https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_e...ale-order/
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/ir...e-362826e3
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastienro...-missiles/
These articles, particularly the last, illuminates two important truths. First, defense against ballistic missiles is ALWAYS going to be significantly more expensive and more technologically difficult than creating an effective ballistic missile offensive capability. Second, no ballistic missile defense, no matter how sophisticated, will be 100% effective. These truths applied to the Iran vs Israel conflict. They apply to the Ukraine vs Russia conflict. The will apply to the "golden dome" the administration is attempting to build.
It appears very likely that Israel was indeed running very low on Arrow missiles during the 12 day war. The US rushing several DDG-51s to the area to augment Israel's BMD capability was not just for show. Iran was also more successful against the Israeli BMD than Israel was willing to live with. Israel was unable to prevent Iran's missile offensive from being relatively effective, despite having the opportunity before they started the war to estimate both the threat Iran's missiles posed and the capability of the Israeli BMD. It appears they got both wrong. This might also account for the unexpected (by me anyway) passivity Israel has exhibited toward Iran. So far, Iran has not agreed to give up enrichment capability. While the estimates of how far the US/Israeli strikes against Iran's nuclear capability are still being "refined", the threat clearly still exists. This was an Israeli war aim. So far, it appears to have not been accomplished.
Ukraine is currently under attack by both UAVs and ballistic missiles. Israel was in the same condition, but the IAF was able to completely neutralize the Iranian drone threat. As discussed at length, Ukraine has not been able to accomplish that same feat. Russia is also increasing the number of drones used in their assaults, making Ukrainian efforts even less effective. https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukrain...d21746912b
It is important that everybody involved clearly understands that Patriot batteries are NOT in any way the answer to this problem. Other SAM missile systems, such as NASAMS and SAMP/T can help but only to a very limited extent. Point defense systems function under severe geometric handicaps in globally defeating the Shahed 136 class drones. They can defend themselves and a circle with about a 60 km diameter against "low flyers". That's it. They can also only engage a limited number of simultaneous targets inside that circle and have a significant reload "dead time" during which they are bricks. These systems can be overloaded fairly easily. Russia now has the ability to do that, which is hurting Ukraine's ability to even mitigate the damage these weapons can do.
The only practical defense against this class of drones is an "adequate" supply of aircraft with look-down shoot-down capability controlled by an AWACS that manages the air fight. This has been clearly demonstrated many in the Israel-Iran conflict. Arguably, it was also demonstrated back in WW II against the V-1, where half the V-1s that were destroyed were killed by aircraft. At that time the UAV (V-1s) had the immense advantage of being slightly faster than the aircraft hunting them. In Ukraine/Israel the aircraft "cruising" speed is 4 times that of the Shahed 136s they hunt. The aircraft top speed is 11 times that of a Shahed 136. Aircraft can go where the targets are and can relatively quickly concentrate to handle local "swarms". They can also engage the drones anywhere in their flight path. SAMs (and guns for that matter) are restricted to a much smaller geographic footprint and have a fixed, limited engagement time window.
Russia's ballistic missile threat in Ukraine and Iran's similar threat in Israel presents a difficult BMD problem. Israel possesses a 3 tier system. The long range tier of Israel's ABM system is the Arrow 3 interceptor. The Arrow 3 has a 1,500 mile range. It is a "hit to kill" weapon that uses both a high-resolution EO sensor and an active radar homing (ARH) seeker for terminal guidance.
The intermediate range tier of Israel's ABM is David's Sling, with a range of 190 miles. David's Sling utilizes both an EO/IR sensor and an ARH seeker for terminal guidance and is also a "hit to kill" weapon.
The Patriot PAC-3 MSE has an Ka (26.5-40 GHz) ARH terminal guidance seeker. Its range, depending on which source one believes, is 22 to 30 miles. It is immediately obvious that the Patriot as an ABM system has a very limited footprint. Subject to that limitation, the system has been quite effective in Ukraine https://kyivindependent.com/patriot-miss...rt-supply/. Recently Russian Iskander-M ballistic missiles have apparently had significant success defeating Patriot batteries by terminal phase maneuvers and/or multiple decoys. https://www.eurasiantimes.com/radar-deco...n-ukraine/ Given that earlier versions of the Patriot often became confused when Iraqi SCUDs broke up, these statements are plausible.
The THAAD missile has a range of 120 miles. It uses a IR optical seeker for terminal guidance. It is a hit to kill weapon. There are a total of 8 THAAD systems in existence. One was present in Israel and used during the 12 day war. Its successes/failures haven't been officially documented. However https://x.com/OSINTWarfare/status/193831...rt-2091465 indicates it was fairly extensively used. Its obvious shortcoming is the exorbitant cost of its missiles.
The SM-3 Block IIA missile has a range of about 750 miles. It is functionally equivalent to the Arrow 3. It is used on DDG-51 AEGIS ships and thus was present near Israel during the 12 day war. They were used. How many were effective is unknown. These missiles are also used in AEGIS Ashore sites. Israel was originally a target customer for these sites but they opted to develop the Arrow 3 instead.
IMO the takeaway for Ukraine is that the Patriot is never going to provide anything close to an adequate missile shield. It is a fairly capable point defense ABM system that needs even more software updates than it has already received. The lack of missile kinetic energy is and will remain a problem against maneuvering targets. Targets that remain on a ballistic trajectory allow the intercepting missile to follow an "optimal" path to intercept. This maximizes the effect of the limited missile thrust. If the missile has to maneuver in response to the targets trajectory changes, it loses energy. It may lack enough to accomplish an intercept under these conditions.
Ukraine would be much better served by AEGIS Ashore sites. The much greater range (and therefore greater kinetic energy) would be of use in Ukraine. However, their fixed location would greatly increase the danger of their destruction. They also take too long to build. The best solutions are all "left of launch". Unfortunately Ukraine has only limited capability to use these approaches.
Added: https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/...-conflict/ More details on missile usage.
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/ir...e-362826e3
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastienro...-missiles/
These articles, particularly the last, illuminates two important truths. First, defense against ballistic missiles is ALWAYS going to be significantly more expensive and more technologically difficult than creating an effective ballistic missile offensive capability. Second, no ballistic missile defense, no matter how sophisticated, will be 100% effective. These truths applied to the Iran vs Israel conflict. They apply to the Ukraine vs Russia conflict. The will apply to the "golden dome" the administration is attempting to build.
It appears very likely that Israel was indeed running very low on Arrow missiles during the 12 day war. The US rushing several DDG-51s to the area to augment Israel's BMD capability was not just for show. Iran was also more successful against the Israeli BMD than Israel was willing to live with. Israel was unable to prevent Iran's missile offensive from being relatively effective, despite having the opportunity before they started the war to estimate both the threat Iran's missiles posed and the capability of the Israeli BMD. It appears they got both wrong. This might also account for the unexpected (by me anyway) passivity Israel has exhibited toward Iran. So far, Iran has not agreed to give up enrichment capability. While the estimates of how far the US/Israeli strikes against Iran's nuclear capability are still being "refined", the threat clearly still exists. This was an Israeli war aim. So far, it appears to have not been accomplished.
Ukraine is currently under attack by both UAVs and ballistic missiles. Israel was in the same condition, but the IAF was able to completely neutralize the Iranian drone threat. As discussed at length, Ukraine has not been able to accomplish that same feat. Russia is also increasing the number of drones used in their assaults, making Ukrainian efforts even less effective. https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukrain...d21746912b
It is important that everybody involved clearly understands that Patriot batteries are NOT in any way the answer to this problem. Other SAM missile systems, such as NASAMS and SAMP/T can help but only to a very limited extent. Point defense systems function under severe geometric handicaps in globally defeating the Shahed 136 class drones. They can defend themselves and a circle with about a 60 km diameter against "low flyers". That's it. They can also only engage a limited number of simultaneous targets inside that circle and have a significant reload "dead time" during which they are bricks. These systems can be overloaded fairly easily. Russia now has the ability to do that, which is hurting Ukraine's ability to even mitigate the damage these weapons can do.
The only practical defense against this class of drones is an "adequate" supply of aircraft with look-down shoot-down capability controlled by an AWACS that manages the air fight. This has been clearly demonstrated many in the Israel-Iran conflict. Arguably, it was also demonstrated back in WW II against the V-1, where half the V-1s that were destroyed were killed by aircraft. At that time the UAV (V-1s) had the immense advantage of being slightly faster than the aircraft hunting them. In Ukraine/Israel the aircraft "cruising" speed is 4 times that of the Shahed 136s they hunt. The aircraft top speed is 11 times that of a Shahed 136. Aircraft can go where the targets are and can relatively quickly concentrate to handle local "swarms". They can also engage the drones anywhere in their flight path. SAMs (and guns for that matter) are restricted to a much smaller geographic footprint and have a fixed, limited engagement time window.
Russia's ballistic missile threat in Ukraine and Iran's similar threat in Israel presents a difficult BMD problem. Israel possesses a 3 tier system. The long range tier of Israel's ABM system is the Arrow 3 interceptor. The Arrow 3 has a 1,500 mile range. It is a "hit to kill" weapon that uses both a high-resolution EO sensor and an active radar homing (ARH) seeker for terminal guidance.
The intermediate range tier of Israel's ABM is David's Sling, with a range of 190 miles. David's Sling utilizes both an EO/IR sensor and an ARH seeker for terminal guidance and is also a "hit to kill" weapon.
The Patriot PAC-3 MSE has an Ka (26.5-40 GHz) ARH terminal guidance seeker. Its range, depending on which source one believes, is 22 to 30 miles. It is immediately obvious that the Patriot as an ABM system has a very limited footprint. Subject to that limitation, the system has been quite effective in Ukraine https://kyivindependent.com/patriot-miss...rt-supply/. Recently Russian Iskander-M ballistic missiles have apparently had significant success defeating Patriot batteries by terminal phase maneuvers and/or multiple decoys. https://www.eurasiantimes.com/radar-deco...n-ukraine/ Given that earlier versions of the Patriot often became confused when Iraqi SCUDs broke up, these statements are plausible.
The THAAD missile has a range of 120 miles. It uses a IR optical seeker for terminal guidance. It is a hit to kill weapon. There are a total of 8 THAAD systems in existence. One was present in Israel and used during the 12 day war. Its successes/failures haven't been officially documented. However https://x.com/OSINTWarfare/status/193831...rt-2091465 indicates it was fairly extensively used. Its obvious shortcoming is the exorbitant cost of its missiles.
The SM-3 Block IIA missile has a range of about 750 miles. It is functionally equivalent to the Arrow 3. It is used on DDG-51 AEGIS ships and thus was present near Israel during the 12 day war. They were used. How many were effective is unknown. These missiles are also used in AEGIS Ashore sites. Israel was originally a target customer for these sites but they opted to develop the Arrow 3 instead.
IMO the takeaway for Ukraine is that the Patriot is never going to provide anything close to an adequate missile shield. It is a fairly capable point defense ABM system that needs even more software updates than it has already received. The lack of missile kinetic energy is and will remain a problem against maneuvering targets. Targets that remain on a ballistic trajectory allow the intercepting missile to follow an "optimal" path to intercept. This maximizes the effect of the limited missile thrust. If the missile has to maneuver in response to the targets trajectory changes, it loses energy. It may lack enough to accomplish an intercept under these conditions.
Ukraine would be much better served by AEGIS Ashore sites. The much greater range (and therefore greater kinetic energy) would be of use in Ukraine. However, their fixed location would greatly increase the danger of their destruction. They also take too long to build. The best solutions are all "left of launch". Unfortunately Ukraine has only limited capability to use these approaches.
Added: https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/...-conflict/ More details on missile usage.