03-05-2025, 02:11 PM
Ukraine is using FWDs to accomplish several important tasks. One of them is the strategic bombardment of critical infrastructure in Russia. The drones they are forced to use are fairly slow and carry small warheads (50 kg or so). Russia is destroying a lot of them. Exactly how many is hard to say, but IMO about +/- 50% of the real "attack" drones don't hit the target. Predictably a much larger percentage of the decoys are destroyed. This situation is far from ideal, but it is really Ukraine's only available way to strategically damage Russia. Let's hope it works. Let's also hope Ukraine gets the time to make it work. Russia is co-operating by not mounting a really effective effort to shut off this Ukrainian effort.
As previously discussed drones interactively guided by FPV cannot operate autonomously beyond the radio horizon. Many of the fixed-wing drones exclusively fly missions beyond that range. Essentially all of the Ukrainian long range drones require no video capability for that reason. They must fly a pre-programmed track to a non-mobile target. NATO "drones" (such as the Storm Shadow) carry infrared target recognition video systems that work autonomously. At this point Ukraine isn't using such technology on long range strikes by FWDs.
Ukraine is understandably concentrating its FWD capability toward the long-range part of the spectrum. This is by far the most significant strategic weapon Ukraine has. Up to now, Ukraine has neglected the "middle distance" drone capability. From [Ref 7] we see that Ukraine has designed strike and reconnaissance FWDs that could fill that gap. However the proliferation of different designs has undoubtedly made creating a coherent program for this genre more difficult. Unlike the limited range multirotor designs these intermediate range drones require good battlefield coordination to be effective. The "hunter-killer" groups work at longer ranges over wider areas.
It is probable that resource limitations have played a major role in Ukraine's decision not to urgently pursue work in this area. This conclusion is also drawn in the CNAS report page 39. As we will see, this may be changing. The Helsing HX-2 is capable of providing this kind of capability. Of course, how much of this is vapor-ware is unknown. How much Ukraine really intends to commit to this design (or any other) is also unknown.
We now turn to examining Russian FWDs. [Ref 5] alluded to the Russian drone program, some of its strengths as well as some of its limitations. This study is pertinent to answering the question about counter-battery fire. Russia has the same problem as Ukraine in that regard. Arguably, Russia for awhile had as good or better results than Ukraine did. We therefore need to look at how that was achieved.
At the beginning of the conflict Russia was fortunate to have three capable FWDs already present in its military. Two of them are primarily reconnaissance drones. These drones are the Orlan-10 and the various ZALA 421-16E models. The Orlan-10 is the major Russian workhorse. This drone is a well thought-out military system designed to fill a well-defined role in the Russian system. The description
Originally the Orlan-10 was equipped to transmit high resolution video at low frame rates. This is an ideal system to locate targets. It is not FPV. Subsequently some Orlan-10s were augmented with an FPV capability. In all cases the "downlink" (usually video) is transmitted separately and using different center frequencies from the control "uplink". The ZALA 421-16E is similar in that regard. It is a newer design (2019) and therefore was from the start more easily electronically upgraded. Both of these drones can carry different ISR packages. Both these drones feature long range and high endurance. Both are "military grade", not "commercial grade" drones. This allows them to use more robust communications systems designed to be resistant to enemy EW. Ukraine has developed jammers that are effective against these drones, but it took awhile.
The "down side" of the military grade drones is that they are considerably more expensive than commercial grade drones. The price of an Orlan-10 is between $87,000 and $120,000, depending on the selected options. The ZALA 431-16E is more expensive, costing between $100,000 and $200,000, again depending on configuration. At the start of the war Russia believed it had an adequate supply of these drones. It turned out the requirement was vastly underestimated. Attrition caused by Ukrainian actions is a factor, but the main factors are 1) the war dragging on far longer than Russia planned and 2) most importantly, the demand for these reconnaissance assets was at least 52 times greater than the planned inventory. These drones are more affected by sanctions than commercial ones because they use some bespoke components and materials. Russia has so far managed to work around these limitations but it is a factor. The use of cut-up water bottles for fuel tanks is an example. Despite that, Russia has ramped up production and is meeting the demand, at least so far.
The main problem Russia has in using these drones effectively is not technical but administrative. This is unsurprising, because the drone units in this war for both Russia and Ukraine have generally been "grafted on" to other formations. There was initially no "horizontal communication" in the ORBAT. Ukraine has adapted better than Russia. A discussion of this problem can be found here.
The third FWD drone that Russia initially brought to this war is the ZALA Lancet 3. Russia originally intended to use both the Lancet 3 and the KUB-BLA Kamikaze drones. The KUB-BLA turned out to be ineffective. It often missed its target and often failed to explode. This failure left the Lancet 3 as the primary weapon. The Lancet 3 has quite a few limitations, as [Ref 5] points out. Originally the Lancet had only a 3 kg warhead. This is approximately equal to the weight of a single-stage RPG-7 warhead. This was later raised to 5kg, probably to allow for a two-stage warhead. It must be noted that these warheads are quite small. While a well directed strike can do significant damage, it is unlikely to destroy a recent NATO armored vehicle. It may achieve a mobility kill. The Lancet is however a functional weapon and has unquestionably done considerable damage to Ukraine.
The use of the Orlon-Lancet team has evolved during the war. This topic will be discussed in conjunction with counter battery effectiveness.
As previously discussed drones interactively guided by FPV cannot operate autonomously beyond the radio horizon. Many of the fixed-wing drones exclusively fly missions beyond that range. Essentially all of the Ukrainian long range drones require no video capability for that reason. They must fly a pre-programmed track to a non-mobile target. NATO "drones" (such as the Storm Shadow) carry infrared target recognition video systems that work autonomously. At this point Ukraine isn't using such technology on long range strikes by FWDs.
Ukraine is understandably concentrating its FWD capability toward the long-range part of the spectrum. This is by far the most significant strategic weapon Ukraine has. Up to now, Ukraine has neglected the "middle distance" drone capability. From [Ref 7] we see that Ukraine has designed strike and reconnaissance FWDs that could fill that gap. However the proliferation of different designs has undoubtedly made creating a coherent program for this genre more difficult. Unlike the limited range multirotor designs these intermediate range drones require good battlefield coordination to be effective. The "hunter-killer" groups work at longer ranges over wider areas.
It is probable that resource limitations have played a major role in Ukraine's decision not to urgently pursue work in this area. This conclusion is also drawn in the CNAS report page 39. As we will see, this may be changing. The Helsing HX-2 is capable of providing this kind of capability. Of course, how much of this is vapor-ware is unknown. How much Ukraine really intends to commit to this design (or any other) is also unknown.
We now turn to examining Russian FWDs. [Ref 5] alluded to the Russian drone program, some of its strengths as well as some of its limitations. This study is pertinent to answering the question about counter-battery fire. Russia has the same problem as Ukraine in that regard. Arguably, Russia for awhile had as good or better results than Ukraine did. We therefore need to look at how that was achieved.
At the beginning of the conflict Russia was fortunate to have three capable FWDs already present in its military. Two of them are primarily reconnaissance drones. These drones are the Orlan-10 and the various ZALA 421-16E models. The Orlan-10 is the major Russian workhorse. This drone is a well thought-out military system designed to fill a well-defined role in the Russian system. The description
Quote:The Orlan-10, while not sophisticated, is cheap and simple to operate. It flies too high to be vulnerable to short-range air defenses, but is too inexpensive to justify using costly long-range defenses. It provides a sufficient view of the battlefield to identify targets.is precisely accurate.
Originally the Orlan-10 was equipped to transmit high resolution video at low frame rates. This is an ideal system to locate targets. It is not FPV. Subsequently some Orlan-10s were augmented with an FPV capability. In all cases the "downlink" (usually video) is transmitted separately and using different center frequencies from the control "uplink". The ZALA 421-16E is similar in that regard. It is a newer design (2019) and therefore was from the start more easily electronically upgraded. Both of these drones can carry different ISR packages. Both these drones feature long range and high endurance. Both are "military grade", not "commercial grade" drones. This allows them to use more robust communications systems designed to be resistant to enemy EW. Ukraine has developed jammers that are effective against these drones, but it took awhile.
The "down side" of the military grade drones is that they are considerably more expensive than commercial grade drones. The price of an Orlan-10 is between $87,000 and $120,000, depending on the selected options. The ZALA 431-16E is more expensive, costing between $100,000 and $200,000, again depending on configuration. At the start of the war Russia believed it had an adequate supply of these drones. It turned out the requirement was vastly underestimated. Attrition caused by Ukrainian actions is a factor, but the main factors are 1) the war dragging on far longer than Russia planned and 2) most importantly, the demand for these reconnaissance assets was at least 52 times greater than the planned inventory. These drones are more affected by sanctions than commercial ones because they use some bespoke components and materials. Russia has so far managed to work around these limitations but it is a factor. The use of cut-up water bottles for fuel tanks is an example. Despite that, Russia has ramped up production and is meeting the demand, at least so far.
The main problem Russia has in using these drones effectively is not technical but administrative. This is unsurprising, because the drone units in this war for both Russia and Ukraine have generally been "grafted on" to other formations. There was initially no "horizontal communication" in the ORBAT. Ukraine has adapted better than Russia. A discussion of this problem can be found here.
The third FWD drone that Russia initially brought to this war is the ZALA Lancet 3. Russia originally intended to use both the Lancet 3 and the KUB-BLA Kamikaze drones. The KUB-BLA turned out to be ineffective. It often missed its target and often failed to explode. This failure left the Lancet 3 as the primary weapon. The Lancet 3 has quite a few limitations, as [Ref 5] points out. Originally the Lancet had only a 3 kg warhead. This is approximately equal to the weight of a single-stage RPG-7 warhead. This was later raised to 5kg, probably to allow for a two-stage warhead. It must be noted that these warheads are quite small. While a well directed strike can do significant damage, it is unlikely to destroy a recent NATO armored vehicle. It may achieve a mobility kill. The Lancet is however a functional weapon and has unquestionably done considerable damage to Ukraine.
The use of the Orlon-Lancet team has evolved during the war. This topic will be discussed in conjunction with counter battery effectiveness.