[dabigv13]

What is the basis for your assumption that Ukrainian morale will flag eventually? This seems unfounded to me. Ukrainians won't forget the atrocities Russia has brought to areas it has occupied.

[dabigv13]

What is the basis for your assumption that Ukrainian morale will flag eventually? This seems unfounded to me. Ukrainians won't forget the atrocities Russia has brought to areas it has occupied.

[Goose]

What is the basis for your assumption that Ukrainian morale will flag eventually? This seems unfounded to me. Ukrainians won't forget the atrocities Russia has brought to areas it has occupied.

No they will not forget. The certainly don't want to surrender to Russia. They have demonstrated that. However, if the way ahead involves Ukraine losing the war and being taken over by Russia anyway there is no reason to keep fighting. You are just postponing the inevitable. Instead you need to save yourself and your family, either by fleeing as refugees or making the best deal you can with the devil. There is no third choice. Once the rank and file lose confidence in the ability to win they will make those choices. If there is no plausible path to victory the rank and file will lose that confidence.

The Ukrainian government has stressed the goal of recapturing all Ukrainian territory partly for morale purposes. A big contributing factor to the incursion into Russia was to demonstrate to the Ukrainian public and to the "West" that Ukraine was not a spent force. The idea of victory motivates people. Once the government starts talking about what they will be willing to give up to end the war it becomes harder for the soldiers and the general public to justify in their own minds being willing to suffer and die fighting for lands that will be surrendered anyway. Things go downhill from there.

Dictatorships can often fight on when victory is viewed by the public as impossible because they let everybody know that if you don't fight on they will kill you themselves immediately. Democracies can't do that. Once the public decides the war is lost, it is.

[Goose]

What is the basis for your assumption that Ukrainian morale will flag eventually? This seems unfounded to me. Ukrainians won't forget the atrocities Russia has brought to areas it has occupied.

No they will not forget. The certainly don't want to surrender to Russia. They have demonstrated that. However, if the way ahead involves Ukraine losing the war and being taken over by Russia anyway there is no reason to keep fighting. You are just postponing the inevitable. Instead you need to save yourself and your family, either by fleeing as refugees or making the best deal you can with the devil. There is no third choice. Once the rank and file lose confidence in the ability to win they will make those choices. If there is no plausible path to victory the rank and file will lose that confidence.

The Ukrainian government has stressed the goal of recapturing all Ukrainian territory partly for morale purposes. A big contributing factor to the incursion into Russia was to demonstrate to the Ukrainian public and to the "West" that Ukraine was not a spent force. The idea of victory motivates people. Once the government starts talking about what they will be willing to give up to end the war it becomes harder for the soldiers and the general public to justify in their own minds being willing to suffer and die fighting for lands that will be surrendered anyway. Things go downhill from there.

Dictatorships can often fight on when victory is viewed by the public as impossible because they let everybody know that if you don't fight on they will kill you themselves immediately. Democracies can't do that. Once the public decides the war is lost, it is.

[dabigv13]

The Ukrainian people have suffered for over two years and still strongly support continuing to fight. I don't think that would change in another year or two or three or four or five or ten, as long as Ukraine holds the majority of their territory, which is likely in my estimation if the West continues to support them.

[dabigv13]

The Ukrainian people have suffered for over two years and still strongly support continuing to fight. I don't think that would change in another year or two or three or four or five or ten, as long as Ukraine holds the majority of their territory, which is likely in my estimation if the West continues to support them.

[Goose]

The Ukrainian people have suffered for over two years and still strongly support continuing to fight. I don't think that would change in another year or two or three or four or five or ten, as long as Ukraine holds the majority of their territory, which is likely in my estimation if the West continues to support them.

I agree the Ukrainian people want to fight on, at least at this point. What happens going forward is IMO a guessing game. While public opinion in Ukraine says "fight" the difficulties in passing a relatively "weak" (by US standards) draft bill were large and it took forever. There hasn't been a flood of new troops and training has been difficult. Ukraine has to create a fighting force that can match their fighting desires. So far, they have not. It can be argued the attack into Russia shows they are getting closer. However events in the Donbas indicates the opposite.

Ukraine is also having to come to grips with the fact they will always be at a massive artillery disadvantage with respect to Russia. The Europeans have promised numbers they can't yet deliver and have never lived up to their words. They can't. They don't have the capacity and aren't building enough capacity to give Ukraine parity when it is all finished (years from now). The US has done our best. We have never promised more than we could deliver. However, what we can deliver even with our programs to increase capacity is not nearly enough. Russia is out-producing Ukraine's sponsors by at least 3:1. No reason to believe that can't continue indefinitely. We gave Russia time to react and mobilize their productive capacity. This is one of the costs. Getting soldiers to fight under such conditions with no end in sight is impossible, no matter how motivated they are.

Obviously events do matter. If Ukraine manages to stop Russia more or less where they are today it will help a lot. If OTOH Ukraine loses the rest of the Donbas IMO it will be an immense hit both on Ukrainian morale and an even bigger one on "Western" support. I don't know what Ukraine is thinking but they do not seem to be defending as stoutly against Russian attacks as in the past. Ukraine is still killing lots of Russians but they are surrendering space. The incursion into Russia apparently hasn't dented the Russian plans much. Russia may just choose to contain the situation and nothing more. 

If Russia captures all of Donbas (or close enough for Putin's purposes) I fear Russia will offer a cease-fire and agree to negotiations. This will put Ukraine in an impossible situation. Much of the "West" wants this war to end and they don't much care what the final configuration is as long as they can claim that Ukraine was not "defeated". Ukraine will not get into NATO as a result of any agreement reached to end the war with Russia still holding lots of Ukraine. Ukraine knows and lots of the West knows such a "freeze" in the war is only a pause. Czechoslovakia all over again.

OTOH it would be politically very difficult for Ukraine to accept such a partition. Practically speaking  when Russia comes for the rest of Ukraine in a year or so, Ukraine won't fight very effectively. The people will have seen this movie before and know how it ends. So will have the "west" and this time they won't offer help for what they believe to be a lost cause.

Where you and I differ here, I think, is that you believe Ukraine's strong desire to fight against Russia can overcome a continually worsening correlation of forces without any reasonable path to victory in sight. I do not. There aren't any real similar historical precedents that apply. The closest parallel might be France in WW II but it isn't really a "good match". That said, France did surrender to the "historical foe" where clear means of resistance remained available. Vichy made a deal with the Devil. The Devil eventually (and predictably) reneged.  I am hoping we don't have to find out who is right here. If Ukraine and "the West" can put together a reasonable plan that will inflict damage upon Russia (militarily, economically, and politically) that Russia simply cannot bear, that changes everything. If that doesn't happen, we will find out who is right.

[Goose]

The Ukrainian people have suffered for over two years and still strongly support continuing to fight. I don't think that would change in another year or two or three or four or five or ten, as long as Ukraine holds the majority of their territory, which is likely in my estimation if the West continues to support them.

I agree the Ukrainian people want to fight on, at least at this point. What happens going forward is IMO a guessing game. While public opinion in Ukraine says "fight" the difficulties in passing a relatively "weak" (by US standards) draft bill were large and it took forever. There hasn't been a flood of new troops and training has been difficult. Ukraine has to create a fighting force that can match their fighting desires. So far, they have not. It can be argued the attack into Russia shows they are getting closer. However events in the Donbas indicates the opposite.

Ukraine is also having to come to grips with the fact they will always be at a massive artillery disadvantage with respect to Russia. The Europeans have promised numbers they can't yet deliver and have never lived up to their words. They can't. They don't have the capacity and aren't building enough capacity to give Ukraine parity when it is all finished (years from now). The US has done our best. We have never promised more than we could deliver. However, what we can deliver even with our programs to increase capacity is not nearly enough. Russia is out-producing Ukraine's sponsors by at least 3:1. No reason to believe that can't continue indefinitely. We gave Russia time to react and mobilize their productive capacity. This is one of the costs. Getting soldiers to fight under such conditions with no end in sight is impossible, no matter how motivated they are.

Obviously events do matter. If Ukraine manages to stop Russia more or less where they are today it will help a lot. If OTOH Ukraine loses the rest of the Donbas IMO it will be an immense hit both on Ukrainian morale and an even bigger one on "Western" support. I don't know what Ukraine is thinking but they do not seem to be defending as stoutly against Russian attacks as in the past. Ukraine is still killing lots of Russians but they are surrendering space. The incursion into Russia apparently hasn't dented the Russian plans much. Russia may just choose to contain the situation and nothing more. 

If Russia captures all of Donbas (or close enough for Putin's purposes) I fear Russia will offer a cease-fire and agree to negotiations. This will put Ukraine in an impossible situation. Much of the "West" wants this war to end and they don't much care what the final configuration is as long as they can claim that Ukraine was not "defeated". Ukraine will not get into NATO as a result of any agreement reached to end the war with Russia still holding lots of Ukraine. Ukraine knows and lots of the West knows such a "freeze" in the war is only a pause. Czechoslovakia all over again.

OTOH it would be politically very difficult for Ukraine to accept such a partition. Practically speaking  when Russia comes for the rest of Ukraine in a year or so, Ukraine won't fight very effectively. The people will have seen this movie before and know how it ends. So will have the "west" and this time they won't offer help for what they believe to be a lost cause.

Where you and I differ here, I think, is that you believe Ukraine's strong desire to fight against Russia can overcome a continually worsening correlation of forces without any reasonable path to victory in sight. I do not. There aren't any real similar historical precedents that apply. The closest parallel might be France in WW II but it isn't really a "good match". That said, France did surrender to the "historical foe" where clear means of resistance remained available. Vichy made a deal with the Devil. The Devil eventually (and predictably) reneged.  I am hoping we don't have to find out who is right here. If Ukraine and "the West" can put together a reasonable plan that will inflict damage upon Russia (militarily, economically, and politically) that Russia simply cannot bear, that changes everything. If that doesn't happen, we will find out who is right.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/outgunned-out...19731.html

This article is definitely a "downer" but it does IMO point out facts and issues that often don't make it into the headlines. Obviously Ukraine has no desire to fuel concerns about their situation. However, these are real issues. It doesn't mean Ukraine is going to cave in tomorrow and none of the people interviewed wanted that or expected that to happen. The morale problems are real. The problems with the conscript soldiers are real. Despite the fact the article only discusses ammunition shortages due to delays in US aid, even in the presence of that aid Ukraine is still at an anywhere between 3:1 (best case) and 10:1 disadvantage relative to Russia. That isn't going to change in the near future if ever. The plan for victory must understand and include this fact. Above all, there must be a plan for victory.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/outgunned-out...19731.html

This article is definitely a "downer" but it does IMO point out facts and issues that often don't make it into the headlines. Obviously Ukraine has no desire to fuel concerns about their situation. However, these are real issues. It doesn't mean Ukraine is going to cave in tomorrow and none of the people interviewed wanted that or expected that to happen. The morale problems are real. The problems with the conscript soldiers are real. Despite the fact the article only discusses ammunition shortages due to delays in US aid, even in the presence of that aid Ukraine is still at an anywhere between 3:1 (best case) and 10:1 disadvantage relative to Russia. That isn't going to change in the near future if ever. The plan for victory must understand and include this fact. Above all, there must be a plan for victory.

[GK3]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/outgunned-out...19731.html

This article is definitely a "downer" but it does IMO point out facts and issues that often don't make it into the headlines. Obviously Ukraine has no desire to fuel concerns about their situation. However, these are real issues. It doesn't mean Ukraine is going to cave in tomorrow and none of the people interviewed wanted that or expected that to happen. The morale problems are real. The problems with the conscript soldiers are real. Despite the fact the article only discusses ammunition shortages due to delays in US aid, even in the presence of that aid Ukraine is still at an anywhere between 3:1 (best case) and 10:1 disadvantage relative to Russia. That isn't going to change in the near future if ever. The plan for victory must understand and include this fact. Above all, there must be a plan for victory.

I think the Yahoo article is probably more negative than reality, but it isn't far away. The fact that we (USA) are so reticent to allow them to use the weapons we provide in a manner that they need, makes those weapons far less valuable. As a result, Ukraine has done a very good job under the circumstances of making their own versions of the weapons, even cruise missles, long range drones, and now equipping old russian era bombs with wings and the ability to glide to their targets. FWLIW I think if we really want Ukraine to win or at least achieve an adequate peace treaty, we need to stop all this mickey mousing around and give them what they need.  There is the old adage, "pay me now, or pay me later"
Of course, Western Europe and the USA has to consider how far Putin will go in an effort to win. Mostly, is he willing to actually use nuclear weapons of any type to "win"?
If the West allows Putin to absorb the Ukraine, what comes next?  Poland, the Baltic States?  The best answer to this conundrum is best left unsaid.

[GK3]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/outgunned-out...19731.html

This article is definitely a "downer" but it does IMO point out facts and issues that often don't make it into the headlines. Obviously Ukraine has no desire to fuel concerns about their situation. However, these are real issues. It doesn't mean Ukraine is going to cave in tomorrow and none of the people interviewed wanted that or expected that to happen. The morale problems are real. The problems with the conscript soldiers are real. Despite the fact the article only discusses ammunition shortages due to delays in US aid, even in the presence of that aid Ukraine is still at an anywhere between 3:1 (best case) and 10:1 disadvantage relative to Russia. That isn't going to change in the near future if ever. The plan for victory must understand and include this fact. Above all, there must be a plan for victory.

I think the Yahoo article is probably more negative than reality, but it isn't far away. The fact that we (USA) are so reticent to allow them to use the weapons we provide in a manner that they need, makes those weapons far less valuable. As a result, Ukraine has done a very good job under the circumstances of making their own versions of the weapons, even cruise missles, long range drones, and now equipping old russian era bombs with wings and the ability to glide to their targets. FWLIW I think if we really want Ukraine to win or at least achieve an adequate peace treaty, we need to stop all this mickey mousing around and give them what they need.  There is the old adage, "pay me now, or pay me later"
Of course, Western Europe and the USA has to consider how far Putin will go in an effort to win. Mostly, is he willing to actually use nuclear weapons of any type to "win"?
If the West allows Putin to absorb the Ukraine, what comes next?  Poland, the Baltic States?  The best answer to this conundrum is best left unsaid.

[fullmetal]

Is there any way to send arms and munitions to Ukraine without announcing it publicly?  I feel like public announcements are what stokes Putin's ire and what tempts Russian declarations of retaliation.  Quiet, massive aid would go a long way toward helping Ukraine without putting the US in the limelight as the "actual" opponent of Russia, as they would have their populace believe.

[fullmetal]

Is there any way to send arms and munitions to Ukraine without announcing it publicly?  I feel like public announcements are what stokes Putin's ire and what tempts Russian declarations of retaliation.  Quiet, massive aid would go a long way toward helping Ukraine without putting the US in the limelight as the "actual" opponent of Russia, as they would have their populace believe.

[Goose]

Is there any way to send arms and munitions to Ukraine without announcing it publicly?  I feel like public announcements are what stokes Putin's ire and what tempts Russian declarations of retaliation.  Quiet, massive aid would go a long way toward helping Ukraine without putting the US in the limelight as the "actual" opponent of Russia, as they would have their populace believe.

There is. Nothing requires q public announcement. However, I am sure Russia would very quickly inform the world what is actually going on, and if the don't the "western" news services certainly would. This is almost exactly what happened with the HARM missiles the US gave to Ukraine.

---

https://www.yahoo.com/news/zelenskiy-say...30331.html

Zelenskiy is fully aware that his nation cannot fight on without such a plan. Neither his people nor western politicians can/will support a "forever" war. Presenting such a plan to the public is somewhat risky, so he wouldn't be doing it if he thought there was another choice. The Ukrainian public may not like the plan for many different reasons. The allies of Ukraine have the same possibility. I hope Zelenskiy has vetted this plan with all the "stakeholders" so he won't run into vocal and definite opposition.

[Goose]

Is there any way to send arms and munitions to Ukraine without announcing it publicly?  I feel like public announcements are what stokes Putin's ire and what tempts Russian declarations of retaliation.  Quiet, massive aid would go a long way toward helping Ukraine without putting the US in the limelight as the "actual" opponent of Russia, as they would have their populace believe.

There is. Nothing requires q public announcement. However, I am sure Russia would very quickly inform the world what is actually going on, and if the don't the "western" news services certainly would. This is almost exactly what happened with the HARM missiles the US gave to Ukraine.

---

https://www.yahoo.com/news/zelenskiy-say...30331.html

Zelenskiy is fully aware that his nation cannot fight on without such a plan. Neither his people nor western politicians can/will support a "forever" war. Presenting such a plan to the public is somewhat risky, so he wouldn't be doing it if he thought there was another choice. The Ukrainian public may not like the plan for many different reasons. The allies of Ukraine have the same possibility. I hope Zelenskiy has vetted this plan with all the "stakeholders" so he won't run into vocal and definite opposition.

[fullmetal]

I thought both candidates in the pres debate last night could have been a little more forthcoming on the details of how the US could help end the Ukraine war, but obviously one candidate was much more vocal about Ukrainian solidarity.  The case for protecting democracy in Eastern Europe against a unilateral act of revanchist aggression should have been an easy home run for rhetoric and oratory.  Every moment we delay is paid for in Ukrainian blood and the blood of coerced Russian conscripts.

Whatever plan is laid out will have to suit Putin's needs and whims for him to come to the negotiation table.  Between economic sanctions, military failure, or domestic unrest, it's going to be one of those levers that changes his thinking.  Or maybe fate will throw us a bone, and it will suddenly not be his thinking that drives the war anymore.

[fullmetal]

I thought both candidates in the pres debate last night could have been a little more forthcoming on the details of how the US could help end the Ukraine war, but obviously one candidate was much more vocal about Ukrainian solidarity.  The case for protecting democracy in Eastern Europe against a unilateral act of revanchist aggression should have been an easy home run for rhetoric and oratory.  Every moment we delay is paid for in Ukrainian blood and the blood of coerced Russian conscripts.

Whatever plan is laid out will have to suit Putin's needs and whims for him to come to the negotiation table.  Between economic sanctions, military failure, or domestic unrest, it's going to be one of those levers that changes his thinking.  Or maybe fate will throw us a bone, and it will suddenly not be his thinking that drives the war anymore.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-put-si...57616.html

Several points to be made here. From the article:

"These were used in two ways," Watling wrote in a September 6 analysis about the risks and opportunities of mobile phones on the battlefield.
"First, the UAV used the network to assist with navigation by triangulating off the bearings of mobile phone masts," he said, using the term UAV to describe an unmanned aerial vehicle.
"Second," he said, "the Russians were sending telemetry data from the UAVs back through the mobile phone network to help plan follow up strikes."

It is clearly not impossible to measure the bearings of cell towers from a drone. To do so precisely is not easy. It is not practical to calibrate each drone in an anechoic chamber. The phase to angle "calibration tables" will need to be a generic one. This limits the ultimate accuracy of the system. That said, the distance from the cell tower is of necessity not large (tens of miles). An approximate angle measurement would work well enough. The first major takeaway is that if Russia can do phase interferometer DF of cell towers on their drones, Ukraine absolutely do the same with GPS jammers. Ukraine's problem is easier. Ukraine wants to maintain a bearing of zero (to hit the target), not measure exactly what the bearing is. Why isn't that happening?

There are also much better ways of navigation using cell towers. The structure and characteristics of their transmissions are known and from that a precise timing reference is possible. That makes using differential delays between several towers to geolocate the receiver. FWIW I can't imagine Russia isn't doing this. It is much easier than measuring the Direction of Arrival (DOA). Remember a drone at 200 ft can see many more cell towers that a person driving/walking on the surface can.

The fact that Russia has a transmitter on the drone gives them the ability to create a cooperative transaction with the cell tower(s). This creates another opportunity to establish an even better timing reference. The problem is that Ukraine doesn't want to shut down its cell phone network. It is next to impossible to know that a particular cellular user is "counterfeit" if a state actor uses its resources to obtain/clone SIM cards. This fact is something the US needs to be painfully aware of. Imagine how easy it would be to navigate without GPS if you can use the cellular system to do it. In WWII the US was concerned about Japanese submarines using US radio stations to navigate. Now there are thousands of radio stations that can be used (and they conveniently transmit their location so you can't get confused).

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-put-si...57616.html

Several points to be made here. From the article:

"These were used in two ways," Watling wrote in a September 6 analysis about the risks and opportunities of mobile phones on the battlefield.
"First, the UAV used the network to assist with navigation by triangulating off the bearings of mobile phone masts," he said, using the term UAV to describe an unmanned aerial vehicle.
"Second," he said, "the Russians were sending telemetry data from the UAVs back through the mobile phone network to help plan follow up strikes."

It is clearly not impossible to measure the bearings of cell towers from a drone. To do so precisely is not easy. It is not practical to calibrate each drone in an anechoic chamber. The phase to angle "calibration tables" will need to be a generic one. This limits the ultimate accuracy of the system. That said, the distance from the cell tower is of necessity not large (tens of miles). An approximate angle measurement would work well enough. The first major takeaway is that if Russia can do phase interferometer DF of cell towers on their drones, Ukraine absolutely do the same with GPS jammers. Ukraine's problem is easier. Ukraine wants to maintain a bearing of zero (to hit the target), not measure exactly what the bearing is. Why isn't that happening?

There are also much better ways of navigation using cell towers. The structure and characteristics of their transmissions are known and from that a precise timing reference is possible. That makes using differential delays between several towers to geolocate the receiver. FWIW I can't imagine Russia isn't doing this. It is much easier than measuring the Direction of Arrival (DOA). Remember a drone at 200 ft can see many more cell towers that a person driving/walking on the surface can.

The fact that Russia has a transmitter on the drone gives them the ability to create a cooperative transaction with the cell tower(s). This creates another opportunity to establish an even better timing reference. The problem is that Ukraine doesn't want to shut down its cell phone network. It is next to impossible to know that a particular cellular user is "counterfeit" if a state actor uses its resources to obtain/clone SIM cards. This fact is something the US needs to be painfully aware of. Imagine how easy it would be to navigate without GPS if you can use the cellular system to do it. In WWII the US was concerned about Japanese submarines using US radio stations to navigate. Now there are thousands of radio stations that can be used (and they conveniently transmit their location so you can't get confused).

[fullmetal]

Ukraine should use their cell network to track fast-moving devices moving in fairly straight lines at altitude (if the cell towers can retain the timing data and perform the same calculations in reverse).  That should help them track drones...but whether you can use that as fire-control data is another question.

[fullmetal]

Ukraine should use their cell network to track fast-moving devices moving in fairly straight lines at altitude (if the cell towers can retain the timing data and perform the same calculations in reverse).  That should help them track drones...but whether you can use that as fire-control data is another question.

[Goose]

Ukraine should use their cell network to track fast-moving devices moving in fairly straight lines at altitude (if the cell towers can retain the timing data and perform the same calculations in reverse).  That should help them track drones...but whether you can use that as fire-control data is another question.

Unfortunately that can only be done if the drone is "registered", which it seldom has reason to do. When it does, it would be in order to make a very short call. As I understand it, the Ukraine uses GSM almost exclusively. Easy, well understood case. Cell tower hardware as designed can to some degree track your cell phone when it is "registered" with the network. However, the tower doesn't actually care much about your relative bearing (like 120 degree sectors). It cares about your range. That allows cell towers to "find" lost or injured people in some cases, but only if 3 or more cells can "see" you. Some cell towers do use "smart" (adaptive) antennas that could yield a "coarse" bearing. AFAIK there is no way to get that information. I assume Russia is smart enough not to allow a drone to "register" unless it really needs to do so. The cell system is not designed to deal with fast-moving (and certainly not airborne) customers. Cell towers OTOH do transmit as part of their normal operations. Depending on the system involved some towers transmit all the time. When you turn on your phone after going a long distance you will notice it takes "awhile" to find the network. It "looks" for a transmitting tower.

[Goose]

Ukraine should use their cell network to track fast-moving devices moving in fairly straight lines at altitude (if the cell towers can retain the timing data and perform the same calculations in reverse).  That should help them track drones...but whether you can use that as fire-control data is another question.

Unfortunately that can only be done if the drone is "registered", which it seldom has reason to do. When it does, it would be in order to make a very short call. As I understand it, the Ukraine uses GSM almost exclusively. Easy, well understood case. Cell tower hardware as designed can to some degree track your cell phone when it is "registered" with the network. However, the tower doesn't actually care much about your relative bearing (like 120 degree sectors). It cares about your range. That allows cell towers to "find" lost or injured people in some cases, but only if 3 or more cells can "see" you. Some cell towers do use "smart" (adaptive) antennas that could yield a "coarse" bearing. AFAIK there is no way to get that information. I assume Russia is smart enough not to allow a drone to "register" unless it really needs to do so. The cell system is not designed to deal with fast-moving (and certainly not airborne) customers. Cell towers OTOH do transmit as part of their normal operations. Depending on the system involved some towers transmit all the time. When you turn on your phone after going a long distance you will notice it takes "awhile" to find the network. It "looks" for a transmitting tower.

[TrumpCard]

Russia took off its gloves long ago, but this is another manifestation of its no holds barred approach. 

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/rus...024-09-12/

[TrumpCard]

Russia took off its gloves long ago, but this is another manifestation of its no holds barred approach. 

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/rus...024-09-12/

[Goose]

Russia took off its gloves long ago, but this is another manifestation of its no holds barred approach. 

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/rus...024-09-12/

The targeted ship was in the Maritime Economic Zone of Romania but not in the territorial waters of Romania. These are legally international waters as far as surface ships are concerned. Under the law, Russia has every right to seize any ship and cargo, including neutral ones, that are  bound to or from Ukraine.  They may not legally sink it without warning. However, every since WW I it has been de facto allowed to sink any ship that is trading with your enemy. Germany certainly did it. The US didn't go to war over it. In WW II the US practiced unrestricted submarine warfare. That all by itself makes it difficult to generate much outrage.

Nobody would be irate if the vessel had been hit in Ukrainian waters. That is no different than being hit sitting at a pier in Odessa. This has happened several times.  Had the attack happened inside Romanian Territorial Waters it would have been an entirely different affair. Russia and their weapons have no right at all to be there. Of course, that only matters if Romania feels like fighting Russia, either alone or with NATO. I am not sure Russia, Ukraine, Romania, and/or NATO want to go there. A diplomatic protest would have been the most probable response. 

The key here is that the vessels trading with Ukraine do really need to hug the coast. Get into Romanian waters ASAP. https://sovereignlimits.com/wp-content/u...OU_UKR.jpg The very light blue areas are territorial waters. Ship operators  don't like to do this for many good reasons. The damaged vessel undoubtedly wanted to go faster and Russia hasn't been very active in stopping the grain trade. That just changed.

I am surprised it has taken so long for this to happen. I am even more surprised Russia used an air-launched missile to do it. Sinking a bulk carrier usually will take a "big" missile because the cargo itself doesn't explode or burn. A torpedo OTOH will easily do so, as these ships have limited excess buoyancy when fully loaded. The compartmentalization depends a lot on the specific vessel. Getting sunk sends a much bigger message than mere damage :-). Insurance rates will rise either way.

[Goose]

Russia took off its gloves long ago, but this is another manifestation of its no holds barred approach. 

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/rus...024-09-12/

The targeted ship was in the Maritime Economic Zone of Romania but not in the territorial waters of Romania. These are legally international waters as far as surface ships are concerned. Under the law, Russia has every right to seize any ship and cargo, including neutral ones, that are  bound to or from Ukraine.  They may not legally sink it without warning. However, every since WW I it has been de facto allowed to sink any ship that is trading with your enemy. Germany certainly did it. The US didn't go to war over it. In WW II the US practiced unrestricted submarine warfare. That all by itself makes it difficult to generate much outrage.

Nobody would be irate if the vessel had been hit in Ukrainian waters. That is no different than being hit sitting at a pier in Odessa. This has happened several times.  Had the attack happened inside Romanian Territorial Waters it would have been an entirely different affair. Russia and their weapons have no right at all to be there. Of course, that only matters if Romania feels like fighting Russia, either alone or with NATO. I am not sure Russia, Ukraine, Romania, and/or NATO want to go there. A diplomatic protest would have been the most probable response. 

The key here is that the vessels trading with Ukraine do really need to hug the coast. Get into Romanian waters ASAP. https://sovereignlimits.com/wp-content/u...OU_UKR.jpg The very light blue areas are territorial waters. Ship operators  don't like to do this for many good reasons. The damaged vessel undoubtedly wanted to go faster and Russia hasn't been very active in stopping the grain trade. That just changed.

I am surprised it has taken so long for this to happen. I am even more surprised Russia used an air-launched missile to do it. Sinking a bulk carrier usually will take a "big" missile because the cargo itself doesn't explode or burn. A torpedo OTOH will easily do so, as these ships have limited excess buoyancy when fully loaded. The compartmentalization depends a lot on the specific vessel. Getting sunk sends a much bigger message than mere damage :-). Insurance rates will rise either way.

[TrumpCard]

Russia took off its gloves long ago, but this is another manifestation of its no holds barred approach. 

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/rus...024-09-12/

The targeted ship was in the Maritime Economic Zone of Romania but not in the territorial waters of Romania. These are legally international waters as far as surface ships are concerned. Under the law, Russia has every right to seize any ship and cargo, including neutral ones, that are  bound to or from Ukraine.  

. . . .

I am surprised it has taken so long for this to happen. I am even more surprised Russia used an air-launched missile to do it. Sinking a bulk carrier usually will take a "big" missile because the cargo itself doesn't explode or burn. A torpedo OTOH will easily do so, as these ships have limited excess buoyancy when fully loaded. The compartmentalization depends a lot on the specific vessel. Getting sunk sends a much bigger message than mere damage :-). Insurance rates will rise either way.

Russia chose a war of aggression.  I do not understand any argument that it is completely legal to shoot at "enemy" ships, so long as you first declare a war of aggression against the country whose flag is on the ship.

As to not sinking the ship, that could be intentional.  Russia is not responsible for the complete destruction of a commercial vessel or the loss of any life.  It fired a "warning" shot that now puts everyone on notice that they had better not be involved with commercial shipping of goods from Ukraine.

[TrumpCard]

Russia took off its gloves long ago, but this is another manifestation of its no holds barred approach. 

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/rus...024-09-12/

The targeted ship was in the Maritime Economic Zone of Romania but not in the territorial waters of Romania. These are legally international waters as far as surface ships are concerned. Under the law, Russia has every right to seize any ship and cargo, including neutral ones, that are  bound to or from Ukraine.  

. . . .

I am surprised it has taken so long for this to happen. I am even more surprised Russia used an air-launched missile to do it. Sinking a bulk carrier usually will take a "big" missile because the cargo itself doesn't explode or burn. A torpedo OTOH will easily do so, as these ships have limited excess buoyancy when fully loaded. The compartmentalization depends a lot on the specific vessel. Getting sunk sends a much bigger message than mere damage :-). Insurance rates will rise either way.

Russia chose a war of aggression.  I do not understand any argument that it is completely legal to shoot at "enemy" ships, so long as you first declare a war of aggression against the country whose flag is on the ship.

As to not sinking the ship, that could be intentional.  Russia is not responsible for the complete destruction of a commercial vessel or the loss of any life.  It fired a "warning" shot that now puts everyone on notice that they had better not be involved with commercial shipping of goods from Ukraine.

[M T]

Speaking of attacking commercial vessels transporting goods to/from an enemy, and what kind of effect is needed if the cargo is flammable, would it now make sense for Ukrainian special operatives to attack oil tankers that filled in Russia?  Say, those servicing Iran?  (A 2022 FT article indicated Russian needs about 240 oil tankers.  I am not aware that Russia has the kind of navy that can protect that many tankers.)

Escalation is a treacherous slope.

[M T]

Speaking of attacking commercial vessels transporting goods to/from an enemy, and what kind of effect is needed if the cargo is flammable, would it now make sense for Ukrainian special operatives to attack oil tankers that filled in Russia?  Say, those servicing Iran?  (A 2022 FT article indicated Russian needs about 240 oil tankers.  I am not aware that Russia has the kind of navy that can protect that many tankers.)

Escalation is a treacherous slope.

[Goose]

Russia chose a war of aggression.  I do not understand any argument that it is completely legal to shoot at "enemy" ships, so long as you first declare a war of aggression against the country whose flag is on the ship.

It is even broader than that. If you have declared a "blockade" you can even legally sink ships that are "neutral" and flying a neutral flag but are operating inside the territorial waters of "the enemy". Minefields obviously can't "see" the flag anyway.

Unfortunately the Laws of armed Conflict cannot be based on who is "morally right". History has shown that even the most egregious forms of aggression have a "story" and some "neutral" nations will support the story, often with tongue firmly in cheek. This is especially true if they can make money doing so. There are many other wars where there were "legitimate" arguments on each side of the issue. The "laws" would therefore be useless if they first require determining who is "in the right" about the conflict itself. In most cases these laws are not "enforceable". Non-belligerents just don't want to risk getting involved by using "kinetic" persuasion. Many times however nations have followed the rules of war  because of the opprobrium and non-kinetic sanctions associated with not doing so were considered an unacceptably high price. The alternative is no "rules" at all. Society has decided that having some rules is "better" than none.

As to not sinking the ship, that could be intentional.  Russia is not responsible for the complete destruction of a commercial vessel or the loss of any life.  It fired a "warning" shot that now puts everyone on notice that they had better not be involved with commercial shipping of goods from Ukraine.

Agree. Russia would prefer the grain trade to stop without them having to dedicate resources to it and/or being condemned for their actions. Obviously when you fire a missile at a ship you can't be absolutely certain nobody will be killed and that the ship will not sink. That said, Russia did use a "minimalist" approach.

[Goose]

Russia chose a war of aggression.  I do not understand any argument that it is completely legal to shoot at "enemy" ships, so long as you first declare a war of aggression against the country whose flag is on the ship.

It is even broader than that. If you have declared a "blockade" you can even legally sink ships that are "neutral" and flying a neutral flag but are operating inside the territorial waters of "the enemy". Minefields obviously can't "see" the flag anyway.

Unfortunately the Laws of armed Conflict cannot be based on who is "morally right". History has shown that even the most egregious forms of aggression have a "story" and some "neutral" nations will support the story, often with tongue firmly in cheek. This is especially true if they can make money doing so. There are many other wars where there were "legitimate" arguments on each side of the issue. The "laws" would therefore be useless if they first require determining who is "in the right" about the conflict itself. In most cases these laws are not "enforceable". Non-belligerents just don't want to risk getting involved by using "kinetic" persuasion. Many times however nations have followed the rules of war  because of the opprobrium and non-kinetic sanctions associated with not doing so were considered an unacceptably high price. The alternative is no "rules" at all. Society has decided that having some rules is "better" than none.

As to not sinking the ship, that could be intentional.  Russia is not responsible for the complete destruction of a commercial vessel or the loss of any life.  It fired a "warning" shot that now puts everyone on notice that they had better not be involved with commercial shipping of goods from Ukraine.

Agree. Russia would prefer the grain trade to stop without them having to dedicate resources to it and/or being condemned for their actions. Obviously when you fire a missile at a ship you can't be absolutely certain nobody will be killed and that the ship will not sink. That said, Russia did use a "minimalist" approach.

[Hurlburt88]

Behind paywall, but probably a few of you can access.   

Gist is that our strategy in Ukraine of containing the expansion of Russia and Russian power is working, and we should stick with it.

https://www.wsj.com/world/ignore-the-def...=wknd_pos1

[Hurlburt88]

Behind paywall, but probably a few of you can access.   

Gist is that our strategy in Ukraine of containing the expansion of Russia and Russian power is working, and we should stick with it.

https://www.wsj.com/world/ignore-the-def...=wknd_pos1

[dabigv13]

I agree with the main theme of the article. There is no shortcut, Ukrainian victory will come with steady western support over the course of many years.

[dabigv13]

I agree with the main theme of the article. There is no shortcut, Ukrainian victory will come with steady western support over the course of many years.

[Goose]

Behind paywall, but probably a few of you can access.   

Gist is that our strategy in Ukraine of containing the expansion of Russia and Russian power is working, and we should stick with it.

https://www.wsj.com/world/ignore-the-def...=wknd_pos1

I agree with the main theme of the article. There is no shortcut, Ukrainian victory will come with steady western support over the course of many years.

Unfortunately I don't subscribe to the WSJ so I can't read the article. I do agree that bogging Russia down in Ukraine has significantly reduced her standing as a world power. They are clearly not the "juggernaut" the wanted the word to believe they were. Unfortunately Russia is demonstrating that if you have nuclear weapons, maybe the "normal" rules don't apply to you. That situation is very bad for humanity. It validates Kim Jong Un's decisions. It leads Iran to the same place. This greatly increases the odds of "adventurism" by both smaller nascent nuclear powers and Russia herself. That in turn leads to the probability of a miscalculation leading to a nuclear exchange. Not good at all.

The OP and I have beat to death the discussion of how long Ukraine can/will continue the fight vs how long Russia can/will. It is interesting that the supposed "great power" Russia is relying on Iranian ballistic missiles to continue the fight. It is also somewhat dependent on military items from North Korea it seems. The bad news here is that it is allowing all three nations to realize the problems they face and possibly address them. That is not good for the US and NATO. It also creates a situation where Russia and Putin may need a "next war" to maintain their alliances and keep internal discontent from breaking out. Making Russia weaker (or even revealing how weak it is) may make adventurism seem mandatory to preserving the status quo.

Whatever one believes about Ukraine's "staying power", one has to be greatly concerned about the ability and willingness of "the west" to stay the course. There are obvious political issues in the US. Germany has similar (and in some ways worse) political questions. France has internal political issues that will at least for awhile make it difficult to concern themselves with Ukraine. The UK is more or less "solid", but if the US isn't I don't expect the UK to "go it alone".

In any case, if Ukraine fails to "win" this war, where winning is defined as ejecting Russia from its territory and establishing a somewhat reliable security situation going forward, the results for the US will be quite bad (on may levels). Belarus is going to be absorbed by Russia quite soon. This is not an "if". If Ukraine "wins", that perhaps will not occur. Ukraine falling to Russia would reinforce the belief that the US is not a reliable insurance policy and Europe, particularly former Warsaw Pact nations, need to get on Putin's bandwagon ASAP. Will "everyone" do that? No, but some (probably more than we expect) will. We do have "skin" in this game, "fair" or not.

[Goose]

Behind paywall, but probably a few of you can access.   

Gist is that our strategy in Ukraine of containing the expansion of Russia and Russian power is working, and we should stick with it.

https://www.wsj.com/world/ignore-the-def...=wknd_pos1

I agree with the main theme of the article. There is no shortcut, Ukrainian victory will come with steady western support over the course of many years.

Unfortunately I don't subscribe to the WSJ so I can't read the article. I do agree that bogging Russia down in Ukraine has significantly reduced her standing as a world power. They are clearly not the "juggernaut" the wanted the word to believe they were. Unfortunately Russia is demonstrating that if you have nuclear weapons, maybe the "normal" rules don't apply to you. That situation is very bad for humanity. It validates Kim Jong Un's decisions. It leads Iran to the same place. This greatly increases the odds of "adventurism" by both smaller nascent nuclear powers and Russia herself. That in turn leads to the probability of a miscalculation leading to a nuclear exchange. Not good at all.

The OP and I have beat to death the discussion of how long Ukraine can/will continue the fight vs how long Russia can/will. It is interesting that the supposed "great power" Russia is relying on Iranian ballistic missiles to continue the fight. It is also somewhat dependent on military items from North Korea it seems. The bad news here is that it is allowing all three nations to realize the problems they face and possibly address them. That is not good for the US and NATO. It also creates a situation where Russia and Putin may need a "next war" to maintain their alliances and keep internal discontent from breaking out. Making Russia weaker (or even revealing how weak it is) may make adventurism seem mandatory to preserving the status quo.

Whatever one believes about Ukraine's "staying power", one has to be greatly concerned about the ability and willingness of "the west" to stay the course. There are obvious political issues in the US. Germany has similar (and in some ways worse) political questions. France has internal political issues that will at least for awhile make it difficult to concern themselves with Ukraine. The UK is more or less "solid", but if the US isn't I don't expect the UK to "go it alone".

In any case, if Ukraine fails to "win" this war, where winning is defined as ejecting Russia from its territory and establishing a somewhat reliable security situation going forward, the results for the US will be quite bad (on may levels). Belarus is going to be absorbed by Russia quite soon. This is not an "if". If Ukraine "wins", that perhaps will not occur. Ukraine falling to Russia would reinforce the belief that the US is not a reliable insurance policy and Europe, particularly former Warsaw Pact nations, need to get on Putin's bandwagon ASAP. Will "everyone" do that? No, but some (probably more than we expect) will. We do have "skin" in this game, "fair" or not.