[Goose]

After looking at pictures of damage in Ukraine, the precision of the Israeli strikes (as shown in this article) is notable.  Not only are there no obvious near-misses (craters around the targets), but the Israelis targeted certain buildings and not others at military sites.  This would suggest very precise intelligence.

I'd have thought Russia could have done that to Ukraine.

It is apples and doughnuts. Israel accomplished two things in their attack. First, its DEAD strikes did exactly that, destroying a significant number of Iranian air defense assets. The goal of this operation was to allow the immediate follow-on strikes to hit their targets with no casualties and to enable future strikes whenever necessary. The second accomplishment was the destruction of critical Iranian weapons manufacturing capabilities by precision strikes upon essential facilities. These were "strategic" targets that wouldn't have much affect on the Iranian ORBAT in an imminent invasion by Israel but could deny Iran the supply of strategic weapons needed to win such a war.

There are important caveats about the Israeli effort. They did not intend to facilitate an immediate invasion of Iran by ground troops. They did not strike Iranian military units in their barracks. They did not try to fix the Iranian military in place so they couldn't move to counter the (non-existent) invasion. Their was no close air support role intended. There was no intention of destroying the more "mundane" Iranian military manufacturing infrastructure, like factories that make small arms ammunition.

Russia faced a different set of problems. First, they don't do SEAD. They have no 5th generation aircraft equipped and trained to do it.  Russia also has never attempted it with their fourth generation assets. They don't even notionally have it in their repertoire. Therefore, whatever air strikes Russia intended against Ukraine would have to be done in the teeth of Ukrainian air defenses. The Ukrainian defenses, while old, were formidable. They were designed to protect "important" point targets and were therefore concentrated around said targets.  Ukraine also had an air force that would fight Russian air strikes. Second, Ukraine presented very few strategic targets. They didn't manufacture lots of missiles. Their "military industrial complex" was in bad shape and could make limited contributions to the war. The R&D facilities were small and well distributed. The only even somewhat "strategic" targets were government administrative facilities, which Russia did try to bomb. Third, Russia did intend to invade Ukraine immediately at the start of hostilities. They needed close air support right from the start. That was where the VKS was expected to spend their effort. They tried, sort of, but it didn't go well.

Russia has never had, even at the height of the cold war, an air force that intended to operate offensively very often. They mostly were tasked with defending against what was assumed to be a "superior" western air threat. Even "strategic" aircraft like the TU-22M were designed to launch cruise missiles against US carriers to defend against them attacking Russia. Russia's precision strategic strike capability is centered around missiles like the Iskander. It is not a VKS asset, but rather an Army asset. No DEAD plan needed. Lots of them used in Ukraine, but with a dearth of "primary" targets were mostly wasted on low value tactical operations.

[Goose]

After looking at pictures of damage in Ukraine, the precision of the Israeli strikes (as shown in this article) is notable.  Not only are there no obvious near-misses (craters around the targets), but the Israelis targeted certain buildings and not others at military sites.  This would suggest very precise intelligence.

I'd have thought Russia could have done that to Ukraine.

It is apples and doughnuts. Israel accomplished two things in their attack. First, its DEAD strikes did exactly that, destroying a significant number of Iranian air defense assets. The goal of this operation was to allow the immediate follow-on strikes to hit their targets with no casualties and to enable future strikes whenever necessary. The second accomplishment was the destruction of critical Iranian weapons manufacturing capabilities by precision strikes upon essential facilities. These were "strategic" targets that wouldn't have much affect on the Iranian ORBAT in an imminent invasion by Israel but could deny Iran the supply of strategic weapons needed to win such a war.

There are important caveats about the Israeli effort. They did not intend to facilitate an immediate invasion of Iran by ground troops. They did not strike Iranian military units in their barracks. They did not try to fix the Iranian military in place so they couldn't move to counter the (non-existent) invasion. Their was no close air support role intended. There was no intention of destroying the more "mundane" Iranian military manufacturing infrastructure, like factories that make small arms ammunition.

Russia faced a different set of problems. First, they don't do SEAD. They have no 5th generation aircraft equipped and trained to do it.  Russia also has never attempted it with their fourth generation assets. They don't even notionally have it in their repertoire. Therefore, whatever air strikes Russia intended against Ukraine would have to be done in the teeth of Ukrainian air defenses. The Ukrainian defenses, while old, were formidable. They were designed to protect "important" point targets and were therefore concentrated around said targets.  Ukraine also had an air force that would fight Russian air strikes. Second, Ukraine presented very few strategic targets. They didn't manufacture lots of missiles. Their "military industrial complex" was in bad shape and could make limited contributions to the war. The R&D facilities were small and well distributed. The only even somewhat "strategic" targets were government administrative facilities, which Russia did try to bomb. Third, Russia did intend to invade Ukraine immediately at the start of hostilities. They needed close air support right from the start. That was where the VKS was expected to spend their effort. They tried, sort of, but it didn't go well.

Russia has never had, even at the height of the cold war, an air force that intended to operate offensively very often. They mostly were tasked with defending against what was assumed to be a "superior" western air threat. Even "strategic" aircraft like the TU-22M were designed to launch cruise missiles against US carriers to defend against them attacking Russia. Russia's precision strategic strike capability is centered around missiles like the Iskander. It is not a VKS asset, but rather an Army asset. No DEAD plan needed. Lots of them used in Ukraine, but with a dearth of "primary" targets were mostly wasted on low value tactical operations.