[Goose]

Russia has been flying out a lot of large cargo planes from Kheimim, including disassembled helicopters. All of the ships normally based out of Tartus remain out to sea since the start of HTS' offensive picking up momentum.

So this is an interesting article, but the observable facts on the ground don't seem to indicate Russia is confident they will retain the bases.

https://www.cnn.com/2024/12/16/politics/...index.html

It is undoubtedly true that no agreement made by HTS in the near term can be considered binding in the longer term. There is not yet a government in Syria. Even HTS does not control wide swaths of territory. We do however know a few things for sure.

Russia has withdrawn (or is withdrawing) all its forces stationed in "outstations". Russia SAMS, air controllers and "advisors" were spread around the rest of the country. None of these isolated outposts had enough "security forces" to defend themselves from the rebels without "help" from either Syrian security forces or Hezbollah. HTS apparently provided security for the convoy from the T4 air base to Khmeimim.  The means that lots of hardware is piling up in Khmeimim that is not normally stationed there. As a result, lots of it has to go elsewhere, and that elsewhere is Libya. This influx of material makes it difficult to know how much of the efflux via air to Libya is actually drawing down the Russian material stationed in Khmeimim. Some of that efflux is probably going to Tartus as well.

All that said, Russia is undoubtedly attempting to plan for all eventualities. Even if they have an agreement with HTS for the short term, it isn't certain that some other group (or HTS assets that just hate Russians) won't decide to attack the Russian positions in Syria. IMO the bottom line is that Russia intends to stay in Syria if it can, and is negotiating like mad to make that happen. Russia believes they are relatively "safe" in the short term, but they are also making contingency plans in case they do have to leave, either slowly or quickly.

I wouldn't read anything into the fact the Russian ships normally stationed in Tartus are anchored off the coast at 15 km distances. Any navy dealing with possible attacks on the base want sea room. Ships anchored in port are located at a totally known position. Land based weapons, such as artillery or missiles can hit those known coordinates with great accuracy. Ships cannot quickly leave port either. The waterways in the port are confined and narrow. However, in the open sea they can slip their anchor and be underway in a very few minutes. CODAG has its advantages. Land based artillery can't hit them if they are a moving target. On top of that, Tartus isn't exactly a good liberty port right now :-).

I hope the US is also being pragmatic about trying to convince HTS to ditch the Russians, but I'm apprehensive about our foreign policy establishment's ability to pivot quickly.

I share your apprehension. However, IMO the foreign policy establishment's number one priority is protecting the Kurds. Number two is urging the HTS to form an inclusive, secular, government. That will be a very heavy lift all by itself. I don't think the HTS folks will take kindly to being threatened regarding Russia. HTS is also probably very conscious of their "independence" and will want to preserve it. Both the US and Russia need to work under those constraints.

IMO our foreign policy establishment has an equally urgent (if not more so) task to perform in Libya. They need to make it crystal clear to Khalifa Haftar that if he grants Russia a naval base in Benghazi he personally will cease to exist very quickly thereafter. Strong message follows. Even Qaddafi wouldn't do that (Russia said he did but they "declined"). He would let Russian ships sit in the Gulf of Sidra but NOT land in Libya for maintenance or fuel. A base in Benghazi would be at least as useful to Russia as Tartus is. NATO South will go nuts. It is CRITICAL this not be allowed to happen. Unfortunately with a change in administration pending in the US getting such a strong stance articulated might be difficult.

[Goose]

Russia has been flying out a lot of large cargo planes from Kheimim, including disassembled helicopters. All of the ships normally based out of Tartus remain out to sea since the start of HTS' offensive picking up momentum.

So this is an interesting article, but the observable facts on the ground don't seem to indicate Russia is confident they will retain the bases.

https://www.cnn.com/2024/12/16/politics/...index.html

It is undoubtedly true that no agreement made by HTS in the near term can be considered binding in the longer term. There is not yet a government in Syria. Even HTS does not control wide swaths of territory. We do however know a few things for sure.

Russia has withdrawn (or is withdrawing) all its forces stationed in "outstations". Russia SAMS, air controllers and "advisors" were spread around the rest of the country. None of these isolated outposts had enough "security forces" to defend themselves from the rebels without "help" from either Syrian security forces or Hezbollah. HTS apparently provided security for the convoy from the T4 air base to Khmeimim.  The means that lots of hardware is piling up in Khmeimim that is not normally stationed there. As a result, lots of it has to go elsewhere, and that elsewhere is Libya. This influx of material makes it difficult to know how much of the efflux via air to Libya is actually drawing down the Russian material stationed in Khmeimim. Some of that efflux is probably going to Tartus as well.

All that said, Russia is undoubtedly attempting to plan for all eventualities. Even if they have an agreement with HTS for the short term, it isn't certain that some other group (or HTS assets that just hate Russians) won't decide to attack the Russian positions in Syria. IMO the bottom line is that Russia intends to stay in Syria if it can, and is negotiating like mad to make that happen. Russia believes they are relatively "safe" in the short term, but they are also making contingency plans in case they do have to leave, either slowly or quickly.

I wouldn't read anything into the fact the Russian ships normally stationed in Tartus are anchored off the coast at 15 km distances. Any navy dealing with possible attacks on the base want sea room. Ships anchored in port are located at a totally known position. Land based weapons, such as artillery or missiles can hit those known coordinates with great accuracy. Ships cannot quickly leave port either. The waterways in the port are confined and narrow. However, in the open sea they can slip their anchor and be underway in a very few minutes. CODAG has its advantages. Land based artillery can't hit them if they are a moving target. On top of that, Tartus isn't exactly a good liberty port right now :-).

I hope the US is also being pragmatic about trying to convince HTS to ditch the Russians, but I'm apprehensive about our foreign policy establishment's ability to pivot quickly.

I share your apprehension. However, IMO the foreign policy establishment's number one priority is protecting the Kurds. Number two is urging the HTS to form an inclusive, secular, government. That will be a very heavy lift all by itself. I don't think the HTS folks will take kindly to being threatened regarding Russia. HTS is also probably very conscious of their "independence" and will want to preserve it. Both the US and Russia need to work under those constraints.

IMO our foreign policy establishment has an equally urgent (if not more so) task to perform in Libya. They need to make it crystal clear to Khalifa Haftar that if he grants Russia a naval base in Benghazi he personally will cease to exist very quickly thereafter. Strong message follows. Even Qaddafi wouldn't do that (Russia said he did but they "declined"). He would let Russian ships sit in the Gulf of Sidra but NOT land in Libya for maintenance or fuel. A base in Benghazi would be at least as useful to Russia as Tartus is. NATO South will go nuts. It is CRITICAL this not be allowed to happen. Unfortunately with a change in administration pending in the US getting such a strong stance articulated might be difficult.