[Goose]

The US and Western Europe underestimated Russia's willingness to absorb pain both financially from sanctions and on the battlefield in the form of casualties.  Maybe we were naive in the extreme to do so, but I suspect if you had told people the outcome of both sanctions and of Ukraine on the battlefield three years ago they would have said that it was a massive success, and would be shocked that Russia had not negotiated an end to the war.

I think you are correct. The people involved undoubtedly thought Russia would decide it wasn't worth the pain and quit. However, if our war plans ever rely on what decisions the enemy will make, they are hopelessly flawed. Our plan must create conditions such that our enemy has no choice at all. If they do have a choice our plan is just wishful thinking. If we can't make it physically impossible for Russia to keep fighting, they may very well do exactly that. That is our repeated error.

I agree with your conclusion.  The plan seems to have been poorly war-gamed.  Someone, somewhere should have built a contingency plan (if x happens, we do y).  Sometimes despite best efforts you do lose, but it is totally fair to criticize us for leaving a lot on the table, afraid of crossing "red lines".  I think after Bucha and after Russian targeting of civilians, there would have been plenty of justification for lifting the self-imposed restrictions on what we provided to Ukraine and how they could use it.

We would indeed have plenty of justification. The problem is there was no certainty at the start of the war that justification would exist. If lifting the restrictions was necessary to victory, we needed to decide on day -1 whether we would do so. If we wouldn't at that point, our war plan is flawed and we need a new one. If we can't generate a new one that will "work", do not enter the war. I agree that taking advantage of changing conditions is necessary and prudent, but if we have to rely on such changes, we are already in deep trouble.

I do disagree with your statement that Russian victory is inevitable if they just keep at it.  Nothing in war is inevitable.  Certainly the most likely outcome is a slow but steady march west by Russian troops and eventual Ukrainian collapse if they keep at it.  But war is a non-linear process, and Russia may not be able to "keep at it" or at least not be able to keep at it without a general mobilization or further reorienting their economy in a way that the population may not tolerate.  Syria has shown us that the regime is fully in control, until it is not, and while I would not predict anything happening in Russia in 6 months, I would not have predicted anything happening in Syria 6 months ago.

You are of course correct. In war nothing is certain, and as I said Ukraine can chose to fight on and hope for a "miracle". That is also why you make your opponents play out bridge hands you know they will win if played correctly. They may make a mistake.  All kinds of things can happen, but Ukraine right now lacks the ability to control events. The one thing that Ukraine can do, at least for awhile, is keep fighting. That is why the USA and Russia can't end this war by themselves. Ukraine still has a vote.

As I said, the Ukrainian calculus probably is weighing whether the slow attrition of war versus a pause, largely on Russia's terms, will give them the best chance of survival as a nation.  I'm fairly certain no one knows.

I agree those issues are part of the Ukrainian calculus. However, I think the number one issue for Ukraine is how to structure their actions so their army is willing to keep fighting. That is a prerequisite to having any other choices to make. It may be there is no "pause" on the table. Even if Ukraine accepted all the current terms, bad as they are, Putin may then just add other conditions. I guess I am still hoping he will overplay his hand.

[Goose]

The US and Western Europe underestimated Russia's willingness to absorb pain both financially from sanctions and on the battlefield in the form of casualties.  Maybe we were naive in the extreme to do so, but I suspect if you had told people the outcome of both sanctions and of Ukraine on the battlefield three years ago they would have said that it was a massive success, and would be shocked that Russia had not negotiated an end to the war.

I think you are correct. The people involved undoubtedly thought Russia would decide it wasn't worth the pain and quit. However, if our war plans ever rely on what decisions the enemy will make, they are hopelessly flawed. Our plan must create conditions such that our enemy has no choice at all. If they do have a choice our plan is just wishful thinking. If we can't make it physically impossible for Russia to keep fighting, they may very well do exactly that. That is our repeated error.

I agree with your conclusion.  The plan seems to have been poorly war-gamed.  Someone, somewhere should have built a contingency plan (if x happens, we do y).  Sometimes despite best efforts you do lose, but it is totally fair to criticize us for leaving a lot on the table, afraid of crossing "red lines".  I think after Bucha and after Russian targeting of civilians, there would have been plenty of justification for lifting the self-imposed restrictions on what we provided to Ukraine and how they could use it.

We would indeed have plenty of justification. The problem is there was no certainty at the start of the war that justification would exist. If lifting the restrictions was necessary to victory, we needed to decide on day -1 whether we would do so. If we wouldn't at that point, our war plan is flawed and we need a new one. If we can't generate a new one that will "work", do not enter the war. I agree that taking advantage of changing conditions is necessary and prudent, but if we have to rely on such changes, we are already in deep trouble.

I do disagree with your statement that Russian victory is inevitable if they just keep at it.  Nothing in war is inevitable.  Certainly the most likely outcome is a slow but steady march west by Russian troops and eventual Ukrainian collapse if they keep at it.  But war is a non-linear process, and Russia may not be able to "keep at it" or at least not be able to keep at it without a general mobilization or further reorienting their economy in a way that the population may not tolerate.  Syria has shown us that the regime is fully in control, until it is not, and while I would not predict anything happening in Russia in 6 months, I would not have predicted anything happening in Syria 6 months ago.

You are of course correct. In war nothing is certain, and as I said Ukraine can chose to fight on and hope for a "miracle". That is also why you make your opponents play out bridge hands you know they will win if played correctly. They may make a mistake.  All kinds of things can happen, but Ukraine right now lacks the ability to control events. The one thing that Ukraine can do, at least for awhile, is keep fighting. That is why the USA and Russia can't end this war by themselves. Ukraine still has a vote.

As I said, the Ukrainian calculus probably is weighing whether the slow attrition of war versus a pause, largely on Russia's terms, will give them the best chance of survival as a nation.  I'm fairly certain no one knows.

I agree those issues are part of the Ukrainian calculus. However, I think the number one issue for Ukraine is how to structure their actions so their army is willing to keep fighting. That is a prerequisite to having any other choices to make. It may be there is no "pause" on the table. Even if Ukraine accepted all the current terms, bad as they are, Putin may then just add other conditions. I guess I am still hoping he will overplay his hand.