[gocard14]

Now that it's been a few days since a lot of the rumors I had posted, I think we can rule a few things out.  I think the speculation of Kherson troops surrendering imminently rumor being passed around from source to source, with little to it.  It seems likely that was either propaganda, or optimistic speculation.  

Lyman seems to be contested, but not captured by Ukraine, and Kreminna might have battling on the outskirts, but it's likely still held by Russia.  

I think all of Kharkiv Oblast has been liberated, except land East of the Oksil river, which seems to be held by Russia.  

I don't think Ukraine is assaulting Lysychansk or Sievierodonetsk directly.  

Ukraine does not hold Donetsk airport.  


If I had a guess, many people saw the rapid pace of Ukrainian gains, and starting guessing what was next to be the first to report things.

The talk about surrender in Kherson is not idle speculation, it's sourced from ISW

"Spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command, Natalya Humeniuk, stated on Sept. 12 that Russian forces located along the right bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast are attempting to negotiate for surrender under the auspices of international law."

Of course this is coming from the Ukraine side that wants to spread news of imminent surrender for morale reasons, and it is also possible that negotiations began and went nowhere, but it is more then just spitballing.

[gocard14]

Now that it's been a few days since a lot of the rumors I had posted, I think we can rule a few things out.  I think the speculation of Kherson troops surrendering imminently rumor being passed around from source to source, with little to it.  It seems likely that was either propaganda, or optimistic speculation.  

Lyman seems to be contested, but not captured by Ukraine, and Kreminna might have battling on the outskirts, but it's likely still held by Russia.  

I think all of Kharkiv Oblast has been liberated, except land East of the Oksil river, which seems to be held by Russia.  

I don't think Ukraine is assaulting Lysychansk or Sievierodonetsk directly.  

Ukraine does not hold Donetsk airport.  


If I had a guess, many people saw the rapid pace of Ukrainian gains, and starting guessing what was next to be the first to report things.

The talk about surrender in Kherson is not idle speculation, it's sourced from ISW

"Spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command, Natalya Humeniuk, stated on Sept. 12 that Russian forces located along the right bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast are attempting to negotiate for surrender under the auspices of international law."

Of course this is coming from the Ukraine side that wants to spread news of imminent surrender for morale reasons, and it is also possible that negotiations began and went nowhere, but it is more then just spitballing.

[dabigv13]

Ukraine is making steady progress in Kherson. There likely have been some Russian surrenders as a part of that. Does not seem to be widespread, but Ukrainian advances do seem to be slightly higher paced in past week. Hopefully the Russians will crumble sooner rather than later. It is only a matter of time now though.

Definitely a lot of rumors flying around that turned out to be false, but Ukraine made them believable with their stunning rout which makes anything seem possible.

[dabigv13]

Ukraine is making steady progress in Kherson. There likely have been some Russian surrenders as a part of that. Does not seem to be widespread, but Ukrainian advances do seem to be slightly higher paced in past week. Hopefully the Russians will crumble sooner rather than later. It is only a matter of time now though.

Definitely a lot of rumors flying around that turned out to be false, but Ukraine made them believable with their stunning rout which makes anything seem possible.

[TrumpCard]

The risk of overextension seemed real anyway. There’s a lot of work for Ukraine to do in the territory it just reclaimed. Set up new lines of defense, clear the remnants of Russian forces in rear areas, de-mine to the extent needed, restore infrastructure, etc. Ukraine seems to have defensible geographic boundaries with the Oskil, SD, and Bakhmutka rivers. Just hunker down in the east for winter. 

If there are gains to be had now, they’re probably in Kherson Oblast, as folks here have said. The south has a warmer climate as well, so there’s more time to advance before cold temps prevail.

[TrumpCard]

The risk of overextension seemed real anyway. There’s a lot of work for Ukraine to do in the territory it just reclaimed. Set up new lines of defense, clear the remnants of Russian forces in rear areas, de-mine to the extent needed, restore infrastructure, etc. Ukraine seems to have defensible geographic boundaries with the Oskil, SD, and Bakhmutka rivers. Just hunker down in the east for winter. 

If there are gains to be had now, they’re probably in Kherson Oblast, as folks here have said. The south has a warmer climate as well, so there’s more time to advance before cold temps prevail.

[Goose]

The talk about surrender in Kherson is not idle speculation, it's sourced from ISW

"Spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command, Natalya Humeniuk, stated on Sept. 12 that Russian forces located along the right bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast are attempting to negotiate for surrender under the auspices of international law."

Of course this is coming from the Ukraine side that wants to spread news of imminent surrender for morale reasons, and it is also possible that negotiations began and went nowhere, but it is more then just spitballing.

The risk of overextension seemed real anyway. There’s a lot of work for Ukraine to do in the territory it just reclaimed. Set up new lines of defense, clear the remnants of Russian forces in rear areas, de-mine to the extent needed, restore infrastructure, etc. Ukraine seems to have defensible geographic boundaries with the Oskil, SD, and Bakhmutka rivers. Just hunker down in the east for winter.

Despite the risk of overextension, I don't think Ukraine is going "on the defensive" in this area. Indeed they will be prudent and place their new territory in a state of defense, but I think they are also going to put as much pressure on Russia in Luhansk as they possibly can. Ukraine isn't going to back off until they absolutely must. There is a real schism opening between the two "independent" states and Russia. The troops from these areas are getting totally destroyed whenever they end up having to fight. Not surprising because they have no training, are not well armed, and have either poor or nonexistent leadership. They also are definitely considered as undesirable by the Russian army. These troops are also not getting paid. To the extent Russia is using these formations to defend anything, there is an opportunity. Ukraine also doesn't want to take the pressure off and allow Russia to redeploy resources from these regions elsewhere.

It is also true that the utility of the Russian passports issued in these areas in coming into question. It is not obvious that you can actually flee to Russia, as the long lines at the border crossings indicate. It is also now not for certain that you won't see Ukrainian troops on your streets "soon". It can give lots of people pause.

If there are gains to be had now, they’re probably in Kherson Oblast, as folks here have said. The south has a warmer climate as well, so there’s more time to advance before cold temps prevail.

Probably this is the case, but keeping things stirred up in the north has advantages. I think it will continue, and during the winter I think long range patrols and Special Forces operations will increase substantially. Ukraine will want to make things just as miserable as possible for the "republics".

Ukraine is making steady progress in Kherson. There likely have been some Russian surrenders as a part of that. Does not seem to be widespread, but Ukrainian advances do seem to be slightly higher paced in past week. Hopefully the Russians will crumble sooner rather than later. It is only a matter of time now though.

I think you are mostly correct. It is certain that Russian outposts have been negotiating surrender terms. While the supply routes to Kherson city still exist, they are very constricted. The supplies flowing to the outposts even when Ukraine is not contesting the routes are undoubtedly even more meager. It is probable some of these outposts realize they are at best looking at starvation and will want to surrender before that happens. This is negotiating surrenders in Kherson, not of Kherson.

It is always wise to remember that in war nothing is inevitable. However, Kherson city is undeniably in a very bad tactical situation. Then again, so was Bastogne. FWIW I think Ukraine really wants to take Nova Kakhovka simultaneously or before it takes Kherson city. Defending Kherson city from a counterattack is orders of magnitude easier if you hold Nova Kakhovka, and visa versa. This also cuts Russian rail communications much more seriously. This is not to say Ukraine would refuse either one if it fell in their lap but I think they will attempt to coordinate these two important objectives. That may allow Kherson to remain Russian longer than otherwise.

It is wise to remember that Russia took Kherson city mostly through the treachery of Ukrainian officials in the area. When one sees how long and effectively Ukraine resisted in other areas it is hard to believe that without that treachery Russia would have ever got to Kherson city on their own. There is a big river in the way. Urkaine could have defended there for a very, very long time. It is also probable that many of the officials in Kherson today are of questionable loyalty to Russia and are negotiating to change sides again. While this isn't the Russian military, treachery in the other direction might have a significant effect.

[Goose]

The talk about surrender in Kherson is not idle speculation, it's sourced from ISW

"Spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command, Natalya Humeniuk, stated on Sept. 12 that Russian forces located along the right bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast are attempting to negotiate for surrender under the auspices of international law."

Of course this is coming from the Ukraine side that wants to spread news of imminent surrender for morale reasons, and it is also possible that negotiations began and went nowhere, but it is more then just spitballing.

The risk of overextension seemed real anyway. There’s a lot of work for Ukraine to do in the territory it just reclaimed. Set up new lines of defense, clear the remnants of Russian forces in rear areas, de-mine to the extent needed, restore infrastructure, etc. Ukraine seems to have defensible geographic boundaries with the Oskil, SD, and Bakhmutka rivers. Just hunker down in the east for winter.

Despite the risk of overextension, I don't think Ukraine is going "on the defensive" in this area. Indeed they will be prudent and place their new territory in a state of defense, but I think they are also going to put as much pressure on Russia in Luhansk as they possibly can. Ukraine isn't going to back off until they absolutely must. There is a real schism opening between the two "independent" states and Russia. The troops from these areas are getting totally destroyed whenever they end up having to fight. Not surprising because they have no training, are not well armed, and have either poor or nonexistent leadership. They also are definitely considered as undesirable by the Russian army. These troops are also not getting paid. To the extent Russia is using these formations to defend anything, there is an opportunity. Ukraine also doesn't want to take the pressure off and allow Russia to redeploy resources from these regions elsewhere.

It is also true that the utility of the Russian passports issued in these areas in coming into question. It is not obvious that you can actually flee to Russia, as the long lines at the border crossings indicate. It is also now not for certain that you won't see Ukrainian troops on your streets "soon". It can give lots of people pause.

If there are gains to be had now, they’re probably in Kherson Oblast, as folks here have said. The south has a warmer climate as well, so there’s more time to advance before cold temps prevail.

Probably this is the case, but keeping things stirred up in the north has advantages. I think it will continue, and during the winter I think long range patrols and Special Forces operations will increase substantially. Ukraine will want to make things just as miserable as possible for the "republics".

Ukraine is making steady progress in Kherson. There likely have been some Russian surrenders as a part of that. Does not seem to be widespread, but Ukrainian advances do seem to be slightly higher paced in past week. Hopefully the Russians will crumble sooner rather than later. It is only a matter of time now though.

I think you are mostly correct. It is certain that Russian outposts have been negotiating surrender terms. While the supply routes to Kherson city still exist, they are very constricted. The supplies flowing to the outposts even when Ukraine is not contesting the routes are undoubtedly even more meager. It is probable some of these outposts realize they are at best looking at starvation and will want to surrender before that happens. This is negotiating surrenders in Kherson, not of Kherson.

It is always wise to remember that in war nothing is inevitable. However, Kherson city is undeniably in a very bad tactical situation. Then again, so was Bastogne. FWIW I think Ukraine really wants to take Nova Kakhovka simultaneously or before it takes Kherson city. Defending Kherson city from a counterattack is orders of magnitude easier if you hold Nova Kakhovka, and visa versa. This also cuts Russian rail communications much more seriously. This is not to say Ukraine would refuse either one if it fell in their lap but I think they will attempt to coordinate these two important objectives. That may allow Kherson to remain Russian longer than otherwise.

It is wise to remember that Russia took Kherson city mostly through the treachery of Ukrainian officials in the area. When one sees how long and effectively Ukraine resisted in other areas it is hard to believe that without that treachery Russia would have ever got to Kherson city on their own. There is a big river in the way. Urkaine could have defended there for a very, very long time. It is also probable that many of the officials in Kherson today are of questionable loyalty to Russia and are negotiating to change sides again. While this isn't the Russian military, treachery in the other direction might have a significant effect.

[Treefence]

The recent rumor, sourced from Russian sources as well, is that Davydiv Brid is now contested. I think this is a key strategic point East of the Inhulets river, and could have a domino effect in the North East Kherson region.  

RE Russia negotiating surrender in Kherson: I hope it's going on, we shall see, but Russia attempted 2 attacks yesterday, so it makes me question it a bit.  That being said, Russia also attacked in two locations north of Kharkiv on September 10th, when the writing was on the wall, so who can tell for sure.

[Treefence]

The recent rumor, sourced from Russian sources as well, is that Davydiv Brid is now contested. I think this is a key strategic point East of the Inhulets river, and could have a domino effect in the North East Kherson region.  

RE Russia negotiating surrender in Kherson: I hope it's going on, we shall see, but Russia attempted 2 attacks yesterday, so it makes me question it a bit.  That being said, Russia also attacked in two locations north of Kharkiv on September 10th, when the writing was on the wall, so who can tell for sure.

[OutsiderFan]

It's not possible to win when your "soldiers" are so undisciplined, easily distracted from whatever the objective is, and frankly stupid. This is no way to win hearts and minds, and only serves to galvanize civilized people against you.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/lesiavasylenko/status/1569739030983593991[/tweet]

[OutsiderFan]

It's not possible to win when your "soldiers" are so undisciplined, easily distracted from whatever the objective is, and frankly stupid. This is no way to win hearts and minds, and only serves to galvanize civilized people against you.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/lesiavasylenko/status/1569739030983593991[/tweet]

[Goose]

The recent rumor, sourced from Russian sources as well, is that Davydiv Brid is now contested. I think this is a key strategic point East of the Inhulets river, and could have a domino effect in the North East Kherson region.

Indeed. It is also on the road to Nova Kakhovka, FWIW. 

RE Russia negotiating surrender in Kherson: I hope it's going on, we shall see, but Russia attempted 2 attacks yesterday, so it makes me question it a bit.  That being said, Russia also attacked in two locations north of Kharkiv on September 10th, when the writing was on the wall, so who can tell for sure.

I wouldn't interpret the attacks as indicative of anything in particular. They could well be spoiling attacks designed to halt or slow the Ukrainian advance. They could also be reconnaissance in force to find a weak spot, which is a Russian sine qua non. If those attacks succeeded it could have an impact, but if they didn't they won't matter. Of course, we probably won't actually know either way :-).

[Goose]

The recent rumor, sourced from Russian sources as well, is that Davydiv Brid is now contested. I think this is a key strategic point East of the Inhulets river, and could have a domino effect in the North East Kherson region.

Indeed. It is also on the road to Nova Kakhovka, FWIW. 

RE Russia negotiating surrender in Kherson: I hope it's going on, we shall see, but Russia attempted 2 attacks yesterday, so it makes me question it a bit.  That being said, Russia also attacked in two locations north of Kharkiv on September 10th, when the writing was on the wall, so who can tell for sure.

I wouldn't interpret the attacks as indicative of anything in particular. They could well be spoiling attacks designed to halt or slow the Ukrainian advance. They could also be reconnaissance in force to find a weak spot, which is a Russian sine qua non. If those attacks succeeded it could have an impact, but if they didn't they won't matter. Of course, we probably won't actually know either way :-).

[BigJohn043]

The talk about surrender in Kherson is not idle speculation, it's sourced from ISW

"Spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command, Natalya Humeniuk, stated on Sept. 12 that Russian forces located along the right bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast are attempting to negotiate for surrender under the auspices of international law."

Of course this is coming from the Ukraine side that wants to spread news of imminent surrender for morale reasons, and it is also possible that negotiations began and went nowhere, but it is more then just spitballing.

The risk of overextension seemed real anyway. There’s a lot of work for Ukraine to do in the territory it just reclaimed. Set up new lines of defense, clear the remnants of Russian forces in rear areas, de-mine to the extent needed, restore infrastructure, etc. Ukraine seems to have defensible geographic boundaries with the Oskil, SD, and Bakhmutka rivers. Just hunker down in the east for winter.

Despite the risk of overextension, I don't think Ukraine is going "on the defensive" in this area. Indeed they will be prudent and place their new territory in a state of defense, but I think they are also going to put as much pressure on Russia in Luhansk as they possibly can. Ukraine isn't going to back off until they absolutely must. There is a real schism opening between the two "independent" states and Russia. The troops from these areas are getting totally destroyed whenever they end up having to fight. Not surprising because they have no training, are not well armed, and have either poor or nonexistent leadership. They also are definitely considered as undesirable by the Russian army. These troops are also not getting paid. To the extent Russia is using these formations to defend anything, there is an opportunity. Ukraine also doesn't want to take the pressure off and allow Russia to redeploy resources from these regions elsewhere.

It is also true that the utility of the Russian passports issued in these areas in coming into question. It is not obvious that you can actually flee to Russia, as the long lines at the border crossings indicate. It is also now not for certain that you won't see Ukrainian troops on your streets "soon". It can give lots of people pause.

If there are gains to be had now, they’re probably in Kherson Oblast, as folks here have said. The south has a warmer climate as well, so there’s more time to advance before cold temps prevail.

Probably this is the case, but keeping things stirred up in the north has advantages. I think it will continue, and during the winter I think long range patrols and Special Forces operations will increase substantially. Ukraine will want to make things just as miserable as possible for the "republics".

Ukraine is making steady progress in Kherson. There likely have been some Russian surrenders as a part of that. Does not seem to be widespread, but Ukrainian advances do seem to be slightly higher paced in past week. Hopefully the Russians will crumble sooner rather than later. It is only a matter of time now though.

I think you are mostly correct. It is certain that Russian outposts have been negotiating surrender terms. While the supply routes to Kherson city still exist, they are very constricted. The supplies flowing to the outposts even when Ukraine is not contesting the routes are undoubtedly even more meager. It is probable some of these outposts realize they are at best looking at starvation and will want to surrender before that happens. This is negotiating surrenders in Kherson, not of Kherson.

It is always wise to remember that in war nothing is inevitable. However, Kherson city is undeniably in a very bad tactical situation. Then again, so was Bastogne. FWIW I think Ukraine really wants to take Nova Kakhovka simultaneously or before it takes Kherson city. Defending Kherson city from a counterattack is orders of magnitude easier if you hold Nova Kakhovka, and visa versa. This also cuts Russian rail communications much more seriously. This is not to say Ukraine would refuse either one if it fell in their lap but I think they will attempt to coordinate these two important objectives. That may allow Kherson to remain Russian longer than otherwise.

It is wise to remember that Russia took Kherson city mostly through the treachery of Ukrainian officials in the area. When one sees how long and effectively Ukraine resisted in other areas it is hard to believe that without that treachery Russia would have ever got to Kherson city on their own. There is a big river in the way. Urkaine could have defended there for a very, very long time. It is also probable that many of the officials in Kherson today are of questionable loyalty to Russia and are negotiating to change sides again. While this isn't the Russian military, treachery in the other direction might have a significant effect.

Bastogne was 7 days.  This is going to be months before winter and even that may not stop the advances.  I am sure the supply situation isn't good, but I can't believe it is as bad as Bastogne.

In any case, as you said above, the tactical situation in Kherson is just brutal.  I also agree with you that retreat is going to be brutal and the political impact will be very bad.  But getting your army destroyed with little left to defend the river seems even worse to me.  The option is trying to defend until winter and hope that at that point he UA slows down and you can retreat seems like a poor strategy to me.

I would be trying to get as much equipment back across that river as I could.  At night.  Whatever.  Then I think you just have to get the soldiers out and leave what is left.  If the soldiers can survive you can probably defend the river.  Certainly during the winter.  Maybe I am wrong but seems like the best plan.

[BigJohn043]

The talk about surrender in Kherson is not idle speculation, it's sourced from ISW

"Spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command, Natalya Humeniuk, stated on Sept. 12 that Russian forces located along the right bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast are attempting to negotiate for surrender under the auspices of international law."

Of course this is coming from the Ukraine side that wants to spread news of imminent surrender for morale reasons, and it is also possible that negotiations began and went nowhere, but it is more then just spitballing.

The risk of overextension seemed real anyway. There’s a lot of work for Ukraine to do in the territory it just reclaimed. Set up new lines of defense, clear the remnants of Russian forces in rear areas, de-mine to the extent needed, restore infrastructure, etc. Ukraine seems to have defensible geographic boundaries with the Oskil, SD, and Bakhmutka rivers. Just hunker down in the east for winter.

Despite the risk of overextension, I don't think Ukraine is going "on the defensive" in this area. Indeed they will be prudent and place their new territory in a state of defense, but I think they are also going to put as much pressure on Russia in Luhansk as they possibly can. Ukraine isn't going to back off until they absolutely must. There is a real schism opening between the two "independent" states and Russia. The troops from these areas are getting totally destroyed whenever they end up having to fight. Not surprising because they have no training, are not well armed, and have either poor or nonexistent leadership. They also are definitely considered as undesirable by the Russian army. These troops are also not getting paid. To the extent Russia is using these formations to defend anything, there is an opportunity. Ukraine also doesn't want to take the pressure off and allow Russia to redeploy resources from these regions elsewhere.

It is also true that the utility of the Russian passports issued in these areas in coming into question. It is not obvious that you can actually flee to Russia, as the long lines at the border crossings indicate. It is also now not for certain that you won't see Ukrainian troops on your streets "soon". It can give lots of people pause.

If there are gains to be had now, they’re probably in Kherson Oblast, as folks here have said. The south has a warmer climate as well, so there’s more time to advance before cold temps prevail.

Probably this is the case, but keeping things stirred up in the north has advantages. I think it will continue, and during the winter I think long range patrols and Special Forces operations will increase substantially. Ukraine will want to make things just as miserable as possible for the "republics".

Ukraine is making steady progress in Kherson. There likely have been some Russian surrenders as a part of that. Does not seem to be widespread, but Ukrainian advances do seem to be slightly higher paced in past week. Hopefully the Russians will crumble sooner rather than later. It is only a matter of time now though.

I think you are mostly correct. It is certain that Russian outposts have been negotiating surrender terms. While the supply routes to Kherson city still exist, they are very constricted. The supplies flowing to the outposts even when Ukraine is not contesting the routes are undoubtedly even more meager. It is probable some of these outposts realize they are at best looking at starvation and will want to surrender before that happens. This is negotiating surrenders in Kherson, not of Kherson.

It is always wise to remember that in war nothing is inevitable. However, Kherson city is undeniably in a very bad tactical situation. Then again, so was Bastogne. FWIW I think Ukraine really wants to take Nova Kakhovka simultaneously or before it takes Kherson city. Defending Kherson city from a counterattack is orders of magnitude easier if you hold Nova Kakhovka, and visa versa. This also cuts Russian rail communications much more seriously. This is not to say Ukraine would refuse either one if it fell in their lap but I think they will attempt to coordinate these two important objectives. That may allow Kherson to remain Russian longer than otherwise.

It is wise to remember that Russia took Kherson city mostly through the treachery of Ukrainian officials in the area. When one sees how long and effectively Ukraine resisted in other areas it is hard to believe that without that treachery Russia would have ever got to Kherson city on their own. There is a big river in the way. Urkaine could have defended there for a very, very long time. It is also probable that many of the officials in Kherson today are of questionable loyalty to Russia and are negotiating to change sides again. While this isn't the Russian military, treachery in the other direction might have a significant effect.

Bastogne was 7 days.  This is going to be months before winter and even that may not stop the advances.  I am sure the supply situation isn't good, but I can't believe it is as bad as Bastogne.

In any case, as you said above, the tactical situation in Kherson is just brutal.  I also agree with you that retreat is going to be brutal and the political impact will be very bad.  But getting your army destroyed with little left to defend the river seems even worse to me.  The option is trying to defend until winter and hope that at that point he UA slows down and you can retreat seems like a poor strategy to me.

I would be trying to get as much equipment back across that river as I could.  At night.  Whatever.  Then I think you just have to get the soldiers out and leave what is left.  If the soldiers can survive you can probably defend the river.  Certainly during the winter.  Maybe I am wrong but seems like the best plan.

[Leftcoast]

Any thoughts on what China makes of this in regards to the future of Taiwan?

On one hand Taiwan is an island nation with an extremely hilly terrain.  Its national capitol is also a tech capitol where any instability could shutdown much of the world's electronics/tech economy (notably including the LARGE chip foundries at TSMC, UMC, #1 and #4 in the world respectively for microchip production **).  I've got to believe that the Chinese Airforce and Military would be fearsome foes especially compared to the anemic Russian performance in Ukraine. Common wisdom holds that China views Taiwan's independent status as a national embarrassment and one where they might willingly take a 10-20 year economic and reputation hit as a viable cost, particularly under the increasingly nationalistic Xi Jinping regime.

There is also a h.uge risk of a super power stand-off with any Taiwan/China war. Island geographies cut both ways. China would almost certainly blockade Taiwan and defend against any arms shipments by sea or by air with deadly force. No simple cross-border transfers of materiel through 3rd party nations. Think about THAT when contemplating US support for Taiwan once hostilities commence.

China must be watching the Ukraine war unfold very, very carefully and taking copious notes on strategy. That makes it even more imperative (if possible) that the world must not waver in making Russia's imperialistic adventure unsuccessful. The economic and political impact of Putin's war with Ukraine would be a mustard seed compared with a Taiwan war.

For those of you who follow Taiwan/China politics - what lessons do you think China is learning from the war in Ukraine? Is Xi more or less likely to consider acting against Taiwan based upon what he's seen over the last 6 months?

===================================

** By one recent estimate Taiwan makes 65% of the worlds semi-conductors and 95% of the "advanced chips". Seems high to me given South Korea's contribution but regardless any shutdown or reduction in supply would be crippling.

[Leftcoast]

Any thoughts on what China makes of this in regards to the future of Taiwan?

On one hand Taiwan is an island nation with an extremely hilly terrain.  Its national capitol is also a tech capitol where any instability could shutdown much of the world's electronics/tech economy (notably including the LARGE chip foundries at TSMC, UMC, #1 and #4 in the world respectively for microchip production **).  I've got to believe that the Chinese Airforce and Military would be fearsome foes especially compared to the anemic Russian performance in Ukraine. Common wisdom holds that China views Taiwan's independent status as a national embarrassment and one where they might willingly take a 10-20 year economic and reputation hit as a viable cost, particularly under the increasingly nationalistic Xi Jinping regime.

There is also a h.uge risk of a super power stand-off with any Taiwan/China war. Island geographies cut both ways. China would almost certainly blockade Taiwan and defend against any arms shipments by sea or by air with deadly force. No simple cross-border transfers of materiel through 3rd party nations. Think about THAT when contemplating US support for Taiwan once hostilities commence.

China must be watching the Ukraine war unfold very, very carefully and taking copious notes on strategy. That makes it even more imperative (if possible) that the world must not waver in making Russia's imperialistic adventure unsuccessful. The economic and political impact of Putin's war with Ukraine would be a mustard seed compared with a Taiwan war.

For those of you who follow Taiwan/China politics - what lessons do you think China is learning from the war in Ukraine? Is Xi more or less likely to consider acting against Taiwan based upon what he's seen over the last 6 months?

===================================

** By one recent estimate Taiwan makes 65% of the worlds semi-conductors and 95% of the "advanced chips". Seems high to me given South Korea's contribution but regardless any shutdown or reduction in supply would be crippling.

[Goose]

Bastogne was 7 days.  This is going to be months before winter and even that may not stop the advances.  I am sure the supply situation isn't good, but I can't believe it is as bad as Bastogne.

You are correct that the supply situation was much worse at Bastogne. Bastogne was cited as an example where the "inevitable" didn't happen. Nobody could have predicted the things that prevented the inevitable. First, the Germans staged 3 uncoordinated attacks instead of one coordinated one. The defenders could defeat them in sequence. They made several serious errors. Second, nobody knew that Patton had early on directed his HQ to make plans to turn the 3rd army 90 degrees to intervene if necessary. Third, 3rd army was able to move much faster than even Patton thought they could. If any one of these hadn't happened, the inevitable would have (or not, who knows?).

In any case, as you said above, the tactical situation in Kherson is just brutal.  I also agree with you that retreat is going to be brutal and the political impact will be very bad.  But getting your army destroyed with little left to defend the river seems even worse to me.  The option is trying to defend until winter and hope that at that point he UA slows down and you can retreat seems like a poor strategy to me.

I would be trying to get as much equipment back across that river as I could.  At night.  Whatever.  Then I think you just have to get the soldiers out and leave what is left.  If the soldiers can survive you can probably defend the river.  Certainly during the winter.  Maybe I am wrong but seems like the best plan.

I think we both agree that Russia has no good choices. IMHO they should just write off everything on the west bank. A retreat won't get anything out unless Ukraine really screws up.

If Russia had a competent force that would fight well and could be relied upon to perform under stress, maybe you could extract something. However, they don't. These days, given drones with IR sensors, artillery works just fine at night. When the Russian troops inside Kherson see equipment being pulled out, they will drop their weapons and run. The Ukrainians can just sit there and kill them. The outposts are an even worse case. If they were reliable, you could tell them "Fight as long as you can to keep the Ukrainians off us. Then you can surrender or try to E&E back across the river. Thanks comrade, go with God". They aren't and as soon as they see withdrawals going on behind them, they will surrender or run. Either way, Ukraine is right on the outskirts of Kherson city almost immediately. Either way Ukraine destroys the troops on the west bank and almost no Ukrainians die. The optics of this would be very bad.

The good thing about staying in place and fighting it out is that Russia could inflict significant casualties on Ukraine. Yes, they lose all those troops, but they will either way. It may be that the supply situation is bad enough Russia can't hold out very long in Kherson and they end up just surrendering, but it does put the onus on Ukraine to decide when/if they attack. Ukraine may screw up the attack. Ukraine may simply chose to wait the Russians out in order to minimize their casualties. This gives Russia a chance to mount a relief force that drives Ukraine out of artillery range. That may not happen, but it is at least possible. It also is possible the weather prevents Ukraine from wiping them out. Not probable, but at least possible.

For Russia, the good news is that they did transfer lots of troops to Kherson Oblast that they didn't send across the river. Is it enough to defend the east bank of the river? I think so, at least for a month or so if they don't run. Obviously this is a wild guess. However, their state of mind and leadership is unknown.

---

https://www.yahoo.com/news/critical-mome...48896.html
Interesting. Some of it I take with a large grain of salt, but most of it looks "right". In particular, the idea that the offensive in the south was "disinformation" or a feint is debunked. Ukraine took advantage of the fact they could present Russia with a Hobson's choice. If they don't reinforce in the south, they lose Kherson. If they do, they create other vulnerabilities. Very smart by Ukraine. That situation still persists. If Russia doesn't have assets to send north, things there will continue to deteriorate. Putin is undoubtedly praying for snow to at least give him time.

[Goose]

Bastogne was 7 days.  This is going to be months before winter and even that may not stop the advances.  I am sure the supply situation isn't good, but I can't believe it is as bad as Bastogne.

You are correct that the supply situation was much worse at Bastogne. Bastogne was cited as an example where the "inevitable" didn't happen. Nobody could have predicted the things that prevented the inevitable. First, the Germans staged 3 uncoordinated attacks instead of one coordinated one. The defenders could defeat them in sequence. They made several serious errors. Second, nobody knew that Patton had early on directed his HQ to make plans to turn the 3rd army 90 degrees to intervene if necessary. Third, 3rd army was able to move much faster than even Patton thought they could. If any one of these hadn't happened, the inevitable would have (or not, who knows?).

In any case, as you said above, the tactical situation in Kherson is just brutal.  I also agree with you that retreat is going to be brutal and the political impact will be very bad.  But getting your army destroyed with little left to defend the river seems even worse to me.  The option is trying to defend until winter and hope that at that point he UA slows down and you can retreat seems like a poor strategy to me.

I would be trying to get as much equipment back across that river as I could.  At night.  Whatever.  Then I think you just have to get the soldiers out and leave what is left.  If the soldiers can survive you can probably defend the river.  Certainly during the winter.  Maybe I am wrong but seems like the best plan.

I think we both agree that Russia has no good choices. IMHO they should just write off everything on the west bank. A retreat won't get anything out unless Ukraine really screws up.

If Russia had a competent force that would fight well and could be relied upon to perform under stress, maybe you could extract something. However, they don't. These days, given drones with IR sensors, artillery works just fine at night. When the Russian troops inside Kherson see equipment being pulled out, they will drop their weapons and run. The Ukrainians can just sit there and kill them. The outposts are an even worse case. If they were reliable, you could tell them "Fight as long as you can to keep the Ukrainians off us. Then you can surrender or try to E&E back across the river. Thanks comrade, go with God". They aren't and as soon as they see withdrawals going on behind them, they will surrender or run. Either way, Ukraine is right on the outskirts of Kherson city almost immediately. Either way Ukraine destroys the troops on the west bank and almost no Ukrainians die. The optics of this would be very bad.

The good thing about staying in place and fighting it out is that Russia could inflict significant casualties on Ukraine. Yes, they lose all those troops, but they will either way. It may be that the supply situation is bad enough Russia can't hold out very long in Kherson and they end up just surrendering, but it does put the onus on Ukraine to decide when/if they attack. Ukraine may screw up the attack. Ukraine may simply chose to wait the Russians out in order to minimize their casualties. This gives Russia a chance to mount a relief force that drives Ukraine out of artillery range. That may not happen, but it is at least possible. It also is possible the weather prevents Ukraine from wiping them out. Not probable, but at least possible.

For Russia, the good news is that they did transfer lots of troops to Kherson Oblast that they didn't send across the river. Is it enough to defend the east bank of the river? I think so, at least for a month or so if they don't run. Obviously this is a wild guess. However, their state of mind and leadership is unknown.

---

https://www.yahoo.com/news/critical-mome...48896.html
Interesting. Some of it I take with a large grain of salt, but most of it looks "right". In particular, the idea that the offensive in the south was "disinformation" or a feint is debunked. Ukraine took advantage of the fact they could present Russia with a Hobson's choice. If they don't reinforce in the south, they lose Kherson. If they do, they create other vulnerabilities. Very smart by Ukraine. That situation still persists. If Russia doesn't have assets to send north, things there will continue to deteriorate. Putin is undoubtedly praying for snow to at least give him time.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-withdr...00465.html
Looks like one of the "outposts" decided to pull itself in. It appears that the units from the "republics" don't want to fight and the "regular" Russian military doesn't trust them (apparently with good reason). This puts an even bigger hole in Russian manpower.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-withdr...00465.html
Looks like one of the "outposts" decided to pull itself in. It appears that the units from the "republics" don't want to fight and the "regular" Russian military doesn't trust them (apparently with good reason). This puts an even bigger hole in Russian manpower.

[BostonCard]

Interesting, this morning on NPR’s “up first” podcast they suggested that it was a deliberate feint.

https://overcast.fm/+Ys-uiORt

I think your “Hobson’s Choice” makes more sense.  If Russia didn’t move troops to reinforce Kherson, they would have pushed much faster/harder down there.

Question for Goose: Nova Kakhovka is on the East bank of the Dnieper.  Do you think the Ukrainians will be able to cross?

Also, in terms of offensives, will be tougher in the winter or in the fall?  What I read is that there are two Rasputitsa’s (aka mud seasons), one in the fall due to rain and one in the spring due to snow melt.  My understanding is that aside from the risk of cold/exposure, armored fighting is easier in the winter, when the ground is solid.  And also, would retreating across the Dniper be possible in the winter when the river will be frozen?

BC

[BostonCard]

Interesting, this morning on NPR’s “up first” podcast they suggested that it was a deliberate feint.

https://overcast.fm/+Ys-uiORt

I think your “Hobson’s Choice” makes more sense.  If Russia didn’t move troops to reinforce Kherson, they would have pushed much faster/harder down there.

Question for Goose: Nova Kakhovka is on the East bank of the Dnieper.  Do you think the Ukrainians will be able to cross?

Also, in terms of offensives, will be tougher in the winter or in the fall?  What I read is that there are two Rasputitsa’s (aka mud seasons), one in the fall due to rain and one in the spring due to snow melt.  My understanding is that aside from the risk of cold/exposure, armored fighting is easier in the winter, when the ground is solid.  And also, would retreating across the Dniper be possible in the winter when the river will be frozen?

BC

[Goose]

Interesting, this morning on NPR’s “up first” podcast they suggested that it was a deliberate feint.

https://overcast.fm/+Ys-uiORt

I think your “Hobson’s Choice” makes more sense.  If Russia didn’t move troops to reinforce Kherson, they would have pushed much faster/harder down there.

Question for Goose: Nova Kakhovka is on the East bank of the Dnieper.  Do you think the Ukrainians will be able to cross?

Uncertain, but the dam makes it lots easier. It is unlikely Russia would blow the dam even if they could. It is also possible to cross infantry on small boats above the dam if you have artillery that can easily reach the east side. I think it likely Ukraine will attempt such a crossing if they get there. OTOH, it is only necessary that they hold the west bank of the Dnieper. The goal is to prevent the Russians from attacking down the M14 to Kherson (or visa versa). Russia would then have the job of an opposed river crossing. Obviously, controlling both sides of the river is the safest. It also threatens an attack down the M14 into Kherson Oblast proper, another good thing.

Also, in terms of offensives, will be tougher in the winter or in the fall?  What I read is that there are two Rasputitsa’s (aka mud seasons), one in the fall due to rain and one in the spring due to snow melt.  My understanding is that aside from the risk of cold/exposure, armored fighting is easier in the winter, when the ground is solid.

The rain can turn the ground into a quagmire. This confines any possible offensives to the roads, and even then it is difficult. When the ground freezes, this removes the constraint. However, in a true combined arms operation you need infantry. The temperatures make infantry operating in the open very prone to frostbite etc. It is hard to fight in the winter, but you can do it. Normally, one would say you need training to do so, but possibly some Ukrainian infantry has already gone through one or more winters fighting in Donbas. They may know how to do it. However, "conventional wisdom" is that the pace of operations in winter will be much slower.   Air support for both sides will be even harder to get because of horrible flying weather.

And also, would retreating across the Dniper be possible in the winter when the river will be frozen?

Yes, absolutely. If Russia can hold on that long they will get a bridge many km wide. However, from
http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/dis...oRiver.htm

In winter the Dnipro freezes over, usually after a 20-day spell of subzero temperature. The average freezing and thawing dates for Kyiv are 17 December and 24 March; for Cherkasy, 23 December and 22 March; for Zaporizhia, 5 January and 9 March; for Kherson, 3 January and 3 March. The ice regime is not stable: sometimes the Dnipro freezes for short intervals, and sometimes it does not freeze at all.

It is also necessary to ensure the river ice is thick enough to support heavy equipment if you are trying to move it that way. IMHO the Russians can't last until January in Kherson baring some very unexpected event. However, I am sure Ukraine would much prefer to get them out before the bad weather starts. Conventional wisdom says they have until sometime in October. Not much time really.

[Goose]

Interesting, this morning on NPR’s “up first” podcast they suggested that it was a deliberate feint.

https://overcast.fm/+Ys-uiORt

I think your “Hobson’s Choice” makes more sense.  If Russia didn’t move troops to reinforce Kherson, they would have pushed much faster/harder down there.

Question for Goose: Nova Kakhovka is on the East bank of the Dnieper.  Do you think the Ukrainians will be able to cross?

Uncertain, but the dam makes it lots easier. It is unlikely Russia would blow the dam even if they could. It is also possible to cross infantry on small boats above the dam if you have artillery that can easily reach the east side. I think it likely Ukraine will attempt such a crossing if they get there. OTOH, it is only necessary that they hold the west bank of the Dnieper. The goal is to prevent the Russians from attacking down the M14 to Kherson (or visa versa). Russia would then have the job of an opposed river crossing. Obviously, controlling both sides of the river is the safest. It also threatens an attack down the M14 into Kherson Oblast proper, another good thing.

Also, in terms of offensives, will be tougher in the winter or in the fall?  What I read is that there are two Rasputitsa’s (aka mud seasons), one in the fall due to rain and one in the spring due to snow melt.  My understanding is that aside from the risk of cold/exposure, armored fighting is easier in the winter, when the ground is solid.

The rain can turn the ground into a quagmire. This confines any possible offensives to the roads, and even then it is difficult. When the ground freezes, this removes the constraint. However, in a true combined arms operation you need infantry. The temperatures make infantry operating in the open very prone to frostbite etc. It is hard to fight in the winter, but you can do it. Normally, one would say you need training to do so, but possibly some Ukrainian infantry has already gone through one or more winters fighting in Donbas. They may know how to do it. However, "conventional wisdom" is that the pace of operations in winter will be much slower.   Air support for both sides will be even harder to get because of horrible flying weather.

And also, would retreating across the Dniper be possible in the winter when the river will be frozen?

Yes, absolutely. If Russia can hold on that long they will get a bridge many km wide. However, from
http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/dis...oRiver.htm

In winter the Dnipro freezes over, usually after a 20-day spell of subzero temperature. The average freezing and thawing dates for Kyiv are 17 December and 24 March; for Cherkasy, 23 December and 22 March; for Zaporizhia, 5 January and 9 March; for Kherson, 3 January and 3 March. The ice regime is not stable: sometimes the Dnipro freezes for short intervals, and sometimes it does not freeze at all.

It is also necessary to ensure the river ice is thick enough to support heavy equipment if you are trying to move it that way. IMHO the Russians can't last until January in Kherson baring some very unexpected event. However, I am sure Ukraine would much prefer to get them out before the bad weather starts. Conventional wisdom says they have until sometime in October. Not much time really.

[BostonCard]

Thanks, you also answered my follow-up question, which was going to be whether the river freezes solidly enough for heavy equipment to go across.  I’d love to see the Russians try, only for some big ole tank to break through the ice and get stuck.

BC

[BostonCard]

Thanks, you also answered my follow-up question, which was going to be whether the river freezes solidly enough for heavy equipment to go across.  I’d love to see the Russians try, only for some big ole tank to break through the ice and get stuck.

BC

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-state-...16407.html
The scapegoating begins. There have been several similar accusations in the last few days. While I don't expect this particular surge to have results, it does remind the "generals" that Putin isn't going to accept any blame he can send their way. It is a warning. However, this and similar warning may backfire, convincing the upper levels of the FSB that Putin has to go to "ensure the security of the state".

UPDATE:
https://www.yahoo.com/news/putin-seeks-a...00413.html
No question the path to blaming the generals has been chosen. Sooner than I thought. For some reason I don't think they are just going to sit there and take it. Further, I think the FSB will see that conflict at the top is not what Russia needs right now. Perhaps I am being over-optimistic, but it is in keeping with Russian history that "third parties" actually decide when a change at the top happens, not the people or the army.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-state-...16407.html
The scapegoating begins. There have been several similar accusations in the last few days. While I don't expect this particular surge to have results, it does remind the "generals" that Putin isn't going to accept any blame he can send their way. It is a warning. However, this and similar warning may backfire, convincing the upper levels of the FSB that Putin has to go to "ensure the security of the state".

UPDATE:
https://www.yahoo.com/news/putin-seeks-a...00413.html
No question the path to blaming the generals has been chosen. Sooner than I thought. For some reason I don't think they are just going to sit there and take it. Further, I think the FSB will see that conflict at the top is not what Russia needs right now. Perhaps I am being over-optimistic, but it is in keeping with Russian history that "third parties" actually decide when a change at the top happens, not the people or the army.

[dabigv13]

Another great article from Jack Watling, I think the best analyst of the Ukraine conflict.

This is on the unlikely prospect of regime change in Russia. The persistence of Saddam's reign in spite of losing the Iran-Iraq war an interesting precedent.

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/pu...ble-russia

[dabigv13]

Another great article from Jack Watling, I think the best analyst of the Ukraine conflict.

This is on the unlikely prospect of regime change in Russia. The persistence of Saddam's reign in spite of losing the Iran-Iraq war an interesting precedent.

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/pu...ble-russia

[Treefence]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-withdr...00465.html
Looks like one of the "outposts" decided to pull itself in. It appears that the units from the "republics" don't want to fight and the "regular" Russian military doesn't trust them (apparently with good reason). This puts an even bigger hole in Russian manpower.

I'm seeing reports Ukraine took this town, Kiselevka, from some of the minor reporters.  Nothing confirmed, but officials for Ukraine have given limited information on towns, and usually wait a while to announce captured settlements.   I don't think this town holds significant importance, except it is closer to Kherson proper, but progress is good to see.  The two key towns I believe are Snihurivka west of the inhulets, and Davydiv Brid east of the inhulets. If Ukraine takes those, then it's game on.

---

UPDATE:
https://www.yahoo.com/news/putin-seeks-a...00413.html
No question the path to blaming the generals has been chosen. Sooner than I thought. For some reason I don't think they are just going to sit there and take it. Further, I think the FSB will see that conflict at the top is not what Russia needs right now. Perhaps I am being over-optimistic, but it is in keeping with Russian history that "third parties" actually decide when a change at the top happens, not the people or the army.

I really hope so, Goose, so much suffering could end almost immediately if it were so. Ukraine deserves victory, and Russia needs a new leader.

---

Goose, probably a crazy question for you, but here it goes:

What if Ukraine tried to storm Kherson?  They are potentially less than 15 kilometers away from the city.  I'm sure it is fortified but Russia has shown an aversion to urban combat.  If you were able to launch an offensive towards the city, you might have the ability to mostly cut logistics to the troops north east of the city, without having to pierce the rest of their defensive lines.

[Treefence]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-withdr...00465.html
Looks like one of the "outposts" decided to pull itself in. It appears that the units from the "republics" don't want to fight and the "regular" Russian military doesn't trust them (apparently with good reason). This puts an even bigger hole in Russian manpower.

I'm seeing reports Ukraine took this town, Kiselevka, from some of the minor reporters.  Nothing confirmed, but officials for Ukraine have given limited information on towns, and usually wait a while to announce captured settlements.   I don't think this town holds significant importance, except it is closer to Kherson proper, but progress is good to see.  The two key towns I believe are Snihurivka west of the inhulets, and Davydiv Brid east of the inhulets. If Ukraine takes those, then it's game on.

---

UPDATE:
https://www.yahoo.com/news/putin-seeks-a...00413.html
No question the path to blaming the generals has been chosen. Sooner than I thought. For some reason I don't think they are just going to sit there and take it. Further, I think the FSB will see that conflict at the top is not what Russia needs right now. Perhaps I am being over-optimistic, but it is in keeping with Russian history that "third parties" actually decide when a change at the top happens, not the people or the army.

I really hope so, Goose, so much suffering could end almost immediately if it were so. Ukraine deserves victory, and Russia needs a new leader.

---

Goose, probably a crazy question for you, but here it goes:

What if Ukraine tried to storm Kherson?  They are potentially less than 15 kilometers away from the city.  I'm sure it is fortified but Russia has shown an aversion to urban combat.  If you were able to launch an offensive towards the city, you might have the ability to mostly cut logistics to the troops north east of the city, without having to pierce the rest of their defensive lines.

[Goose]

Another great article from Jack Watling, I think the best analyst of the Ukraine conflict.

This is on the unlikely prospect of regime change in Russia. The persistence of Saddam's reign in spite of losing the Iran-Iraq war an interesting precedent.

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/pu...ble-russia

I like Jack Watling too. While this article does talk about the idea of regime change in Russia as being "unlikely", the article is also suggesting that the west needs to be prepared for several different possible scenarios. I agree with that. Chaos theory applies to war in general and wars involving Russia in spades. "Insignificant" events can suddenly change everything for reasons that analysts subsequently take years dissecting.

My expectation is still that none of what Dr. Watling discusses will be what removes Putin, unless one describes actions by the FSB as a "palace coup". I don't, because they are not really part of "the government". They are a separate state that is loyal only to itself and it's "principles". Putin came from there but he is now, and has been for a long time, outside the tent. The FSB can cause the replacement of the head of state without "regime change". They have many levers of power they can throw (or refuse to throw) that can replace Putin with somebody they believe will get Russia back on the rails. It certainly wouldn't be the first time. The name changes but the organization remains.

The FSB is the only nationwide organization in Russia that is not subject to coercion by anybody else and is not penetrated by the FSB. They are also capable of compartmentalizing things so that Putin will not be aware of them. FSB staff are used to following orders from above that they do not fully understand the reasons for. They are indeed the "Deep State", and they can make things happen in ways nobody else can.

There are some other authors that have written in more detail  than Dr. Watling did here drawing parallels between Saddam's survival and Putin's. FWIW I think the history of the two nations, the makeup of the populace, and the social organization of the two countries are so different this is an impossible simile. Yes, they both might survive, but the mechanics of how the did/do it are of necessity very different.

UPDATE:
https://www.yahoo.com/news/world-must-re...00396.html
Another suggestion to be prepared for unexpected results.

[Goose]

Another great article from Jack Watling, I think the best analyst of the Ukraine conflict.

This is on the unlikely prospect of regime change in Russia. The persistence of Saddam's reign in spite of losing the Iran-Iraq war an interesting precedent.

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/pu...ble-russia

I like Jack Watling too. While this article does talk about the idea of regime change in Russia as being "unlikely", the article is also suggesting that the west needs to be prepared for several different possible scenarios. I agree with that. Chaos theory applies to war in general and wars involving Russia in spades. "Insignificant" events can suddenly change everything for reasons that analysts subsequently take years dissecting.

My expectation is still that none of what Dr. Watling discusses will be what removes Putin, unless one describes actions by the FSB as a "palace coup". I don't, because they are not really part of "the government". They are a separate state that is loyal only to itself and it's "principles". Putin came from there but he is now, and has been for a long time, outside the tent. The FSB can cause the replacement of the head of state without "regime change". They have many levers of power they can throw (or refuse to throw) that can replace Putin with somebody they believe will get Russia back on the rails. It certainly wouldn't be the first time. The name changes but the organization remains.

The FSB is the only nationwide organization in Russia that is not subject to coercion by anybody else and is not penetrated by the FSB. They are also capable of compartmentalizing things so that Putin will not be aware of them. FSB staff are used to following orders from above that they do not fully understand the reasons for. They are indeed the "Deep State", and they can make things happen in ways nobody else can.

There are some other authors that have written in more detail  than Dr. Watling did here drawing parallels between Saddam's survival and Putin's. FWIW I think the history of the two nations, the makeup of the populace, and the social organization of the two countries are so different this is an impossible simile. Yes, they both might survive, but the mechanics of how the did/do it are of necessity very different.

UPDATE:
https://www.yahoo.com/news/world-must-re...00396.html
Another suggestion to be prepared for unexpected results.

[TrumpCard]

I'm seeing reports Ukraine took this town, Kiselevka, from some of the minor reporters.  Nothing confirmed, but officials for Ukraine have given limited information on towns, and usually wait a while to announce captured settlements.   I don't think this town holds significant importance, except it is closer to Kherson proper, but progress is good to see.  The two key towns I believe are Snihurivka west of the inhulets, and Davydiv Brid east of the inhulets. If Ukraine takes those, then it's game on.

I have seen plenty of speculation about Ukraine gaining this town or that, but nothing remotely solid.  Sources like ISW that are firmly pro-Ukraine are not reporting Ukraine taking any new territory on that front.  

Another online source, who generally is very pro-Ukraine as speculates favorably for that side, seems to indicate that Ukraine's progress on the Kherson front is minimial and could be reversed, and that Russia is now establishing more defensive lines on the Eastern front.  The tweet below is part of a update thread that overall seems like fine for Ukraine but does not include any exciting new developments.

https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1570104670902972416

[TrumpCard]

I'm seeing reports Ukraine took this town, Kiselevka, from some of the minor reporters.  Nothing confirmed, but officials for Ukraine have given limited information on towns, and usually wait a while to announce captured settlements.   I don't think this town holds significant importance, except it is closer to Kherson proper, but progress is good to see.  The two key towns I believe are Snihurivka west of the inhulets, and Davydiv Brid east of the inhulets. If Ukraine takes those, then it's game on.

I have seen plenty of speculation about Ukraine gaining this town or that, but nothing remotely solid.  Sources like ISW that are firmly pro-Ukraine are not reporting Ukraine taking any new territory on that front.  

Another online source, who generally is very pro-Ukraine as speculates favorably for that side, seems to indicate that Ukraine's progress on the Kherson front is minimial and could be reversed, and that Russia is now establishing more defensive lines on the Eastern front.  The tweet below is part of a update thread that overall seems like fine for Ukraine but does not include any exciting new developments.

https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1570104670902972416

[Treefence]

I saw the same, and also saw Defmon with the same tweet, so we will have to wait and see.  I saw some follow up people saying they doubted the update, so it might be nothing.

[Treefence]

I saw the same, and also saw Defmon with the same tweet, so we will have to wait and see.  I saw some follow up people saying they doubted the update, so it might be nothing.