[GK3]

You mention that NATO would have little time to organize, but that seems unlikely given modern satellite imaging. We know that Russia was building up forces on the border of Ukraine for months, just few actually believed they would pull the trigger on the invasions. We would undoubtedly see a similar buildup prior to invasions of a NATO country. 

Now I'm sure explanations would be given to cover the buildup (exercises, etc), but if NATO leadership is on point I suspect that forces could be organized or forward deployed, both to have reactive capability and as a deterrent.

That is what Russia and the US said, and then Ukraine invaded Kursk :-). With NATO, the problem is that an Article 5 invocation before a battle actually starts isn't going to draw any response. The other problem is that there aren't really contingency plans that allow significant forces to be deployed on Day 1. During the Cold War, Germany, the UK, and the US had around 20 divisions (12 BRD, 4 UK, 4 US). They were all supposedly "ready to fight tonight". These troops were stationed on or relatively near the German border. According to plan many units of these forces would be in action from Day 1 before any Article 5 invocation was even possible. By Day 4 they all would be.
 
What is stationed in the Baltics? The Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) of about 7,700 troops total. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Enhan...d_Presence

The numbers involved, although a notable supplement to the armed forces of the country being defended, are limited so that they avoid seeming to threaten Russia. The chief value of the force is that it is impossible to invade Poland or the Baltic States without battling the soldiers and firing on the flags of the involved NATO states, giving cause for war. It is believed that the prospect of war with all those countries will deter aggression.

Frankly stated, they are a hostage force. They will be unable to defend the countries involved.
 
If NATO responds by choosing to fight (not a sure thing) it will take time to bring forward the necessary troops. Of course Russia might simplify that by moving forward themselves. It isn't going to be on day 1, and probably not week 1. NATO air power can be used much quicker if the political will allows. How quickly can/will the present administration make the decision to defend Latvia? I don't pretend to know, but I am guessing it won't be in the first 24 hours. By then, it may not matter.

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If this were to happen in most administrations, I would think the undersecretary and the SecDef would be fired. Not expecting that now but would be happy to be wrong.

Totally agree. I will point out however that the SecDef may have actually run it by the President and received a verbal OK. The President may not have realized what he had agreed to, or he may have forgotten he even did agree. In any case, it is IMO very disturbing, at best. What is the "plan" in Ukraine and how does this series of events fit into the plan?

I would expect that if Russia masses sufficient assets close to the Baltic/Poland borders, it will not be a secret to NATO.  The "Trip Wire" forces in Poland/Baltic states will be in a difficult position.  Whether they function as the "trip wire" that allows Article 5 to be invoked and positive responses is as of today unknown.  Once Article 5 is invoked we shall see what happens. 
I also believe that we anticipate that our SEAD/DEAD plans to be sufficient to give us dominance of the airspace over the resulting battlefield. Allowing us to bring up ground forces and fight the war in the Poland/Baltic States arena. Not a pretty picture if you live in those areas.  My questions will our DEAD plans work?  If we can't dominate the airspace we will have some issues. The first of which will be does NATO mean anything at all.

[GK3]

You mention that NATO would have little time to organize, but that seems unlikely given modern satellite imaging. We know that Russia was building up forces on the border of Ukraine for months, just few actually believed they would pull the trigger on the invasions. We would undoubtedly see a similar buildup prior to invasions of a NATO country. 

Now I'm sure explanations would be given to cover the buildup (exercises, etc), but if NATO leadership is on point I suspect that forces could be organized or forward deployed, both to have reactive capability and as a deterrent.

That is what Russia and the US said, and then Ukraine invaded Kursk :-). With NATO, the problem is that an Article 5 invocation before a battle actually starts isn't going to draw any response. The other problem is that there aren't really contingency plans that allow significant forces to be deployed on Day 1. During the Cold War, Germany, the UK, and the US had around 20 divisions (12 BRD, 4 UK, 4 US). They were all supposedly "ready to fight tonight". These troops were stationed on or relatively near the German border. According to plan many units of these forces would be in action from Day 1 before any Article 5 invocation was even possible. By Day 4 they all would be.
 
What is stationed in the Baltics? The Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) of about 7,700 troops total. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Enhan...d_Presence

The numbers involved, although a notable supplement to the armed forces of the country being defended, are limited so that they avoid seeming to threaten Russia. The chief value of the force is that it is impossible to invade Poland or the Baltic States without battling the soldiers and firing on the flags of the involved NATO states, giving cause for war. It is believed that the prospect of war with all those countries will deter aggression.

Frankly stated, they are a hostage force. They will be unable to defend the countries involved.
 
If NATO responds by choosing to fight (not a sure thing) it will take time to bring forward the necessary troops. Of course Russia might simplify that by moving forward themselves. It isn't going to be on day 1, and probably not week 1. NATO air power can be used much quicker if the political will allows. How quickly can/will the present administration make the decision to defend Latvia? I don't pretend to know, but I am guessing it won't be in the first 24 hours. By then, it may not matter.

---

If this were to happen in most administrations, I would think the undersecretary and the SecDef would be fired. Not expecting that now but would be happy to be wrong.

Totally agree. I will point out however that the SecDef may have actually run it by the President and received a verbal OK. The President may not have realized what he had agreed to, or he may have forgotten he even did agree. In any case, it is IMO very disturbing, at best. What is the "plan" in Ukraine and how does this series of events fit into the plan?

I would expect that if Russia masses sufficient assets close to the Baltic/Poland borders, it will not be a secret to NATO.  The "Trip Wire" forces in Poland/Baltic states will be in a difficult position.  Whether they function as the "trip wire" that allows Article 5 to be invoked and positive responses is as of today unknown.  Once Article 5 is invoked we shall see what happens. 
I also believe that we anticipate that our SEAD/DEAD plans to be sufficient to give us dominance of the airspace over the resulting battlefield. Allowing us to bring up ground forces and fight the war in the Poland/Baltic States arena. Not a pretty picture if you live in those areas.  My questions will our DEAD plans work?  If we can't dominate the airspace we will have some issues. The first of which will be does NATO mean anything at all.