[Goose]

Or a high value asset at sea ... say an aircraft carrier to close to shore.  Mass attacks by cheap weapons are a going to be a challenge in many areas.

Not at all. First, no aircraft carrier is going to be "close to shore" if that shore is hostile. The F-18 has a combat radius of about 1000 km. While all strikes aren't launched at maximum range, I would be real surprised if aircraft carriers would ever get closer than about 300 miles. That really cuts down on what drones can be used. It also makes a mass attack much harder.

Even more importantly, the aircraft carrier is a moving target. It can change direction unexpectedly. Even if you know exactly where the aircraft carrier was when it launched the air strike (which you probably don't), you have no idea where it intends to recover the strike. It moves at 30 knots normally and can go faster if needed. The low altitude drones launched with an initial vector will find an empty sea. The ocean is large. Even with "modern technology" finding a vessel is difficult. The normal theory of anti-ship missiles is that they are relatively fast (in the case of Russian missiles, VERY fast). The can get to the predicted position of the target in a short enough time that their on-board radar has a good chance of still being able to see the ship, even though it won't be exactly where predicted. If the ship made a significant course change, the missile falls into the ocean. Some missiles attempt a search, but most don't have enough fuel/kinetic energy to do much of that. Current "drones" are slow and have no on-board radar. Their chances of hitting anything are slim and none. You can build a high speed drone that has an onboard radar. It is called an anti-ship missile :-).

A possible analog of these "drones" is the older Chinese "Silkworm" missile system. It is relatively fast and has an onboard radar. The current version of "drones" have neither of these things. It has a range well less than 300 miles. It has been used in war. It has never, ever hit anything that was moving. It did "OK" against fixed targets. In the first Iraq war one did fly through the entire "close in" fleet of destroyers. It hit nothing.

Edit: To be fair, a Silkworm did hit a couple of moving oil tankers in the confined waters of the Persian Gulf. Obviously these tankers were not combatants and were not expecting an attack.

[Goose]

Or a high value asset at sea ... say an aircraft carrier to close to shore.  Mass attacks by cheap weapons are a going to be a challenge in many areas.

Not at all. First, no aircraft carrier is going to be "close to shore" if that shore is hostile. The F-18 has a combat radius of about 1000 km. While all strikes aren't launched at maximum range, I would be real surprised if aircraft carriers would ever get closer than about 300 miles. That really cuts down on what drones can be used. It also makes a mass attack much harder.

Even more importantly, the aircraft carrier is a moving target. It can change direction unexpectedly. Even if you know exactly where the aircraft carrier was when it launched the air strike (which you probably don't), you have no idea where it intends to recover the strike. It moves at 30 knots normally and can go faster if needed. The low altitude drones launched with an initial vector will find an empty sea. The ocean is large. Even with "modern technology" finding a vessel is difficult. The normal theory of anti-ship missiles is that they are relatively fast (in the case of Russian missiles, VERY fast). The can get to the predicted position of the target in a short enough time that their on-board radar has a good chance of still being able to see the ship, even though it won't be exactly where predicted. If the ship made a significant course change, the missile falls into the ocean. Some missiles attempt a search, but most don't have enough fuel/kinetic energy to do much of that. Current "drones" are slow and have no on-board radar. Their chances of hitting anything are slim and none. You can build a high speed drone that has an onboard radar. It is called an anti-ship missile :-).

A possible analog of these "drones" is the older Chinese "Silkworm" missile system. It is relatively fast and has an onboard radar. The current version of "drones" have neither of these things. It has a range well less than 300 miles. It has been used in war. It has never, ever hit anything that was moving. It did "OK" against fixed targets. In the first Iraq war one did fly through the entire "close in" fleet of destroyers. It hit nothing.

Edit: To be fair, a Silkworm did hit a couple of moving oil tankers in the confined waters of the Persian Gulf. Obviously these tankers were not combatants and were not expecting an attack.

[dabigv13]

American carriers can survive nuclear explosions. An FPV drone will never trouble it, apart from perhaps some surprise attack on ships in port. An FPV drone could target vulnerable systems like radars in this scenario, but it would need to be a true surprise attack for it to have any chance.

[dabigv13]

American carriers can survive nuclear explosions. An FPV drone will never trouble it, apart from perhaps some surprise attack on ships in port. An FPV drone could target vulnerable systems like radars in this scenario, but it would need to be a true surprise attack for it to have any chance.

[Goose]

American carriers can survive nuclear explosions. An FPV drone will never trouble it, apart from perhaps some surprise attack on ships in port. An FPV drone could target vulnerable systems like radars in this scenario, but it would need to be a true surprise attack for it to have any chance.

In port, or when the ship is not moving FPV drones can hit it. I agree that carriers are rugged. To really damage their ability to operate isn't easy. However, if they have aircraft on the deck those aircraft aren't so rugged. A relatively small explosion can start a very bad fire that will detonate the weapons on the other aircraft. A "lucky shot" is possible. However, armed aircraft in a friendly port are not very probable. FPVs in port can do some damage. The again, so can mortars. Definitely not a game changer.

[Goose]

American carriers can survive nuclear explosions. An FPV drone will never trouble it, apart from perhaps some surprise attack on ships in port. An FPV drone could target vulnerable systems like radars in this scenario, but it would need to be a true surprise attack for it to have any chance.

In port, or when the ship is not moving FPV drones can hit it. I agree that carriers are rugged. To really damage their ability to operate isn't easy. However, if they have aircraft on the deck those aircraft aren't so rugged. A relatively small explosion can start a very bad fire that will detonate the weapons on the other aircraft. A "lucky shot" is possible. However, armed aircraft in a friendly port are not very probable. FPVs in port can do some damage. The again, so can mortars. Definitely not a game changer.

[GK3]

What I do not understand at all is how effective Mainstay, or AWACS aircrafts are at picking up incoming missles, aircraft, or whatever, flying low in the weeds so to speak.

The short answer is very effective, subject to certain assumptions. I don't know the exact detailed capability of an A-50, but even assuming it is comparable to a late 1990s AWACS, it has a very good Digital Moving Target processor that uses the coherent Doppler shift in the radar returns from moving targets to make them absolutely stand out from the ground clutter. These platforms can even see cars on the freeway if they turn the low speed limit down far enough. The assumptions are 1) the target has a relative velocity component in it's course that is large enough to be detected, and 2) the target has a radar cross section large enough to be detected. The second requirement can be greatly affected by building a "stealth" cruse missile, which both we and the Russians (e.g. KH-101) have done. However, the physical size of most cruise missiles is such that the X band radar will see a missile when it would not see an aircraft of similar stealth. It has to do with the mode of reflection involved. That is one reason (of many) why the  E-7 Wedgetail operating in L band is such a high priority acquisition for the USAF. The USN was very smart (or lucky) in the original design of the E-2. Its radars, including APS-145 (https://www.radartutorial.eu/19.kartei/0...86.en.html) and the latest and greatest APY-9 (https://www.radartutorial.eu/19.kartei/0...83.en.html) operate just below P band.

BI recently had an article how we are now giving Ukraine a long range cruise missle that  has a range of 200 miles.  I am not sure how the Tomahawk missles feels about that.  200 miles is hardly a long range weapon.

The Tomahawk engine will just be warmed up at 200 miles :-).

I have seen articles that indicated that the S400 can find things flying down in the weeds, say  100 to 200 ft above mean ground level about 45 km out.  Can it then intercept that incoming missles in the time left if the incoming weapon is say moving at 500 mph?  Seems to me there is a very good chance that the incoming weapon would hit you before you hit it.

45 km is not literally correct. The radar horizon (without refraction) for a radar antenna located 10 feet above the ground and a cruise missile at 200 ft is 34.1 km. If the radar is at 20 ft in the air the horizon is 36.7 km. At 926 kph the 36.7 km will be covered in 142.7 seconds. Obviously the intercept needs to occur well away from the S400 to avoid fragment damage. Can an S400 accomplish this? The answer is a very qualified yes. The S400 does have an "automatic" mode that could in theory launch the missile. How well that actually works is an open question. The Russians tend to prefer a "man in the loop" operation. It is also pretty risky leaving a missile battery in full automatic mode for a long period of time. It is probable there is a non-zero false alarm rate. There are "red on red" issues at the very least, especially because supposedly both Russia and Ukraine aren't using the IFF much if at all. Under normal circumstances you don't do that. It is also obvious you get exactly one chance. There are also missile flight issues. The launch direction may require rapid missile maneuvers very near the ground to happen at rates the missile simply can't do. It is imperative the missile crew and the support staff be aware that a missile may be launched "unexpectedly" :-). Ideally, you want a SHORAD system allocated to defend the S400.

All that said, when the Ukrainians initially received the Patriot systems they apparently did leave it full automatic lots of the time. It worked well. I doubt the S400 would do the same.

Can an AWACS type aircraft pick up those low flying weapons easily?  Even if they do, how do they facilitate the destruction of those weapons.  Can an AWACS system overide the control of the ground based air defense systems and launch the air defense systems long before the Air defense system radar even finds it?

Yes, an AWACS system can detect such targets almost immediately after they are launched. The AWACS would evaluate the threat and ideally assign an aircraft to shoot it down. The AWACS can track "lots" of such target and coordinate the air battle to (in theory) make the best use of its assigned air assets. The aircraft get a vector (and updated vectors if needed) toward the target. Once the aircraft has the target on its radar, the AWACS quits helping. The aircraft then shoots the missile down. Obviously this engagement can't take forever. It depends on where the missile is coming from. If no aircraft is available with permissive geometry, the AWACS can designate the target for any appropriate missile battery. The NASAMS has often been demonstrated operating in this mode. The AWACS doesn't exactly "take control". The battery computer and guidance uplink participates (as can the battery personnel). However, if the battery has not detected the target the AWACS updates will be used to "steer" the AMRAAM to the target until it is within range. Patriot can be used the same way. Additionally, Patriot batteries can "handoff" targets to NASAMS. In this manner, batteries can engage targets they themselves cannot "see". All this has been demonstrated. The AWACS has clearly demonstrated in actual conflicts the ability to shoot down cruse missiles at scale using aircraft directed by the AWACS. The "other" capabilities have definitely been demonstrated many times, although AFAIK it hasn't been used in conflict.

Russia claims the A-50 can do all these same things as part of their IADS. However, we have not seen them actually do this. Russia also claims they can guide the long range S400 missiles from the A-50. This is a very "big deal" in long range engagements. However, AFAIK we have never actually seen the Russians do any of this, even in drills.

This conflict has created a really new issue the worlds militaries need to deal with.  We are no longer talking about expensive Reaper drones firing a few weapons at a target, but more about flying hundreds of cheap drones carrying from 5 to say 50 kilos of explosives. I think it would be very hard for a single country to be able to stop this kind of attack outside of the largest countries on the planetl

I am not in complete agreement. The hundreds of cheap "quadcoptor" drones have very limited range. These aren't weapons that have much reach. They are important weapons and certainly will make a tactical contribution in the near future. Most of these drones are not fast. The ones that have reasonable range are more like the  Shahed 136. They are slow and can easily be run down by high performance aircraft. None of these weapons are gamechangers. There is going to be a lot of development of these weapons making them more capable. There will even more improvements in defensive measures IMO. Even in the last two years massive changes have occurred during the middle of a war. Five years from now, the scene will be vastly different than it is today. IMO FPV drones will basically not exist in five years, if not sooner. Their EW signature can't be eliminated. If you radiate and can't defend yourself you will be a big bullseye. Scarily, AI will be used to recognize and attack targets with maybe a "squirt" when that determination is made. In short the future will not look like the present and the correlation of forces will be very different.

I
How much of a radar return is there from a quad copter carrying say a 20 kg weapon load? I have always assumed that these weapons would be flown and target on local targets.  Is there any kind or real radar return off these smaller drones?

[GK3]

What I do not understand at all is how effective Mainstay, or AWACS aircrafts are at picking up incoming missles, aircraft, or whatever, flying low in the weeds so to speak.

The short answer is very effective, subject to certain assumptions. I don't know the exact detailed capability of an A-50, but even assuming it is comparable to a late 1990s AWACS, it has a very good Digital Moving Target processor that uses the coherent Doppler shift in the radar returns from moving targets to make them absolutely stand out from the ground clutter. These platforms can even see cars on the freeway if they turn the low speed limit down far enough. The assumptions are 1) the target has a relative velocity component in it's course that is large enough to be detected, and 2) the target has a radar cross section large enough to be detected. The second requirement can be greatly affected by building a "stealth" cruse missile, which both we and the Russians (e.g. KH-101) have done. However, the physical size of most cruise missiles is such that the X band radar will see a missile when it would not see an aircraft of similar stealth. It has to do with the mode of reflection involved. That is one reason (of many) why the  E-7 Wedgetail operating in L band is such a high priority acquisition for the USAF. The USN was very smart (or lucky) in the original design of the E-2. Its radars, including APS-145 (https://www.radartutorial.eu/19.kartei/0...86.en.html) and the latest and greatest APY-9 (https://www.radartutorial.eu/19.kartei/0...83.en.html) operate just below P band.

BI recently had an article how we are now giving Ukraine a long range cruise missle that  has a range of 200 miles.  I am not sure how the Tomahawk missles feels about that.  200 miles is hardly a long range weapon.

The Tomahawk engine will just be warmed up at 200 miles :-).

I have seen articles that indicated that the S400 can find things flying down in the weeds, say  100 to 200 ft above mean ground level about 45 km out.  Can it then intercept that incoming missles in the time left if the incoming weapon is say moving at 500 mph?  Seems to me there is a very good chance that the incoming weapon would hit you before you hit it.

45 km is not literally correct. The radar horizon (without refraction) for a radar antenna located 10 feet above the ground and a cruise missile at 200 ft is 34.1 km. If the radar is at 20 ft in the air the horizon is 36.7 km. At 926 kph the 36.7 km will be covered in 142.7 seconds. Obviously the intercept needs to occur well away from the S400 to avoid fragment damage. Can an S400 accomplish this? The answer is a very qualified yes. The S400 does have an "automatic" mode that could in theory launch the missile. How well that actually works is an open question. The Russians tend to prefer a "man in the loop" operation. It is also pretty risky leaving a missile battery in full automatic mode for a long period of time. It is probable there is a non-zero false alarm rate. There are "red on red" issues at the very least, especially because supposedly both Russia and Ukraine aren't using the IFF much if at all. Under normal circumstances you don't do that. It is also obvious you get exactly one chance. There are also missile flight issues. The launch direction may require rapid missile maneuvers very near the ground to happen at rates the missile simply can't do. It is imperative the missile crew and the support staff be aware that a missile may be launched "unexpectedly" :-). Ideally, you want a SHORAD system allocated to defend the S400.

All that said, when the Ukrainians initially received the Patriot systems they apparently did leave it full automatic lots of the time. It worked well. I doubt the S400 would do the same.

Can an AWACS type aircraft pick up those low flying weapons easily?  Even if they do, how do they facilitate the destruction of those weapons.  Can an AWACS system overide the control of the ground based air defense systems and launch the air defense systems long before the Air defense system radar even finds it?

Yes, an AWACS system can detect such targets almost immediately after they are launched. The AWACS would evaluate the threat and ideally assign an aircraft to shoot it down. The AWACS can track "lots" of such target and coordinate the air battle to (in theory) make the best use of its assigned air assets. The aircraft get a vector (and updated vectors if needed) toward the target. Once the aircraft has the target on its radar, the AWACS quits helping. The aircraft then shoots the missile down. Obviously this engagement can't take forever. It depends on where the missile is coming from. If no aircraft is available with permissive geometry, the AWACS can designate the target for any appropriate missile battery. The NASAMS has often been demonstrated operating in this mode. The AWACS doesn't exactly "take control". The battery computer and guidance uplink participates (as can the battery personnel). However, if the battery has not detected the target the AWACS updates will be used to "steer" the AMRAAM to the target until it is within range. Patriot can be used the same way. Additionally, Patriot batteries can "handoff" targets to NASAMS. In this manner, batteries can engage targets they themselves cannot "see". All this has been demonstrated. The AWACS has clearly demonstrated in actual conflicts the ability to shoot down cruse missiles at scale using aircraft directed by the AWACS. The "other" capabilities have definitely been demonstrated many times, although AFAIK it hasn't been used in conflict.

Russia claims the A-50 can do all these same things as part of their IADS. However, we have not seen them actually do this. Russia also claims they can guide the long range S400 missiles from the A-50. This is a very "big deal" in long range engagements. However, AFAIK we have never actually seen the Russians do any of this, even in drills.

This conflict has created a really new issue the worlds militaries need to deal with.  We are no longer talking about expensive Reaper drones firing a few weapons at a target, but more about flying hundreds of cheap drones carrying from 5 to say 50 kilos of explosives. I think it would be very hard for a single country to be able to stop this kind of attack outside of the largest countries on the planetl

I am not in complete agreement. The hundreds of cheap "quadcoptor" drones have very limited range. These aren't weapons that have much reach. They are important weapons and certainly will make a tactical contribution in the near future. Most of these drones are not fast. The ones that have reasonable range are more like the  Shahed 136. They are slow and can easily be run down by high performance aircraft. None of these weapons are gamechangers. There is going to be a lot of development of these weapons making them more capable. There will even more improvements in defensive measures IMO. Even in the last two years massive changes have occurred during the middle of a war. Five years from now, the scene will be vastly different than it is today. IMO FPV drones will basically not exist in five years, if not sooner. Their EW signature can't be eliminated. If you radiate and can't defend yourself you will be a big bullseye. Scarily, AI will be used to recognize and attack targets with maybe a "squirt" when that determination is made. In short the future will not look like the present and the correlation of forces will be very different.

I
How much of a radar return is there from a quad copter carrying say a 20 kg weapon load? I have always assumed that these weapons would be flown and target on local targets.  Is there any kind or real radar return off these smaller drones?

[Goose]

How much of a radar return is there from a quad copter carrying say a 20 kg weapon load? I have always assumed that these weapons would be flown and target on local targets.  Is there any kind or real radar return off these smaller drones?

Not much, but "enough" in many cases. An AWACS in general won't see it at any reasonable range. It isn't so much that it is a very small target (which it is), but rather it is too slow. The Doppler shift due to target velocity will be at too low a frequency to filter it out from ground clutter. However, the relatively short range of such weapons does mean that simple and "low" power radars looking "up" at a say 15 degree elevation can see these targets, because they are "close" and the free space path loss is small. This type of detection can direct both kinetic weapons (guns) and directed energy weapons (lasers and high power microwave transmitters) at these types of targets. It turns out that there are also some ultra-wide-band (UWB) radars that work very well on these types of targets. The trick is to build an antenna that will support the bandwidth. Work is ongoing.

[Goose]

How much of a radar return is there from a quad copter carrying say a 20 kg weapon load? I have always assumed that these weapons would be flown and target on local targets.  Is there any kind or real radar return off these smaller drones?

Not much, but "enough" in many cases. An AWACS in general won't see it at any reasonable range. It isn't so much that it is a very small target (which it is), but rather it is too slow. The Doppler shift due to target velocity will be at too low a frequency to filter it out from ground clutter. However, the relatively short range of such weapons does mean that simple and "low" power radars looking "up" at a say 15 degree elevation can see these targets, because they are "close" and the free space path loss is small. This type of detection can direct both kinetic weapons (guns) and directed energy weapons (lasers and high power microwave transmitters) at these types of targets. It turns out that there are also some ultra-wide-band (UWB) radars that work very well on these types of targets. The trick is to build an antenna that will support the bandwidth. Work is ongoing.

[dabigv13]

Ukraine lost an F16 earlier this week due to a crash, attributed to pilot error. Noncombat.

https://www.wsj.com/world/ukrainian-f-16...h-4f6d66f6

[dabigv13]

Ukraine lost an F16 earlier this week due to a crash, attributed to pilot error. Noncombat.

https://www.wsj.com/world/ukrainian-f-16...h-4f6d66f6

[Goose]

Ukraine lost an F16 earlier this week due to a crash, attributed to pilot error. Noncombat.

https://www.wsj.com/world/ukrainian-f-16...h-4f6d66f6

Unfortunate. I guess we are not really certain that it was a "crash". It may be the Ukrainians would rather admit to a crash than that a Russian missile strike was successful. There are good tactical as well as political reasons for them to do so. OTOH it may have been a crash, perhaps partly due to a long day chasing drones by a relatively inexperienced pilot. If it was a crash, I hope the pilot is OK, either because he punched out or because the "crash" wasn't all that bad. Stuff happens. Losses due to operations are real. Losing aircraft is bad. Losing pilots is worse, they are harder to replace.

[Goose]

Ukraine lost an F16 earlier this week due to a crash, attributed to pilot error. Noncombat.

https://www.wsj.com/world/ukrainian-f-16...h-4f6d66f6

Unfortunate. I guess we are not really certain that it was a "crash". It may be the Ukrainians would rather admit to a crash than that a Russian missile strike was successful. There are good tactical as well as political reasons for them to do so. OTOH it may have been a crash, perhaps partly due to a long day chasing drones by a relatively inexperienced pilot. If it was a crash, I hope the pilot is OK, either because he punched out or because the "crash" wasn't all that bad. Stuff happens. Losses due to operations are real. Losing aircraft is bad. Losing pilots is worse, they are harder to replace.

[BostonCard]

https://x.com/defmon3/status/1829196136051036554?s=46

I am always a bit hesitant to post stuff like this because you never know how widespread it is, but given the situation on the ground, where Russia has been making slow but steady gains in the East and now is seriously threatening Pokrovsk, which is strategically important as a logistical hub for Ukraine, I find this and other comments like it to be credible. I wish the situation were better, and I can only hope that Russia’s relative inability to take advantage with a big breakthrough is that they are just as exhausted as the Ukrainians, but I think it is just lack of initiative. I am hoping that something can at least stabilize the front and halt Russian advances, but the news is leaving me increasingly pessimistic.

BC

---

F-16 pilot was confirmed to have been killed.

https://www.cnn.com/2024/08/29/europe/uk...index.html

BC

[BostonCard]

https://x.com/defmon3/status/1829196136051036554?s=46

I am always a bit hesitant to post stuff like this because you never know how widespread it is, but given the situation on the ground, where Russia has been making slow but steady gains in the East and now is seriously threatening Pokrovsk, which is strategically important as a logistical hub for Ukraine, I find this and other comments like it to be credible. I wish the situation were better, and I can only hope that Russia’s relative inability to take advantage with a big breakthrough is that they are just as exhausted as the Ukrainians, but I think it is just lack of initiative. I am hoping that something can at least stabilize the front and halt Russian advances, but the news is leaving me increasingly pessimistic.

BC

---

F-16 pilot was confirmed to have been killed.

https://www.cnn.com/2024/08/29/europe/uk...index.html

BC

[TrumpCard]

I have been hoping that weather eventually will cause the Russian offensive in the Donbas to stall.  The Ukrainians need to hold out for at least another month until rainy season.  If they can do so, then I hope they can re-generate and re-allocate forces so as to stabilize the front line in time for Spring 2025.  I didn't predict Ukraine's success in Kursk, so maybe I'm missing something, but it doesn't seem like Ukraine is poised to retake land in the Donbas or in the South anytime soon.  Simply stabilizing the situation seems like the best they can do in the near term.  Like this post says, we have to hope that Russia also is running out of steam.

[TrumpCard]

I have been hoping that weather eventually will cause the Russian offensive in the Donbas to stall.  The Ukrainians need to hold out for at least another month until rainy season.  If they can do so, then I hope they can re-generate and re-allocate forces so as to stabilize the front line in time for Spring 2025.  I didn't predict Ukraine's success in Kursk, so maybe I'm missing something, but it doesn't seem like Ukraine is poised to retake land in the Donbas or in the South anytime soon.  Simply stabilizing the situation seems like the best they can do in the near term.  Like this post says, we have to hope that Russia also is running out of steam.

[Goose]

https://x.com/defmon3/status/1829196136051036554?s=46

I am always a bit hesitant to post stuff like this because you never know how widespread it is, but given the situation on the ground, where Russia has been making slow but steady gains in the East and now is seriously threatening Pokrovsk, which is strategically important as a logistical hub for Ukraine, I find this and other comments like it to be credible. I wish the situation were better, and I can only hope that Russia’s relative inability to take advantage with a big breakthrough is that they are just as exhausted as the Ukrainians, but I think it is just lack of initiative. I am hoping that something can at least stabilize the front and halt Russian advances, but the news is leaving me increasingly pessimistic.

BC

IMO it is important to "face the facts". It is often true that the troops in the field do not "understand the big picture" and are affected greatly by their local situation. That said, the repeated backward movement of the Ukrainian military in Donbas cannot be denied or ignored. The other thing that cannot be ignored is that Ukraine does not have enough 155 mm ammunition to match Russia's rate of expenditure of similar munitions. This is not because the US is holding back. That is over. The EU contribution also fell well short of what was promised. Even if it were as promised, Russia has many, many more 153 mm tubes and much more ammunition than Ukraine does. That isn't going to change.

The comments about the effectiveness of the newly "trained" Ukrainians is disturbing but quite possibly a reflection of unit solidarity. The US has had similar reports in every war. They were largely untrue. What is true is that their is no substitute for combat experience, particularly in the infantry. "New Guys" historically die at a much greater rate than "veterans". Training is valuable but cannot actually deliver the full lessons of staying alive in combat. Soldiers have to adapt and many of them don't live long enough to do so.

This situation IMO reflects a lack of understanding from day 1 by the US and NATO of the correlation of forces that would apply to a long war. Ukraine can't win a long war. Ukraine basically knew that from the start but didn't want to tell everybody that because the US and NATO may not have supported them if they "knew". NATO and the US either didn't know or didn't want to face that fact. In any case, there is no plan to win in place today. Lacking that, eventual defeat is inevitable baring some "black swan" that makes Russia give up. The troops know this, and how long their morale will hold up is questionable.

---

F-16 pilot was confirmed to have been killed.

https://www.cnn.com/2024/08/29/europe/uk...index.html

BC

Very unfortunate, especially given it was a very "involved" aviator. Stuff happens. Ukraine is saying it wasn't pilot error. We may never know what happened. That said, it isn't all that rare that aircraft are lost, especially by inexperienced pilots. It could have been due to an aircraft fault of some kind. There are also lots of inexperienced support troops involved too. This event, while "bad", shouldn't IMO lead to despair.

[Goose]

https://x.com/defmon3/status/1829196136051036554?s=46

I am always a bit hesitant to post stuff like this because you never know how widespread it is, but given the situation on the ground, where Russia has been making slow but steady gains in the East and now is seriously threatening Pokrovsk, which is strategically important as a logistical hub for Ukraine, I find this and other comments like it to be credible. I wish the situation were better, and I can only hope that Russia’s relative inability to take advantage with a big breakthrough is that they are just as exhausted as the Ukrainians, but I think it is just lack of initiative. I am hoping that something can at least stabilize the front and halt Russian advances, but the news is leaving me increasingly pessimistic.

BC

IMO it is important to "face the facts". It is often true that the troops in the field do not "understand the big picture" and are affected greatly by their local situation. That said, the repeated backward movement of the Ukrainian military in Donbas cannot be denied or ignored. The other thing that cannot be ignored is that Ukraine does not have enough 155 mm ammunition to match Russia's rate of expenditure of similar munitions. This is not because the US is holding back. That is over. The EU contribution also fell well short of what was promised. Even if it were as promised, Russia has many, many more 153 mm tubes and much more ammunition than Ukraine does. That isn't going to change.

The comments about the effectiveness of the newly "trained" Ukrainians is disturbing but quite possibly a reflection of unit solidarity. The US has had similar reports in every war. They were largely untrue. What is true is that their is no substitute for combat experience, particularly in the infantry. "New Guys" historically die at a much greater rate than "veterans". Training is valuable but cannot actually deliver the full lessons of staying alive in combat. Soldiers have to adapt and many of them don't live long enough to do so.

This situation IMO reflects a lack of understanding from day 1 by the US and NATO of the correlation of forces that would apply to a long war. Ukraine can't win a long war. Ukraine basically knew that from the start but didn't want to tell everybody that because the US and NATO may not have supported them if they "knew". NATO and the US either didn't know or didn't want to face that fact. In any case, there is no plan to win in place today. Lacking that, eventual defeat is inevitable baring some "black swan" that makes Russia give up. The troops know this, and how long their morale will hold up is questionable.

---

F-16 pilot was confirmed to have been killed.

https://www.cnn.com/2024/08/29/europe/uk...index.html

BC

Very unfortunate, especially given it was a very "involved" aviator. Stuff happens. Ukraine is saying it wasn't pilot error. We may never know what happened. That said, it isn't all that rare that aircraft are lost, especially by inexperienced pilots. It could have been due to an aircraft fault of some kind. There are also lots of inexperienced support troops involved too. This event, while "bad", shouldn't IMO lead to despair.

[dabigv13]

Rumors now the F16 may have been shot down by a Ukrainian Patriot SAM. The F16 was hunting cruise missiles at the time of the incident.

https://x.com/DAlperovitch/status/1829228808697983312

[dabigv13]

Rumors now the F16 may have been shot down by a Ukrainian Patriot SAM. The F16 was hunting cruise missiles at the time of the incident.

https://x.com/DAlperovitch/status/1829228808697983312

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-strik...35487.html

Zelenskyy firing the head of the Air Force may have been necessary for reasons entirely outside the loss of the F-16. If so, the timing is unfortunate. It is difficult to believe Ukraine knows for sure what happened at this point unless it is indeed true that a Patriot hit the F-16. One also hopes the firing isn't a knee-jerk reaction.

Before we got additional data my assumption was that the F-16 crashed on landing. That is a good bet if one knows nothing else about the event. However, the F-16 was still out hunting drones. From CNN:

In a statement issued later on Thursday, the Ukrainian Air Force said Moonfish destroyed three cruise missiles and one attack drone on Monday, before he was killed in the crash. The air force said he was posthumously awarded the rank of colonel.

The article also says contact with the aircraft was lost as it approached another Russian target. An F-16 can carry six AMRAAMs, although four AMRAAMS and two Sidewinders is a more normal configuration. Both cruise missiles and drones fly relatively low. The F-16 can fly at a slightly higher altitude and shoot cruise missiles down with AMRAAMS. Doing that with drones is frowned upon because the missile is much more expensive than the drone. The drone also isn't a great radar target in many cases and the AMRAAM might not "lock up" on it.

Both cruise missiles and drones can also be shot down with the onboard auto-cannon. If you dive toward the drone you must be very careful to manage your altitude. It is very easy to get yourself in a situation where you will simply hit the ground. Target fixation contributes to the likelihood of making such an error. You need to "boom and zoom". If you miss, come around again. It is a drone. It isn't coming after you. Pilots sometimes err by trying to "fix" a bad initial approach by slowing down too much and fall out of the sky. The other problem is flying through derbies of the drone you just shot down. Shooting down drones with the gun isn't a trivial task, especially for pilots that do not have lots of experience in the jet. However, that is the best way to do it and what Ukraine needs right now.

There are also tons of other things that could have happened. The F-16 could have collided with the drone. At low altitude you don't have much time to recover. Something in the jet may have broken. These are used airplanes that probably didn't get the most comprehensive maintenance near the end of the NATO service. The Ukrainian personnel maintaining them are also very inexperienced. At this point we just don't know.

As far as Ukrainian air defenses e.g. a Patriot shooting down the F-16, that is unfortunately a possibility. I don't know if the F-16s and the Patriots retained their NATO IFF gear. That hardware is not something we want in Russian hands, so maybe it was all removed. Even if it wasn't it is unclear Ukraine would use it. Even if they did, plenty of Ukrainian SAM batteries don't have it. Also, at 200 ft a MANPADS can do the job. They definitely don't have NATO IFF. We do know that early in the war Ukraine decided the only way their air force could operate was by designating certain areas as free-fire zones for SAMS and other areas as aircraft operations areas where the SAMs were absolutely weapons tight. Perhaps the F-16 strayed into a SAM area, or perhaps the recent Russian attack was so intense that all SAM restrictions were lifted.

Running an air force under these conditions isn't easy. Let's hope Ukraine can do so, because without one they are indeed in dire straits.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-strik...35487.html

Zelenskyy firing the head of the Air Force may have been necessary for reasons entirely outside the loss of the F-16. If so, the timing is unfortunate. It is difficult to believe Ukraine knows for sure what happened at this point unless it is indeed true that a Patriot hit the F-16. One also hopes the firing isn't a knee-jerk reaction.

Before we got additional data my assumption was that the F-16 crashed on landing. That is a good bet if one knows nothing else about the event. However, the F-16 was still out hunting drones. From CNN:

In a statement issued later on Thursday, the Ukrainian Air Force said Moonfish destroyed three cruise missiles and one attack drone on Monday, before he was killed in the crash. The air force said he was posthumously awarded the rank of colonel.

The article also says contact with the aircraft was lost as it approached another Russian target. An F-16 can carry six AMRAAMs, although four AMRAAMS and two Sidewinders is a more normal configuration. Both cruise missiles and drones fly relatively low. The F-16 can fly at a slightly higher altitude and shoot cruise missiles down with AMRAAMS. Doing that with drones is frowned upon because the missile is much more expensive than the drone. The drone also isn't a great radar target in many cases and the AMRAAM might not "lock up" on it.

Both cruise missiles and drones can also be shot down with the onboard auto-cannon. If you dive toward the drone you must be very careful to manage your altitude. It is very easy to get yourself in a situation where you will simply hit the ground. Target fixation contributes to the likelihood of making such an error. You need to "boom and zoom". If you miss, come around again. It is a drone. It isn't coming after you. Pilots sometimes err by trying to "fix" a bad initial approach by slowing down too much and fall out of the sky. The other problem is flying through derbies of the drone you just shot down. Shooting down drones with the gun isn't a trivial task, especially for pilots that do not have lots of experience in the jet. However, that is the best way to do it and what Ukraine needs right now.

There are also tons of other things that could have happened. The F-16 could have collided with the drone. At low altitude you don't have much time to recover. Something in the jet may have broken. These are used airplanes that probably didn't get the most comprehensive maintenance near the end of the NATO service. The Ukrainian personnel maintaining them are also very inexperienced. At this point we just don't know.

As far as Ukrainian air defenses e.g. a Patriot shooting down the F-16, that is unfortunately a possibility. I don't know if the F-16s and the Patriots retained their NATO IFF gear. That hardware is not something we want in Russian hands, so maybe it was all removed. Even if it wasn't it is unclear Ukraine would use it. Even if they did, plenty of Ukrainian SAM batteries don't have it. Also, at 200 ft a MANPADS can do the job. They definitely don't have NATO IFF. We do know that early in the war Ukraine decided the only way their air force could operate was by designating certain areas as free-fire zones for SAMS and other areas as aircraft operations areas where the SAMs were absolutely weapons tight. Perhaps the F-16 strayed into a SAM area, or perhaps the recent Russian attack was so intense that all SAM restrictions were lifted.

Running an air force under these conditions isn't easy. Let's hope Ukraine can do so, because without one they are indeed in dire straits.

[M T]

We are so fortunate to have Goose point out details and considerations that aren't making the nightly news, or almost any other online news site.
I think some news organization could do well to hire him to provide the color commentary on this war.

[M T]

We are so fortunate to have Goose point out details and considerations that aren't making the nightly news, or almost any other online news site.
I think some news organization could do well to hire him to provide the color commentary on this war.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukrainian-air...59699.html

Great videos of a MIG-29 launching carrying JDAMS to destroy two bridges in Kursk Oblast. It appears the MIG-29 can carry 2 JDAMs. The video also shows ground crew programming/verifying  the JDAMS using a laptop with what appears to be a PCMCIA 1553 interface. This indicates you can't do it from the cockpit as that would be easier. You wouldn't be balancing a laptop on the landing gear. That strongly indicates that the JDAMS aren't getting the high-accuracy handoff they will from an F-16. Not also that one of the bombs has a somewhat dished in nose. Apparently was still functional :-). 

Obviously it isn't necessarily true that the arming of the aircraft and the two bridges being destroyed are directly connected. In fact, the first attack used two JDAMS. At about 43 seconds into the video there are two clearly separate explosions, so the aircraft would at a minimum have to rearm for the second bridge. It is also good that Ukraine put to bed the (many) stories that claimed ATACMS destroyed the bridges. The second bridge does show signs of damage that could have come from an ATACMS. It could have also come from artillery or M31A2 rockets. However, an ATACMS is very unlikely (more like incapable)  of doing what the JDAMS did to the bridges.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukrainian-air...59699.html

Great videos of a MIG-29 launching carrying JDAMS to destroy two bridges in Kursk Oblast. It appears the MIG-29 can carry 2 JDAMs. The video also shows ground crew programming/verifying  the JDAMS using a laptop with what appears to be a PCMCIA 1553 interface. This indicates you can't do it from the cockpit as that would be easier. You wouldn't be balancing a laptop on the landing gear. That strongly indicates that the JDAMS aren't getting the high-accuracy handoff they will from an F-16. Not also that one of the bombs has a somewhat dished in nose. Apparently was still functional :-). 

Obviously it isn't necessarily true that the arming of the aircraft and the two bridges being destroyed are directly connected. In fact, the first attack used two JDAMS. At about 43 seconds into the video there are two clearly separate explosions, so the aircraft would at a minimum have to rearm for the second bridge. It is also good that Ukraine put to bed the (many) stories that claimed ATACMS destroyed the bridges. The second bridge does show signs of damage that could have come from an ATACMS. It could have also come from artillery or M31A2 rockets. However, an ATACMS is very unlikely (more like incapable)  of doing what the JDAMS did to the bridges.

[GK3]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukrainian-air...59699.html

Great videos of a MIG-29 launching carrying JDAMS to destroy two bridges in Kursk Oblast. It appears the MIG-29 can carry 2 JDAMs. The video also shows ground crew programming/verifying  the JDAMS using a laptop with what appears to be a PCMCIA 1553 interface. This indicates you can't do it from the cockpit as that would be easier. You wouldn't be balancing a laptop on the landing gear. That strongly indicates that the JDAMS aren't getting the high-accuracy handoff they will from an F-16. Not also that one of the bombs has a somewhat dished in nose. Apparently was still functional :-). 

Obviously it isn't necessarily true that the arming of the aircraft and the two bridges being destroyed are directly connected. In fact, the first attack used two JDAMS. At about 43 seconds into the video there are two clearly separate explosions, so the aircraft would at a minimum have to rearm for the second bridge. It is also good that Ukraine put to bed the (many) stories that claimed ATACMS destroyed the bridges. The second bridge does show signs of damage that could have come from an ATACMS. It could have also come from artillery or M31A2 rockets. However, an ATACMS is very unlikely (more like incapable)  of doing what the JDAMS did to the bridges.

I think I read somewhere that they found they could not program the Mig 29 hardware to use our JDAMS and came up with the work around. I also had the impression that the weapon could be reprogrammed from a laptop in the cockpit, I have no idea if that is correct.  Here is another link.  I apologize if it is the identical info: https://armyrecognition.com/focus-analys...rsk-bridge

[GK3]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukrainian-air...59699.html

Great videos of a MIG-29 launching carrying JDAMS to destroy two bridges in Kursk Oblast. It appears the MIG-29 can carry 2 JDAMs. The video also shows ground crew programming/verifying  the JDAMS using a laptop with what appears to be a PCMCIA 1553 interface. This indicates you can't do it from the cockpit as that would be easier. You wouldn't be balancing a laptop on the landing gear. That strongly indicates that the JDAMS aren't getting the high-accuracy handoff they will from an F-16. Not also that one of the bombs has a somewhat dished in nose. Apparently was still functional :-). 

Obviously it isn't necessarily true that the arming of the aircraft and the two bridges being destroyed are directly connected. In fact, the first attack used two JDAMS. At about 43 seconds into the video there are two clearly separate explosions, so the aircraft would at a minimum have to rearm for the second bridge. It is also good that Ukraine put to bed the (many) stories that claimed ATACMS destroyed the bridges. The second bridge does show signs of damage that could have come from an ATACMS. It could have also come from artillery or M31A2 rockets. However, an ATACMS is very unlikely (more like incapable)  of doing what the JDAMS did to the bridges.

I think I read somewhere that they found they could not program the Mig 29 hardware to use our JDAMS and came up with the work around. I also had the impression that the weapon could be reprogrammed from a laptop in the cockpit, I have no idea if that is correct.  Here is another link.  I apologize if it is the identical info: https://armyrecognition.com/focus-analys...rsk-bridge

[Goose]

I think I read somewhere that they found they could not program the Mig 29 hardware to use our JDAMS and came up with the work around. I also had the impression that the weapon could be reprogrammed from a laptop in the cockpit, I have no idea if that is correct.  Here is another link.  I apologize if it is the identical info: https://armyrecognition.com/focus-analys...rsk-bridge

It isn't identical. It has some different information. I also believe you are correct that there is an article out there that shows a tablet PC and a handheld GPS (strapped to a canopy support strut) that can be used with JDAMS. If memory servers it was not on a MIG-29 but rather an SU-27. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/20...ide-bombs/. The article states that the JDAM has to know its location and speed when it is dropped. To do that, the article discusses the Mil-std 1760 C interface. The following link is a very good one. Those interested in how all this works should definitely read it. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIL-STD-1760.

It is NOT TRUE that the JDAM needs to know its altitude and speed (in 3d vector space) when dropped. It will perform better if it does. If it doesn't get the initial data it will use GPS to derive an approximation to initialize the INS. The INS can derive roll, pitch and yaw all by itself if necessary, but will do  better if it has initial values. If GPS is available all the way to the target, the INS initialization error won't matter much. The CEP will not be as good as it might have been, but it will still be "very close" to spec. If the GPS is not available sometime after launch, the initial INS bias error will matter to some degree.

The GPS on a NATO aircraft is much better than the GPS in your cell phone or the one in the JDAM itself. So is the INS of the NATO aircraft. The aircraft GPS can wok in the presence of jamming that will disable the JDAM GPS. The NATO launch platform can give an initial setting for the JDAM from its GPS if it is working. If GPS isn't working, the NATO aircraft can transfer its INS position, which is probably "pretty good". A Soviet era aircraft has none of these things and has no 1553 bus. It is possible Ukraine fished the wiring for a 1553 bus out to the hardpoints where the JDAMs live. The GPS hanging above the tablet PC isn't in the same league as say an F-16 GPS. It doesn't supply the code offsets and the 1 Pulse Per Second (1 PPS) signal needed to synchronize the code offsets with the GPS in the JDAM. It may supply the satellite numbers it is using. While Ukraine can do lots of things, the limitations of the underlying platform are real. IMO it is unlikely the tablet PC can provide a "quality" JDAM INS and GPS initialization. I suspect it is up to the JDAM to find the target. A bridge is big enough target that accumulated INS error and initial values bias won't matter much. The fact Ukraine can launch the JDAM at all is a major accomplishment.

[Goose]

I think I read somewhere that they found they could not program the Mig 29 hardware to use our JDAMS and came up with the work around. I also had the impression that the weapon could be reprogrammed from a laptop in the cockpit, I have no idea if that is correct.  Here is another link.  I apologize if it is the identical info: https://armyrecognition.com/focus-analys...rsk-bridge

It isn't identical. It has some different information. I also believe you are correct that there is an article out there that shows a tablet PC and a handheld GPS (strapped to a canopy support strut) that can be used with JDAMS. If memory servers it was not on a MIG-29 but rather an SU-27. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/20...ide-bombs/. The article states that the JDAM has to know its location and speed when it is dropped. To do that, the article discusses the Mil-std 1760 C interface. The following link is a very good one. Those interested in how all this works should definitely read it. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIL-STD-1760.

It is NOT TRUE that the JDAM needs to know its altitude and speed (in 3d vector space) when dropped. It will perform better if it does. If it doesn't get the initial data it will use GPS to derive an approximation to initialize the INS. The INS can derive roll, pitch and yaw all by itself if necessary, but will do  better if it has initial values. If GPS is available all the way to the target, the INS initialization error won't matter much. The CEP will not be as good as it might have been, but it will still be "very close" to spec. If the GPS is not available sometime after launch, the initial INS bias error will matter to some degree.

The GPS on a NATO aircraft is much better than the GPS in your cell phone or the one in the JDAM itself. So is the INS of the NATO aircraft. The aircraft GPS can wok in the presence of jamming that will disable the JDAM GPS. The NATO launch platform can give an initial setting for the JDAM from its GPS if it is working. If GPS isn't working, the NATO aircraft can transfer its INS position, which is probably "pretty good". A Soviet era aircraft has none of these things and has no 1553 bus. It is possible Ukraine fished the wiring for a 1553 bus out to the hardpoints where the JDAMs live. The GPS hanging above the tablet PC isn't in the same league as say an F-16 GPS. It doesn't supply the code offsets and the 1 Pulse Per Second (1 PPS) signal needed to synchronize the code offsets with the GPS in the JDAM. It may supply the satellite numbers it is using. While Ukraine can do lots of things, the limitations of the underlying platform are real. IMO it is unlikely the tablet PC can provide a "quality" JDAM INS and GPS initialization. I suspect it is up to the JDAM to find the target. A bridge is big enough target that accumulated INS error and initial values bias won't matter much. The fact Ukraine can launch the JDAM at all is a major accomplishment.

[Mick]

Apologies if this has already been posted. Ukraine hit a major oil refinery in Moscow and a power station in Tver as Ukraine tries to disrupt fuel supplies to the front line and damage one of Russia's few remaining export industries.

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/ukraine...e-89cd6736

[Mick]

Apologies if this has already been posted. Ukraine hit a major oil refinery in Moscow and a power station in Tver as Ukraine tries to disrupt fuel supplies to the front line and damage one of Russia's few remaining export industries.

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/ukraine...e-89cd6736

[TrumpCard]

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/p...ve-ukraine

[TrumpCard]

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/p...ve-ukraine

[dabigv13]

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/p...ve-ukraine

I thought this was a good article. I have said from the beginning that the West should anticipate this being a many year conflict. I think the US and west at the outset was concerned about Ukraine's initial ability to resist, but after that phase they have provided arms in type and quantity that would enable Ukraine to mostly blunt Russian offensives, but perhaps not enough to enable Ukraine to pursue large scale offensives of their own, probably because of US doubts about their effectiveness.

The downside to a strategy of defense and containment, is the necessity of multi year commitment from the west. Even if it is the most likely strategy to succeed (if a successful end state might be the survival of the Ukrainian state controlling most of their prewar territory), it is dependent on the political winds in foreign countries continuing to blow in the right direction.

Obviously this tension was the impetus for the Kursk offensive. Unsure of future US support, they made a big gamble for a bargaining chip. Perhaps one that will not be worth it in the end, but the motivation to try something/anything rather than be slowly chewed up is understandable.

Here's another good article specifically on Kursk from Michael Kofman and Rob Lee-

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/ukraines-gamble

[dabigv13]

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/p...ve-ukraine

I thought this was a good article. I have said from the beginning that the West should anticipate this being a many year conflict. I think the US and west at the outset was concerned about Ukraine's initial ability to resist, but after that phase they have provided arms in type and quantity that would enable Ukraine to mostly blunt Russian offensives, but perhaps not enough to enable Ukraine to pursue large scale offensives of their own, probably because of US doubts about their effectiveness.

The downside to a strategy of defense and containment, is the necessity of multi year commitment from the west. Even if it is the most likely strategy to succeed (if a successful end state might be the survival of the Ukrainian state controlling most of their prewar territory), it is dependent on the political winds in foreign countries continuing to blow in the right direction.

Obviously this tension was the impetus for the Kursk offensive. Unsure of future US support, they made a big gamble for a bargaining chip. Perhaps one that will not be worth it in the end, but the motivation to try something/anything rather than be slowly chewed up is understandable.

Here's another good article specifically on Kursk from Michael Kofman and Rob Lee-

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/ukraines-gamble

[Goose]

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/p...ve-ukraine

Interesting article. Like the first part especially

Washington has tried to find the sweet spot between supporting Ukraine and punishing Russia on the one hand, and reducing the risks of escalation on the other. As rational as this approach may appear, it rests on a faulty assumption: that Putin’s mind can be changed.

The article IMO correctly states that Putin will never end the war by deciding it just isn't worth it. However, the article the attempts to create what I believe to be a false dichotomy. The first arm of that dichotomy is that an aggressive posture by Ukraine can never force Russia to quit the war. It seems the authors believe the only way to make Russia quit fighting is by dictating terms from the steps of the Kremlin. Since that is not possible the idea of the Ukraine taking the offensive is rejected.

The second arm of the dichotomy is that after the "front" is stabilized, Ukraine should hunker down and defend. At this point the article IMO goes off the rails. It claims that Ukraine can hang on until Putin dies. It does add the possibility of Putin being forced out or killed. Right now Ukraine is being pounded relentlessly  from the air. Ukraine has only limited ability to suppress the Russian onslaught. Defending against air attack requires an air force. SAMS simply can't do it alone. It is also very difficult to defeat an air offensive without the ability to attack the air bases, launching points, and storage sites of the munitions used for said offensive.  The article also seems to believe that Ukrainian morale will hold up to a destroyed economy and a continually escalating air bombardment while being subjected to continuous ground offensives that kills many Ukrainians daily. Ukraine has to do this until Putin dies. IMO this approach is a guarantee of relatively rapid defeat.

The dichotomy is false for two reasons. First, Ukraine can force Putin to quit by creating conditions where the Russian people simply won't do it. They may overthrow Putin, but the can also just say no. This can be accomplished by raising the cost in blood, treasure, and inconvenience to the average Russian beyond what they will bear. That threshold is much, much lower than the Ukrainian one is. For Russia, as the article states, it is a war of choice. Putin chose to do it and the public went along. When the public no longer goes along and makes the opposite choice, Putin is in big trouble. It can also be done by convincing the average Russian that Russia too cannot "win" and risks more than it gains by continuing to try. Ukraine doesn't need to invade Russia to do this. It can do it by creating severe economic problems via damage to the Russian oil industry. It can also do it by taking back Crimea, leaving Russia less secure than they were at the start of the war.

Second, in order for Ukraine to "defend" itself it absolutely must force Russia to defend everywhere by the threat of Ukrainian attack. If that can't be done, Russia's already superior numbers are multiplied. Ukraine must also attack deep into Russia (via drones at a minimum) to force Russia to defend its infrastructure and economy. Thus even defense requires offense.

IMO it is impossible to believe the Ukrainian people will continue the fight if the policy becomes accepting continued attacks, poverty, and death indefinitely until either by divine intervention Putin dies or Ukraine is defeated. The population has already endured much and will endure a lot more if there is a way to victory. If there isn't, their continued resistance is futile.

[Goose]

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/p...ve-ukraine

Interesting article. Like the first part especially

Washington has tried to find the sweet spot between supporting Ukraine and punishing Russia on the one hand, and reducing the risks of escalation on the other. As rational as this approach may appear, it rests on a faulty assumption: that Putin’s mind can be changed.

The article IMO correctly states that Putin will never end the war by deciding it just isn't worth it. However, the article the attempts to create what I believe to be a false dichotomy. The first arm of that dichotomy is that an aggressive posture by Ukraine can never force Russia to quit the war. It seems the authors believe the only way to make Russia quit fighting is by dictating terms from the steps of the Kremlin. Since that is not possible the idea of the Ukraine taking the offensive is rejected.

The second arm of the dichotomy is that after the "front" is stabilized, Ukraine should hunker down and defend. At this point the article IMO goes off the rails. It claims that Ukraine can hang on until Putin dies. It does add the possibility of Putin being forced out or killed. Right now Ukraine is being pounded relentlessly  from the air. Ukraine has only limited ability to suppress the Russian onslaught. Defending against air attack requires an air force. SAMS simply can't do it alone. It is also very difficult to defeat an air offensive without the ability to attack the air bases, launching points, and storage sites of the munitions used for said offensive.  The article also seems to believe that Ukrainian morale will hold up to a destroyed economy and a continually escalating air bombardment while being subjected to continuous ground offensives that kills many Ukrainians daily. Ukraine has to do this until Putin dies. IMO this approach is a guarantee of relatively rapid defeat.

The dichotomy is false for two reasons. First, Ukraine can force Putin to quit by creating conditions where the Russian people simply won't do it. They may overthrow Putin, but the can also just say no. This can be accomplished by raising the cost in blood, treasure, and inconvenience to the average Russian beyond what they will bear. That threshold is much, much lower than the Ukrainian one is. For Russia, as the article states, it is a war of choice. Putin chose to do it and the public went along. When the public no longer goes along and makes the opposite choice, Putin is in big trouble. It can also be done by convincing the average Russian that Russia too cannot "win" and risks more than it gains by continuing to try. Ukraine doesn't need to invade Russia to do this. It can do it by creating severe economic problems via damage to the Russian oil industry. It can also do it by taking back Crimea, leaving Russia less secure than they were at the start of the war.

Second, in order for Ukraine to "defend" itself it absolutely must force Russia to defend everywhere by the threat of Ukrainian attack. If that can't be done, Russia's already superior numbers are multiplied. Ukraine must also attack deep into Russia (via drones at a minimum) to force Russia to defend its infrastructure and economy. Thus even defense requires offense.

IMO it is impossible to believe the Ukrainian people will continue the fight if the policy becomes accepting continued attacks, poverty, and death indefinitely until either by divine intervention Putin dies or Ukraine is defeated. The population has already endured much and will endure a lot more if there is a way to victory. If there isn't, their continued resistance is futile.