(08-24-2024, 03:30 PM)BostonCard Wrote: If I want to be charitable, I’d say that Western slowly incrementalism approach of sending a toe over the red line, followed by a foot, etc. winds up being less provocative than full on obliterating it, but we have to remember that every limitation we put on Ukraine makes their defense less effective, which reduces their chance of pushing the Russians back and increases Ukrainian casualties.IMO you are correct that the "slow incrementalism" is a bit "safer". It does come with some significant costs however. As the ISW has pointed out, the "technological" advances each side makes often changes the balance of power significantly. However, the other side successfully adapts to the changed threat relatively quickly and that advantage is negated. The also point out that the ability to combine several such changes together has a synergistic effect that is a major force multiplier. It can put the opponent at a very significant disadvantage that can be a game-changer. Slow incrementalism precludes the arrival of multiple technologies simultaneously and forfeits that advantage.
BC
The second major disadvantage is that we are slowly training the Russian military to be a better force. I have seen several repetitions in the press of the "immunization" analogy. At the start of this war the Russian army was a basket case. They had mile upon mile of immobile military vehicle convoys stopped dead on the roads for days. Their attempt to seize an airhead to outflank Kiev became a laughingstock despite the quite anemic force Ukraine sent to oppose it. The Russian army today isn't great shakes but it doesn't make those kinds of mistakes on a daily basis anymore. They have at least pretty much figured out what they can and can't do and are doing it. At the start of the war the VKS was a non-factor. They have finally developed a glide bomb capability that they never had before. It is causing Ukraine major problems. When first introduced the HIMARS and other GPS guided weapons were very effective. This forced the Russians to manufacture and deploy their GPS jamming capability at scale, which negated much of the benefit of our weapons. Ukraine and the west have (IMO mysteriously) failed to counter that action effectively. It goes on and on.
Every time we deploy a new weapon or give Ukraine permission to use an existing weapon in new ways, it causes the Russians major problems for awhile. However, since we do it in isolation Russia can endure the problem while developing the necessary "antibodies" to beat the infection. We need to overwhelm their immune system and we can't do it staying with "slow incrementalism". Should we ever have to fight the Russian army directly we will be fighting a much better organized and more appropriately equipped force. They will also be much more accustomed to NATO SAMs in "real life", which is very valuable to them. Not good for Ukraine and not good for us.
IMO we must take Putin at his word. He says he will not use nuclear weapons unless there is a "threat to the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Russia". Until the latest offensive by Ukraine it was pretty clear none of the conditions Putin set were being met. Arguably, the Russian territorial integrity has been breached by Ukraine. Putin did nothing. He could believe that he will defeat Ukraine so any such incursions are meaningless and not a "real" threat. It could also mean he isn't sure what would happen if he did respond with a nuclear weapon and therefore won't do so unless it becomes an "emergency". FWIW I believe this is the actual case. It is also possible that Putin is unsure his military would obey the order.
The real question is: "Does Putin believe an imminent Ukrainian victory and reconquest of all their territory necessitate a nuclear action?". If we believe he does, do we actually want a Ukrainian victory? If we do not want that victory, why are we assisting Ukraine? If we do want such a victory, we (actually Ukraine mostly) will have to face that nuclear response in any case. What will we do? Better to decide now than wait for the event and then decide under great pressure. OTOH, if we don't believe Putin would escalate if he is about to lose the war, why go slow?
