[Goose]

Since the other Russian offensives didn't happen, Ukraine was able to utilize the 67th Mechanized Brigade and the 4th Special Purpose Regiment   to bring the offensive along the Sumy axis to a halt. That would probably not have been possible if Russia had executed their original plan. In September Ukraine committed the 12th National Guard Brigade Azov (Azov Corps) and both the 79th and 82nd Air Assault Brigades to the battle north of Pokrovsk. It is very improbable that this strategic reserve would have been available if Putin had pulled the trigger back in March/early April. Many people (including me) were increasingly asking "What is Putin waiting for?". Ref-6 addressed the issue directly. It predicted that there would be a "soft start" to the offensive but that it would build up. Basically, that didn't happen. This article did address several of the same issues discussed above. I do believe it was updated after its original May of 2025 publication date. In any event, it fills the event "hole" from the non-existent Russian summer offensive to the present, more or less. Fast-forwarding to Ref-7 (2 Sept) we have the following

As August gives way to September, it is now abundantly clear that Putin’s big summer offensive has failed. The Russian army has been unable to secure any front line breakthroughs or capture a single major city, with overall Russian advances during the three summer months limited to an estimated 0.3 percent of Ukrainian territory. Crucially, key strategic objectives like Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine remain in Ukrainian hands.

 

As previously stated, my position is that the offensive didn't "fail". It didn't happen. However, the current "state of play" is in any case showing signs that Putin was correct about the Ukrainian army being vulnerable.

 

Ukraine simply doesn't (and never did) have enough troops to defend its frontier from Russia. We here in the "west" have trouble comprehending the sheer size of Ukraine, let alone Russia. While many web articles go to great lengths to (correctly) point out that the feasible lines of advance into Ukraine are limited, the number is very large. This situation makes fighting in Ukraine and Russia quite unique. The battles in Donbas occur along restricted GLOCs. In very few cases (all in the south) has Ukraine attempted to defend in anything other than "built up" areas. Even the fighting in open fields involves defending one treeline and falling back to the next if flanked. In the open steppe, of which Ukraine and Russia both have in abundance, infantry simply cannot defend a line of contact. Artillery will get them if nothing else does.

 

I could go on and on about the history of combat in the Russian steppe areas, and in a future post, I might. Suffice it to say that Russia (and Ukraine as formerly part of Russia) are a black hole for troops. Many go in, none come out. No matter how many troops an attacker has, it is never enough. Germany attempted with some success to overcome this limitation by using very mobile forces. Offensively, this worked. However, once an area was secured forces were required to prevent the Russians from infiltrating back in. Germany simply didn't have enough PZ and PZG divisions to secure the vast eastern front. They had to "make do" with inadequate infantry forces (many of which were not German) that were not very mobile.

 

Eventually, Soviet mobile forces did to the Germans and their allies what Germany originally did to the Russians. Obviously, if you intend to fight in Russia (or Ukraine) you must have competent mobile forces. Nobody in their right mind would even dream of fighting in Ukraine without that, and even with that it is quite possible to get thinned out by the size of the battle area to the point you can't complete the task. Yet Ukraine and Russia are beating their heads against each other with primarily "leg" infantry to advance a few km a month. Crazy.

 

The employment of FPV drones, initially by Ukraine and subsequently by Russia has made this infantry battle even deadlier than it was in the past. Infantry by itself has a relatively limited "kill zone". An AK-47 hs a maximum range of 800 meters, and an effective range of 300-400 meters. The US NGSW machine gun has a maximum range of 1200 meters and an effective range of 800 meters. Traditional infantry on infantry attacks where the defending side has significant cover (natural, field fortifications or an urban area) relies on the attacker bringing a significantly larger force to the battle unobserved. If the defender detects the attacker's movement to contact they can request artillery or air support to break up the attack before it goes in. Even if no such support is forthcoming the defender can optimally position himself to receive the attack. A person standing on unobstructed level ground can notionally see another such person at a range of about 8.5 km. Obviously topographic features and obstructions (e.g. foliage) can greatly lessen that distance. The attacker will do everything possible to utilize such cover to get as close to the objective as possible without being detected.

 

The FPV drones in Ukraine increased the detection range to 20 km or so. Ukraine was reliably able to detect enemy infantry concentrating for and advancing to contact. These attacks were very often broken up by artillery before they even started. The FPV drones also made using terrain and obstructions to mask troop movements almost impossible. The Russian massed "meat attacks" became too costly to contemplate. Russia responded by reducing the battlefield density. They seldom attacked in company or platoon strength. They would send out fire teams and hopefully several of them would get through undetected. If they did, they would attack in numbers that were far too small to break into the Ukrainian defenses but large enough to still cause casualties. This paradyme was expanded by supplying these fire team members with motorcycles and golf-cart type vehicles. The hope was these vehicles would allow some of the fire team to survive long enough to actually reach the Ukrainian defenses. The Russians would then try to reinforce these troops using similar low-density troop movements.

[Goose]

Since the other Russian offensives didn't happen, Ukraine was able to utilize the 67th Mechanized Brigade and the 4th Special Purpose Regiment   to bring the offensive along the Sumy axis to a halt. That would probably not have been possible if Russia had executed their original plan. In September Ukraine committed the 12th National Guard Brigade Azov (Azov Corps) and both the 79th and 82nd Air Assault Brigades to the battle north of Pokrovsk. It is very improbable that this strategic reserve would have been available if Putin had pulled the trigger back in March/early April. Many people (including me) were increasingly asking "What is Putin waiting for?". Ref-6 addressed the issue directly. It predicted that there would be a "soft start" to the offensive but that it would build up. Basically, that didn't happen. This article did address several of the same issues discussed above. I do believe it was updated after its original May of 2025 publication date. In any event, it fills the event "hole" from the non-existent Russian summer offensive to the present, more or less. Fast-forwarding to Ref-7 (2 Sept) we have the following

As August gives way to September, it is now abundantly clear that Putin’s big summer offensive has failed. The Russian army has been unable to secure any front line breakthroughs or capture a single major city, with overall Russian advances during the three summer months limited to an estimated 0.3 percent of Ukrainian territory. Crucially, key strategic objectives like Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine remain in Ukrainian hands.

 

As previously stated, my position is that the offensive didn't "fail". It didn't happen. However, the current "state of play" is in any case showing signs that Putin was correct about the Ukrainian army being vulnerable.

 

Ukraine simply doesn't (and never did) have enough troops to defend its frontier from Russia. We here in the "west" have trouble comprehending the sheer size of Ukraine, let alone Russia. While many web articles go to great lengths to (correctly) point out that the feasible lines of advance into Ukraine are limited, the number is very large. This situation makes fighting in Ukraine and Russia quite unique. The battles in Donbas occur along restricted GLOCs. In very few cases (all in the south) has Ukraine attempted to defend in anything other than "built up" areas. Even the fighting in open fields involves defending one treeline and falling back to the next if flanked. In the open steppe, of which Ukraine and Russia both have in abundance, infantry simply cannot defend a line of contact. Artillery will get them if nothing else does.

 

I could go on and on about the history of combat in the Russian steppe areas, and in a future post, I might. Suffice it to say that Russia (and Ukraine as formerly part of Russia) are a black hole for troops. Many go in, none come out. No matter how many troops an attacker has, it is never enough. Germany attempted with some success to overcome this limitation by using very mobile forces. Offensively, this worked. However, once an area was secured forces were required to prevent the Russians from infiltrating back in. Germany simply didn't have enough PZ and PZG divisions to secure the vast eastern front. They had to "make do" with inadequate infantry forces (many of which were not German) that were not very mobile.

 

Eventually, Soviet mobile forces did to the Germans and their allies what Germany originally did to the Russians. Obviously, if you intend to fight in Russia (or Ukraine) you must have competent mobile forces. Nobody in their right mind would even dream of fighting in Ukraine without that, and even with that it is quite possible to get thinned out by the size of the battle area to the point you can't complete the task. Yet Ukraine and Russia are beating their heads against each other with primarily "leg" infantry to advance a few km a month. Crazy.

 

The employment of FPV drones, initially by Ukraine and subsequently by Russia has made this infantry battle even deadlier than it was in the past. Infantry by itself has a relatively limited "kill zone". An AK-47 hs a maximum range of 800 meters, and an effective range of 300-400 meters. The US NGSW machine gun has a maximum range of 1200 meters and an effective range of 800 meters. Traditional infantry on infantry attacks where the defending side has significant cover (natural, field fortifications or an urban area) relies on the attacker bringing a significantly larger force to the battle unobserved. If the defender detects the attacker's movement to contact they can request artillery or air support to break up the attack before it goes in. Even if no such support is forthcoming the defender can optimally position himself to receive the attack. A person standing on unobstructed level ground can notionally see another such person at a range of about 8.5 km. Obviously topographic features and obstructions (e.g. foliage) can greatly lessen that distance. The attacker will do everything possible to utilize such cover to get as close to the objective as possible without being detected.

 

The FPV drones in Ukraine increased the detection range to 20 km or so. Ukraine was reliably able to detect enemy infantry concentrating for and advancing to contact. These attacks were very often broken up by artillery before they even started. The FPV drones also made using terrain and obstructions to mask troop movements almost impossible. The Russian massed "meat attacks" became too costly to contemplate. Russia responded by reducing the battlefield density. They seldom attacked in company or platoon strength. They would send out fire teams and hopefully several of them would get through undetected. If they did, they would attack in numbers that were far too small to break into the Ukrainian defenses but large enough to still cause casualties. This paradyme was expanded by supplying these fire team members with motorcycles and golf-cart type vehicles. The hope was these vehicles would allow some of the fire team to survive long enough to actually reach the Ukrainian defenses. The Russians would then try to reinforce these troops using similar low-density troop movements.