[Goose]

These narrative videos, [Ref 1] , and [Ref 2] provide some insight into the history and current state of drone warfare in Ukraine. IMO after 27 minutes Ref 1 unfortunately has very low entropy. Otherwise, watching them both IMO is very useful. These videos do (atypically) provide some references to Ukrainian losses and difficulties but also highlight how tactics have evolved.

 

There are many posts on the internet showing various multirotor drones being used in Ukraine. Multirotor drones suffer from the significant handicap that rotors are much less efficient providers of lift than wings. This means lots of the battery power is burned up just staying in the air. The DJI Mavic 3 is a "solid" reference point the "close range" drone class. The CNAS report stated that the Mavic is by far the most used drone by both sides. The Mavic-3 specification table must be somewhat carefully interpreted. The specs are not in general simultaneous valid. The 28 km range is the total distance traveled, not the two-way range. This is pretty much universal in all such drone specs. This range is achieve at sea level, no wind, camera off, and flying at 9 m/s (nowhere near the maximum of 21 m/s). If the camera is operating the 28 km drops by at least 1/3, giving a range of 19 km.

 

As specified by the manufacturer (DJI) the Mavic 3 can carry a "payload" of only 100 g. However, it is possible to use a lighter camera configuration and overload the drone to carry a larger payload. The Ukrainians have done this. The Mavic 3 Pro has the same specs FWIW. Elsewhere on the net one can find articles on overloading this drone. The US M67 hand grenade weight is 400 g. Therefore a Mavic 3 can in theory carry two such grenades. The video example in Ref 1 @ 8:56 only show them carrying one. It was apparently an MK-2 clone, which weighs 600 g. It is probable Ukraine has some lighter custom made "bombs" with less explosive but lighter weight. Based on the typical mission length from the article, the range is reduced by up 50% carrying the grenade. The Ukrainian installed second battery can allow trading off range vs carrying capacity to some extent. However the total load is ultimately limited by the lift the drone lift fans can generate.

 

[Ref 3] contains a good narrative article about targeting Russian forces using Mavic 3 drones.

 

Several internet articles reference "racing drones" (RD). RD in the Ukraine context is easily misunderstood. RD in Ukraine refers more to how the drone is operated than specific drone characteristics. RD requires immersive technology (goggles) and very low latency data links. It requires the drone software disable its safety features such as obstacle avoidance and platform stabilization (permanently or under operator control). Thus the operator can fly the drone into dangerous situations in order to strike a target. He can also easily crash it. In this context the Mavic 3 is regarded as an RD, as we see in the literature. The RD trades off range, safety, and endurance for speed, agility, and payload. This is required to deliver a kinetically useful payload at relatively high speed to a precise point on the target. These are exclusively kamikaze weapons. This technology is typical of this type of drone. The drone may natively have relatively high performance but it must also carry a useful kinetic payload.  The small consumer "racing drones" available on the entertainment market have neither the range nor the payload to be at all useful militarily.

 

There are larger multirotor drones that can to some degree overcome the rather severe payload restrictions of a Mavic 3 drone class. Two lists of commercial heavy lift drone candidates (with good associated discussion) are available here and here. The DJI FlyCart 30 is a multirotor heavy lift drone. The specifications and detailed discussion for this drone provides good insight into its capabilities. Apparently Amazon is using this drone in commercial service. It can carry a 30 kg payload. The drone has a 28 km one-way range with no payload and a 16 km one-way range with a 30 kg load. Thus, this drone could presumably deliver a 30 kg free-fall weapon at a range of 11 km and return to base. The typical price for the drone (without controller) is $20,560.00.  A similar drone can be found here. This page has a calculator for various payload/range combinations. This is a US product with a price tag of $55,495.00.

 

There are many "intermediate" stage drones that can carry smaller but "useful" payloads. When evaluating such drones it is important to distinguish their "gross" payload from the available munition payload. The camera, navigation and radio payload must often be subtracted from the supplied number. A good example is the TDRONE-1200. This offering is oriented toward custom configurations so exact specs are elusive. It may reflect better the "typical" Ukrainian approach. The "typical" price per unit is $3699.00 ~ $5098.00, not including things like the battery(!).

 

The following narrative [Ref 4] documents the use of these heavier drones. They have the ability to carry must more lethal payloads and IMO are much more kinetically useful. There are several important points made in this article that will be cited later in this document.

 

The pictures in this article are interesting. It would appear some of the "bombs" being used are cluster type munitions. Some of the munition bodies in the last picture are IMO certainly cluster munition carriers. These types of munitions are much more effective if they are "two stage". The first (small) explosion scatters the munitions over a relatively wide area and then each sub-munition explodes when it hits the ground or when it has traveled a specified distance. Such two stage munitions are difficult to fabricate. It does not appear the ones in the picture are two stage, but it is hard to tell. For reference, a 30  kg payload could reasonably distribute about the 1.5 times the number of M24/M26  munitions as carried by a  M864 155 mm shell. 30 kg of M42 would be 144 munitions, but the structure/explosives to disperse them consume quite a bit of available payload.

 

The black munition on the tabletop appears to be fabricated as a small mortar bomb. For reference, a 60 mm mortar bomb weighs +/- 1.3 kg. A relatively small amount of that is propellant charge (often wrapped around the shell base in "rings". The number of rings is changed as a gross function of range). The explosive charge in the projectile is typically about 300 grams. The rest is fragmentation metal and fuse. The tail section is necessary to provide aerodynamic stability.

 

The article contains one conclusion that IMO is very ill supported. The article states

 

 "A non-profit group called the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) found Russia is sacrificing nearly 60 soldiers, killed and wounded, for every square kilometer of ground captured in eastern Ukraine. ISW reported that Russia may have lost as many as 3,000 casualties in the Pokrovsk area alone during one two-week period earlier this month".

 

The article uses this statement to justify the assertion that the Ukrainian strategy of "turning increasingly to unmanned aerial drone units like this one" is working. However, Ukraine has relatively massive quantities of other combat arms operating in the same area. What proportion are caused by drones they don't say. It would seem they don't know. If they did, why omit it? The article attributes exactly one Russian death to drones. The cited ISW analysis does say that "Ukrainian drones continue to be the most effective weapon to repel Russian assaults in the Pokrovsk direction." However, this statement is being made in the face of continued deterioration of the Ukrainian position in that area. Things are manifestly and undeniably worse in the Pokrovsk area than they were on the 24th of December. That is not indicative of the strategy "working". Unfortunately I see quite a few similar poorly supported arguments made in other articles.
 

[Goose]

These narrative videos, [Ref 1] , and [Ref 2] provide some insight into the history and current state of drone warfare in Ukraine. IMO after 27 minutes Ref 1 unfortunately has very low entropy. Otherwise, watching them both IMO is very useful. These videos do (atypically) provide some references to Ukrainian losses and difficulties but also highlight how tactics have evolved.

 

There are many posts on the internet showing various multirotor drones being used in Ukraine. Multirotor drones suffer from the significant handicap that rotors are much less efficient providers of lift than wings. This means lots of the battery power is burned up just staying in the air. The DJI Mavic 3 is a "solid" reference point the "close range" drone class. The CNAS report stated that the Mavic is by far the most used drone by both sides. The Mavic-3 specification table must be somewhat carefully interpreted. The specs are not in general simultaneous valid. The 28 km range is the total distance traveled, not the two-way range. This is pretty much universal in all such drone specs. This range is achieve at sea level, no wind, camera off, and flying at 9 m/s (nowhere near the maximum of 21 m/s). If the camera is operating the 28 km drops by at least 1/3, giving a range of 19 km.

 

As specified by the manufacturer (DJI) the Mavic 3 can carry a "payload" of only 100 g. However, it is possible to use a lighter camera configuration and overload the drone to carry a larger payload. The Ukrainians have done this. The Mavic 3 Pro has the same specs FWIW. Elsewhere on the net one can find articles on overloading this drone. The US M67 hand grenade weight is 400 g. Therefore a Mavic 3 can in theory carry two such grenades. The video example in Ref 1 @ 8:56 only show them carrying one. It was apparently an MK-2 clone, which weighs 600 g. It is probable Ukraine has some lighter custom made "bombs" with less explosive but lighter weight. Based on the typical mission length from the article, the range is reduced by up 50% carrying the grenade. The Ukrainian installed second battery can allow trading off range vs carrying capacity to some extent. However the total load is ultimately limited by the lift the drone lift fans can generate.

 

[Ref 3] contains a good narrative article about targeting Russian forces using Mavic 3 drones.

 

Several internet articles reference "racing drones" (RD). RD in the Ukraine context is easily misunderstood. RD in Ukraine refers more to how the drone is operated than specific drone characteristics. RD requires immersive technology (goggles) and very low latency data links. It requires the drone software disable its safety features such as obstacle avoidance and platform stabilization (permanently or under operator control). Thus the operator can fly the drone into dangerous situations in order to strike a target. He can also easily crash it. In this context the Mavic 3 is regarded as an RD, as we see in the literature. The RD trades off range, safety, and endurance for speed, agility, and payload. This is required to deliver a kinetically useful payload at relatively high speed to a precise point on the target. These are exclusively kamikaze weapons. This technology is typical of this type of drone. The drone may natively have relatively high performance but it must also carry a useful kinetic payload.  The small consumer "racing drones" available on the entertainment market have neither the range nor the payload to be at all useful militarily.

 

There are larger multirotor drones that can to some degree overcome the rather severe payload restrictions of a Mavic 3 drone class. Two lists of commercial heavy lift drone candidates (with good associated discussion) are available here and here. The DJI FlyCart 30 is a multirotor heavy lift drone. The specifications and detailed discussion for this drone provides good insight into its capabilities. Apparently Amazon is using this drone in commercial service. It can carry a 30 kg payload. The drone has a 28 km one-way range with no payload and a 16 km one-way range with a 30 kg load. Thus, this drone could presumably deliver a 30 kg free-fall weapon at a range of 11 km and return to base. The typical price for the drone (without controller) is $20,560.00.  A similar drone can be found here. This page has a calculator for various payload/range combinations. This is a US product with a price tag of $55,495.00.

 

There are many "intermediate" stage drones that can carry smaller but "useful" payloads. When evaluating such drones it is important to distinguish their "gross" payload from the available munition payload. The camera, navigation and radio payload must often be subtracted from the supplied number. A good example is the TDRONE-1200. This offering is oriented toward custom configurations so exact specs are elusive. It may reflect better the "typical" Ukrainian approach. The "typical" price per unit is $3699.00 ~ $5098.00, not including things like the battery(!).

 

The following narrative [Ref 4] documents the use of these heavier drones. They have the ability to carry must more lethal payloads and IMO are much more kinetically useful. There are several important points made in this article that will be cited later in this document.

 

The pictures in this article are interesting. It would appear some of the "bombs" being used are cluster type munitions. Some of the munition bodies in the last picture are IMO certainly cluster munition carriers. These types of munitions are much more effective if they are "two stage". The first (small) explosion scatters the munitions over a relatively wide area and then each sub-munition explodes when it hits the ground or when it has traveled a specified distance. Such two stage munitions are difficult to fabricate. It does not appear the ones in the picture are two stage, but it is hard to tell. For reference, a 30  kg payload could reasonably distribute about the 1.5 times the number of M24/M26  munitions as carried by a  M864 155 mm shell. 30 kg of M42 would be 144 munitions, but the structure/explosives to disperse them consume quite a bit of available payload.

 

The black munition on the tabletop appears to be fabricated as a small mortar bomb. For reference, a 60 mm mortar bomb weighs +/- 1.3 kg. A relatively small amount of that is propellant charge (often wrapped around the shell base in "rings". The number of rings is changed as a gross function of range). The explosive charge in the projectile is typically about 300 grams. The rest is fragmentation metal and fuse. The tail section is necessary to provide aerodynamic stability.

 

The article contains one conclusion that IMO is very ill supported. The article states

 

 "A non-profit group called the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) found Russia is sacrificing nearly 60 soldiers, killed and wounded, for every square kilometer of ground captured in eastern Ukraine. ISW reported that Russia may have lost as many as 3,000 casualties in the Pokrovsk area alone during one two-week period earlier this month".

 

The article uses this statement to justify the assertion that the Ukrainian strategy of "turning increasingly to unmanned aerial drone units like this one" is working. However, Ukraine has relatively massive quantities of other combat arms operating in the same area. What proportion are caused by drones they don't say. It would seem they don't know. If they did, why omit it? The article attributes exactly one Russian death to drones. The cited ISW analysis does say that "Ukrainian drones continue to be the most effective weapon to repel Russian assaults in the Pokrovsk direction." However, this statement is being made in the face of continued deterioration of the Ukrainian position in that area. Things are manifestly and undeniably worse in the Pokrovsk area than they were on the 24th of December. That is not indicative of the strategy "working". Unfortunately I see quite a few similar poorly supported arguments made in other articles.