(09-15-2024, 05:13 PM)BostonCard Wrote: This should be a “gifted” version of the WSJ article:First, many thanks to BC for the gifted access to the article. My "take" on the article is not at all positive however. I find it to be exceedingly poorly reasoned and simply factually incorrect in a few important places. The author states that there are three "pillars" of the "West".
https://www.wsj.com/world/ignore-the-def..._permalink
BC
Quote:The first is to furnish Ukraine with weapons, intelligence and help with targeting. This has been an enormous initiative, comparable to the Lend-Lease program for U.S. allies in World War II and encompassing the contributions not just of the U.S., France, Britain and Germany but of dozens of other countries, from Canada to South Korea.This is patent nonsense. Consider the following from https://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/...iet-union/
Quote:During World War II, the Soviet Union received almost 15,000 U.S.-built aircraft under the lend-lease program.Ukraine right now is scheduled to receive maybe 50 F-16s from several smaller NATO countries. The US is supplying none.
From https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/ar...tern-front
Quote:Those shipments included 400,000 vehicles, 14,000 aircraft, 13,000 tanks, 8,000 tractors, 4.5 million tons of food, and 2.7 million tons of petroleum products, as well as millions of blankets, uniforms, and boots, and 107,000 tons of cotton.The US has supplied 31 Abrams tanks to Ukraine. The idea that the US is providing anything the scale of lend-lease is absurd. I am sure Ukraine would very much appreciate receiving 1% of those 15,000 aircraft. Not happening. The author goes on to state that the West is proud of their commitment. Fine, but nowhere in the document does the author even attempt to demonstrate that this "commitment" is adequate to achieve any particular outcome, let alone the "desired outcome". That "desired outcome" is never defined explicitly so it is left to our imagination whether the actual contributions of "the West" are sufficient to reach it.
The second "pillar" is the bilateral agreements that "tighten ties to Ukraine".
Quote:The shared goal of these pacts is to end the war on the best terms possible for Ukraine and to ensure a peaceful future by making the country powerful enough that Russia will never invade again.Of course, none of these bilateral agreements actually commit anybody to do anything in particular. They set ambitious "goals" for postwar security. They do nothing to directly affect the current conflict and the author makes no claim that they do. How is that a "pillar" of anything? It is very relevant to recall the Trilateral Statement where both the US and the UK UNILATERALLY guaranteed the sovereignty of Ukraine. If I were a Ukrainian, I would accept any such agreements as a big "maybe, if we feel like it".
The third "pillar" is that "Ukraine is entering Europe". Exactly how that affects the current war is never actually stated, but the closest it comes is
Quote:But Ukraine is not giving up on Europe, and Europe can no longer afford the benign neglect it cultivated for Ukraine in the 1990s and even after the Russian invasion of 2014. Europe’s own well-being depends on its ability to integrate Ukraine. It would be a catastrophe for Europe if Ukraine became a failed state or a Russian colony the size of Texas, bordering five members of the EU and NATO.I am willing to believe that statement is true, although the author asserts it without proof or even a supporting argument. However, it is pretty definite and demonstrable that several European countries (Hungary and Fico-led Slovakia) do not believe that statement is true. In fact, they believe the opposite. It is also clearly true that the Alternative für Deutschland and Rassemblement National are not in favor of supporting Ukraine. These parties are already in a position to make it very difficult for France and Germany to continue even their present support of Ukraine, let alone increase it. The SPD in Germany is also becoming a bit "wobbly" on exactly what it is willing to do and is also firmly indicating it wants the war in Ukraine to end. It is unclear how much they care about the terms. In short, even granting the authors assertion that the EU needs to make sure Ukraine "wins" to some extent, it is very unclear that the EU can and will do "enough" to prevent that outcome. The author makes absolutely no attempt to demonstrate they will.
The author then argues that these pillars have "worked", basically because Ukraine is still fighting. The direct connection to these pillars is unclear.
The author states
Quote:In February 2022, Russia occupied some 11% of Ukrainian territory. After the deaths of countless Russian soldiers, Russia now occupies just some 18% of Ukrainian territory. The numbers chart Russia’s humiliation in this war—its strategic quandary and ultimate dead end.It is nice to state Russia is humiliated, in a strategic quandary, and at an ultimate dead end. However, the facts supplied in no way demonstrate any of the above. In fact, it demonstrates the opposite (if anything). Russia has gained 7% more Ukrainian territory. While that is "disappointing" to those who thought Russia should do better, it in no way supports the idea Russia will have to quit. If the war continues as it currently is, Russia will eventually "win", not Ukraine. What the author needed to show is that Ukraine can force Russia to quit fighting given the current situation. He makes no attempt to do that, he merely states without any rationale that Russia is at a "dead end".
(continued in next post)
