[Goose]

A cogent and balanced look at the state of the war in this interview with Michael Kofman.

https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/...looks.html

Agree it is a cogent and fairly balanced interview. I agree with some of it but have problems with a few things.

Is there any limit to the Russian supply of troops? Do you see that advantage fading at all, whether because of diminishing numbers or political backlash? 

It’s a good question. Russia’s advantage has been the ability to withstand very high levels of attrition because of the materiel and manpower resources they have, and also their significant capacity for mobilization of resources on a national scale — that is, defense industrial production, manpower recruitment, and the like.

But Russia’s actually operating under very significant constraints. And if anything, its advantage on the battlefield is likely to decline as we get into this winter and look further ahead into 2025. First, in terms of equipment, the Russian military has been sustaining very high levels of loss that are principally being replaced by Soviet-era stocks — not entirely, but at this stage, Russia is eating through its Soviet legacy, and its rate of equipment production is quite low relative to the numbers being lost on the battlefield.

This doesn’t mean that Russia is going to run out of armored fighting vehicles.

Agree. Kofman appears to forget this subsequently however

What it does mean is that the Russian military has increasingly been forced to adjust tactics to minimize their losses,

Since they aren't in any danger of running out they weren't "forced" to do anything. A better explanation is that Russia learned that their tactics were causing excessive losses of material and were ineffective. That is "good" for Russia not bad. Minimizing losses is in general a good tactic whenever possible.

 and that also reduces their ability to achieve any operationally meaningful breakthroughs.

Name one operationally significant "breakthrough" Russia has achieved in this entire war. They are structurally incapable of it. The trench warfare that currently dominates this war makes "breakthroughs" impossible to achieve if the retreating forces retain cohesion. They just fall back to the next trench line. At the beginning of the war when trench warfare had not set in, Ukraine was disorganized, and Russia had all its "elite" (category A) formations it was theoretically possible. In the event Russia's reorganization into BTGs and lack of training resulted in it not happening. Russia also was and is incapable of logistically sustaining fast moving breakthroughs. They are not resourced or trained to do that. Russia is now fighting as they did in WW II. Trundle up to the enemy MLR. Flatten everything with artillery and warm bodies. Force the enemy to retreat to the next line of resistance. Take a week or so to reorganize and bring up the required logistics. Repeat. No "breakthrough" desired.

When you look at manpower, the Russian government has significantly increased the payouts and benefits to recruit personnel. The reason for that is straightforward. It’s clear that at this rate of loss, the Russian contract recruitment campaign is unable to keep up. This too does not mean that Russia is going to run out of manpower, but it’s clear that they’re struggling, and they are not likely to be able to sustain this pace of operations, staying on the offensive with this rate of loss.

Why can't they? Why is it clear they can't keep up? So far they have. They are "struggling, not failing. Assuming they will fail is a fact not in evidence. More importantly contract troops aren't the only source of manpower. Putin just drafted 130,000 troops. On top of that, Putin can declare "special" mobilizations to augment his troop strength whenever he wants. This goes on all the time. If worse comes to worse Putin can declare a general mobilization and get all the troops he needs for a very, very long time. He doesn't want to do that because it carries a political and economic cost. We can have this conversation when Putin is forced to do it.

Which could mean there’s an incentive for both sides to come to the negotiating table. Perhaps a bit more of an incentive than there was a year ago?

The way I would put it is that the Russian military is actually operating under significant constraints. Given the likely decline in the relative advantage at the front line, Russia’s potential negotiating position actually isn’t all that strong. And while Russia has the resources to sustain the war in the near term, looking just a bit beyond that you see a fairly problematic picture in terms of the rate of inflation in Russia’s overheating economy, the deficit of skilled labor — because the state is pulling workers into the defense industry and contracting them to fight in the war — the steady depletion of Russia’s liquid reserves, and the fact that much of the budget is tied to the current oil price. The economic picture for Russia isn’t particularly rosy. The effort to juggle several different parts of this equation may not be sustainable. And this too must at some point weigh on the Russian leadership’s mind.

I am sure these problems do weigh on the Russian leadership's mind. They are doing everything the can to avoid the worst effects of these events. Ukraine's drone attacks on both military and commercial (oil) targets are materially adding to the problems. So is the termination of delivering Russian gas through Ukraine. However Russia isn't going to negotiate anything that doesn't involve Ukraine at best becoming a Russian vassal state. They are "all in" on the notion that Ukraine's problems are much worse than Russia's problems and that Ukraine will crack first. The ongoing destruction of the Ukrainian power grid and the continued pressure forcing retreats in the Donbas lend credence to that idea. Questions about the steadfastness of western support is an additional reason that Russia has no need at all to negotiate. As bad as things are in Russia they are worse in Ukraine.

However this war ends the situation in Russia will not be "good". If the war ends in a "victory" Putin can spin the hardships as "the price of victory". He can also promise "a brighter day ahead". Given the political fallout in eastern Europe of a Russian success Putin may be right. If the war is lost, the knowledge of the personnel losses (for nothing) spread through public and the economy is wrecked Putin will have big problems, best case. He isn't going to negotiate such a settlement under any conditions.

[Goose]

A cogent and balanced look at the state of the war in this interview with Michael Kofman.

https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/...looks.html

Agree it is a cogent and fairly balanced interview. I agree with some of it but have problems with a few things.

Is there any limit to the Russian supply of troops? Do you see that advantage fading at all, whether because of diminishing numbers or political backlash? 

It’s a good question. Russia’s advantage has been the ability to withstand very high levels of attrition because of the materiel and manpower resources they have, and also their significant capacity for mobilization of resources on a national scale — that is, defense industrial production, manpower recruitment, and the like.

But Russia’s actually operating under very significant constraints. And if anything, its advantage on the battlefield is likely to decline as we get into this winter and look further ahead into 2025. First, in terms of equipment, the Russian military has been sustaining very high levels of loss that are principally being replaced by Soviet-era stocks — not entirely, but at this stage, Russia is eating through its Soviet legacy, and its rate of equipment production is quite low relative to the numbers being lost on the battlefield.

This doesn’t mean that Russia is going to run out of armored fighting vehicles.

Agree. Kofman appears to forget this subsequently however

What it does mean is that the Russian military has increasingly been forced to adjust tactics to minimize their losses,

Since they aren't in any danger of running out they weren't "forced" to do anything. A better explanation is that Russia learned that their tactics were causing excessive losses of material and were ineffective. That is "good" for Russia not bad. Minimizing losses is in general a good tactic whenever possible.

 and that also reduces their ability to achieve any operationally meaningful breakthroughs.

Name one operationally significant "breakthrough" Russia has achieved in this entire war. They are structurally incapable of it. The trench warfare that currently dominates this war makes "breakthroughs" impossible to achieve if the retreating forces retain cohesion. They just fall back to the next trench line. At the beginning of the war when trench warfare had not set in, Ukraine was disorganized, and Russia had all its "elite" (category A) formations it was theoretically possible. In the event Russia's reorganization into BTGs and lack of training resulted in it not happening. Russia also was and is incapable of logistically sustaining fast moving breakthroughs. They are not resourced or trained to do that. Russia is now fighting as they did in WW II. Trundle up to the enemy MLR. Flatten everything with artillery and warm bodies. Force the enemy to retreat to the next line of resistance. Take a week or so to reorganize and bring up the required logistics. Repeat. No "breakthrough" desired.

When you look at manpower, the Russian government has significantly increased the payouts and benefits to recruit personnel. The reason for that is straightforward. It’s clear that at this rate of loss, the Russian contract recruitment campaign is unable to keep up. This too does not mean that Russia is going to run out of manpower, but it’s clear that they’re struggling, and they are not likely to be able to sustain this pace of operations, staying on the offensive with this rate of loss.

Why can't they? Why is it clear they can't keep up? So far they have. They are "struggling, not failing. Assuming they will fail is a fact not in evidence. More importantly contract troops aren't the only source of manpower. Putin just drafted 130,000 troops. On top of that, Putin can declare "special" mobilizations to augment his troop strength whenever he wants. This goes on all the time. If worse comes to worse Putin can declare a general mobilization and get all the troops he needs for a very, very long time. He doesn't want to do that because it carries a political and economic cost. We can have this conversation when Putin is forced to do it.

Which could mean there’s an incentive for both sides to come to the negotiating table. Perhaps a bit more of an incentive than there was a year ago?

The way I would put it is that the Russian military is actually operating under significant constraints. Given the likely decline in the relative advantage at the front line, Russia’s potential negotiating position actually isn’t all that strong. And while Russia has the resources to sustain the war in the near term, looking just a bit beyond that you see a fairly problematic picture in terms of the rate of inflation in Russia’s overheating economy, the deficit of skilled labor — because the state is pulling workers into the defense industry and contracting them to fight in the war — the steady depletion of Russia’s liquid reserves, and the fact that much of the budget is tied to the current oil price. The economic picture for Russia isn’t particularly rosy. The effort to juggle several different parts of this equation may not be sustainable. And this too must at some point weigh on the Russian leadership’s mind.

I am sure these problems do weigh on the Russian leadership's mind. They are doing everything the can to avoid the worst effects of these events. Ukraine's drone attacks on both military and commercial (oil) targets are materially adding to the problems. So is the termination of delivering Russian gas through Ukraine. However Russia isn't going to negotiate anything that doesn't involve Ukraine at best becoming a Russian vassal state. They are "all in" on the notion that Ukraine's problems are much worse than Russia's problems and that Ukraine will crack first. The ongoing destruction of the Ukrainian power grid and the continued pressure forcing retreats in the Donbas lend credence to that idea. Questions about the steadfastness of western support is an additional reason that Russia has no need at all to negotiate. As bad as things are in Russia they are worse in Ukraine.

However this war ends the situation in Russia will not be "good". If the war ends in a "victory" Putin can spin the hardships as "the price of victory". He can also promise "a brighter day ahead". Given the political fallout in eastern Europe of a Russian success Putin may be right. If the war is lost, the knowledge of the personnel losses (for nothing) spread through public and the economy is wrecked Putin will have big problems, best case. He isn't going to negotiate such a settlement under any conditions.