Timely article on what a European security deployment to Ukraine could look like. I am not necessarily optimistic the political will is really there, and neither are the authors, but good to see some discussion of what a European security force could look like. I quoted extensively but the entire article is worth reading, and free.
https://warontherocks.com/2025/03/willpo...n-ukraine/
Quote:The multinational task force envisioned does not need to be everywhere in Ukraine. It needs to have a presence on three directions, and with sufficient mobility to redeploy as necessary along the front. Any future Russian attack would invariably be along several predictable directions. Today, most of the fighting is concentrated typically along three to four sectors of the front at a time. Hence, a relatively small force package can be sufficient for introducing risk into Russian calculus. The most obvious directions would be Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Donetsk. Western formations would deploy to these regions not as frontline troops, but as supporting echelons backing Ukrainian forces.
A European commitment would also help avoid a worst-case scenario after any ceasefire, in which Ukraine sees itself as abandoned without any security commitment or Western military presence. The army will demobilize and many of the men may then leave abroad, which would shrink the force significantly. Essentially, this is also about Ukrainians seeing that they have a future and that, in the event of another Russian invasion, they also have a chance.
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Given the significant degradation in Russian force quality over the course of the last three years of fighting, the initial force deployed could be as few as three combat brigades, or their equivalents. The force may need to grow over time as Russia reconstitutes. This would amount to perhaps 15,000 to 20,000 personnel in country, with another 30,000 to 40,000 required for sustained rotation, for a total of 45,000 to 60,000 troops. A notional force structure would include a divisional headquarters, three maneuver brigades, a logistics brigade, and a fires brigade. Conversely, nations could set up their own national support elements in place of a logistics brigade.
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European leaders may worry what will happen if this force is engaged by Russian strike capabilities. There is a somewhat fraught discussion at present about the need for robust air defenses. Yet the war has shown that dispersal is highly effective, as is entrenchment, and Ukrainian air defense (much of it Western systems) intercepts a significant percentage of Russian strikes. If anything, the experience has illustrated that air and missile defenses are more effective than expected, while a force that is properly dispersed is a very unattractive target for prestige strike systems. A multinational force could manage its footprint in country to make itself a hard target, in much the same way as hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian troops do every day. Indeed, mass casualty events are rare, even relatively close to the front line. If losses take place from skirmishes, or incidents, there’s no reason they would lead to a war with Russia, and in many similar cases have not in the past.
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It will be objected that European air forces currently lack the training, munitions, or command-and-control infrastructure to execute such operations. This is in some cases correct. And initially, U.S. support may be necessary when it comes to logistical and organizational capacity. But addressing such a glaring set of deficiencies is vital to restoring NATO’s conventional deterrence posture and this is a solvable problem. Indeed, it is the problem Europe should be solving, and the foremost priority for European investment into their militaries. Making European airpower useable against its primary threat should be a driver of force planning across the continent irrespective of commitments made to Ukraine.
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Russia may strongly object to such a force if it is proposed in negotiations. So long, however, as a commitment is not made to exclude European forces from Ukraine after a ceasefire, then it is doubtful that a Russian military that is currently struggling to break through Ukrainian defenses would be immediately recommitted to the attack should Ukrainians on the line of contact be reinforced from European militaries. In short, Moscow may protest, but it is not clear in such a scenario that it could prevent such a policy being implemented.
The policy set out above would require significant investment and the political determination by European states that they were prepared to fight for Ukraine. It will also require reprioritization, at least in the interim, when looking at their current commitments. Strategically there is a compelling case that it is better to prevent the subjugation of Ukraine than face an emboldened Russia elsewhere on the continent. Politically, this is a matter for the member states. However, current debate on this topic veers between vague security commitments without any reference to the necessary force requirements, and wild statements of troop requirements that make the proposition insurmountable. A more careful examination of what it takes demonstrates that it is possible, but will be costly in resources and political will.
https://warontherocks.com/2025/03/willpo...n-ukraine/