[Goose]

 1) 19 Feb   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Sumy_offensive
 2) 28 Feb   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Trump...ce_meeting
 3)  4 March https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/what-...h%20Russia.
 4)  6 March https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-russi...1fe89bba0f
 5) 14 March https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/m...gotiations
 6) 20 May   https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-researc...-offensive
 7) 2 Sept   https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/uk...n-victory/
 8) 17 Sept  https://kyivindependent.com/russia-prepa...nsky-says/

 9) 17 Sept  https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/zele...34906.html

10)  7 Oct   https://www.theatlantic.com/internationa...on/684419/

11)  9 Oct   https://www.twz.com/news-features/inside...-in-a-year

12) 10 Nov   https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/ukra...26456.html

13) 11 Nov   https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/ukra...27265.html
 

Many of you may remember that I predicted that Ukraine wouldn't last past June of this year. Obviously that was not what happened, which all of you have been kind enough not to remind me :-). However, I think it is worth examining why the outcome was different and to look at what might come "next".

 

My original analysis was based on the expectation that the administration would fully throw Ukraine under the bus. I expected that the US would cease all arms deliveries to Ukraine. Doing so seemed almost a certainty when SecDef ordered (on essentially day 1 of his tenure) that all military aid flowing to Ukraine based on previous appropriations cease immediately. While this was immediately reversed by "higher authority" SecDef's preferences were quite clear. I expected that the US would cut off all intelligence support. I further expected that the president would remove all sanctions from Russia. That is what the president had campaigned upon. He was going to end the war quickly, and this would certainly go a long way to make that happen. Had the president actually done this it would have made most of the previous and subsequent EU sanctions moot. The US would presumably provide Russia's needs that the EU/UK would prohibit. It looked probable at the time that the "worst case" scenario was unfolding (Ref-2, Ref-3, Ref-4).

 

My analysis also took into account that in 2024 Putin had directed the substantial expansion of the Russian army. By January 2025 it was apparent Putin had largely succeeded in greatly increasing the available troop strength that could be deployed in Ukraine. While the quality of the troops may have been questionable, there was no reason to believe they would be any worse than what Russia was previously using. I therefore expected major Russian offensives on several fronts. I expected these offensives to begin just after the mud season ended, probably late February/early March. From Ref-9

Zelensky said Russia prepared operations this year along four axes: Sumy, Novopavlivka, Pokrovsk and Zaporizhzhya.

It did initially appear that was the "plan", as an offensive along the Sumy axis did take place in mid-February (Ref-1, Ref-5). Soviet doctrine always called for multiple axis of advance. Sometimes one offensive would start a week or two earlier than the others. This was done to give the opponent the opportunity to make a mistake by weakening the defenses against the pending operations in order to defeat the initial earlier offensive.

 

In all cases the "additional" offensives were additionally (sometimes primarily) intended to deny the enemy the ability to shift reserves from one area to another. This aspect is especially important with respect to Ukraine. The vast majority of the Ukrainian military is infantry. Almost none of that infantry has organic transport. Ukraine also lacks a large "transportation corps" that can be used to move these infantry organization quickly and easily. On top of that, much of the Ukrainian infantry are "national guard" type volunteers that joined the military/organized themselves to defend their local area. These troops would understandably resist orders to move a long way from home even if it were possible to move them. Ukraine has addressed the need for a "mobile reserve" by developing several "elite" formations that are as close as Ukraine has to mechanized infantry. They also have smaller groups that are Special Operations Capable. Both forces are capable but available in extremely limited numbers. Thus, once these elite units were committed Ukraine would have no reserves.

 

For whatever reasons the administration did not completely throw Ukraine under the bus. We can conjecture as to why, and that would perhaps be interesting. Push-back from the UK, EU, and some GOP US Senators probably played a role. When Putin did not accede to a cease fire after Zelenskyy did it probably destroyed the administration's "quick end" plans. In any case, the administration at least stayed the execution.

 

Even more inexplicably the other three identified Russian offensives didn't go in. Putin had all the troops he needed already in place. Yet we did not see three more offensives of more than 100k troops suddenly attacking with new energy and determination. This makes no sense. Russia now has 700K troops involved in the Ukraine area. If nothing else, that costs a LOT of money. IMO the TL;DR is that Putin believed it highly likely the administration would hand him Ukraine on a plate. It is still probable Putin believes that will happen. It was always unlikely that several of the four possible offensives would result in breakthroughs. It would be certain that stepped-up "meat" attacks would result in very high casualties. While Putin has never shown an aversion to casualties he undoubtedly didn't want to run up a massive butcher's bill unnecessarily. If the administration was going to grant his wish fairly soon it would be hard to explain the deaths. In addition, nothing in war is certain and the offensives could have totally failed. Avoiding that risk was a definite consideration. Besides, the troops were there and could be used at any later time Putin chose.

 

[Goose]

 1) 19 Feb   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Sumy_offensive
 2) 28 Feb   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Trump...ce_meeting
 3)  4 March https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/what-...h%20Russia.
 4)  6 March https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-russi...1fe89bba0f
 5) 14 March https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/m...gotiations
 6) 20 May   https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-researc...-offensive
 7) 2 Sept   https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/uk...n-victory/
 8) 17 Sept  https://kyivindependent.com/russia-prepa...nsky-says/

 9) 17 Sept  https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/zele...34906.html

10)  7 Oct   https://www.theatlantic.com/internationa...on/684419/

11)  9 Oct   https://www.twz.com/news-features/inside...-in-a-year

12) 10 Nov   https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/ukra...26456.html

13) 11 Nov   https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/ukra...27265.html
 

Many of you may remember that I predicted that Ukraine wouldn't last past June of this year. Obviously that was not what happened, which all of you have been kind enough not to remind me :-). However, I think it is worth examining why the outcome was different and to look at what might come "next".

 

My original analysis was based on the expectation that the administration would fully throw Ukraine under the bus. I expected that the US would cease all arms deliveries to Ukraine. Doing so seemed almost a certainty when SecDef ordered (on essentially day 1 of his tenure) that all military aid flowing to Ukraine based on previous appropriations cease immediately. While this was immediately reversed by "higher authority" SecDef's preferences were quite clear. I expected that the US would cut off all intelligence support. I further expected that the president would remove all sanctions from Russia. That is what the president had campaigned upon. He was going to end the war quickly, and this would certainly go a long way to make that happen. Had the president actually done this it would have made most of the previous and subsequent EU sanctions moot. The US would presumably provide Russia's needs that the EU/UK would prohibit. It looked probable at the time that the "worst case" scenario was unfolding (Ref-2, Ref-3, Ref-4).

 

My analysis also took into account that in 2024 Putin had directed the substantial expansion of the Russian army. By January 2025 it was apparent Putin had largely succeeded in greatly increasing the available troop strength that could be deployed in Ukraine. While the quality of the troops may have been questionable, there was no reason to believe they would be any worse than what Russia was previously using. I therefore expected major Russian offensives on several fronts. I expected these offensives to begin just after the mud season ended, probably late February/early March. From Ref-9

Zelensky said Russia prepared operations this year along four axes: Sumy, Novopavlivka, Pokrovsk and Zaporizhzhya.

It did initially appear that was the "plan", as an offensive along the Sumy axis did take place in mid-February (Ref-1, Ref-5). Soviet doctrine always called for multiple axis of advance. Sometimes one offensive would start a week or two earlier than the others. This was done to give the opponent the opportunity to make a mistake by weakening the defenses against the pending operations in order to defeat the initial earlier offensive.

 

In all cases the "additional" offensives were additionally (sometimes primarily) intended to deny the enemy the ability to shift reserves from one area to another. This aspect is especially important with respect to Ukraine. The vast majority of the Ukrainian military is infantry. Almost none of that infantry has organic transport. Ukraine also lacks a large "transportation corps" that can be used to move these infantry organization quickly and easily. On top of that, much of the Ukrainian infantry are "national guard" type volunteers that joined the military/organized themselves to defend their local area. These troops would understandably resist orders to move a long way from home even if it were possible to move them. Ukraine has addressed the need for a "mobile reserve" by developing several "elite" formations that are as close as Ukraine has to mechanized infantry. They also have smaller groups that are Special Operations Capable. Both forces are capable but available in extremely limited numbers. Thus, once these elite units were committed Ukraine would have no reserves.

 

For whatever reasons the administration did not completely throw Ukraine under the bus. We can conjecture as to why, and that would perhaps be interesting. Push-back from the UK, EU, and some GOP US Senators probably played a role. When Putin did not accede to a cease fire after Zelenskyy did it probably destroyed the administration's "quick end" plans. In any case, the administration at least stayed the execution.

 

Even more inexplicably the other three identified Russian offensives didn't go in. Putin had all the troops he needed already in place. Yet we did not see three more offensives of more than 100k troops suddenly attacking with new energy and determination. This makes no sense. Russia now has 700K troops involved in the Ukraine area. If nothing else, that costs a LOT of money. IMO the TL;DR is that Putin believed it highly likely the administration would hand him Ukraine on a plate. It is still probable Putin believes that will happen. It was always unlikely that several of the four possible offensives would result in breakthroughs. It would be certain that stepped-up "meat" attacks would result in very high casualties. While Putin has never shown an aversion to casualties he undoubtedly didn't want to run up a massive butcher's bill unnecessarily. If the administration was going to grant his wish fairly soon it would be hard to explain the deaths. In addition, nothing in war is certain and the offensives could have totally failed. Avoiding that risk was a definite consideration. Besides, the troops were there and could be used at any later time Putin chose.