[BostonCard]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/thestudyofwar/status/1575289372710150145?s=21&t=PLR6HoUcFnxmzqrEbvOWuA[/tweet]

That Lyman salient is looking precarious for Russia.  There’s one road out, and the Ukrainian army can hit anything retreating from there.

BC

[BostonCard]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/thestudyofwar/status/1575289372710150145?s=21&t=PLR6HoUcFnxmzqrEbvOWuA[/tweet]

That Lyman salient is looking precarious for Russia.  There’s one road out, and the Ukrainian army can hit anything retreating from there.

BC

[Goose]

I wonder if the Ukrainians can barter the captured T-90M for some good US weapons…

https://www.economist.com/the-economist-...nk-matters

BC

I am pretty sure they already negotiated a memorandum of understanding with regard to "technical cooperation" in their original deal. It is pretty standard in cases like this :-). Ask the Israelis, although theirs keeps getting re-negotiated.

---

https://twitter.com/thestudyofwar/status...zqrEbvOWuA

That Lyman salient is looking precarious for Russia.  There’s one road out, and the Ukrainian army can hit anything retreating from there.

BC

It sure is. At one point there were supposedly over 2000 troops inside that Lyman salient. I haven't seen anything on them retreating, and as you point out Ukraine would certainly know about (and take under fire) such a retreat. Finally seeing a big POW count might knock some sense into the Russian public, but I wouldn't count on it.

Once again, we see horrible tactical leadership by Russia. They are endangering their forces to no purpose. Ukraine OTOH in similar circumstances would hold on until the last moment, inflicting as many casualties as possible, and the get out. There was a prepared position already there behind them. So far, I don't recall Russia retreating successfully unless they fell back all the way to the Russian border!

[Goose]

I wonder if the Ukrainians can barter the captured T-90M for some good US weapons…

https://www.economist.com/the-economist-...nk-matters

BC

I am pretty sure they already negotiated a memorandum of understanding with regard to "technical cooperation" in their original deal. It is pretty standard in cases like this :-). Ask the Israelis, although theirs keeps getting re-negotiated.

---

https://twitter.com/thestudyofwar/status...zqrEbvOWuA

That Lyman salient is looking precarious for Russia.  There’s one road out, and the Ukrainian army can hit anything retreating from there.

BC

It sure is. At one point there were supposedly over 2000 troops inside that Lyman salient. I haven't seen anything on them retreating, and as you point out Ukraine would certainly know about (and take under fire) such a retreat. Finally seeing a big POW count might knock some sense into the Russian public, but I wouldn't count on it.

Once again, we see horrible tactical leadership by Russia. They are endangering their forces to no purpose. Ukraine OTOH in similar circumstances would hold on until the last moment, inflicting as many casualties as possible, and the get out. There was a prepared position already there behind them. So far, I don't recall Russia retreating successfully unless they fell back all the way to the Russian border!

[BostonCard]

This thread is for goose…

[tweet]https://twitter.com/noclador/status/1574606905363898387?s=21&t=PLR6HoUcFnxmzqrEbvOWuA[/tweet]

You can get a good sense of what equipment has been sent to Ukraine (or is about to be sent), based on what the military is replacing in its budget.

BC

[BostonCard]

This thread is for goose…

[tweet]https://twitter.com/noclador/status/1574606905363898387?s=21&t=PLR6HoUcFnxmzqrEbvOWuA[/tweet]

You can get a good sense of what equipment has been sent to Ukraine (or is about to be sent), based on what the military is replacing in its budget.

BC

[TrumpCard]

Once again, we see horrible tactical leadership by Russia. They are endangering their forces to no purpose. Ukraine OTOH in similar circumstances would hold on until the last moment, inflicting as many casualties as possible, and the get out. There was a prepared position already there behind them. So far, I don't recall Russia retreating successfully unless they fell back all the way to the Russian border!

I’m not sure we should assume this follow up offensive is so great for Ukraine. The initial offensive was lightening fast and netted thousands of square miles with a strong/defensible border at the Oskil River. This new offensive seems more grinding and isn’t taking nearly as much land. Maybe 100 sq miles so far and another 100 if Lyman falls?  And agin Lyman is a town of 20k people (pre-war), so we’re not talking about liberating large numbers of Ukrainians still living in this town (or the smaller surrounding towns). I guess the theory is that Ukraine should take what Russia is giving, and Kherson would be too difficult to liberate right now. And better not to lose a war of attrition in the South. But jeez, this seems like a small prize compared to the potential for liberating the land west of the Dnipro.

[TrumpCard]

Once again, we see horrible tactical leadership by Russia. They are endangering their forces to no purpose. Ukraine OTOH in similar circumstances would hold on until the last moment, inflicting as many casualties as possible, and the get out. There was a prepared position already there behind them. So far, I don't recall Russia retreating successfully unless they fell back all the way to the Russian border!

I’m not sure we should assume this follow up offensive is so great for Ukraine. The initial offensive was lightening fast and netted thousands of square miles with a strong/defensible border at the Oskil River. This new offensive seems more grinding and isn’t taking nearly as much land. Maybe 100 sq miles so far and another 100 if Lyman falls?  And agin Lyman is a town of 20k people (pre-war), so we’re not talking about liberating large numbers of Ukrainians still living in this town (or the smaller surrounding towns). I guess the theory is that Ukraine should take what Russia is giving, and Kherson would be too difficult to liberate right now. And better not to lose a war of attrition in the South. But jeez, this seems like a small prize compared to the potential for liberating the land west of the Dnipro.

[gocard14]

I

This thread is for goose…

[tweet]https://twitter.com/noclador/status/1574606905363898387?s=21&t=PLR6HoUcFnxmzqrEbvOWuA[/tweet]

You can get a good sense of what equipment has been sent to Ukraine (or is about to be sent), based on what the military is replacing in its budget.

BC

Interesting. Mostly what you’d expect, a lot of money for artillery shells and ramping up production, money for HIMARs and reloads, etc. they did flag money for Patriots/missles but that may be for Poland or other NATO Allies to replace their donated S300 systems.

[gocard14]

I

This thread is for goose…

[tweet]https://twitter.com/noclador/status/1574606905363898387?s=21&t=PLR6HoUcFnxmzqrEbvOWuA[/tweet]

You can get a good sense of what equipment has been sent to Ukraine (or is about to be sent), based on what the military is replacing in its budget.

BC

Interesting. Mostly what you’d expect, a lot of money for artillery shells and ramping up production, money for HIMARs and reloads, etc. they did flag money for Patriots/missles but that may be for Poland or other NATO Allies to replace their donated S300 systems.

[Goose]

I’m not sure we should assume this follow up offensive is so great for Ukraine. The initial offensive was lightening fast and netted thousands of square miles with a strong/defensible border at the Oskil River. This new offensive seems more grinding and isn’t taking nearly as much land. Maybe 100 sq miles so far and another 100 if Lyman falls?  And agin Lyman is a town of 20k people (pre-war), so we’re not talking about liberating large numbers of Ukrainians still living in this town (or the smaller surrounding towns). I guess the theory is that Ukraine should take what Russia is giving, and Kherson would be too difficult to liberate right now. And better not to lose a war of attrition in the South. But jeez, this seems like a small prize compared to the potential for liberating the land west of the Dnipro.

The initial offensive hit a defense that was a shell. There was nothing behind it. That isn't good military practice, but Russia just doesn't have the troops for a defense in depth. The shell itself was manned by troops some of which were not very good. Once through, the offensive hit air. Russia apparently also ordered basically all the units in the northern part of the Kharkiv Oblast to withdraw whether pressed or not. Not a standard military practice, in fact quite puzzling. It may be Russia felt these troops might run anyway and better they do so in a somewhat orderly fashion. In any case, Ukraine was given a gift. They were smart enough and well trained enough to capitalize on Russia's failures but in most cases it isn't going to be like that.
FWIW, victory by Ukraine in Lyman might actually damage the Russian military more than the previous offensive. It appears, as far as I can tell, that Russia did not evacuate Lyman. As I was saying all along during the previous offensive, the lack of POWs indicated Russia was not resisting. What little they had there mostly got out. It appears that may not be the case at Lyman. A few thousand Russian POWs might be quite useful to Ukraine. Politically, Putin isn't going to like that much. Also, as the ISW is pointing put, victory here would put the Ukrainian thrust on the rear of the current Russian offensive in Donetsk. It will be a bit far away, but as we have seen that can change fast. Does Russia keep trying to advance or does it turn to "honor the threat"? I am assuming creating a new defensive line south of Lyman from whole cloth is beyond their capabilities. War is usually hard.

I also wouldn't give up hope around Kherson. Ukraine may have figured out how long Russia can survive there and are just waiting for the Russians to weaken enough to collapse. No point in losing troops you don't have to. I for sure don't want to let the Russians off the hook there, but I also expect Ukraine feels the same :-). Lets see what happens in a month.

[Goose]

I’m not sure we should assume this follow up offensive is so great for Ukraine. The initial offensive was lightening fast and netted thousands of square miles with a strong/defensible border at the Oskil River. This new offensive seems more grinding and isn’t taking nearly as much land. Maybe 100 sq miles so far and another 100 if Lyman falls?  And agin Lyman is a town of 20k people (pre-war), so we’re not talking about liberating large numbers of Ukrainians still living in this town (or the smaller surrounding towns). I guess the theory is that Ukraine should take what Russia is giving, and Kherson would be too difficult to liberate right now. And better not to lose a war of attrition in the South. But jeez, this seems like a small prize compared to the potential for liberating the land west of the Dnipro.

The initial offensive hit a defense that was a shell. There was nothing behind it. That isn't good military practice, but Russia just doesn't have the troops for a defense in depth. The shell itself was manned by troops some of which were not very good. Once through, the offensive hit air. Russia apparently also ordered basically all the units in the northern part of the Kharkiv Oblast to withdraw whether pressed or not. Not a standard military practice, in fact quite puzzling. It may be Russia felt these troops might run anyway and better they do so in a somewhat orderly fashion. In any case, Ukraine was given a gift. They were smart enough and well trained enough to capitalize on Russia's failures but in most cases it isn't going to be like that.
FWIW, victory by Ukraine in Lyman might actually damage the Russian military more than the previous offensive. It appears, as far as I can tell, that Russia did not evacuate Lyman. As I was saying all along during the previous offensive, the lack of POWs indicated Russia was not resisting. What little they had there mostly got out. It appears that may not be the case at Lyman. A few thousand Russian POWs might be quite useful to Ukraine. Politically, Putin isn't going to like that much. Also, as the ISW is pointing put, victory here would put the Ukrainian thrust on the rear of the current Russian offensive in Donetsk. It will be a bit far away, but as we have seen that can change fast. Does Russia keep trying to advance or does it turn to "honor the threat"? I am assuming creating a new defensive line south of Lyman from whole cloth is beyond their capabilities. War is usually hard.

I also wouldn't give up hope around Kherson. Ukraine may have figured out how long Russia can survive there and are just waiting for the Russians to weaken enough to collapse. No point in losing troops you don't have to. I for sure don't want to let the Russians off the hook there, but I also expect Ukraine feels the same :-). Lets see what happens in a month.

[M T]

I don't have access to the New York Times, but this come-on from them today is relevant:
"Russian soldiers describe battlefield failures, looting and civilian executions in thousands of intercepted phone calls obtained exclusively by The Times."

Sounds like confirming evidence of war crimes.

It is also a reminder that that cell phone you use every day might be more vulnerable to a 3rd party's interception & recording than you may realize.

[M T]

I don't have access to the New York Times, but this come-on from them today is relevant:
"Russian soldiers describe battlefield failures, looting and civilian executions in thousands of intercepted phone calls obtained exclusively by The Times."

Sounds like confirming evidence of war crimes.

It is also a reminder that that cell phone you use every day might be more vulnerable to a 3rd party's interception & recording than you may realize.

[Treefence]

Goose, in regards to Kherson, do you think it's possible Ukraine is waiting for the right moment, to start a counter offensive from the Zaporizhzhia region, in hopes to cut off what is left of the supply lines to Kherson, and also end the land bridge to Crimea?  The only reason I bring that up is because Russian sources has repeatedly mentioned a mass of Ukrainian armor near that area, and have been expecting an attack.  This could all be a bluff by Ukraine, to conceal attacks elsewhere, maybe there's a bunch of inflatable tank brigades in that area, spooking Russian sources...

[Treefence]

Goose, in regards to Kherson, do you think it's possible Ukraine is waiting for the right moment, to start a counter offensive from the Zaporizhzhia region, in hopes to cut off what is left of the supply lines to Kherson, and also end the land bridge to Crimea?  The only reason I bring that up is because Russian sources has repeatedly mentioned a mass of Ukrainian armor near that area, and have been expecting an attack.  This could all be a bluff by Ukraine, to conceal attacks elsewhere, maybe there's a bunch of inflatable tank brigades in that area, spooking Russian sources...

[Goose]

Goose, in regards to Kherson, do you think it's possible Ukraine is waiting for the right moment, to start a counter offensive from the Zaporizhzhia region, in hopes to cut off what is left of the supply lines to Kherson, and also end the land bridge to Crimea?  The only reason I bring that up is because Russian sources has repeatedly mentioned a mass of Ukrainian armor near that area, and have been expecting an attack.  This could all be a bluff by Ukraine, to conceal attacks elsewhere, maybe there's a bunch of inflatable tank brigades in that area, spooking Russian sources...

Certainly possible. It is known that Zelenskyy is partial to such an offensive and had to be talked out of it. It appears that Russia isn't making as much use of that land bridge right now as previously. The most recent reinforcements have come across the bridge and through Crimea. That could just be a coincidence however.

My guess, FWIW (very little) is that the armor force is there for three reasons. First, it forces Russia to garrison the Zaporizhzhia region much more heavily. They can't move forces either towards Kherson or towards Donetsk without leaving a hole Ukraine could exploit. Second, if Kherson/Nova Kakhovka (especially the latter) is captured, the Russians may decide to retreat via/pull out of the "land bridge" back towards Donetsk. If that happens, this armor could hit the flank of a retreating Russian army with it's other flank to the Sea of Azov. Not a good place to be. Third, it prevents Russia from moving north west any further out of the land bridge. Give all this, it is doing lots of good just sitting there.

[Goose]

Goose, in regards to Kherson, do you think it's possible Ukraine is waiting for the right moment, to start a counter offensive from the Zaporizhzhia region, in hopes to cut off what is left of the supply lines to Kherson, and also end the land bridge to Crimea?  The only reason I bring that up is because Russian sources has repeatedly mentioned a mass of Ukrainian armor near that area, and have been expecting an attack.  This could all be a bluff by Ukraine, to conceal attacks elsewhere, maybe there's a bunch of inflatable tank brigades in that area, spooking Russian sources...

Certainly possible. It is known that Zelenskyy is partial to such an offensive and had to be talked out of it. It appears that Russia isn't making as much use of that land bridge right now as previously. The most recent reinforcements have come across the bridge and through Crimea. That could just be a coincidence however.

My guess, FWIW (very little) is that the armor force is there for three reasons. First, it forces Russia to garrison the Zaporizhzhia region much more heavily. They can't move forces either towards Kherson or towards Donetsk without leaving a hole Ukraine could exploit. Second, if Kherson/Nova Kakhovka (especially the latter) is captured, the Russians may decide to retreat via/pull out of the "land bridge" back towards Donetsk. If that happens, this armor could hit the flank of a retreating Russian army with it's other flank to the Sea of Azov. Not a good place to be. Third, it prevents Russia from moving north west any further out of the land bridge. Give all this, it is doing lots of good just sitting there.

[Mick]

LOL. Have you been watching the same war as us? Russian conventional capability can barely turn small Ukrainian towns into rubble and only with months of sustained artillery bombardment. 

Russian military on paper might have some good systems. But they used them up, don't know how to use them, or they're actually garbage.

Based on virtually every report I've read about the lack of quality of Russia's conventional weapons, I wonder how strong the quality of their nuclear weapons are.  I'm not eager to find out, just wondering aloud...

[Mick]

LOL. Have you been watching the same war as us? Russian conventional capability can barely turn small Ukrainian towns into rubble and only with months of sustained artillery bombardment. 

Russian military on paper might have some good systems. But they used them up, don't know how to use them, or they're actually garbage.

Based on virtually every report I've read about the lack of quality of Russia's conventional weapons, I wonder how strong the quality of their nuclear weapons are.  I'm not eager to find out, just wondering aloud...

[Goose]

LOL. Have you been watching the same war as us? Russian conventional capability can barely turn small Ukrainian towns into rubble and only with months of sustained artillery bombardment. 

Russian military on paper might have some good systems. But they used them up, don't know how to use them, or they're actually garbage.

Based on virtually every report I've read about the lack of quality of Russia's conventional weapons, I wonder how strong the quality of their nuclear weapons are.  I'm not eager to find out, just wondering aloud...

IMHO these "reports" about the lack of quality of Russian conventional weapons must be carefully examined. First and foremost, keep in mind that the "good" results Ukraine is getting are largely achieved using mostly these same weapons. The Ukrainians are using T-72 just like the Russians are. They are also using BMP-x and BTR-x APC. The Ukrainian Air Defense forces has prevented Russia from obtaining air superiority with the same S-300 missiles Russia has used to do the converse.

These systems all have issues. Russian tanks use an auto-loader which requires the ammunition to reside in the turret. Turret hits tend to "cook off" the ammo. Guess what? So do Leopard II tanks. They have both turret ammo and hull ammo. The is a blowout panel on the turret that is designed to make sympathetic detonation survivable. There is empirical evidence it does not. There is conclusive empirical evidence that a hit on the hull ammo launches the turret exactly like a Russian tank. So, do Leopard II tanks suck? British Challenger tank, ditto, but worse. The Brits know this. There are lots of things about Russian IFVs that suck. However, when used properly they can work well. Other nations have demonstrated that fact.

Kalibr cruise missiles work just fine. They ought to, they are just improved Tomahawks. The problem is the Russians just didn't make enough of them. The KH-101 is a fine missile. Even fewer of them were built. The Iskander is a very good weapons system. Again, the problem is Russia didn't build enough of them. The can't expend them all in Ukraine because they require them to defend the rest of the country. Before we get too complacent here, how many ATACMS did the US build? They are comparable systems.

It is certainly true Russia has some weapons systems that basically don't work well. Their anti-radiation missiles are very poor. Their drone technology is not "modern". On the other hand, they have some weapons systems that we either don't have or the Russian ones are better. GPS jammers are an example of that. Russian QA/QC also leaves a lot to be desired. However, the vast majority of their weapons actually work quite well.

Russia's problems are much, much more the people than the equipment. One can go on and on about the mistakes Russia has made both tactically and strategically. However, as Ukraine often shows, when used properly these weapons can be made to work and work well. Poorly trained under motivated troops with basically no leadership can't accomplish anything no matter how good their equipment is.

As to your question about the Russian nuclear weapons, almost all we know dates back to Soviet days. Back then, based on the warhead tracking missions for Russian tests and the like, we have every reason to believe these weapons work just fine. Today, who knows? On thing to consider is that Russian weapons have a shorter shelf life than US ones do. Theirs are therefore newer than ours, on average. Whether that makes them more or less reliable, we don't know. I for one would say that if even half of them work, the world is in a lot of trouble, and I am pretty sure they can meet that low bar.

[Goose]

LOL. Have you been watching the same war as us? Russian conventional capability can barely turn small Ukrainian towns into rubble and only with months of sustained artillery bombardment. 

Russian military on paper might have some good systems. But they used them up, don't know how to use them, or they're actually garbage.

Based on virtually every report I've read about the lack of quality of Russia's conventional weapons, I wonder how strong the quality of their nuclear weapons are.  I'm not eager to find out, just wondering aloud...

IMHO these "reports" about the lack of quality of Russian conventional weapons must be carefully examined. First and foremost, keep in mind that the "good" results Ukraine is getting are largely achieved using mostly these same weapons. The Ukrainians are using T-72 just like the Russians are. They are also using BMP-x and BTR-x APC. The Ukrainian Air Defense forces has prevented Russia from obtaining air superiority with the same S-300 missiles Russia has used to do the converse.

These systems all have issues. Russian tanks use an auto-loader which requires the ammunition to reside in the turret. Turret hits tend to "cook off" the ammo. Guess what? So do Leopard II tanks. They have both turret ammo and hull ammo. The is a blowout panel on the turret that is designed to make sympathetic detonation survivable. There is empirical evidence it does not. There is conclusive empirical evidence that a hit on the hull ammo launches the turret exactly like a Russian tank. So, do Leopard II tanks suck? British Challenger tank, ditto, but worse. The Brits know this. There are lots of things about Russian IFVs that suck. However, when used properly they can work well. Other nations have demonstrated that fact.

Kalibr cruise missiles work just fine. They ought to, they are just improved Tomahawks. The problem is the Russians just didn't make enough of them. The KH-101 is a fine missile. Even fewer of them were built. The Iskander is a very good weapons system. Again, the problem is Russia didn't build enough of them. The can't expend them all in Ukraine because they require them to defend the rest of the country. Before we get too complacent here, how many ATACMS did the US build? They are comparable systems.

It is certainly true Russia has some weapons systems that basically don't work well. Their anti-radiation missiles are very poor. Their drone technology is not "modern". On the other hand, they have some weapons systems that we either don't have or the Russian ones are better. GPS jammers are an example of that. Russian QA/QC also leaves a lot to be desired. However, the vast majority of their weapons actually work quite well.

Russia's problems are much, much more the people than the equipment. One can go on and on about the mistakes Russia has made both tactically and strategically. However, as Ukraine often shows, when used properly these weapons can be made to work and work well. Poorly trained under motivated troops with basically no leadership can't accomplish anything no matter how good their equipment is.

As to your question about the Russian nuclear weapons, almost all we know dates back to Soviet days. Back then, based on the warhead tracking missions for Russian tests and the like, we have every reason to believe these weapons work just fine. Today, who knows? On thing to consider is that Russian weapons have a shorter shelf life than US ones do. Theirs are therefore newer than ours, on average. Whether that makes them more or less reliable, we don't know. I for one would say that if even half of them work, the world is in a lot of trouble, and I am pretty sure they can meet that low bar.

[dabigv13]

If I were Putin I'd order a nuclear test or two just to be sure.

And honestly it would probably be his safest move if he wants to scare Ukraine's allies and give rhetorical ammo to those who favor appeasement without risking anything too hot coming back his way.

[dabigv13]

If I were Putin I'd order a nuclear test or two just to be sure.

And honestly it would probably be his safest move if he wants to scare Ukraine's allies and give rhetorical ammo to those who favor appeasement without risking anything too hot coming back his way.

[Goose]

If I were Putin I'd order a nuclear test or two just to be sure.

And honestly it would probably be his safest move if he wants to scare Ukraine's allies and give rhetorical ammo to those who favor appeasement without risking anything too hot coming back his way.

Interesting thought. It would appear you are talking about an actual atmospheric explosion, something that hasn't happened for a while. It would also be a treaty violation, but then that may not matter. If he didn't announce it in advance, he would be risking accidentally starting a nuclear war. An underground test would probably not need advanced notice, but would not be as spectacular.

I agree it could be a good form of messaging. I don't think it would say much about the state of his deterrent force weapons. If it "worked", the next one might not and visa-versa. How many do you need to test to be "sure"?

[Goose]

If I were Putin I'd order a nuclear test or two just to be sure.

And honestly it would probably be his safest move if he wants to scare Ukraine's allies and give rhetorical ammo to those who favor appeasement without risking anything too hot coming back his way.

Interesting thought. It would appear you are talking about an actual atmospheric explosion, something that hasn't happened for a while. It would also be a treaty violation, but then that may not matter. If he didn't announce it in advance, he would be risking accidentally starting a nuclear war. An underground test would probably not need advanced notice, but would not be as spectacular.

I agree it could be a good form of messaging. I don't think it would say much about the state of his deterrent force weapons. If it "worked", the next one might not and visa-versa. How many do you need to test to be "sure"?

[BostonCard]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/ralee85/status/1575628562844897280?s=46&t=xn2ViKKUJQJId1COif2NxA[/tweet]

Looks like the noose is tightening on Lyman.

To paraphrase: “how did you lose the battle?”

“Two ways, gradually and then suddenly

BC

[BostonCard]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/ralee85/status/1575628562844897280?s=46&t=xn2ViKKUJQJId1COif2NxA[/tweet]

Looks like the noose is tightening on Lyman.

To paraphrase: “how did you lose the battle?”

“Two ways, gradually and then suddenly

BC

[Treefence]

Reports are just under a thousand, to a few thousand troops may still be there and encircled.  My guess is the negotiate a way to surrender, possibly delaying just a bit so it seemed like they fought hard, but I think this will be awful timing for Putin about to announce the "annexation" of the four oblasts tomorrow.  As much as I'd hope this would lead to a brobdingnagian shakeup with Russia, I think more likely it'll lead to a lot of, if not all, the Azovstal defenders and other POW's being freed.  Another big success for Ukraine, and hopefully the operational momentum continues.

[Treefence]

Reports are just under a thousand, to a few thousand troops may still be there and encircled.  My guess is the negotiate a way to surrender, possibly delaying just a bit so it seemed like they fought hard, but I think this will be awful timing for Putin about to announce the "annexation" of the four oblasts tomorrow.  As much as I'd hope this would lead to a brobdingnagian shakeup with Russia, I think more likely it'll lead to a lot of, if not all, the Azovstal defenders and other POW's being freed.  Another big success for Ukraine, and hopefully the operational momentum continues.

[Goose]

ISW is saying that the last road out of Lyman is indeed in Ukrainian hands, although it happened after their cutoff on 9/29 so it won't show on their map until 9/30. Probably it will be a few days before we find out how many POWs were taken. I am hoping for 2K or so. This should cause Russia to re-configure their GLOCS and troops in the area. However, if they don't react promptly the Ukrainians can continue their offensive. As long as you face inferior forces, keep going.

[Goose]

ISW is saying that the last road out of Lyman is indeed in Ukrainian hands, although it happened after their cutoff on 9/29 so it won't show on their map until 9/30. Probably it will be a few days before we find out how many POWs were taken. I am hoping for 2K or so. This should cause Russia to re-configure their GLOCS and troops in the area. However, if they don't react promptly the Ukrainians can continue their offensive. As long as you face inferior forces, keep going.

[BostonCard]

I remember when Ukrainian women and children were queueing for days on the Polish border to get out.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/samueloakford/status/1575530122513289217?s=46&t=EHgT7NNBnxoGybH49597Ow[/tweet]

BC

---

It appears that some Russians are getting out of Lyman…

[tweet]https://twitter.com/arvelleg1/status/1575834731702206464?s=46&t=EHgT7NNBnxoGybH49597Ow[/tweet]

BC

[BostonCard]

I remember when Ukrainian women and children were queueing for days on the Polish border to get out.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/samueloakford/status/1575530122513289217?s=46&t=EHgT7NNBnxoGybH49597Ow[/tweet]

BC

---

It appears that some Russians are getting out of Lyman…

[tweet]https://twitter.com/arvelleg1/status/1575834731702206464?s=46&t=EHgT7NNBnxoGybH49597Ow[/tweet]

BC

[dabigv13]

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1575843498217144321?s=20&t=Y9DQbZ3UWGJ85inhhDXh3A[/tweet]

We've only been seeing one type of GMLRS missile so far, the M31, which has a single big warhead for a single hardened target. This missile, the M30, can go as far and is GPS guided as well, but is meant as an area attack weapon against softer targets.

Will be very useful at attacking Russian infantry.

[dabigv13]

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1575843498217144321?s=20&t=Y9DQbZ3UWGJ85inhhDXh3A[/tweet]

We've only been seeing one type of GMLRS missile so far, the M31, which has a single big warhead for a single hardened target. This missile, the M30, can go as far and is GPS guided as well, but is meant as an area attack weapon against softer targets.

Will be very useful at attacking Russian infantry.

[Treefence]

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1575843498217144321?s=20&t=Y9DQbZ3UWGJ85inhhDXh3A[/tweet]

We've only been seeing one type of GMLRS missile so far, the M31, which has a single big warhead for a single hardened target. This missile, the M30, can go as far and is GPS guided as well, but is meant as an area attack weapon against softer targets.

Will be very useful at attacking Russian infantry.

These seem like they'd be relevant if a group of Russians were hastily fleeing encirclement, congregated on a single road out of an area...

[Treefence]

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1575843498217144321?s=20&t=Y9DQbZ3UWGJ85inhhDXh3A[/tweet]

We've only been seeing one type of GMLRS missile so far, the M31, which has a single big warhead for a single hardened target. This missile, the M30, can go as far and is GPS guided as well, but is meant as an area attack weapon against softer targets.

Will be very useful at attacking Russian infantry.

These seem like they'd be relevant if a group of Russians were hastily fleeing encirclement, congregated on a single road out of an area...

[Goose]

https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/157...5inhhDXh3A

We've only been seeing one type of GMLRS missile so far, the M31, which has a single big warhead for a single hardened target. This missile, the M30, can go as far and is GPS guided as well, but is meant as an area attack weapon against softer targets.

Will be very useful at attacking Russian infantry.

These seem like they'd be relevant if a group of Russians were hastily fleeing encirclement, congregated on a single road out of an area...

This variant was intended as a replacement for the M30 DPICM. It indeed works well against infantry in the open. It also works well against "soft" targets such as truck-borne infantry and any other similar transport, like commercial trucks, trains etc.. It was intended (hoped?) that this munition would also serve against IFVs and to some extent against armor. In this latter role it was not effective.

With 155mm artillery, the "original" recipe was to use VT against Warsaw pact motor rifle formations and DPICM against Guards Armored formations. The M270 as originally built fired only DPICM, as the Warsaw pact was converting motor rifle formation from trucks to IFVs. This was also what the Grad and it's successor (Smerch) fired. However, the end of the cold war led to the idea that the "dud rate" of the DPICM was unacceptable because it could endanger civilians and advancing friendly troops, so after many attempts to lower the dud rate below 1% the M30A1 was created. It never came close to replacing DPICM. Russia of course never even considered replacing DPICM.

I do hope Ukraine finds occasion to use these weapons. This is also one of the many reasons infantry should never ride on the outside of their IFV. Inside, you are quite safe. Outside, you are in lots of trouble.

[Goose]

https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/157...5inhhDXh3A

We've only been seeing one type of GMLRS missile so far, the M31, which has a single big warhead for a single hardened target. This missile, the M30, can go as far and is GPS guided as well, but is meant as an area attack weapon against softer targets.

Will be very useful at attacking Russian infantry.

These seem like they'd be relevant if a group of Russians were hastily fleeing encirclement, congregated on a single road out of an area...

This variant was intended as a replacement for the M30 DPICM. It indeed works well against infantry in the open. It also works well against "soft" targets such as truck-borne infantry and any other similar transport, like commercial trucks, trains etc.. It was intended (hoped?) that this munition would also serve against IFVs and to some extent against armor. In this latter role it was not effective.

With 155mm artillery, the "original" recipe was to use VT against Warsaw pact motor rifle formations and DPICM against Guards Armored formations. The M270 as originally built fired only DPICM, as the Warsaw pact was converting motor rifle formation from trucks to IFVs. This was also what the Grad and it's successor (Smerch) fired. However, the end of the cold war led to the idea that the "dud rate" of the DPICM was unacceptable because it could endanger civilians and advancing friendly troops, so after many attempts to lower the dud rate below 1% the M30A1 was created. It never came close to replacing DPICM. Russia of course never even considered replacing DPICM.

I do hope Ukraine finds occasion to use these weapons. This is also one of the many reasons infantry should never ride on the outside of their IFV. Inside, you are quite safe. Outside, you are in lots of trouble.