https://www.yahoo.com/news/mystery-syria...20743.html
https://www.yahoo.com/news/future-russia...48895.html
https://www.newarab.com/news/russia-with...thin-month
The first article provides some information on how Assad fled Syria. It pretty much debunks (though not totally) the theory promulgated at the time that an IL-76 carrying Assad went down near Homs. The ADS-B data used to justify the idea the aircraft crashed contained maneuvers the plane just couldn't do. The position reports are GPS based and jamming-spoofing is known to happen in that area (probably from the Russians themselves). On top of that once the aircraft was identified on the air base radar turning off the transponder would quite possibly be a very good idea :-).
The idea that Russia has been given a month to leave is plausible, but so are lots of other things. The last link above presents that view is fact. While I hope it is so, I am not betting that way yet :-). The air base and port in Syria are very useful to Russia, especially when their warships can freely transit from Syria to Russian ports in the Black Sea. Supplies and personnel have a much shorter trip than if they must come through the Western Mediterranean from the Arctic or Baltic Sea. Ships can also take the short route for repair and dockyard services in Novorossiysk. The port in Syria also poses a threat to traffic from the exit of the Suez canal and anything else in the eastern Mediterranean.
Logistics ships destined for ports in Africa, both the north coast and the east coast, benefit from the option of stopping in Syria to make a "pit stop". It also allows transshipment of cargo to "regularly scheduled" back-and-forth delivery operations, which previously Russia has used to maintain a flow of war material to their clients. Without the port in Syria these deliveries would be longer voyages that would have to be loaded optimally for the destinations. This would impose constraints and delays Russia currently does not have.
A naval base in Libya would help Russia ship bulky materials to destinations in Africa. It would also pose a threat to sea control in the Mediterranean by NATO because of its central location and proximity to many critical NATO facilities. It would be a "short" delivery run from Syria if Russia maintains that base. If Russia does not, it can still ship materials via Libya more easily if it has a dedicated naval facility.
Of course, neither of these bases would be sustainable in the event of full-scale war. However, even in that event they would consume NATO resources to neutralize them. Russia stationed four Kilo submarines at Tartus. They would probably do the same at Benghazi. Those boats could do a lot of damage with their cruise missiles and torpedoes before they were eliminated. In the "low scale" conflicts in Africa, similar to what has transpired in Syria for years, the ability of Russia to directly project power from Benghazi would be very unwelcome to NATO.
The Russian air base in Syria is much more important to Russia than the port is. The Russian heavy-lift air transports cannot fly from Russian territory directly to Libya fully loaded. They are constrained to very light loads. The current pathway for fully-loaded transports is a flight via Syria to refuel and then a flight on to Libya. Russia has no good alternative to this approach. The US, if faced with the same problem, would use its tanker fleet to refuel the heavy-lift transports in flight. Russia can't do that, they don't have that capability. The possibility of negotiating landing rights in "nearby" countries e.g. Egypt is problematic for Russia. The neighboring states in the Middle East don't want to be seen facilitating Russia's African adventures. They also don't want to risk US/NATO sanctions for doing so. Russia doesn't want to be put in a situation where its air route could be unexpectedly closed by these nations. Russia therefore needs Khmeimim badly. Khmeimim needs Tartus to bring in the jet fuel and supplies to keep it running.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/future-russia...48895.html
https://www.newarab.com/news/russia-with...thin-month
The first article provides some information on how Assad fled Syria. It pretty much debunks (though not totally) the theory promulgated at the time that an IL-76 carrying Assad went down near Homs. The ADS-B data used to justify the idea the aircraft crashed contained maneuvers the plane just couldn't do. The position reports are GPS based and jamming-spoofing is known to happen in that area (probably from the Russians themselves). On top of that once the aircraft was identified on the air base radar turning off the transponder would quite possibly be a very good idea :-).
The idea that Russia has been given a month to leave is plausible, but so are lots of other things. The last link above presents that view is fact. While I hope it is so, I am not betting that way yet :-). The air base and port in Syria are very useful to Russia, especially when their warships can freely transit from Syria to Russian ports in the Black Sea. Supplies and personnel have a much shorter trip than if they must come through the Western Mediterranean from the Arctic or Baltic Sea. Ships can also take the short route for repair and dockyard services in Novorossiysk. The port in Syria also poses a threat to traffic from the exit of the Suez canal and anything else in the eastern Mediterranean.
Logistics ships destined for ports in Africa, both the north coast and the east coast, benefit from the option of stopping in Syria to make a "pit stop". It also allows transshipment of cargo to "regularly scheduled" back-and-forth delivery operations, which previously Russia has used to maintain a flow of war material to their clients. Without the port in Syria these deliveries would be longer voyages that would have to be loaded optimally for the destinations. This would impose constraints and delays Russia currently does not have.
A naval base in Libya would help Russia ship bulky materials to destinations in Africa. It would also pose a threat to sea control in the Mediterranean by NATO because of its central location and proximity to many critical NATO facilities. It would be a "short" delivery run from Syria if Russia maintains that base. If Russia does not, it can still ship materials via Libya more easily if it has a dedicated naval facility.
Of course, neither of these bases would be sustainable in the event of full-scale war. However, even in that event they would consume NATO resources to neutralize them. Russia stationed four Kilo submarines at Tartus. They would probably do the same at Benghazi. Those boats could do a lot of damage with their cruise missiles and torpedoes before they were eliminated. In the "low scale" conflicts in Africa, similar to what has transpired in Syria for years, the ability of Russia to directly project power from Benghazi would be very unwelcome to NATO.
The Russian air base in Syria is much more important to Russia than the port is. The Russian heavy-lift air transports cannot fly from Russian territory directly to Libya fully loaded. They are constrained to very light loads. The current pathway for fully-loaded transports is a flight via Syria to refuel and then a flight on to Libya. Russia has no good alternative to this approach. The US, if faced with the same problem, would use its tanker fleet to refuel the heavy-lift transports in flight. Russia can't do that, they don't have that capability. The possibility of negotiating landing rights in "nearby" countries e.g. Egypt is problematic for Russia. The neighboring states in the Middle East don't want to be seen facilitating Russia's African adventures. They also don't want to risk US/NATO sanctions for doing so. Russia doesn't want to be put in a situation where its air route could be unexpectedly closed by these nations. Russia therefore needs Khmeimim badly. Khmeimim needs Tartus to bring in the jet fuel and supplies to keep it running.