeT3cwfmsvTu2H7pxA[/tweet]

Of course, Russia has a gazillion tanks in storage, but hot damned.

BC

[dabigv13]

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/Poutsup/status/1579970832708747264?s=20&t=Tsdn3JYeeuJV8dV34_zTXw[/tweet]

[dabigv13]

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/Poutsup/status/1579970832708747264?s=20&t=Tsdn3JYeeuJV8dV34_zTXw[/tweet]

[Treefence]

There is starting to be some movement in getting Ukraine "long range weapons."  I'm not quite sure if that means ATACMS, or possibly something else.  Apparently Lloyd Austin at the Ramstein 6 meeting today, "Ukraine needs long range weapons." 

My first question to Goose would would be, what are some realistic options?  

My second question to Goose would be, if ATACMS were on the table (I know we've had this discussion for months) what are the chances that various Russian air defense systems would be more effective against those, compared to the current munitions, which Russian air defense seems ineffective at stopping?

[Treefence]

There is starting to be some movement in getting Ukraine "long range weapons."  I'm not quite sure if that means ATACMS, or possibly something else.  Apparently Lloyd Austin at the Ramstein 6 meeting today, "Ukraine needs long range weapons." 

My first question to Goose would would be, what are some realistic options?  

My second question to Goose would be, if ATACMS were on the table (I know we've had this discussion for months) what are the chances that various Russian air defense systems would be more effective against those, compared to the current munitions, which Russian air defense seems ineffective at stopping?

[dabigv13]

ATACMS are slightly faster, > Mach 3, than GMLRS, >Mach 2.5, per open source information, and a bit larger. They would probably be a bit easier to detect on radar, but I think it's pretty safe to say that if they aren't shooting down GMLRS, they probably won't be shooting down ATACMS.

Now if they concentrated their air defense for a particularly high value target they have a chance of shooting one down, if you go by the theoretical or declared capabilities of Russian AD systems. However as we have seen the real world Russian performance typically does not measure up to theoretical capabilities.

[dabigv13]

ATACMS are slightly faster, > Mach 3, than GMLRS, >Mach 2.5, per open source information, and a bit larger. They would probably be a bit easier to detect on radar, but I think it's pretty safe to say that if they aren't shooting down GMLRS, they probably won't be shooting down ATACMS.

Now if they concentrated their air defense for a particularly high value target they have a chance of shooting one down, if you go by the theoretical or declared capabilities of Russian AD systems. However as we have seen the real world Russian performance typically does not measure up to theoretical capabilities.

[Treefence]

Thanks, appreciate the answer!  

I might have jumped the gun on the quote from Austin, it sounds like people might have misquoted him, and they were referring to long range air defense, but we will know more over time.

[Treefence]

Thanks, appreciate the answer!  

I might have jumped the gun on the quote from Austin, it sounds like people might have misquoted him, and they were referring to long range air defense, but we will know more over time.

[TrumpCard]

Jack Detsch with some interesting tweets this morning on Russian success using Iranian-made drones and on Elon Musk's idiotic attempts to negotiate with Putin.

[TrumpCard]

Jack Detsch with some interesting tweets this morning on Russian success using Iranian-made drones and on Elon Musk's idiotic attempts to negotiate with Putin.

[Treefence]

Okay here is the direct quote from Austin: "We know that Ukraine still needs even more long range fires *pause* in/and air defense systems and artillery systems, along with other crucial capabilities."  I added the pause, because there was a long pause, intentional or not.  I'm not sure if his next word was "in" or "and", since both could lead to different interpretations. Anyways, this leaves it somewhat open and vague, and maybe this is intentional. It seems the US has always announced what systems it is sending, but they do not always specify the ammunition they send.

[Treefence]

Okay here is the direct quote from Austin: "We know that Ukraine still needs even more long range fires *pause* in/and air defense systems and artillery systems, along with other crucial capabilities."  I added the pause, because there was a long pause, intentional or not.  I'm not sure if his next word was "in" or "and", since both could lead to different interpretations. Anyways, this leaves it somewhat open and vague, and maybe this is intentional. It seems the US has always announced what systems it is sending, but they do not always specify the ammunition they send.

[Goose]

There is starting to be some movement in getting Ukraine "long range weapons."  I'm not quite sure if that means ATACMS, or possibly something else.  Apparently Lloyd Austin at the Ramstein 6 meeting today, "Ukraine needs long range weapons." 

My first question to Goose would would be, what are some realistic options?  

My second question to Goose would be, if ATACMS were on the table (I know we've had this discussion for months) what are the chances that various Russian air defense systems would be more effective against those, compared to the current munitions, which Russian air defense seems ineffective at stopping?

ATACMS are slightly faster, > Mach 3, than GMLRS, >Mach 2.5, per open source information, and a bit larger. They would probably be a bit easier to detect on radar, but I think it's pretty safe to say that if they aren't shooting down GMLRS, they probably won't be shooting down ATACMS.

Now if they concentrated their air defense for a particularly high value target they have a chance of shooting one down, if you go by the theoretical or declared capabilities of Russian AD systems. However as we have seen the real world Russian performance typically does not measure up to theoretical capabilities.

I think dabigv13 is pretty much correct. Shooting down GMLRS doesn't happen for many reasons. The S-X00 systems that can do it are located pretty "far back". Their missiles would have to be fast enough to reach the GMLRS before they reached their targets. The GMLRS also don't fly real high, so the radars of the potential interceptors won't see them "early" in their flight path. This makes the required response time very short. On top of that, most of the missiles that could even hope to get there in time are SARH. The illuminator however would have to be able to "see" the target area, which generally it couldn't. On top of that, usually "several" GMLRS are launched, often full salvos. Shooting down one, even if you could, wouldn't much matter. If by some chance a GMLRS salvo flew directly over a TOR, some might get shot down. However, its target tracker probably would ignore them and the TOR wouldn't even launch :-).

The ATACMS is a bit of a different case. Since it is a ballistic missile with greater range it does fly higher and will be in the detection space much longer. It is also probable the S-X00 is much closer to the target (which may be in fact behind it). The geometry is potentially much better in this case. While a boost-phase intercept is unlikely a transit phase or "downhill" phase intercept is possible. The illuminator would have a reasonable elevation angle to work with. The ATACMS is also used as a single missile, so there won't be many targets that need simultaneous attention.

If the S-X00 system actually works as advertised, it would have a reasonable "shot". One data point on that is the Ukraine has flat out stated that their S-300 systems cannot intercept Iskander-m missiles. The ATACMS is an analog of this missile, so there is reason to believe Russia probably can't reliably shoot down an ATACMS. As I have pointed out before, Russia is apparently not using Big Bird/Tomb Stone/Grave Stone radars or their Mainstay AEW aircraft to task S-X00 batteries. These batteries must therefore find their own targets, and that can be problematic. It is also probable that the crews have not drilled on shooting down ballistic missiles as a priority. The Russian systems are generally manpower intensive. If you are well trained, they are great. If you are not, they don't work so well.

As far as "other" types of long-range weapons the US could provide, there is one that would possibly work. The US has already provided Harpoon missile systems to Ukraine. We could therefore presumably provide SLAM-ER missiles for those launchers. This may be politically more acceptable to the administration because they have not made a big deal about NOT doing so. Otherwise, we don't have any currently active tactical ballistic missiles available. Israel does, but I doubt they would go along with selling them to Ukraine. China does, and ditto.

[Goose]

There is starting to be some movement in getting Ukraine "long range weapons."  I'm not quite sure if that means ATACMS, or possibly something else.  Apparently Lloyd Austin at the Ramstein 6 meeting today, "Ukraine needs long range weapons." 

My first question to Goose would would be, what are some realistic options?  

My second question to Goose would be, if ATACMS were on the table (I know we've had this discussion for months) what are the chances that various Russian air defense systems would be more effective against those, compared to the current munitions, which Russian air defense seems ineffective at stopping?

ATACMS are slightly faster, > Mach 3, than GMLRS, >Mach 2.5, per open source information, and a bit larger. They would probably be a bit easier to detect on radar, but I think it's pretty safe to say that if they aren't shooting down GMLRS, they probably won't be shooting down ATACMS.

Now if they concentrated their air defense for a particularly high value target they have a chance of shooting one down, if you go by the theoretical or declared capabilities of Russian AD systems. However as we have seen the real world Russian performance typically does not measure up to theoretical capabilities.

I think dabigv13 is pretty much correct. Shooting down GMLRS doesn't happen for many reasons. The S-X00 systems that can do it are located pretty "far back". Their missiles would have to be fast enough to reach the GMLRS before they reached their targets. The GMLRS also don't fly real high, so the radars of the potential interceptors won't see them "early" in their flight path. This makes the required response time very short. On top of that, most of the missiles that could even hope to get there in time are SARH. The illuminator however would have to be able to "see" the target area, which generally it couldn't. On top of that, usually "several" GMLRS are launched, often full salvos. Shooting down one, even if you could, wouldn't much matter. If by some chance a GMLRS salvo flew directly over a TOR, some might get shot down. However, its target tracker probably would ignore them and the TOR wouldn't even launch :-).

The ATACMS is a bit of a different case. Since it is a ballistic missile with greater range it does fly higher and will be in the detection space much longer. It is also probable the S-X00 is much closer to the target (which may be in fact behind it). The geometry is potentially much better in this case. While a boost-phase intercept is unlikely a transit phase or "downhill" phase intercept is possible. The illuminator would have a reasonable elevation angle to work with. The ATACMS is also used as a single missile, so there won't be many targets that need simultaneous attention.

If the S-X00 system actually works as advertised, it would have a reasonable "shot". One data point on that is the Ukraine has flat out stated that their S-300 systems cannot intercept Iskander-m missiles. The ATACMS is an analog of this missile, so there is reason to believe Russia probably can't reliably shoot down an ATACMS. As I have pointed out before, Russia is apparently not using Big Bird/Tomb Stone/Grave Stone radars or their Mainstay AEW aircraft to task S-X00 batteries. These batteries must therefore find their own targets, and that can be problematic. It is also probable that the crews have not drilled on shooting down ballistic missiles as a priority. The Russian systems are generally manpower intensive. If you are well trained, they are great. If you are not, they don't work so well.

As far as "other" types of long-range weapons the US could provide, there is one that would possibly work. The US has already provided Harpoon missile systems to Ukraine. We could therefore presumably provide SLAM-ER missiles for those launchers. This may be politically more acceptable to the administration because they have not made a big deal about NOT doing so. Otherwise, we don't have any currently active tactical ballistic missiles available. Israel does, but I doubt they would go along with selling them to Ukraine. China does, and ditto.