[Goose]

Would I have preferred to win? Yeah, sure. But I've seen no one saying how we could possibly have done that given how badly our OL was manhandled. The main issues I saw with that game are:

1) Shaw is still way too passive on 4th down.
2) We made good defensive adjustments after the half, but WSU countered and we never fixed it.
3) Our OL is somewhere between "okay" and "horrific" on the road.

#1 would be trivial to fix and criticize Shaw all day and twice on Saturdays for it. Maybe eventually he'll figure it out.

I agree with 2 and 3 for sure. I do, however, have problems with 1. Most coaches, including Shaw, have been very cautious about "going for it" on 4th down. I am aware that the statistics indicate the probability of success is greater than coaches seem to believe. However, I am virtually certain that those statistics are biased because they can only be gathered when the coach did choose to take the risk. In those cases, given that coaches are as conservative as they are, the fact it was attempted at all indicates the coach knew something that made success at least seem probable. Therefore, we don't have data that actually covers the entire sample space. Based on this biased data, one cannot in general conclude that going on 4th down and < 1 yard is a good idea (oversimplifying your argument I know, but this is the short version). The conventional wisdom is what it is for a reason. Do I think Shaw should have gone for the 4th and 1 against WSU (instead of punting)? In hindsight, probably yes. Given how we were playing on the OL, would we have made it? Probably not, it was that kind of day. I can live with either decision, especially without the benefit of hindsight.

[Goose]

Would I have preferred to win? Yeah, sure. But I've seen no one saying how we could possibly have done that given how badly our OL was manhandled. The main issues I saw with that game are:

1) Shaw is still way too passive on 4th down.
2) We made good defensive adjustments after the half, but WSU countered and we never fixed it.
3) Our OL is somewhere between "okay" and "horrific" on the road.

#1 would be trivial to fix and criticize Shaw all day and twice on Saturdays for it. Maybe eventually he'll figure it out.

I agree with 2 and 3 for sure. I do, however, have problems with 1. Most coaches, including Shaw, have been very cautious about "going for it" on 4th down. I am aware that the statistics indicate the probability of success is greater than coaches seem to believe. However, I am virtually certain that those statistics are biased because they can only be gathered when the coach did choose to take the risk. In those cases, given that coaches are as conservative as they are, the fact it was attempted at all indicates the coach knew something that made success at least seem probable. Therefore, we don't have data that actually covers the entire sample space. Based on this biased data, one cannot in general conclude that going on 4th down and < 1 yard is a good idea (oversimplifying your argument I know, but this is the short version). The conventional wisdom is what it is for a reason. Do I think Shaw should have gone for the 4th and 1 against WSU (instead of punting)? In hindsight, probably yes. Given how we were playing on the OL, would we have made it? Probably not, it was that kind of day. I can live with either decision, especially without the benefit of hindsight.

[BostonCard]

A lot of the fourth down success data is extrapolated from third down data.  That’s imperfect but gives you an idea of the likelihood of success.

BC

[BostonCard]

A lot of the fourth down success data is extrapolated from third down data.  That’s imperfect but gives you an idea of the likelihood of success.

BC

[cardcrimson]

At least we haven't punted from inside the opponents 30 in a while. . . .Progress!

[cardcrimson]

At least we haven't punted from inside the opponents 30 in a while. . . .Progress!

[Goose]

A lot of the fourth down success data is extrapolated from third down data.  That’s imperfect but gives you an idea of the likelihood of success.

BC

I would argue it is very imperfect, in fact misleadingly so. On 3rd down you can call plays that are high risk without having to turn the ball over. You can then go for it on 4th down/punt if the bomb/draw/sweep you called on 3rd down doesn't get you the yard. That option doesn't exist on 4th down. It is an entire different ballgame for the defense. They can pretty much discount a lot of possible plays and not defend against them. They can't do that on 3rd down. While it may sound great to throw the bomb on 4th and 1, I don't think many coaches are going to do it. :)

[Goose]

A lot of the fourth down success data is extrapolated from third down data.  That’s imperfect but gives you an idea of the likelihood of success.

BC

I would argue it is very imperfect, in fact misleadingly so. On 3rd down you can call plays that are high risk without having to turn the ball over. You can then go for it on 4th down/punt if the bomb/draw/sweep you called on 3rd down doesn't get you the yard. That option doesn't exist on 4th down. It is an entire different ballgame for the defense. They can pretty much discount a lot of possible plays and not defend against them. They can't do that on 3rd down. While it may sound great to throw the bomb on 4th and 1, I don't think many coaches are going to do it. :)

[stupac2]

Eh, I could buy those arguments if the analysis indicated that going for it was a close decision. But for the most part it's just not. Here's a post that explains it all: http://www.advancedfootballanalytics.com...down-study

If you just want the conclusion it's basically this graph:



If you're well away from the boundary line, then it's not that close of a decision. The second one (the 4th and 7) is in "go for it" territory, but only just. I sort of understand the rationale, though given the game situation I still think you ought to go for it. But the other one, the 4th and 1, was just bad. There was really no choice but to go for it.

(And yes, this is all NFL data, but if anything that's just going to make going for it a better option since college offenses are better/defenses are worse, and kicking games are worse.)

[stupac2]

Eh, I could buy those arguments if the analysis indicated that going for it was a close decision. But for the most part it's just not. Here's a post that explains it all: http://www.advancedfootballanalytics.com...down-study

If you just want the conclusion it's basically this graph:



If you're well away from the boundary line, then it's not that close of a decision. The second one (the 4th and 7) is in "go for it" territory, but only just. I sort of understand the rationale, though given the game situation I still think you ought to go for it. But the other one, the 4th and 1, was just bad. There was really no choice but to go for it.

(And yes, this is all NFL data, but if anything that's just going to make going for it a better option since college offenses are better/defenses are worse, and kicking games are worse.)

[Goose]

Eh, I could buy those arguments if the analysis indicated that going for it was a close decision. But for the most part it's just not.

If you're well away from the boundary line, then it's not that close of a decision. The second one (the 4th and 7) is in "go for it" territory, but only just. I sort of understand the rationale, though given the game situation I still think you ought to go for it. But the other one, the 4th and 1, was just bad. There was really no choice but to go for it.

I have looked at the article previously. I have two issues with it. First, the value of EP (expected points) is computed using data gathered from games where coaches make decisions as they do today. If the coaches used the model presented in this document, the data would change. We would for sure have lots more data on EP of 4th downs when they don't punt. So, the "actual" EP on 4th down from a given place on the field is probably significantly different from the measured average in today's game.
Second, using EP is an attempt to model a complex non-random quantity as a random variable. We are often forced to do this when the actual problem is just too complex to analyze. However, relying on this type of analysis can lead to seriously incorrect conclusions in "corner cases" like this. The problem is that there may be hidden structure that is not reflected in the measured expected value. For instance, (from the article), the time to get to the office on the back roads may be a function of the weather, or a function of your neighbors making the same choice you do. If you don't know about the other factors, using the expected value may make good sense. However, it may not ever produce an "optimal" strategy. You can actually do better if you include the other factors. That may be true even if you don't know what those factors are. Over the history of the game, the coaches have done a Monte Carlo simulation of what happens if you go for it on 4th down. The results of that simulation have convinced them that the actions indicated in the graph are in fact not optimal. It may be that their objective function isn't EP, but rather staying employed  :), which may not be the same thing. Anyway, the graph hasn't convinced them, at least not yet.

A minor point, but the distance from the boundary where EP is greater if you go for it than punt may mean very little. You would have to know what the two PDFs actually looked like. All you are sure of is the EP doesn't decrease. It may not increase very fast. In addition, the fact that the graph isn't non-decreasing from 90 yards down to 35 yards is very suspect. It is probably due to lack of meaningful data at the larger yardages because nobody goes for it there unless really forced to.

[Goose]

Eh, I could buy those arguments if the analysis indicated that going for it was a close decision. But for the most part it's just not.

If you're well away from the boundary line, then it's not that close of a decision. The second one (the 4th and 7) is in "go for it" territory, but only just. I sort of understand the rationale, though given the game situation I still think you ought to go for it. But the other one, the 4th and 1, was just bad. There was really no choice but to go for it.

I have looked at the article previously. I have two issues with it. First, the value of EP (expected points) is computed using data gathered from games where coaches make decisions as they do today. If the coaches used the model presented in this document, the data would change. We would for sure have lots more data on EP of 4th downs when they don't punt. So, the "actual" EP on 4th down from a given place on the field is probably significantly different from the measured average in today's game.
Second, using EP is an attempt to model a complex non-random quantity as a random variable. We are often forced to do this when the actual problem is just too complex to analyze. However, relying on this type of analysis can lead to seriously incorrect conclusions in "corner cases" like this. The problem is that there may be hidden structure that is not reflected in the measured expected value. For instance, (from the article), the time to get to the office on the back roads may be a function of the weather, or a function of your neighbors making the same choice you do. If you don't know about the other factors, using the expected value may make good sense. However, it may not ever produce an "optimal" strategy. You can actually do better if you include the other factors. That may be true even if you don't know what those factors are. Over the history of the game, the coaches have done a Monte Carlo simulation of what happens if you go for it on 4th down. The results of that simulation have convinced them that the actions indicated in the graph are in fact not optimal. It may be that their objective function isn't EP, but rather staying employed  :), which may not be the same thing. Anyway, the graph hasn't convinced them, at least not yet.

A minor point, but the distance from the boundary where EP is greater if you go for it than punt may mean very little. You would have to know what the two PDFs actually looked like. All you are sure of is the EP doesn't decrease. It may not increase very fast. In addition, the fact that the graph isn't non-decreasing from 90 yards down to 35 yards is very suspect. It is probably due to lack of meaningful data at the larger yardages because nobody goes for it there unless really forced to.

[Mick]

Why is 7-5 some sort of unacceptable result? Preseason the bookies suggested 8-4. Bill Connelly's S&P+ prediction system suggested 8-4. ESPN's FPI suggested... 8-4. People's expectations well outran the actual neutral observers' expectations.*

*(Now I suppose a reasonable logical retort is that the neutral observers did not, preseason, reckon with "Bryce Love, supernova," and that figuring in that talent should push Stanford up a win or so. But that's only counting the upside scenarios. It doesn't account for the underperformance of Stanford's DBs, the injury-enforced instability at OL, and the barren defensive line. Some of those problems are coaching problems, of course, but some of it is strictly in the "stuff happens" category.)

I think people were aware of the 8-4 prognostications, and similarly aware of Shaw's penchant for exceeding Vegas odds in most categories.  Therefore, I think many of us had mentally baked in a 9-3 record, rather than 7-5.  And there's a whole lot of difference between the two, like hitting .310 vs. .285.

[Mick]

Why is 7-5 some sort of unacceptable result? Preseason the bookies suggested 8-4. Bill Connelly's S&P+ prediction system suggested 8-4. ESPN's FPI suggested... 8-4. People's expectations well outran the actual neutral observers' expectations.*

*(Now I suppose a reasonable logical retort is that the neutral observers did not, preseason, reckon with "Bryce Love, supernova," and that figuring in that talent should push Stanford up a win or so. But that's only counting the upside scenarios. It doesn't account for the underperformance of Stanford's DBs, the injury-enforced instability at OL, and the barren defensive line. Some of those problems are coaching problems, of course, but some of it is strictly in the "stuff happens" category.)

I think people were aware of the 8-4 prognostications, and similarly aware of Shaw's penchant for exceeding Vegas odds in most categories.  Therefore, I think many of us had mentally baked in a 9-3 record, rather than 7-5.  And there's a whole lot of difference between the two, like hitting .310 vs. .285.

[washingtonismoney]

I think people were aware of the 8-4 prognostications, and similarly aware of Shaw's penchant for exceeding Vegas odds in most categories.  Therefore, I think many of us had mentally baked in a 9-3 record, rather than 7-5.  And there's a whole lot of difference between the two, like hitting .310 vs. .285.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uBgGaGUnvA0

[washingtonismoney]

I think people were aware of the 8-4 prognostications, and similarly aware of Shaw's penchant for exceeding Vegas odds in most categories.  Therefore, I think many of us had mentally baked in a 9-3 record, rather than 7-5.  And there's a whole lot of difference between the two, like hitting .310 vs. .285.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uBgGaGUnvA0

[CardinalSagehen]

[quote author=washingtonismoney link=topic=17909.msg210937#msg210937 date=1509985278]
Why is 7-5 some sort of unacceptable result? Preseason the bookies suggested 8-4. Bill Connelly's S&P+ prediction system suggested 8-4. ESPN's FPI suggested... 8-4. People's expectations well outran the actual neutral observers' expectations.*

*(Now I suppose a reasonable logical retort is that the neutral observers did not, preseason, reckon with "Bryce Love, supernova," and that figuring in that talent should push Stanford up a win or so. But that's only counting the upside scenarios. It doesn't account for the underperformance of Stanford's DBs, the injury-enforced instability at OL, and the barren defensive line. Some of those problems are coaching problems, of course, but some of it is strictly in the "stuff happens" category.)

I think people were aware of the 8-4 prognostications, and similarly aware of Shaw's penchant for exceeding Vegas odds in most categories.  Therefore, I think many of us had mentally baked in a 9-3 record, rather than 7-5.  And there's a whole lot of difference between the two, like hitting .310 vs. .285.
[/quote]

You're both right.  Before the season, I would have seen 7-5 as a disappointment for the team that I perceived us to have.  But after watching us against USC and SDSU, I felt that 8-4 would be a very solid finish and 7-5 was definitely possible, maybe even likely. 

Some people seem to think that we ought to be better than Top 20 every year, when in fact our multi-year recruiting level is merely Top 20.  If our season were a book and this were a book club, we'd be experiencing the "willing suspension of disbelief".  This is defined as "willingness to suspend one's critical faculties and believe something surreal; sacrifice of realism and logic for the sake of enjoyment."  That has been my own reality ever since the SDSU game...

[CardinalSagehen]

[quote author=washingtonismoney link=topic=17909.msg210937#msg210937 date=1509985278]
Why is 7-5 some sort of unacceptable result? Preseason the bookies suggested 8-4. Bill Connelly's S&P+ prediction system suggested 8-4. ESPN's FPI suggested... 8-4. People's expectations well outran the actual neutral observers' expectations.*

*(Now I suppose a reasonable logical retort is that the neutral observers did not, preseason, reckon with "Bryce Love, supernova," and that figuring in that talent should push Stanford up a win or so. But that's only counting the upside scenarios. It doesn't account for the underperformance of Stanford's DBs, the injury-enforced instability at OL, and the barren defensive line. Some of those problems are coaching problems, of course, but some of it is strictly in the "stuff happens" category.)

I think people were aware of the 8-4 prognostications, and similarly aware of Shaw's penchant for exceeding Vegas odds in most categories.  Therefore, I think many of us had mentally baked in a 9-3 record, rather than 7-5.  And there's a whole lot of difference between the two, like hitting .310 vs. .285.
[/quote]

You're both right.  Before the season, I would have seen 7-5 as a disappointment for the team that I perceived us to have.  But after watching us against USC and SDSU, I felt that 8-4 would be a very solid finish and 7-5 was definitely possible, maybe even likely. 

Some people seem to think that we ought to be better than Top 20 every year, when in fact our multi-year recruiting level is merely Top 20.  If our season were a book and this were a book club, we'd be experiencing the "willing suspension of disbelief".  This is defined as "willingness to suspend one's critical faculties and believe something surreal; sacrifice of realism and logic for the sake of enjoyment."  That has been my own reality ever since the SDSU game...

[teejers1]

And how much "enjoyment" have you had the last couple games?

When you win with a butt-ugly offense, it's at least tolerable (well, at least to a large number of fans).

When you lose with a butt-ugly offense, it's unwatchable/intolerable.

[teejers1]

And how much "enjoyment" have you had the last couple games?

When you win with a butt-ugly offense, it's at least tolerable (well, at least to a large number of fans).

When you lose with a butt-ugly offense, it's unwatchable/intolerable.

[BostonCard]

If the only way to get enjoyment out of rooting for a football team is to watch them win, I suggest you become an Alabama fan.

Yes, all told I prefer winning over losing, and I prefer winning with a dynamic offense over winning with a butt-ugly offense.  But save for disappointment, my enjoyment of rooting for Stanford is not entirely predicated on us winning.  I first came to Stanford during Walsh' second term.  I became hooked on college football when we beat Colorado in a shootout in the fall of 1993 (before I even stepped foot on campus).  Ironically, that was the high water mark for Stanford for the next two years; we had losing seasons in Walsh' last two years.  I then got to enjoy two years of dramatic improvement under Willingham, highlighted by a 7-5 year in 1996 where we drubbed Nick Saban and WSU in the Sun Bowl, a game I enjoyed from the Great Barrier reef.  Ironically, the Sun Bowl was the bowl we went to last year after a "disappointing" season under Shaw, and a 7-5 record is what our "disappointment" this year is likely to be.  Then, back to losing, until 1999 when we started with the disaster against Texas.  We lost 69-17, and I remember the comments on TOS when that happened.  I mean, that was butt-ugly offense and, frankly, it would be hard to call it a butt ugly defense, because the defense was just not there.  And yet... we went to the Rose Bowl that year as the Pac-10 champions.  It is hard to believe, given the results of that first game, and a butt-ugly loss to San Jose friggin State.  But UW lost to UCLA giving them their second Pac-10 loss, and we backed into the Rose Bowl, and nobody was going to look at the first Rose Bowl game in almost 30 years and say we were not worthy.  And then, another losing season... before we beat #5 Oregon and #4 UCLA on consecutive weeks.  The Oregon game was something else (it featured not one, but two blocked punts as we came back from about 14 points down, if I remember).  But that turned out to be the high water mark for sometime.  We finished in a three-way tie for second in the Pac-10, got relegated to the friggin Seattle Bowl, where we played like crap against Georgia Tech in a game we should have dominated, then watched our coach bolt for the Domers, and for all our troubles were rewarded with Buddy Teevens, and later, Walt Harris.

Frankly, I don't see how anybody who survived the ensuing five years, and I know you were one of those, could think that this team is unwatchable or intolerable.

I suppose the upshot is that there is nothing like 3 Rose Bowls in 4 years to give even Stanford fans a sense of entitlement.

BC

[BostonCard]

If the only way to get enjoyment out of rooting for a football team is to watch them win, I suggest you become an Alabama fan.

Yes, all told I prefer winning over losing, and I prefer winning with a dynamic offense over winning with a butt-ugly offense.  But save for disappointment, my enjoyment of rooting for Stanford is not entirely predicated on us winning.  I first came to Stanford during Walsh' second term.  I became hooked on college football when we beat Colorado in a shootout in the fall of 1993 (before I even stepped foot on campus).  Ironically, that was the high water mark for Stanford for the next two years; we had losing seasons in Walsh' last two years.  I then got to enjoy two years of dramatic improvement under Willingham, highlighted by a 7-5 year in 1996 where we drubbed Nick Saban and WSU in the Sun Bowl, a game I enjoyed from the Great Barrier reef.  Ironically, the Sun Bowl was the bowl we went to last year after a "disappointing" season under Shaw, and a 7-5 record is what our "disappointment" this year is likely to be.  Then, back to losing, until 1999 when we started with the disaster against Texas.  We lost 69-17, and I remember the comments on TOS when that happened.  I mean, that was butt-ugly offense and, frankly, it would be hard to call it a butt ugly defense, because the defense was just not there.  And yet... we went to the Rose Bowl that year as the Pac-10 champions.  It is hard to believe, given the results of that first game, and a butt-ugly loss to San Jose friggin State.  But UW lost to UCLA giving them their second Pac-10 loss, and we backed into the Rose Bowl, and nobody was going to look at the first Rose Bowl game in almost 30 years and say we were not worthy.  And then, another losing season... before we beat #5 Oregon and #4 UCLA on consecutive weeks.  The Oregon game was something else (it featured not one, but two blocked punts as we came back from about 14 points down, if I remember).  But that turned out to be the high water mark for sometime.  We finished in a three-way tie for second in the Pac-10, got relegated to the friggin Seattle Bowl, where we played like crap against Georgia Tech in a game we should have dominated, then watched our coach bolt for the Domers, and for all our troubles were rewarded with Buddy Teevens, and later, Walt Harris.

Frankly, I don't see how anybody who survived the ensuing five years, and I know you were one of those, could think that this team is unwatchable or intolerable.

I suppose the upshot is that there is nothing like 3 Rose Bowls in 4 years to give even Stanford fans a sense of entitlement.

BC

[cardcrimson]

I think you mean Saban and MSU.

The four years from 79-82 sum up the potential and frustration for me. Started with a great comeback tie against USC at the Coliseum and ended in Berkeley with a trombone player and a ref waving his hands as he ran down the field. Probably the best quarterback in Stanford, if not college, history and the guy leaves the farm with a losing record and no bowls.

[cardcrimson]

I think you mean Saban and MSU.

The four years from 79-82 sum up the potential and frustration for me. Started with a great comeback tie against USC at the Coliseum and ended in Berkeley with a trombone player and a ref waving his hands as he ran down the field. Probably the best quarterback in Stanford, if not college, history and the guy leaves the farm with a losing record and no bowls.

[Goose]

Despite all the to and fro on this board, and all the brainpower dedicated to the subject, football is a simple game. If your OL is getting beat on every play, your offense is going to be "butt-ugly" no matter what play you have called. There will simply be no way the play can be executed. Now, if your OL is able to win the battle on some plays, or get a stand-off 25% of the time, then maybe, just maybe, you can generate enough offense to win the game. In that case, play calling can make a difference, because you need to optimize your chances. If you are too aggressive, you may turn the ball over, and since you have little margin for error at that point, you lose. OTOH if you don't take advantage of the few good OL plays you get, you also lose.
Stanford can't be in that mode against UW this Friday. Our OL needs to play well. If it doesn't, we will be trying to win with a "butt ugly" offense, and you can only do that if you are lucky and have a great defense. I don't like our odds in that case, so lets go with plan A  :) .

[Goose]

Despite all the to and fro on this board, and all the brainpower dedicated to the subject, football is a simple game. If your OL is getting beat on every play, your offense is going to be "butt-ugly" no matter what play you have called. There will simply be no way the play can be executed. Now, if your OL is able to win the battle on some plays, or get a stand-off 25% of the time, then maybe, just maybe, you can generate enough offense to win the game. In that case, play calling can make a difference, because you need to optimize your chances. If you are too aggressive, you may turn the ball over, and since you have little margin for error at that point, you lose. OTOH if you don't take advantage of the few good OL plays you get, you also lose.
Stanford can't be in that mode against UW this Friday. Our OL needs to play well. If it doesn't, we will be trying to win with a "butt ugly" offense, and you can only do that if you are lucky and have a great defense. I don't like our odds in that case, so lets go with plan A  :) .

[Stymie]

Watching one's team win with a Woody Hayes "strategy" of 3.34 yards and a cloud of dust is acceptable, but leaves a bad taste in the mouth of any esthete who understands the Corinthian ideals of sport.

As for the Rose Bowl, it is a second-tier venue (except when it is a CFB final).  The 71 and 72 wins (which were top end contests) were massively better than the recent 3 out of 4 against fellow 2nd rate opponents.  No contest.

To me, Stanford embodies and should continue to promote excellence, in all that it does.  But we are very rarely going to have the footballing talent of Alabama, SC, ND, etc., both at the player and the coaching level, so we need to be inventive, outside the box and at the very least, entertaining.  Boring is not an option.

Finally, "Intellectual Brutality" is an offensive, disrespectful slogan, and a false one when you can't back it up with on the field and on the sideline performances.

[Stymie]

Watching one's team win with a Woody Hayes "strategy" of 3.34 yards and a cloud of dust is acceptable, but leaves a bad taste in the mouth of any esthete who understands the Corinthian ideals of sport.

As for the Rose Bowl, it is a second-tier venue (except when it is a CFB final).  The 71 and 72 wins (which were top end contests) were massively better than the recent 3 out of 4 against fellow 2nd rate opponents.  No contest.

To me, Stanford embodies and should continue to promote excellence, in all that it does.  But we are very rarely going to have the footballing talent of Alabama, SC, ND, etc., both at the player and the coaching level, so we need to be inventive, outside the box and at the very least, entertaining.  Boring is not an option.

Finally, "Intellectual Brutality" is an offensive, disrespectful slogan, and a false one when you can't back it up with on the field and on the sideline performances.

[CardinalSagehen]

And how much "enjoyment" have you had the last couple games?

When you win with a butt-ugly offense, it's at least tolerable (well, at least to a large number of fans).

When you lose with a butt-ugly offense, it's unwatchable/intolerable.

Believe me, I hate these losses as much as anyone.  I'm in a crappy mood for 2 days after each one.  On Sunday, my wife finally had to tell me to stop talking about it.

But I have known for a while now, logically, that this team just isn't very good compared to our recent standards.  We have inconsistent OL play, we're undermanned on the DL, and we're still searching for our QB.  Play-calling can smooth that over a bit, but it can't fix it.   

So, I expect the worst and hope for the best.  This Friday night's game is a good example.  I am suspending my disbelief and hoping for any kind of win, even if it's butt-ugly.  And in the meanwhile, I'm entertained all week long by the anticipation of a game that I could otherwise choose to stop caring about.

[CardinalSagehen]

And how much "enjoyment" have you had the last couple games?

When you win with a butt-ugly offense, it's at least tolerable (well, at least to a large number of fans).

When you lose with a butt-ugly offense, it's unwatchable/intolerable.

Believe me, I hate these losses as much as anyone.  I'm in a crappy mood for 2 days after each one.  On Sunday, my wife finally had to tell me to stop talking about it.

But I have known for a while now, logically, that this team just isn't very good compared to our recent standards.  We have inconsistent OL play, we're undermanned on the DL, and we're still searching for our QB.  Play-calling can smooth that over a bit, but it can't fix it.   

So, I expect the worst and hope for the best.  This Friday night's game is a good example.  I am suspending my disbelief and hoping for any kind of win, even if it's butt-ugly.  And in the meanwhile, I'm entertained all week long by the anticipation of a game that I could otherwise choose to stop caring about.

[Papa John]

We're 5-1 in our previous six games and are playing on Friday to stay alive in the Pac-12 North! I am not quitting on this team or this coaching staff.

[Papa John]

We're 5-1 in our previous six games and are playing on Friday to stay alive in the Pac-12 North! I am not quitting on this team or this coaching staff.

[CTcard]

[quote author=stupac2 link=topic=17909.msg210991#msg210991 date=1510004289]
Eh, I could buy those arguments if the analysis indicated that going for it was a close decision. But for the most part it's just not.

If you're well away from the boundary line, then it's not that close of a decision. The second one (the 4th and 7) is in "go for it" territory, but only just. I sort of understand the rationale, though given the game situation I still think you ought to go for it. But the other one, the 4th and 1, was just bad. There was really no choice but to go for it.

I have looked at the article previously. I have two issues with it.[/quote]

Well, most fundamentally, I have different issues with this chart.

One is possibly only connected to my own ignorance. I have not seen anybody analyze how strongly the various percentages vary by the nature of the two teams involved. As simple as a good/bad offense versus a good/bad defense, to run pass abilities, to ball control approaches, etc. It would seem to me that those kind of variation might drastically change the decision tree.


Another issue is with how some people use the chart. In many cases, the most important issue is not necessarily to maximize expected points. An obvious example is towards the end of a game at a point where you most likely going to win. At that point, expected points is far less important that avoiding low probability events that might hand the game to your opponent.
Similarly, if you are behind, you may need to try for max points rather than maximize expected points.


That being said, I suspect Stanford should have tried for a first down in at least two of the three cases that are under discussion in the WSU game.
Stanford had 8 fourth downs in the game. The three most in question were:
Second quarter, fourth and 10 at the WSU 37. Score WSU 14, Stanford 7. Chart says either go for it barely or kick a FG.* Punt pinned WSU at the 4.
Fourth quarter, fourth and 1 on our own 47. Score WSU 17, Stanford 21. Chart says go for it. Punt pinned WSu at the 6.
Fourth quarter, fourth and 7 on WSU 48. Score WSU 24, Stanford 21. Chart is on border of punt/go for it. Punt put WSU on the 20.

* This is NFL data that says the split between punt and FG is on opponents' 37. For college that has to be closer in, and under the conditions presumably closer again.


I would choose go for it in all of those situations, but overwhelmingly on the last one where the chart is perhaps most ambiguous. But, under the game situation and the play of our defense, there was a significant chance we wouldn't see the ball again and a large chance we wouldn't get the ball back in decent field position. Given that we struggled to move the ball, the field position that we had in hand, close to FG range, was critical at that moment.

[CTcard]

[quote author=stupac2 link=topic=17909.msg210991#msg210991 date=1510004289]
Eh, I could buy those arguments if the analysis indicated that going for it was a close decision. But for the most part it's just not.

If you're well away from the boundary line, then it's not that close of a decision. The second one (the 4th and 7) is in "go for it" territory, but only just. I sort of understand the rationale, though given the game situation I still think you ought to go for it. But the other one, the 4th and 1, was just bad. There was really no choice but to go for it.

I have looked at the article previously. I have two issues with it.[/quote]

Well, most fundamentally, I have different issues with this chart.

One is possibly only connected to my own ignorance. I have not seen anybody analyze how strongly the various percentages vary by the nature of the two teams involved. As simple as a good/bad offense versus a good/bad defense, to run pass abilities, to ball control approaches, etc. It would seem to me that those kind of variation might drastically change the decision tree.


Another issue is with how some people use the chart. In many cases, the most important issue is not necessarily to maximize expected points. An obvious example is towards the end of a game at a point where you most likely going to win. At that point, expected points is far less important that avoiding low probability events that might hand the game to your opponent.
Similarly, if you are behind, you may need to try for max points rather than maximize expected points.


That being said, I suspect Stanford should have tried for a first down in at least two of the three cases that are under discussion in the WSU game.
Stanford had 8 fourth downs in the game. The three most in question were:
Second quarter, fourth and 10 at the WSU 37. Score WSU 14, Stanford 7. Chart says either go for it barely or kick a FG.* Punt pinned WSU at the 4.
Fourth quarter, fourth and 1 on our own 47. Score WSU 17, Stanford 21. Chart says go for it. Punt pinned WSu at the 6.
Fourth quarter, fourth and 7 on WSU 48. Score WSU 24, Stanford 21. Chart is on border of punt/go for it. Punt put WSU on the 20.

* This is NFL data that says the split between punt and FG is on opponents' 37. For college that has to be closer in, and under the conditions presumably closer again.


I would choose go for it in all of those situations, but overwhelmingly on the last one where the chart is perhaps most ambiguous. But, under the game situation and the play of our defense, there was a significant chance we wouldn't see the ball again and a large chance we wouldn't get the ball back in decent field position. Given that we struggled to move the ball, the field position that we had in hand, close to FG range, was critical at that moment.

[jacketree]

I'm not sure about that chart - it needs a fourth dimension - time left and a Fifth Dimension - game situation.

If I'm reading that chart right, you should always go for it on 4th and 1 inside your own 5.  Good luck on the Monday morning talk shows.....

As to the three 4th downs in question, my own hindsight / couch coaching said that at least two of the three punts were the right call.

1. 4th and 10 at WSU 37 trailing by 7 in 2nd quarter.  A 54-yard FG attempt in the cold?  Nah. Right call.  Pinned at the 4 is a good outcome.
2. 4th and 1 at own 47 leading by 4 in 4th quarter. Tempting, but lots of runs for loss that day and not letting Costello sling it.  Pinned at the 6 is a good outcome and resulted in a 3rd and 14.  Sure if you had known the defense would give up a 94 yard drive, roll the dice, but you don't know that.
3. 4th and 7 at WSU 48.  Yeah it was getting late, but enough time and 2 time outs to get a stop.  Not the best punt coverage, IIRC or they would have been pinned inside the 5, which is still a good outcome.  Borderline call, but you should be able to have faith in your punting, coverage and defense.  Really good chance they don't pick up those 7 yards and then you are really behind the 8-ball just due to field position; which is where they wound up anyway, but  this is a tough call to criticize IMO.

P.S.  Always need the Fifth Dimension, particularly after these tough losses.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GztV3yWN...TJ&index=5

[jacketree]

I'm not sure about that chart - it needs a fourth dimension - time left and a Fifth Dimension - game situation.

If I'm reading that chart right, you should always go for it on 4th and 1 inside your own 5.  Good luck on the Monday morning talk shows.....

As to the three 4th downs in question, my own hindsight / couch coaching said that at least two of the three punts were the right call.

1. 4th and 10 at WSU 37 trailing by 7 in 2nd quarter.  A 54-yard FG attempt in the cold?  Nah. Right call.  Pinned at the 4 is a good outcome.
2. 4th and 1 at own 47 leading by 4 in 4th quarter. Tempting, but lots of runs for loss that day and not letting Costello sling it.  Pinned at the 6 is a good outcome and resulted in a 3rd and 14.  Sure if you had known the defense would give up a 94 yard drive, roll the dice, but you don't know that.
3. 4th and 7 at WSU 48.  Yeah it was getting late, but enough time and 2 time outs to get a stop.  Not the best punt coverage, IIRC or they would have been pinned inside the 5, which is still a good outcome.  Borderline call, but you should be able to have faith in your punting, coverage and defense.  Really good chance they don't pick up those 7 yards and then you are really behind the 8-ball just due to field position; which is where they wound up anyway, but  this is a tough call to criticize IMO.

P.S.  Always need the Fifth Dimension, particularly after these tough losses.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GztV3yWN...TJ&index=5

[CowboyIndian]

As for the Rose Bowl, it is a second-tier venue (except when it is a CFB final).

If you don't want to be thought an idiot, do not say idiotic things.

[CowboyIndian]

As for the Rose Bowl, it is a second-tier venue (except when it is a CFB final).

If you don't want to be thought an idiot, do not say idiotic things.

[81alum]

Finally, "Intellectual Brutality" is an offensive, disrespectful slogan, and a false one when you can't back it up with on the field and on the sideline performances.

I think our first down play calling last game is perfectly described by the term "intellectual brutality."

[81alum]

Finally, "Intellectual Brutality" is an offensive, disrespectful slogan, and a false one when you can't back it up with on the field and on the sideline performances.

I think our first down play calling last game is perfectly described by the term "intellectual brutality."