(06-09-2022, 07:52 AM)dabigv13 Wrote: I'm not certain but I think the second article you linked was perhaps from June 4th, with date written in Euro style. Finland and Sweden had not applied for NATO membership by April 6th.
The article was listed as "revised" five days ago, but it shows up in a Google search for dates between April 1 to April 30. I imagine the "original" was in April and the later revisions applied the NATO membership updates. I think Google uses the original post date, not a date from the article text, but that may not be the case.
Quote:This was apparently a discussion Erdogan had with Finnish president Niinisto in April. The first article you linked I think touches on this same discussion, but Niinisto now is revealing what Erdogan told him regarding Finnish accession to NATO.
Quote:IN AN INTERVIEW WITH IS, THE PRESIDENT OF THE Republic Sauli Niinistö said that there was no reason to doubt Turkey's position before Erdogan's sharp exits.
According to Niinistö, in a telephone conversation on 4 April, Erdogan clearly expressed his support for Finland's efforts.
- At the end of a rather long discussion, he said that you are applying for NATO membership, we will look at it favorably, we will assess it favorably , Niinistö says.
https://www.is.fi/politiikka/art-2000008869077.html
This is a good article IMHO. However, one has to consider the entirety of its content.
Quote:It is noteworthy that the Turkish Chancellery tweeted, following a discussion between Niinistö and Erdogan on 4 April, that Erdogan had expressed in a call his expectations for the lifting of the arms embargo on Turkey.
Niinistö told STT that the arms export issue did not appear to be a condition for Finland's NATO membership, but “there was a separate discussion about this”.
Why did you think this was a separate discussion when for Erdogan it seems to have been one of the main themes? How could it be assessed that lifting the arms embargo would not be a condition for Finland's NATO membership?
- The absence of such a condition. These things had nothing to do with it, it was one thing he raised, among other things. Besides, we apparently still have things open, no negative solution has been announced for arms export requests, which do not seem to be even deadly weapons requests. They are resolved on a case-by-case basis.
Riiiight. The Turks were diplomatic enough to not explicitly link removing the embargo as the cost of their support, but they did raise the issue in the same phone call and "Erdogan had expressed in a call his expectations for the lifting of the arms embargo on Turkey." Of course they were linked. Only somebody who is exercising very wishful thinking could believe they were not. The Turks are sensitive to blackmail and they assumed the Finns probably would be too. No need for anybody to "lose face".
Quote:Erdogan is moving the goalposts. Maybe that should have been anticipated more by NATO, Finland, and Sweden, but my estimation is that Erdogan was always going to try to and get maximal leverage for his vote and publicly stating support for Finnish/Swedish accession before it's even declared throws away that leverage. I am skeptical NATO could have done much more on this,
A very reasonable assumption. IMHO you are exactly correct. That is why it was essential to get any quid pro quo out of the way before things became public. The only way to be relatively sure that is accomplished is for Erdogan to throw away that leverage. Until he does that, there is no agreement you can count on. NATO most certainly could have and should have done this. It may be that no agreement could be reached, in which case an alternative arrangement with Finland and Sweden may have been necessary. Allowing this dispute to "go public" was absolutely avoidable and should have been.
Quote:but I am pretty optimistic this will get sorted eventually, because if it doesn't then Erdogan gets nothing.
I am not so optimistic as you are, especially since this thing will now be publicly negotiated. I think the idea Erdogan gets nothing is dangerously wrong. What he gets at this point, no matter how things play out, is the ability to show the Turkish people (and the rest of the Muslim world, which is important to him) that he protects them from exploration and disrespect by "the West" and that he protects his countries interests no matter what. He is not a "lackey" of the EU or the US who think they are "better" than us Turks. This is very important to him.
From Erdogan's point of view the best outcome is that Sweden and Finland cave and he can crow about it. That way he can have his victory and still extract some loot. Unfortunately, since this is now all public, the ability of Sweden and Finland to compromise is circumscribed because they too can't seem to be pushed around by Turkey. The level of compromise Erdogan can accept is also circumscribed because he can't appear to "back down" or be bribed. Not a good place to be. Compromises made in private are easier to politically motivate than ones extracted in public. Consider the US removing IRBMs from Turkey after the Cuban Missile crisis. Kennedy could never have allowed that to be public at the time.
It is entirely possible that the minimum Erdogan requires and what Finland/Sweden can agree to are mutually exclusive. If so, letting this go public is a disaster for NATO. It calls into question the fabric that holds the alliance together. While this may indeed be a question NATO needs to ask itself, it should do so behind closed doors. If, OTOH, something can be worked out, it could have and should have been worked out without the drama and the hard feelings that will inevitably remain going forward.