03-01-2026, 02:40 PM
(03-01-2026, 11:52 AM)dabigv13 Wrote: Multiple US bases with hits from Shahed drones. A startling failure imho. There seems to be no point defense systems active in all the strikes I have seen.I agree that the US has no point defense systems installed on the ground at these bases. A 20mm Phalanx has a maximum range of 2000 meters. NSA Bahrain covers 152 acres. If it were a square (which obviously it isn't) it would be about 9670 meters on a side. Thus, to defend the entire base one would need about 8 CIWS. Obviously defending the entire base may be unnecessary. One could choose the "important" facilities and position the CIWS appropriately. This of course assumes the CWIS could "see" the slow drone at a range of 2000 meters. I don't know if it can or can't. I do know that there were several studies done to investigate its effectiveness against "small" drones and the results were not encouraging. The Shahed is larger, so it might work. In any case, as you point out, there are none installed. As with all point defense systems, particularly short range ones, they can be easily defeated by the simultaneous arrival of multiple targets. There simply isn't time to engage all the targets.
Quote:A CIWS doesn't require a lot of troops on the ground.Agree, but since it is an "automatic" system care must be taken to de-conflict and identify "friendly" aircraft. Given that Bahrain is not a NATO member, IFF could be a real problem :-).
Quote:A helicopter with a side mount 50 cal could handle these.How do they acquire the target? Helicopters don't have an appropriate radar. Visually? If so, it would be very, very easy to not see the target until it was way too late, or not at all, particularly at night. What if there are two missiles approaching from significantly different directions? I doubt very much that such a system would be effective.
Quote:In this we agree. In the past we have demonstrated that our AWACS plus fighters based system worked pretty well. The shorter range is problematic but not insurmountable. Even the "best" systems will have "leakers", but the number of leakers getting through is way, way too high. I am not privy to the causes of the problem. I suspect it may be assigning an inadequate number of fighters to the task. The controllers may be running out of assets and some Shaheds may get through without being engaged at all. The other problem could be detection, but since that hasn't been an issue in the past I can't imagine it is now.
I'm not saying the US can or should exactly adopt the Ukrainian system for dealing with these. There are unique factors to each conflict, and the US has much, much more money to throw at this problem than Ukraine. But the US should have effective ways of dealing with these and they are not being used, or used effectively.
IMO the "best" approach to a barrier defense system for this conflict would be small (300 tons or so) combatants carrying cheap short range APKWS missiles stationed about 30 miles into the Gulf. The would get tasking from the AWACS for targets that couldn't be engaged by fighters or that were but got through anyway. They would carry an appropriate radar. Of course, we don't have such an option. We do have the option of installing APKWS missiles in a point defense role, but acquisition would be a problem. They are a "last ditch" system at that point and they have a very short engagement window. The 30 miles into the Gulf gives the shipboard systems a larger window.
