[Goose]

There are several masters thesis on the Internet reverse engineering the DJI protocol. [JAM-2] actually reverse engineers what the control messages to the DJI drones are and what they do down to the bit level. There are many more dealing with all aspects of the various commercial drone protocols. I am willing to wager that Russia by now has source code copies of all the DJI software. If Ukraine doesn't have that as well they have reverse engineered it and produced the equivalent. There are no secrets.

It is critical to understand that the control link and video backlink required by commercial FPV drones that use radio communication creates an inherent vulnerability to EW. There is no way around that fact. They can and will be jammed into uselessness in any future conflict.  This has already happened in Ukraine, mitigated only by the fact both sides use the same drones. 

Section 2.4 of [JAM-1] presents a good description of various jamming techniques. Suffice it to say it is quite easy to build a barrage noise jammer that will cover the  entire 2.4-2.5 GHz (100 MHz wide) ISM band and the entire 5.725-5.875 GHz (150 MHz wide) ISM band. These frequencies are an immutable attribute of commercial drones. It would be illegal to use these drones commercially if they used non-approved bands, so such drones will never be built. Of course, the military can order drones using other bands, but because they would use non-standard parts they would be at least an order of magnitude (probably more) expensive. Russia is a past master at building high-power barrage noise jammers. The US is pretty good at it too. A B-52 can render E through G band unusable for several miles around it. This is not news.
 

Both sides are also using "tone jammers to jam some of the frequencies in the ISM band but not others. This temporarily allows the side doing that to operate their own drones while their opponent cannot. Ukraine has had some success in Electronic Counter-Counter Measures (ECCM) by hacking the DJI software to change the operating frequency set. This defeats Russian jamming until Russia figures out what Ukraine is doing. It is effective for a few hours at most, and usually much less than that. It also imposes a significant organizational challenge to Ukraine as the change has to be made simultaneously by all the "users" for it to be effective. This tactic is addressed in [JAM-3]. Of course, if the opponent is jamming the entire band, this approach will not work. Note that this tactic doesn't increase the frequency range the drones can use. That is dictated by hardware constraints.

 

The simple fact is that when jamming is present these DJI-based drones (or any other drones in the same ISM bands) are totally useless for both sides, period.  Both Ukraine and Russia are stuck with that. They are also stuck with the fact that their own EW by design will jam their own drones as well as their opponents. This places both sides equally on the horns of a dilemma. If either side is jamming, neither can use drones because the drones will go out of control when they reach the jamming boundary. If neither side is jamming, both can use drones. Nobody is "getting around" this conundrum. Both sides can manipulate the situation by selectively jamming only parts of the band and not jamming others. Of course, if the other side is jamming the entire band, that won't help.
 
There are Internet sources that assert the "answer" to the jamming problems is simply to buy more drones. An example is [WA-4]. It states

“Both sides recognize that the adversary EW is having a massive effect on such drones, but it’s not cost-effective to proof them against EW. It’s just cheaper and easier to get large quantities of COTS [Commercial Off-The-Shelf] UAVs and replace lost drones.”

This is solving the wrong problem. Yes, you can replace the drones that do not penetrate the EW screen. Those replacements can't penetrate it either. The E field doesn't care how many drones you send against it. It is not being "expended" in knocking them down. If you desperately want to know what is going on 1.5 km in front of you having all kinds of "spare" drones won't help you one bit if they can't get through the enemy EW. [CNAS] makes similar points, stating (pg. 2)

Drones do not have to be survivable if they are cheap and plentiful because one can have resiliency through reconstitution. Because they are vulnerable, drones must be cheap enough and easy enough to manufacture that they can be readily replaced. Instead of hardening commercial drones against electronic attacks, which would notably raise the costs, both parties have opted to instead buy more cheap drones.
The logic of resiliency through reconstitution also applies to military drones.

Once again, replacing drones that are destroyed by EW isn't a solution to the military necessity that they will be effective when they are needed.
 
It is indeed true that "hardening" commercial drones against electronic attack will "notably" raise costs. It is also true that increasing the ground EW capability to defeat that hardening is generally much cheaper proportionally. This subject can be discussed in detail but for the purposes of this discussion, I can only say "trust me" (and CNAS). It is a long nerdy journey.  That doesn't mean attempts are not being made. [WA-5] shows an attempt by Russia to move one of their bespoke drones that uses DJI electronics out of the 2.4 and 5.8 ISM bands. Of course, when/if it works Ukraine will just add a 1.4 Ghz capability to their jammers.
 
CNAS also states

As a result, Ukrainian troops often refrain from sending commercial drones on missions if Russian EW systems are operating. Yet, Russia cannot jam everywhere all the time.

CNAS concedes the point that Russia can deny Ukraine the ability to use their FPV drones whenever the Russian EW is present. Of course, Russia also can't use their own FPV drones then either.  It is clearly true that Russia cannot jam "everywhere". Their country is far too large for that. It is unclear (to me at least) why/if CNAS believes Russia can't jam along the entire line of contact if they wish to do so. It is not a technological challenge. Russia knows how to build the equipment. Sanctions may prevent them from getting enough parts to do so. Disorganization may inhibit appropriate distribution of EW assets. Eventually Russia would get it done, given time. It is reasonable to assume any near-peer enemy of the US, especially China, could successfully execute the task.
 
Importantly, we do know that the US could jam along the entire line of contact in Ukraine if we wished to. At least we could back when the insurgents were using cell phones to set of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) in Iraq. The US built jammers that jammed cell phones "locally". From a standing start within three months at least two manufactures were cranking them out like hotcakes. We built so many that virtually every unit in Iraq had plenty of them. Every vehicle had one. The insurgents quickly figured out using cell phones as detonators didn't work anymore. They quit using them within a couple of months of the jammers started showing up. However, the contracts were in place and the government feared cancellation fees. So the companies kept building them. I have no idea where the many thousands of jammers ended up. These jammers were IMO technically more complicated than what is being used in Ukraine, although they were still relatively simple.
 
If our ability to field ground jammers isn't immediately available, there is always this [EC-37B]  and these [EC-130H]. The EC-130H Baseline 2 was a state-of-the art platform in the early 2000s. Unfortunately not all EC-130Hs were upgraded to Baseline 2 because the airframes were running out of hours (and we still believed we would never need them). Similarly, the EC-37B program started in 2017 has only recently delivered an operational platform. The stuff still "works", but obviously we must take our ECM requirements seriously going forward. Of course, the EA-18G and the F-35s carry jammers that can neutralize commercial FPVs. I am assuming they will have better things to do if the US is involved in a war.

[Goose]

There are several masters thesis on the Internet reverse engineering the DJI protocol. [JAM-2] actually reverse engineers what the control messages to the DJI drones are and what they do down to the bit level. There are many more dealing with all aspects of the various commercial drone protocols. I am willing to wager that Russia by now has source code copies of all the DJI software. If Ukraine doesn't have that as well they have reverse engineered it and produced the equivalent. There are no secrets.

It is critical to understand that the control link and video backlink required by commercial FPV drones that use radio communication creates an inherent vulnerability to EW. There is no way around that fact. They can and will be jammed into uselessness in any future conflict.  This has already happened in Ukraine, mitigated only by the fact both sides use the same drones. 

Section 2.4 of [JAM-1] presents a good description of various jamming techniques. Suffice it to say it is quite easy to build a barrage noise jammer that will cover the  entire 2.4-2.5 GHz (100 MHz wide) ISM band and the entire 5.725-5.875 GHz (150 MHz wide) ISM band. These frequencies are an immutable attribute of commercial drones. It would be illegal to use these drones commercially if they used non-approved bands, so such drones will never be built. Of course, the military can order drones using other bands, but because they would use non-standard parts they would be at least an order of magnitude (probably more) expensive. Russia is a past master at building high-power barrage noise jammers. The US is pretty good at it too. A B-52 can render E through G band unusable for several miles around it. This is not news.
 

Both sides are also using "tone jammers to jam some of the frequencies in the ISM band but not others. This temporarily allows the side doing that to operate their own drones while their opponent cannot. Ukraine has had some success in Electronic Counter-Counter Measures (ECCM) by hacking the DJI software to change the operating frequency set. This defeats Russian jamming until Russia figures out what Ukraine is doing. It is effective for a few hours at most, and usually much less than that. It also imposes a significant organizational challenge to Ukraine as the change has to be made simultaneously by all the "users" for it to be effective. This tactic is addressed in [JAM-3]. Of course, if the opponent is jamming the entire band, this approach will not work. Note that this tactic doesn't increase the frequency range the drones can use. That is dictated by hardware constraints.

 

The simple fact is that when jamming is present these DJI-based drones (or any other drones in the same ISM bands) are totally useless for both sides, period.  Both Ukraine and Russia are stuck with that. They are also stuck with the fact that their own EW by design will jam their own drones as well as their opponents. This places both sides equally on the horns of a dilemma. If either side is jamming, neither can use drones because the drones will go out of control when they reach the jamming boundary. If neither side is jamming, both can use drones. Nobody is "getting around" this conundrum. Both sides can manipulate the situation by selectively jamming only parts of the band and not jamming others. Of course, if the other side is jamming the entire band, that won't help.
 
There are Internet sources that assert the "answer" to the jamming problems is simply to buy more drones. An example is [WA-4]. It states

“Both sides recognize that the adversary EW is having a massive effect on such drones, but it’s not cost-effective to proof them against EW. It’s just cheaper and easier to get large quantities of COTS [Commercial Off-The-Shelf] UAVs and replace lost drones.”

This is solving the wrong problem. Yes, you can replace the drones that do not penetrate the EW screen. Those replacements can't penetrate it either. The E field doesn't care how many drones you send against it. It is not being "expended" in knocking them down. If you desperately want to know what is going on 1.5 km in front of you having all kinds of "spare" drones won't help you one bit if they can't get through the enemy EW. [CNAS] makes similar points, stating (pg. 2)

Drones do not have to be survivable if they are cheap and plentiful because one can have resiliency through reconstitution. Because they are vulnerable, drones must be cheap enough and easy enough to manufacture that they can be readily replaced. Instead of hardening commercial drones against electronic attacks, which would notably raise the costs, both parties have opted to instead buy more cheap drones.
The logic of resiliency through reconstitution also applies to military drones.

Once again, replacing drones that are destroyed by EW isn't a solution to the military necessity that they will be effective when they are needed.
 
It is indeed true that "hardening" commercial drones against electronic attack will "notably" raise costs. It is also true that increasing the ground EW capability to defeat that hardening is generally much cheaper proportionally. This subject can be discussed in detail but for the purposes of this discussion, I can only say "trust me" (and CNAS). It is a long nerdy journey.  That doesn't mean attempts are not being made. [WA-5] shows an attempt by Russia to move one of their bespoke drones that uses DJI electronics out of the 2.4 and 5.8 ISM bands. Of course, when/if it works Ukraine will just add a 1.4 Ghz capability to their jammers.
 
CNAS also states

As a result, Ukrainian troops often refrain from sending commercial drones on missions if Russian EW systems are operating. Yet, Russia cannot jam everywhere all the time.

CNAS concedes the point that Russia can deny Ukraine the ability to use their FPV drones whenever the Russian EW is present. Of course, Russia also can't use their own FPV drones then either.  It is clearly true that Russia cannot jam "everywhere". Their country is far too large for that. It is unclear (to me at least) why/if CNAS believes Russia can't jam along the entire line of contact if they wish to do so. It is not a technological challenge. Russia knows how to build the equipment. Sanctions may prevent them from getting enough parts to do so. Disorganization may inhibit appropriate distribution of EW assets. Eventually Russia would get it done, given time. It is reasonable to assume any near-peer enemy of the US, especially China, could successfully execute the task.
 
Importantly, we do know that the US could jam along the entire line of contact in Ukraine if we wished to. At least we could back when the insurgents were using cell phones to set of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) in Iraq. The US built jammers that jammed cell phones "locally". From a standing start within three months at least two manufactures were cranking them out like hotcakes. We built so many that virtually every unit in Iraq had plenty of them. Every vehicle had one. The insurgents quickly figured out using cell phones as detonators didn't work anymore. They quit using them within a couple of months of the jammers started showing up. However, the contracts were in place and the government feared cancellation fees. So the companies kept building them. I have no idea where the many thousands of jammers ended up. These jammers were IMO technically more complicated than what is being used in Ukraine, although they were still relatively simple.
 
If our ability to field ground jammers isn't immediately available, there is always this [EC-37B]  and these [EC-130H]. The EC-130H Baseline 2 was a state-of-the art platform in the early 2000s. Unfortunately not all EC-130Hs were upgraded to Baseline 2 because the airframes were running out of hours (and we still believed we would never need them). Similarly, the EC-37B program started in 2017 has only recently delivered an operational platform. The stuff still "works", but obviously we must take our ECM requirements seriously going forward. Of course, the EA-18G and the F-35s carry jammers that can neutralize commercial FPVs. I am assuming they will have better things to do if the US is involved in a war.