[Goose]

For those of you interested in the evasion of oil sanctions:
https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-contin...00891.html

As can be seen no "technology" is required. The press knows about this. Ships flying EU flags are involved. The US has drones in this area all the time. We know which ships are cheating. If the EU was actually serious, their Customs could bust these ships on arrival. The composition of crude oil is pretty area specific. In addition to drone videos they could just analyze the oil and prove it was Russian. The US is not twisting enough arms.

These ships could also be stopped in the Black Sea and impounded if there was a navy/coast guard that was able and willing to do it. Ukraine and Romania are not able. Turkey is not willing. Not much we can do about that.

[Goose]

For those of you interested in the evasion of oil sanctions:
https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-contin...00891.html

As can be seen no "technology" is required. The press knows about this. Ships flying EU flags are involved. The US has drones in this area all the time. We know which ships are cheating. If the EU was actually serious, their Customs could bust these ships on arrival. The composition of crude oil is pretty area specific. In addition to drone videos they could just analyze the oil and prove it was Russian. The US is not twisting enough arms.

These ships could also be stopped in the Black Sea and impounded if there was a navy/coast guard that was able and willing to do it. Ukraine and Romania are not able. Turkey is not willing. Not much we can do about that.

[BostonCard]

Looks like Russian milbloggers have confirmed that Ukraine has captured Kupyansk and Izium!!!  ADD: Looks like Lyman has also been taken.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1568502187835404289?s=46&t=x1b0GrTuZnQNWY7_3qV-aw[/tweet]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/ralee85/status/1568502706557296641?s=46&t=x1b0GrTuZnQNWY7_3qV-aw[/tweet]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/ralee85/status/1568544126831927296?s=46&t=x1b0GrTuZnQNWY7_3qV-aw[/tweet]

(Despite the video I posted yesterday being a fake, it turns out the underlying message: Ukrainians we’re making a move on Lyman was accurate).

BC

---

Nice summary, with confirmation at the bottom that Kupyansk has been taken by Ukrainian forces.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/maria_drutska/status/1568354385113096205?s=46&t=x1b0GrTuZnQNWY7_3qV-aw[/tweet]

BC

[BostonCard]

Looks like Russian milbloggers have confirmed that Ukraine has captured Kupyansk and Izium!!!  ADD: Looks like Lyman has also been taken.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1568502187835404289?s=46&t=x1b0GrTuZnQNWY7_3qV-aw[/tweet]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/ralee85/status/1568502706557296641?s=46&t=x1b0GrTuZnQNWY7_3qV-aw[/tweet]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/ralee85/status/1568544126831927296?s=46&t=x1b0GrTuZnQNWY7_3qV-aw[/tweet]

(Despite the video I posted yesterday being a fake, it turns out the underlying message: Ukrainians we’re making a move on Lyman was accurate).

BC

---

Nice summary, with confirmation at the bottom that Kupyansk has been taken by Ukrainian forces.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/maria_drutska/status/1568354385113096205?s=46&t=x1b0GrTuZnQNWY7_3qV-aw[/tweet]

BC

[BostonCard]

This one is also for goose:

[tweet]https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1568524159675781120?s=46&t=x1b0GrTuZnQNWY7_3qV-aw[/tweet]

Note the comment about effective counter-battery fire (second paragraph).

BC

[BostonCard]

This one is also for goose:

[tweet]https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1568524159675781120?s=46&t=x1b0GrTuZnQNWY7_3qV-aw[/tweet]

Note the comment about effective counter-battery fire (second paragraph).

BC

[BostonCard]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/loogunda/status/1568534720559865857?s=46&t=x1b0GrTuZnQNWY7_3qV-aw[/tweet]

I’d take this one with a grain of salt.  But at the pace that news of Ukrainian advances has been coming, it’s not completely out of the question.  Note, I’m not sure if this refers to the city of Donetsk, which has been in the hands of the DNR separatists since the 2014 war, or Severodonetsk, which is on the other side of the Donetsk river from Lyshsyshank, and was the big prize of the Russian offensive in the summer.

Already this is looking like a complete collapse of the Russian front.  It suggests that the Russian line was a mile wide (well, several hundred miles wide) and about an inch deep.  It’s hard to believe, but then again, if reports of 50,000 Russian casualties are correct, then, maybe.  ~50,000 dead (if the data from the Russian treasury is accurate) implies at least 150,000 wounded (would be more than that but for Russian disregard for the lives of their own soldiers and crappy military evacuation). Their initial invading force was ~100,000 with maybe 50,000 in reserve plus you figure a bunch of LNR and DNR conscripts, plus the newly recruited and poorly trained “volunteers” so no way of knowing its total force but it is perhaps consistent with reports that Russian BTG’s were operating at <50%.  Military doctrine states that this is well beyond the threshold where fighting force struggles with cohesion.

I don’t want to get ahead of myself here. The success of the Ukrainian advance has exceeded even the most optimistic projections, but it is a long way from over.  Russian forces will regroup, and as Ukraine pushes towards the East, Russian supply lines are less stretched, Russian forces are more entrenched, the local population is more pro-Russian, and it will become tougher. That being said, I have consistently underestimated the Ukrainians and overestimated the Russians (because the Russian army really can’t be *that* bad, right?). I keep thinking they will get their act together.  But until they do, it is great to see what the Ukrainians have done.

BC

---

Here’s the full translation of that Russian telegram:

[tweet]https://twitter.com/intelarrow/status/1568532954397171712?s=46&t=x1b0GrTuZnQNWY7_3qV-aw[/tweet]

And from the translation, if true, it appears that Ukrainians are at the doorstep of the city of Donetsk, which they lost back in 2014.

BC

[BostonCard]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/loogunda/status/1568534720559865857?s=46&t=x1b0GrTuZnQNWY7_3qV-aw[/tweet]

I’d take this one with a grain of salt.  But at the pace that news of Ukrainian advances has been coming, it’s not completely out of the question.  Note, I’m not sure if this refers to the city of Donetsk, which has been in the hands of the DNR separatists since the 2014 war, or Severodonetsk, which is on the other side of the Donetsk river from Lyshsyshank, and was the big prize of the Russian offensive in the summer.

Already this is looking like a complete collapse of the Russian front.  It suggests that the Russian line was a mile wide (well, several hundred miles wide) and about an inch deep.  It’s hard to believe, but then again, if reports of 50,000 Russian casualties are correct, then, maybe.  ~50,000 dead (if the data from the Russian treasury is accurate) implies at least 150,000 wounded (would be more than that but for Russian disregard for the lives of their own soldiers and crappy military evacuation). Their initial invading force was ~100,000 with maybe 50,000 in reserve plus you figure a bunch of LNR and DNR conscripts, plus the newly recruited and poorly trained “volunteers” so no way of knowing its total force but it is perhaps consistent with reports that Russian BTG’s were operating at <50%.  Military doctrine states that this is well beyond the threshold where fighting force struggles with cohesion.

I don’t want to get ahead of myself here. The success of the Ukrainian advance has exceeded even the most optimistic projections, but it is a long way from over.  Russian forces will regroup, and as Ukraine pushes towards the East, Russian supply lines are less stretched, Russian forces are more entrenched, the local population is more pro-Russian, and it will become tougher. That being said, I have consistently underestimated the Ukrainians and overestimated the Russians (because the Russian army really can’t be *that* bad, right?). I keep thinking they will get their act together.  But until they do, it is great to see what the Ukrainians have done.

BC

---

Here’s the full translation of that Russian telegram:

[tweet]https://twitter.com/intelarrow/status/1568532954397171712?s=46&t=x1b0GrTuZnQNWY7_3qV-aw[/tweet]

And from the translation, if true, it appears that Ukrainians are at the doorstep of the city of Donetsk, which they lost back in 2014.

BC

[OutsiderFan]

It's now clear this conflict ends with Russia completely out of Ukraine, including Crimea. The only question is how fast it happens, how much money and lives are lost getting to this point, and in Putin's case, how much his political power is weakened as it all unfolds.

Is it better for Putin to voluntarily withdraw from pre-2014 Ukrainian territory sooner, to preserve some of his military, or to have Ukraine defeat and force Russian surrender? The closer Ukraine gets to victory the more support it will get from its allies, further accelerating Russia's demise in Ukraine.

What is Russia's best move? What is its most likely move as its defeat in Ukraine becomes inevitable?

People need to stop referring to Ukraine taking its own territory back as "falling."  Izyum did not "fall" as much as it was liberated from occupying forces.

[OutsiderFan]

It's now clear this conflict ends with Russia completely out of Ukraine, including Crimea. The only question is how fast it happens, how much money and lives are lost getting to this point, and in Putin's case, how much his political power is weakened as it all unfolds.

Is it better for Putin to voluntarily withdraw from pre-2014 Ukrainian territory sooner, to preserve some of his military, or to have Ukraine defeat and force Russian surrender? The closer Ukraine gets to victory the more support it will get from its allies, further accelerating Russia's demise in Ukraine.

What is Russia's best move? What is its most likely move as its defeat in Ukraine becomes inevitable?

People need to stop referring to Ukraine taking its own territory back as "falling."  Izyum did not "fall" as much as it was liberated from occupying forces.

[Treefence]

Are Ukrainians really about to attack on all fronts?  This is nuts! Is it possible that Ukraine can sustain this?  A couple weeks ago all we were thinking about is maintaining lines and the hope of a future counter offensive, but now Russians are fleeing Izyum and other major areas, and reports of Ukrainians taking back the Donetsk airport and beginning an assault Lysychansk. Reports are Ukraine is making gains in the Kherson region as well, but who knows.  How can Putin stay in power after this?

[Treefence]

Are Ukrainians really about to attack on all fronts?  This is nuts! Is it possible that Ukraine can sustain this?  A couple weeks ago all we were thinking about is maintaining lines and the hope of a future counter offensive, but now Russians are fleeing Izyum and other major areas, and reports of Ukrainians taking back the Donetsk airport and beginning an assault Lysychansk. Reports are Ukraine is making gains in the Kherson region as well, but who knows.  How can Putin stay in power after this?

[OutsiderFan]

This is the kind of high level strategic discussion I was looking to engage folks here about. 

[tweet]https://twitter.com/RealCynicalFox/status/1568511739721056258[/tweet]

[OutsiderFan]

This is the kind of high level strategic discussion I was looking to engage folks here about. 

[tweet]https://twitter.com/RealCynicalFox/status/1568511739721056258[/tweet]

[dabigv13]

Putin must be feeling like this guy today.

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1568595664711593984?s=20&t=NxW4dXaNkzORSLkhdnb28g[/tweet]

[dabigv13]

Putin must be feeling like this guy today.

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1568595664711593984?s=20&t=NxW4dXaNkzORSLkhdnb28g[/tweet]

[BostonCard]

This take looks very good in retrospect.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/ralee85/status/1568610879046037507?s=21&t=0DxGmeE2HShYGUFP2XbGOg[/tweet]

A number of people made similar posts, including on this thread, but it was hard, at the time, to distinguish between a rational assessment and wishful thinking.  Glad it turned out to be right.

BC

[BostonCard]

This take looks very good in retrospect.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/ralee85/status/1568610879046037507?s=21&t=0DxGmeE2HShYGUFP2XbGOg[/tweet]

A number of people made similar posts, including on this thread, but it was hard, at the time, to distinguish between a rational assessment and wishful thinking.  Glad it turned out to be right.

BC

[dabigv13]

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/Faytuks/status/1568605699222999043?s=20&t=FBjhCLRMd_WxPtLeRGhASg[/tweet]

A stunning collapse. This is near the border with Russia east/northeast of Kharkiv. Press on to Belgorod!

[dabigv13]

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/Faytuks/status/1568605699222999043?s=20&t=FBjhCLRMd_WxPtLeRGhASg[/tweet]

A stunning collapse. This is near the border with Russia east/northeast of Kharkiv. Press on to Belgorod!

[BostonCard]

By the way, the following are “trending” on Twitter.

Izyum
Kharkiv Oblast

And now

Molitopl

I haven’t seen anything more than speculation that it might be the next target, but that would be a key strategic city to take, as it would prevent the Russians from accessing Crimea over land.

BC

---

[tweet]https://twitter.com/polidemitolog/status/1568614369902067712?s=21&t=0DxGmeE2HShYGUFP2XbGOg[/tweet]

As ever, this is a fast developing situation, and not all tweets will be real.

BC

---

Also trending on Twitter (as a joke): Vladivostok.

BC

[BostonCard]

By the way, the following are “trending” on Twitter.

Izyum
Kharkiv Oblast

And now

Molitopl

I haven’t seen anything more than speculation that it might be the next target, but that would be a key strategic city to take, as it would prevent the Russians from accessing Crimea over land.

BC

---

[tweet]https://twitter.com/polidemitolog/status/1568614369902067712?s=21&t=0DxGmeE2HShYGUFP2XbGOg[/tweet]

As ever, this is a fast developing situation, and not all tweets will be real.

BC

---

Also trending on Twitter (as a joke): Vladivostok.

BC

[dabigv13]

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/vcdgf555/status/1568574387670102016?s=20&t=xXLrOZZTY1IL-wM4gzhiQg[/tweet]

If Ukraine has another reserve striking force, and many people think they do, then deploying it in the south to cut off Melitopol would be awesome.

As it is the whole of the Russian front from Kharkiv to Lysychansk is collapsing. 

Think of the Russians defending anywhere else, seeing what's happening to their buddies up north. None of them are sleeping very soundly.

[dabigv13]

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/vcdgf555/status/1568574387670102016?s=20&t=xXLrOZZTY1IL-wM4gzhiQg[/tweet]

If Ukraine has another reserve striking force, and many people think they do, then deploying it in the south to cut off Melitopol would be awesome.

As it is the whole of the Russian front from Kharkiv to Lysychansk is collapsing. 

Think of the Russians defending anywhere else, seeing what's happening to their buddies up north. None of them are sleeping very soundly.

[Treefence]

Where does this stop?  Given the amounts of equipment and fleeing Russian soldiers, on top of the likely amounts that are captured, where can Russia mount a defense?  It seems in occupied territory just off the front, they had minimal defenses, likely due to manpower shortages.  If that is the case, is it possible this Ukrainian offensive doesn't stop till Russian borders?  Goose, is there any way to predict what happens next?

[Treefence]

Where does this stop?  Given the amounts of equipment and fleeing Russian soldiers, on top of the likely amounts that are captured, where can Russia mount a defense?  It seems in occupied territory just off the front, they had minimal defenses, likely due to manpower shortages.  If that is the case, is it possible this Ukrainian offensive doesn't stop till Russian borders?  Goose, is there any way to predict what happens next?

[dabigv13]

I thought this was a good state of play article from today by Jack Watling, who I think has been one of the best informed analysts of this conflict

https://www.theguardian.com/world/commen...-carefully

[dabigv13]

I thought this was a good state of play article from today by Jack Watling, who I think has been one of the best informed analysts of this conflict

https://www.theguardian.com/world/commen...-carefully

[Goose]

Already this is looking like a complete collapse of the Russian front.  It suggests that the Russian line was a mile wide (well, several hundred miles wide) and about an inch deep.  It’s hard to believe, but then again, if reports of 50,000 Russian casualties are correct, then, maybe.  ~50,000 dead (if the data from the Russian treasury is accurate) implies at least 150,000 wounded (would be more than that but for Russian disregard for the lives of their own soldiers and crappy military evacuation). Their initial invading force was ~100,000 with maybe 50,000 in reserve plus you figure a bunch of LNR and DNR conscripts, plus the newly recruited and poorly trained “volunteers” so no way of knowing its total force but it is perhaps consistent with reports that Russian BTG’s were operating at <50%.  Military doctrine states that this is well beyond the threshold where fighting force struggles with cohesion.

I don’t want to get ahead of myself here. The success of the Ukrainian advance has exceeded even the most optimistic projections, but it is a long way from over.  Russian forces will regroup, and as Ukraine pushes towards the East, Russian supply lines are less stretched, Russian forces are more entrenched, the local population is more pro-Russian, and it will become tougher. That being said, I have consistently underestimated the Ukrainians and overestimated the Russians (because the Russian army really can’t be *that* bad, right?). I keep thinking they will get their act together.  But until they do, it is great to see what the Ukrainians have done.

BC

---

Here’s the full translation of that Russian telegram:
https://twitter.com/intelarrow/status/15...WY7_3qV-aw
And from the translation, if true, it appears that Ukrainians are at the doorstep of the city of Donetsk, which they lost back in 2014.

BC

IMHO great post BC. Lots of things are in motion and there is still plenty of "fog" going on. Izyum has been taken (we think) but there is disagreement about whether the Russians surrendered there, abandoned their heavy equipment there and fled, or retreated (to where?) in good order. There are reports of POWs in the thousands, which, if true, really says the Russian army is routed and falling apart (as opposed to just too thin on the ground).

The reference to counter-battery in your previous post was a bit pro-forma, but there are lots of other ones out there. It appears that Ukraine has developed a significant capability there. It is a learned skill and as I have said before requires coordination between different forces over a potentially wide area. It takes practice to get good at it. Ukraine has had plenty of practice.

The important point is that Ukraine retains (yes, the dreaded "r word") Kupiansk and Kivsharivka. All this success flows from there. The reinforcements destined for that area were apparently cut up on the roads before they reached their destination. This is a key skill for Ukraine to demonstrate. Moving formations are much easier targets than dug in defenses (duh). Russia is going to need to move forces around to stop the bleeding. If Ukraine can significantly damage those moving forces the offensive can continue until it hits another major line of defense (if there is one).

The Russian troops to the south in Kharkiv Oblast knew that if one or both of Kupiansk and Kivsharivka were lost, there was no road or rail transport available to supply them or extract them. They were halfway out the back door before Ukraine knocked on the front. It is probable that much of Ukraine's success further south in Luhansk is simply due to panic. Those troops aren't cut off, but they fear they might be. It isn't probable that all, or even most, of the Ukrainian troops that are now advancing in the south are equipped and trained to the standard the ones that started this offensive were. It doesn't matter as long as the Russians keep running. However, it will matter if/when they don't. We can only hope the Ukraine has kept track of which are their "A" units and which are their "C" units.

We don't know yet how big a dent was made in Russian forces, but at the very least it is "significant". Supposedly Russia moved lots of troops to Kherson Oblast during the early summer. Do they try to move them back? It would seem Ukraine intends to continue their offensive in Kherson. If Russia starts to run there it could end the war. It could end because Putin falls or it could end because Crimea gets overrun. As we are seeing, if the Ukrainian offensive hits air things can deteriorate real fast. OTOH lots of troops were moved to Kherson. Many bloggers are giving Ukraine credit for luring Russia to place those troops across the river where they are now isolated. I don't quite think that's accurate. I think Russia put a lot of those troops on the Crimea side of the river in Kherson Oblast to prevent what we are seeing in Kharkiv Oblast. Whether they can/will do so is something I dearly want us to find out.

One area we don't hear much about is the "land bridge" between Donbas and Crimea. Right now, it isn't so useful to Kherson city but it still allows moving forces relatively quickly by road between Russia/Donbas and Kherson/Crimea. I have no idea what the feasibility of this might be, but the depth of that "land bridge" isn't large. If Ukraine could cut that route (either by physically occupying a position astride the road or by bringing the road into observed fire range) that would send a brobdingnagian shock wave throughout Crimea and Kherson Oblast. The Kerch bridge would be the only reliable way out. I suspect lots of people would decide now was a good time to visit relatives in (fill in the blank Russian city).

[Goose]

Already this is looking like a complete collapse of the Russian front.  It suggests that the Russian line was a mile wide (well, several hundred miles wide) and about an inch deep.  It’s hard to believe, but then again, if reports of 50,000 Russian casualties are correct, then, maybe.  ~50,000 dead (if the data from the Russian treasury is accurate) implies at least 150,000 wounded (would be more than that but for Russian disregard for the lives of their own soldiers and crappy military evacuation). Their initial invading force was ~100,000 with maybe 50,000 in reserve plus you figure a bunch of LNR and DNR conscripts, plus the newly recruited and poorly trained “volunteers” so no way of knowing its total force but it is perhaps consistent with reports that Russian BTG’s were operating at <50%.  Military doctrine states that this is well beyond the threshold where fighting force struggles with cohesion.

I don’t want to get ahead of myself here. The success of the Ukrainian advance has exceeded even the most optimistic projections, but it is a long way from over.  Russian forces will regroup, and as Ukraine pushes towards the East, Russian supply lines are less stretched, Russian forces are more entrenched, the local population is more pro-Russian, and it will become tougher. That being said, I have consistently underestimated the Ukrainians and overestimated the Russians (because the Russian army really can’t be *that* bad, right?). I keep thinking they will get their act together.  But until they do, it is great to see what the Ukrainians have done.

BC

---

Here’s the full translation of that Russian telegram:
https://twitter.com/intelarrow/status/15...WY7_3qV-aw
And from the translation, if true, it appears that Ukrainians are at the doorstep of the city of Donetsk, which they lost back in 2014.

BC

IMHO great post BC. Lots of things are in motion and there is still plenty of "fog" going on. Izyum has been taken (we think) but there is disagreement about whether the Russians surrendered there, abandoned their heavy equipment there and fled, or retreated (to where?) in good order. There are reports of POWs in the thousands, which, if true, really says the Russian army is routed and falling apart (as opposed to just too thin on the ground).

The reference to counter-battery in your previous post was a bit pro-forma, but there are lots of other ones out there. It appears that Ukraine has developed a significant capability there. It is a learned skill and as I have said before requires coordination between different forces over a potentially wide area. It takes practice to get good at it. Ukraine has had plenty of practice.

The important point is that Ukraine retains (yes, the dreaded "r word") Kupiansk and Kivsharivka. All this success flows from there. The reinforcements destined for that area were apparently cut up on the roads before they reached their destination. This is a key skill for Ukraine to demonstrate. Moving formations are much easier targets than dug in defenses (duh). Russia is going to need to move forces around to stop the bleeding. If Ukraine can significantly damage those moving forces the offensive can continue until it hits another major line of defense (if there is one).

The Russian troops to the south in Kharkiv Oblast knew that if one or both of Kupiansk and Kivsharivka were lost, there was no road or rail transport available to supply them or extract them. They were halfway out the back door before Ukraine knocked on the front. It is probable that much of Ukraine's success further south in Luhansk is simply due to panic. Those troops aren't cut off, but they fear they might be. It isn't probable that all, or even most, of the Ukrainian troops that are now advancing in the south are equipped and trained to the standard the ones that started this offensive were. It doesn't matter as long as the Russians keep running. However, it will matter if/when they don't. We can only hope the Ukraine has kept track of which are their "A" units and which are their "C" units.

We don't know yet how big a dent was made in Russian forces, but at the very least it is "significant". Supposedly Russia moved lots of troops to Kherson Oblast during the early summer. Do they try to move them back? It would seem Ukraine intends to continue their offensive in Kherson. If Russia starts to run there it could end the war. It could end because Putin falls or it could end because Crimea gets overrun. As we are seeing, if the Ukrainian offensive hits air things can deteriorate real fast. OTOH lots of troops were moved to Kherson. Many bloggers are giving Ukraine credit for luring Russia to place those troops across the river where they are now isolated. I don't quite think that's accurate. I think Russia put a lot of those troops on the Crimea side of the river in Kherson Oblast to prevent what we are seeing in Kharkiv Oblast. Whether they can/will do so is something I dearly want us to find out.

One area we don't hear much about is the "land bridge" between Donbas and Crimea. Right now, it isn't so useful to Kherson city but it still allows moving forces relatively quickly by road between Russia/Donbas and Kherson/Crimea. I have no idea what the feasibility of this might be, but the depth of that "land bridge" isn't large. If Ukraine could cut that route (either by physically occupying a position astride the road or by bringing the road into observed fire range) that would send a brobdingnagian shock wave throughout Crimea and Kherson Oblast. The Kerch bridge would be the only reliable way out. I suspect lots of people would decide now was a good time to visit relatives in (fill in the blank Russian city).

[Goose]

Where does this stop?  Given the amounts of equipment and fleeing Russian soldiers, on top of the likely amounts that are captured, where can Russia mount a defense?  It seems in occupied territory just off the front, they had minimal defenses, likely due to manpower shortages.  If that is the case, is it possible this Ukrainian offensive doesn't stop till Russian borders?  Goose, is there any way to predict what happens next?

Ukraine will pretty soon "run out of gas". However, the definition of that isn't fixed. Eventually Ukraine will have to figure out how to supply the penetration into the previously occupied territory. That will slow them down even if Russia doesn't. The best analogy is the allied breakout from Normandy. After breaking the front, Patton basically had nothing in front of him. Logistics was what limited his advance. Nobody yet knows when Ukraine will hit that limit. Nobody yet knows where Russia intends to defend. I am not sure even Russia yet knows. I certainly can't predict what happens next.

What I hope happens next is that Russia attempts to deploy it's (only partially trained) reserves piecemeal in the north and Ukraine simply brushes them aside. The only thing that might save Russia from this mistake is that they can't physically deliver these troops fast enough to get them destroyed before cooler heads prevail. I have no idea what plans (if any) Russia has made for rally points and defense in depth. They may try to bring troops from Kherson back north. At best that takes time. Where these troops would go is unknown. Lots of opportunities for both sides to make mistakes.

UPDATE: https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-abando...52300.html
A pretty reliable source with a good "read" on what is known to be true. Obviously many missing details. One thing we really don't yet know is how many Russian troops didn't make it out. Two days ago Ukraine announced one Guards Airborne regiment was completely wiped out They must have stood their ground if this is accurate. Ukraine also reported a Russian motor rifle regiment had suffered over 50% casualties. If typical, this has to be real bad news for Putin. Regiments being written off is a big deal.

[Goose]

Where does this stop?  Given the amounts of equipment and fleeing Russian soldiers, on top of the likely amounts that are captured, where can Russia mount a defense?  It seems in occupied territory just off the front, they had minimal defenses, likely due to manpower shortages.  If that is the case, is it possible this Ukrainian offensive doesn't stop till Russian borders?  Goose, is there any way to predict what happens next?

Ukraine will pretty soon "run out of gas". However, the definition of that isn't fixed. Eventually Ukraine will have to figure out how to supply the penetration into the previously occupied territory. That will slow them down even if Russia doesn't. The best analogy is the allied breakout from Normandy. After breaking the front, Patton basically had nothing in front of him. Logistics was what limited his advance. Nobody yet knows when Ukraine will hit that limit. Nobody yet knows where Russia intends to defend. I am not sure even Russia yet knows. I certainly can't predict what happens next.

What I hope happens next is that Russia attempts to deploy it's (only partially trained) reserves piecemeal in the north and Ukraine simply brushes them aside. The only thing that might save Russia from this mistake is that they can't physically deliver these troops fast enough to get them destroyed before cooler heads prevail. I have no idea what plans (if any) Russia has made for rally points and defense in depth. They may try to bring troops from Kherson back north. At best that takes time. Where these troops would go is unknown. Lots of opportunities for both sides to make mistakes.

UPDATE: https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-abando...52300.html
A pretty reliable source with a good "read" on what is known to be true. Obviously many missing details. One thing we really don't yet know is how many Russian troops didn't make it out. Two days ago Ukraine announced one Guards Airborne regiment was completely wiped out They must have stood their ground if this is accurate. Ukraine also reported a Russian motor rifle regiment had suffered over 50% casualties. If typical, this has to be real bad news for Putin. Regiments being written off is a big deal.

[BostonCard]

Thanks for your analysis goose.

As for the land bridge, I mentioned that “Melitopol” was trending on twitter.  Looks like mostly speculation, but you aren’t the only one thinking of breaking up the land bridge next.

Eg

[tweet]https://twitter.com/miker479/status/1568648330036535297?s=46&t=9bkGfZnKGhni7u20glZ97A[/tweet]

BC

[BostonCard]

Thanks for your analysis goose.

As for the land bridge, I mentioned that “Melitopol” was trending on twitter.  Looks like mostly speculation, but you aren’t the only one thinking of breaking up the land bridge next.

Eg

[tweet]https://twitter.com/miker479/status/1568648330036535297?s=46&t=9bkGfZnKGhni7u20glZ97A[/tweet]

BC

[BostonCard]

Credit where credit is due, goose.  You’ve been saying for *months* that the way Ukraine turns the tide of the war is not by our-artillarying the Russians, but with a mobile, nimble, combined arms approach.  Your only uncertainty was whether Ukraine would have the capability.  I think they’ve answered that *in spade*, and in the process, proving you right about the best way to defeat the Russians.  Hats off.

BC

---

Without trying to be a downer, I will note that the liberated land constitutes just under 0.2% of the land area of Ukraine and just over 2% of the area that Russia is occupying.  Hopefully it is just the start of continued pushback.

BC

[tweet]https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1568657170899812353?s=46&t=9bkGfZnKGhni7u20glZ97A[/tweet]

Certainly puts that 2% (and probably more like 5% at this point) into perspective.

BC

[BostonCard]

Credit where credit is due, goose.  You’ve been saying for *months* that the way Ukraine turns the tide of the war is not by our-artillarying the Russians, but with a mobile, nimble, combined arms approach.  Your only uncertainty was whether Ukraine would have the capability.  I think they’ve answered that *in spade*, and in the process, proving you right about the best way to defeat the Russians.  Hats off.

BC

---

Without trying to be a downer, I will note that the liberated land constitutes just under 0.2% of the land area of Ukraine and just over 2% of the area that Russia is occupying.  Hopefully it is just the start of continued pushback.

BC

[tweet]https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1568657170899812353?s=46&t=9bkGfZnKGhni7u20glZ97A[/tweet]

Certainly puts that 2% (and probably more like 5% at this point) into perspective.

BC

[BostonCard]

Everything old is new again…

[tweet]https://twitter.com/bazaarofwar/status/1509646507804401672?s=46&t=9bkGfZnKGhni7u20glZ97A[/tweet]

Midway through the thread there’s a point about how having GLOC’s parallel to the front is bad.

BC

[BostonCard]

Everything old is new again…

[tweet]https://twitter.com/bazaarofwar/status/1509646507804401672?s=46&t=9bkGfZnKGhni7u20glZ97A[/tweet]

Midway through the thread there’s a point about how having GLOC’s parallel to the front is bad.

BC

[Goose]

Credit where credit is due, goose.  You’ve been saying for *months* that the way Ukraine turns the tide of the war is not by our-artillarying the Russians, but with a mobile, nimble, combined arms approach.  Your only uncertainty was whether Ukraine would have the capability.  I think they’ve answered that *in spade*, and in the process, proving you right about the best way to defeat the Russians.  Hats off.

BC

Thanks BC. I wish I could take credit, but it has been NATO doctrine since the mid 70s. Back then, NATO didn't have the capability (although the Bundeswehr quietly though it did :-). I am glad we didn't find out). Along those lines, while it isn't nearly as exciting as some of what we are seeing
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/09/10/7366908
Ukraine is demonstrating the maturity to know it needs more formations with better training, more highly trained (specialist mostly) troops in the already "A" units, and that it also needs training in large unit command and control. Ex-Soviet armies have almost no training in operating large units because these units aren't capable of doing anything except following orders. That doesn't work with the NATO approach. Good for them. That said, looking at many of the videos I see them doing things that make my skin crawl. I think more training is needed :-). Still, it is remarkable how much Ukraine has been able to re-orient their military.

The following is from a link in BC's recent post. FWIW, I think lots of this is BS, but for the sake of argument
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/15684...22279.html
He theorizes Ukraine has 3 division sized units that are prepared for motorized (not necessarily armored) combat. He further theorizes that one unit was committed in Kherson, one unit Kharkiv, and one unit is still uncommitted. It would be nice if true. FWIW it looks to me like the more heavily armored units were committed in Kherson. That makes sense because there is more Russian artillery there and they were reinforcing. The units committed in the north appear to be lighter and possibly not the same quality. Obviously this is difficult to know from internet videos, but the fight in the north is much more free flowing. That tends to indicate to me that if there is yet a third "motorized" unit it is still in a shakedown stage and is the weakest of the three. Given the struggle Ukraine has had to generate the 2 units we have seen in action, it is hard to believe there is another unit in reserve that is actually "better". However, a unit that isn't perfect can be used as a follow-on force for a breakthrough like has occurred in the north, and that is where I would expect to see it used, if at all. Given this, a third front may or may not be realistic.

Naturally, maybe Ukraine has identified a place for this "third force" that may be very productive. Normally, you would want a "two up, one back" reserve, but maybe with winter arriving soon, that caution isn't necessary. We shall see. I would add that the idea presented in the above link that Ukraine can quickly generate another 2-3 mobile units from the units that had be previously defending in Kharkiv is nonsense. Such units have to be trained. It has taken Ukraine 2-3 (more, depending on how you count) months to train what the have to their current standard. NATO would say 6 months is a minimum. The idea you can turn untrained troops into a mobile striking force in a few weeks just isn't realistic.

---

Everything old is new again…

https://twitter.com/bazaarofwar/status/1...7u20glZ97A

Midway through the thread there’s a point about how having GLOC’s parallel to the front is bad.

BC

Great find BC! I have to quote this from it because it is so bang on to the situation in Kharkiv ATM

Denain is interesting because it shows the importance of the operational level of war. Unseating an enemy position by rendering its position untenable is far more efficient—and often far more effective—than defeating it in a large set-piece battle.

[Goose]

Credit where credit is due, goose.  You’ve been saying for *months* that the way Ukraine turns the tide of the war is not by our-artillarying the Russians, but with a mobile, nimble, combined arms approach.  Your only uncertainty was whether Ukraine would have the capability.  I think they’ve answered that *in spade*, and in the process, proving you right about the best way to defeat the Russians.  Hats off.

BC

Thanks BC. I wish I could take credit, but it has been NATO doctrine since the mid 70s. Back then, NATO didn't have the capability (although the Bundeswehr quietly though it did :-). I am glad we didn't find out). Along those lines, while it isn't nearly as exciting as some of what we are seeing
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/09/10/7366908
Ukraine is demonstrating the maturity to know it needs more formations with better training, more highly trained (specialist mostly) troops in the already "A" units, and that it also needs training in large unit command and control. Ex-Soviet armies have almost no training in operating large units because these units aren't capable of doing anything except following orders. That doesn't work with the NATO approach. Good for them. That said, looking at many of the videos I see them doing things that make my skin crawl. I think more training is needed :-). Still, it is remarkable how much Ukraine has been able to re-orient their military.

The following is from a link in BC's recent post. FWIW, I think lots of this is BS, but for the sake of argument
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/15684...22279.html
He theorizes Ukraine has 3 division sized units that are prepared for motorized (not necessarily armored) combat. He further theorizes that one unit was committed in Kherson, one unit Kharkiv, and one unit is still uncommitted. It would be nice if true. FWIW it looks to me like the more heavily armored units were committed in Kherson. That makes sense because there is more Russian artillery there and they were reinforcing. The units committed in the north appear to be lighter and possibly not the same quality. Obviously this is difficult to know from internet videos, but the fight in the north is much more free flowing. That tends to indicate to me that if there is yet a third "motorized" unit it is still in a shakedown stage and is the weakest of the three. Given the struggle Ukraine has had to generate the 2 units we have seen in action, it is hard to believe there is another unit in reserve that is actually "better". However, a unit that isn't perfect can be used as a follow-on force for a breakthrough like has occurred in the north, and that is where I would expect to see it used, if at all. Given this, a third front may or may not be realistic.

Naturally, maybe Ukraine has identified a place for this "third force" that may be very productive. Normally, you would want a "two up, one back" reserve, but maybe with winter arriving soon, that caution isn't necessary. We shall see. I would add that the idea presented in the above link that Ukraine can quickly generate another 2-3 mobile units from the units that had be previously defending in Kharkiv is nonsense. Such units have to be trained. It has taken Ukraine 2-3 (more, depending on how you count) months to train what the have to their current standard. NATO would say 6 months is a minimum. The idea you can turn untrained troops into a mobile striking force in a few weeks just isn't realistic.

---

Everything old is new again…

https://twitter.com/bazaarofwar/status/1...7u20glZ97A

Midway through the thread there’s a point about how having GLOC’s parallel to the front is bad.

BC

Great find BC! I have to quote this from it because it is so bang on to the situation in Kharkiv ATM

Denain is interesting because it shows the importance of the operational level of war. Unseating an enemy position by rendering its position untenable is far more efficient—and often far more effective—than defeating it in a large set-piece battle.