[Goose]

(Continued)
The author then makes statements drawing a parallel between the war in Ukraine to the Cold War. The end of the Cold War is apparently something this author has written books about. I haven't read any of them, but IMO the conclusions he draws need to be examined closely. He states

For the U.S. and other countries committed to Ukraine, the Cold War holds valuable lessons. Its essence was the containment of Soviet power, which was always messy and difficult. On both sides of the Iron Curtain, many thought that the Soviet Union was pulling ahead in the 1970s, that it was gaining ground and self-confidence and might win the Cold War. By the 1980s, the fallacy of such reasoning was apparent, underscoring the value of not reading too much into news cycles and of not inferring too much from the status quo. Now the West is again containing the spread of Russian power. This is a strategic necessity, and it will demand Cold War-style patience. In Ukraine, such patience will be rewarded.

First of all, the author was a high school student when the Cold War ended. He wasn't old enough in the 1980s to know anything about what was "apparent" in the 1980s, even the late 1980s. He would need to quote references and reports by people from that era to support his statements. These reports are at best very thin on the ground and he cites none of them. In point of fact, the "collapse" of the Soviet Union was predicted by virtually nobody. Even while it was happening the "end result" was vastly unclear.

The author also apparently believes that the collapse of the USSR was an inevitable consequence of the US and the West policies containing the spread of Russian power for the 74 years from 1917 to 1991. He also apparently believes the situation in Ukraine is somehow parallel to those years. The idea that the "fall" of the USSR was "inevitable" is very arguable. It is unquestionably true that the decisions made by the Russian leadership resulted in consequences they did not expect or intend. They could have made other choices. If the leader of the USSR at the time was Stalin (or even Khrushchev) instead of Michael Gorbachev it is very probable the results would have been very different. Putin is not Gorbachev.

That said, this is merely the gorilla in the room. The planetary mass is that during the Cold War the US and Russia were not actually shooting at each other. Both sides could let their proxies fight but at no time was these conflicts existential for either party. The Ukrainian war is arguably existential for Russia. The US could lose in Vietnam or even Korea and still be basically unaffected. The USSR could lose in Afghanistan and survive it. If Putin loses in Ukraine, it is very probable he can't survive it. His rule is a personal one, not an ideologically based one. There is no "next man up".

Ukraine and Russia are obviously in an existential "hot" war. Unlike the Cold War that the US and Russia "fought", Ukraine and Russia are killing lots of their people. Ukraine is seeing its infrastructure destroyed progressively. Ukraine is now starting to inflict similar damage on Russia, although at much lower levels. Russia has seen massive casualties. However, they have secured an indigenous  supply of artillery ammunition that will allow them to maintain at least a 3:1 superiority over Ukraine indefinitely. Any shells they get from the DPRK is a bonus. Russia has also started to successfully ramp up production of Iskander and similar missiles. This link isn't "new" but it is relevant. https://www.nbcnews.com/investigations/r...rcna158883. Russia is importing ballistic missiles from Iran. It also both build and imports drones from Iran. It also imports ballistic missiles from the DPRK.

Ukraine imports a very limited number of ballistic missiles from the US that it can't fire into Russia except under very limited conditions. Ukraine is also doing some indigenous "good things" to improve its ability to strike into Russia. We could (and have :-) go on and on about the relative correlation of forces. However, it is absolutely clear that neither Russia nor Ukraine can keep fighting for 74 more years at this level. Looking at a "never ending war", Russia has to be the favorite with a GDP that is 14 times that of Ukraine (2022) and a population that is 3.8 times as large. This doesn't mean Ukraine can't win, but it does mean playing the "long game" as the author suggests simply will not work for Ukraine. It may work OK eventually for the West, because the West can possibly endure a Ukraine that becomes a Russian vassal state. Russia may find themselves in an impossible situation even if they win. Counting on that is a bad idea though. The author previously made the argument that the EU couldn't allow that outcome.

Lastly the author considers two cases as the possible outcomes of the US election. One possible outcome is that the new president increases aid and allows permission for Ukraine to be more aggressive. The other was that something like the current situation continues. The author motivated the idea that congress would not allow less. That may be true, but as we found out in 2024 it is sufficient that the Speaker be unwilling to bring an aid bill forward to a vote. While staying clear of the Terry rule, I would argue that it is far from certain that with a different president this roadblock could or would be removable, as it finally was in 2024. 

FOOTNOTE:
The author states:

Too much attention is paid to the weaponry Ukraine lacks and to the areas in which its military has fallen short. But the country has a growing military arsenal, from defense-industrial capacity that will come online in 2025 to the lived experience of its soldiers and officers, who are on the avant-garde of 21st-century warfare.

Anybody that believes the war in Ukraine represents generalized 21st-century warfare is at best sadly mistaken. A fight between China and the US would bear NO resemblance  to the war in Ukraine. The "lived experience" of a fight between two countries that virtually don't have an air force is "typical" of nothing. The war in Ukraine is a very specific situation with unique characteristics. That doesn't mean that nothing can be learned from it, but conclusions must carefully be evaluated in terms of their applicability to other conflicts. See my previous diatribe about the battle of Lissa

[Goose]

(Continued)
The author then makes statements drawing a parallel between the war in Ukraine to the Cold War. The end of the Cold War is apparently something this author has written books about. I haven't read any of them, but IMO the conclusions he draws need to be examined closely. He states

For the U.S. and other countries committed to Ukraine, the Cold War holds valuable lessons. Its essence was the containment of Soviet power, which was always messy and difficult. On both sides of the Iron Curtain, many thought that the Soviet Union was pulling ahead in the 1970s, that it was gaining ground and self-confidence and might win the Cold War. By the 1980s, the fallacy of such reasoning was apparent, underscoring the value of not reading too much into news cycles and of not inferring too much from the status quo. Now the West is again containing the spread of Russian power. This is a strategic necessity, and it will demand Cold War-style patience. In Ukraine, such patience will be rewarded.

First of all, the author was a high school student when the Cold War ended. He wasn't old enough in the 1980s to know anything about what was "apparent" in the 1980s, even the late 1980s. He would need to quote references and reports by people from that era to support his statements. These reports are at best very thin on the ground and he cites none of them. In point of fact, the "collapse" of the Soviet Union was predicted by virtually nobody. Even while it was happening the "end result" was vastly unclear.

The author also apparently believes that the collapse of the USSR was an inevitable consequence of the US and the West policies containing the spread of Russian power for the 74 years from 1917 to 1991. He also apparently believes the situation in Ukraine is somehow parallel to those years. The idea that the "fall" of the USSR was "inevitable" is very arguable. It is unquestionably true that the decisions made by the Russian leadership resulted in consequences they did not expect or intend. They could have made other choices. If the leader of the USSR at the time was Stalin (or even Khrushchev) instead of Michael Gorbachev it is very probable the results would have been very different. Putin is not Gorbachev.

That said, this is merely the gorilla in the room. The planetary mass is that during the Cold War the US and Russia were not actually shooting at each other. Both sides could let their proxies fight but at no time was these conflicts existential for either party. The Ukrainian war is arguably existential for Russia. The US could lose in Vietnam or even Korea and still be basically unaffected. The USSR could lose in Afghanistan and survive it. If Putin loses in Ukraine, it is very probable he can't survive it. His rule is a personal one, not an ideologically based one. There is no "next man up".

Ukraine and Russia are obviously in an existential "hot" war. Unlike the Cold War that the US and Russia "fought", Ukraine and Russia are killing lots of their people. Ukraine is seeing its infrastructure destroyed progressively. Ukraine is now starting to inflict similar damage on Russia, although at much lower levels. Russia has seen massive casualties. However, they have secured an indigenous  supply of artillery ammunition that will allow them to maintain at least a 3:1 superiority over Ukraine indefinitely. Any shells they get from the DPRK is a bonus. Russia has also started to successfully ramp up production of Iskander and similar missiles. This link isn't "new" but it is relevant. https://www.nbcnews.com/investigations/r...rcna158883. Russia is importing ballistic missiles from Iran. It also both build and imports drones from Iran. It also imports ballistic missiles from the DPRK.

Ukraine imports a very limited number of ballistic missiles from the US that it can't fire into Russia except under very limited conditions. Ukraine is also doing some indigenous "good things" to improve its ability to strike into Russia. We could (and have :-) go on and on about the relative correlation of forces. However, it is absolutely clear that neither Russia nor Ukraine can keep fighting for 74 more years at this level. Looking at a "never ending war", Russia has to be the favorite with a GDP that is 14 times that of Ukraine (2022) and a population that is 3.8 times as large. This doesn't mean Ukraine can't win, but it does mean playing the "long game" as the author suggests simply will not work for Ukraine. It may work OK eventually for the West, because the West can possibly endure a Ukraine that becomes a Russian vassal state. Russia may find themselves in an impossible situation even if they win. Counting on that is a bad idea though. The author previously made the argument that the EU couldn't allow that outcome.

Lastly the author considers two cases as the possible outcomes of the US election. One possible outcome is that the new president increases aid and allows permission for Ukraine to be more aggressive. The other was that something like the current situation continues. The author motivated the idea that congress would not allow less. That may be true, but as we found out in 2024 it is sufficient that the Speaker be unwilling to bring an aid bill forward to a vote. While staying clear of the Terry rule, I would argue that it is far from certain that with a different president this roadblock could or would be removable, as it finally was in 2024. 

FOOTNOTE:
The author states:

Too much attention is paid to the weaponry Ukraine lacks and to the areas in which its military has fallen short. But the country has a growing military arsenal, from defense-industrial capacity that will come online in 2025 to the lived experience of its soldiers and officers, who are on the avant-garde of 21st-century warfare.

Anybody that believes the war in Ukraine represents generalized 21st-century warfare is at best sadly mistaken. A fight between China and the US would bear NO resemblance  to the war in Ukraine. The "lived experience" of a fight between two countries that virtually don't have an air force is "typical" of nothing. The war in Ukraine is a very specific situation with unique characteristics. That doesn't mean that nothing can be learned from it, but conclusions must carefully be evaluated in terms of their applicability to other conflicts. See my previous diatribe about the battle of Lissa