[BostonCard]

The US had a chance to commit weapons and money to Ukraine early on in this war that could have defeated Russia. Russia was not ready for what happened to them in Ukraine. If Ukraine had a minimal air force in 2023, which it could have, and adequate medium range missiles to prevent Russia from fortifying the south, Ukraine could have forced Russia out of Crimea. As it was, with US dithering and lack of focus, Ukraine had to assault a well built set of concrete fortifications arrayed in depth. They tried, but failed. Obviously the US had no real strategic plan for Ukraine to win. We maybe had a plan for them not to lose quickly. Apparently some thought Russia would give up under those conditions. They won't, because they realized that their victory is inevitable if they just keep at it.

The lesson we need to learn (and seemingly never do) is that we should never enter a war, even by proxy, unless we have a clear definition of victory and a plan the compels that outcome. It can't involve assumptions about the other sides behavior. What if the enemy doesn't do what you expect him to do? If we can't define victory and/or have no plan to compel that outcome, stay out of it. Plans can fail and require reconsideration, but we must have one to start with. We did not.

The US and Western Europe underestimated Russia's willingness to absorb pain both financially from sanctions and on the battlefield in the form of casualties.  Maybe we were naive in the extreme to do so, but I suspect if you had told people the outcome of both sanctions and of Ukraine on the battlefield three years ago they would have said that it was a massive success, and would be shocked that Russia had not negotiated an end to the war.  The WSJ or NYTimes had a piece that described that sanctions as both more effective and less effective than hoped (if I find it again, I will post).

I agree with your conclusion.  The plan seems to have been poorly war-gamed.  Someone, somewhere should have built a contingency plan (if x happens, we do y).  Sometimes despite best efforts you do lose, but it is totally fair to criticize us for leaving a lot on the table, afraid of crossing "red lines".  I think after Bucha and after Russian targeting of civilians, there would have been plenty of justification for lifting the self-imposed restrictions on what we provided to Ukraine and how they could use it.

I do disagree with your statement that Russian victory is inevitable if they just keep at it.  Nothing in war is inevitable.  Certainly the most likely outcome is a slow but steady march west by Russian troops and eventual Ukrainian collapse if they keep at it.  But war is a non-linear process, and Russia may not be able to "keep at it" or at least not be able to keep at it without a general mobilization or further reorienting their economy in a way that the population may not tolerate.  Syria has shown us that the regime is fully in control, until it is not, and while I would not predict anything happening in Russia in 6 months, I would not have predicted anything happening in Syria 6 months ago.  As I said, the Ukrainian calculus probably is weighing whether the slow attrition of war versus a pause, largely on Russia's terms, will give them the best chance of survival as a nation.  I'm fairly certain no one knows.

BC

[BostonCard]

The US had a chance to commit weapons and money to Ukraine early on in this war that could have defeated Russia. Russia was not ready for what happened to them in Ukraine. If Ukraine had a minimal air force in 2023, which it could have, and adequate medium range missiles to prevent Russia from fortifying the south, Ukraine could have forced Russia out of Crimea. As it was, with US dithering and lack of focus, Ukraine had to assault a well built set of concrete fortifications arrayed in depth. They tried, but failed. Obviously the US had no real strategic plan for Ukraine to win. We maybe had a plan for them not to lose quickly. Apparently some thought Russia would give up under those conditions. They won't, because they realized that their victory is inevitable if they just keep at it.

The lesson we need to learn (and seemingly never do) is that we should never enter a war, even by proxy, unless we have a clear definition of victory and a plan the compels that outcome. It can't involve assumptions about the other sides behavior. What if the enemy doesn't do what you expect him to do? If we can't define victory and/or have no plan to compel that outcome, stay out of it. Plans can fail and require reconsideration, but we must have one to start with. We did not.

The US and Western Europe underestimated Russia's willingness to absorb pain both financially from sanctions and on the battlefield in the form of casualties.  Maybe we were naive in the extreme to do so, but I suspect if you had told people the outcome of both sanctions and of Ukraine on the battlefield three years ago they would have said that it was a massive success, and would be shocked that Russia had not negotiated an end to the war.  The WSJ or NYTimes had a piece that described that sanctions as both more effective and less effective than hoped (if I find it again, I will post).

I agree with your conclusion.  The plan seems to have been poorly war-gamed.  Someone, somewhere should have built a contingency plan (if x happens, we do y).  Sometimes despite best efforts you do lose, but it is totally fair to criticize us for leaving a lot on the table, afraid of crossing "red lines".  I think after Bucha and after Russian targeting of civilians, there would have been plenty of justification for lifting the self-imposed restrictions on what we provided to Ukraine and how they could use it.

I do disagree with your statement that Russian victory is inevitable if they just keep at it.  Nothing in war is inevitable.  Certainly the most likely outcome is a slow but steady march west by Russian troops and eventual Ukrainian collapse if they keep at it.  But war is a non-linear process, and Russia may not be able to "keep at it" or at least not be able to keep at it without a general mobilization or further reorienting their economy in a way that the population may not tolerate.  Syria has shown us that the regime is fully in control, until it is not, and while I would not predict anything happening in Russia in 6 months, I would not have predicted anything happening in Syria 6 months ago.  As I said, the Ukrainian calculus probably is weighing whether the slow attrition of war versus a pause, largely on Russia's terms, will give them the best chance of survival as a nation.  I'm fairly certain no one knows.

BC