[Goose]

https://www.wsj.com/world/us-weapons-rus..._permalink

Wall Street Journal Article reiterating much of what I can read here from Goose's excellent analysis.  The Russians are learning countermeasures to Western-supplied technology.

Interesting article. It seems to be contradicting previous statements that the SDB inaccuracy problems in the presence of jamming had been remedied by software improvements. Hard to know which is correct. OTOH Ukraine has few aircract that can use them, so it may not matter that much.

I appreciate the quote you cite from the article. However I believe that the press and many of the "talking heads" over interpret the heck out of the data. They want to extract basic "truths" from little evidence. Human nature, but it can be dangerous. I am going to "correct" the quote below :-).

Western military doctrine has long relied on a belief necessity that SPEED, mobility and precision can defeat mass—meaning that well-targeted strikes can cripple a more numerous enemy, reducing the need for massive expenditure on troops, tanks and artillery.

During the Cold War we lacked the ability to maintain an adequate standing army to "match up" with Russia man-to-man. That is still true in a long war. We had to beat them utilizing many fewer highly trained troops. Our expenditures on troops and tanks were indeed massive. We train the heck out of our troops, very much unlike Russia. That costs piles of money. Instead of artillery we spent massive amounts of money on air superiority. Our plan was/is to get inside the enemies decision cycle and move so fast that Russia couldn't react quickly enough to get their superior mass in a place where it could stop us. We had to always "be ready to fight tonight" and expected the war to be a "come as you are" event that would not last long enough for even medium term "lessons learned" to matter. Ukraine is fighting virtually without an Air Force and has no ability to move troops FAST anywhere. Both Ukraine and Russia are engaged in trench warfare. Until recently the VKS was a non-factor. Extrapolating results in Ukraine to evaluate NATO  strategic and tactical planning is therefore highly suspect. Yes, if you run the Wishbone with just the up back and no halfbacks it probably won't work well :-). Both "teams" are doing that. Russia has a bigger OL and just keeps substituting fresh players.

That proposition, however, had not been tested in a major war until Ukraine. The introduction of Western weapons there showed that what may have worked against Saddam Hussein’s army, the Taliban or Islamic State guerrillas won’t necessarily perform against a modern military like Russia’s or China’s.

“We have probably made some bad assumptions because over the last 20 years we were launching precision weapons against people that could not do anything about it,” said retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, a former commander of the U.S. Army in Europe. “Now we are doing it against a peer opponent, and Russia and China do have these capabilities.”

Ukraine is not capable of executing a rapid "Hail Mary" offensive against a weak left flank like we did in the First Gulf war. There is no comparison. Russia had developed tactical GPS jamming that Saddam used briefly in the Second Gulf War. Russia however did not have anywhere near enough of them to make a significant impact when they invaded Ukraine in 2022. It took about a year before the "precision strike" weapons we delivered to Ukraine were severely degraded across most of the battlefield. Ukraine gave Russia time to correct a deficiency in their defense. Russia learned and prioritized building more jammers. Never, ever, ever give Russia time. Ukraine was unable to do this.

Russia still does not, and will never have adequate jamming capability to protect every important target in their country. The "peer" opponent had convoys of troops and supplies at a dead standstill across the Ukrainian landscape for WEEKS at the start of the war. These convoys would have been wiped out by the USAF within two to four hours in a "real" war. The casualties would have been horrendous. Ukraine could do nothing like that.

It is true that the US has not upgraded its existing precision strike weapons to resist GPS jamming. This may be because we did not believe Russia had enough jammers to require us to do so. In the US military it was (and I assume still is) the responsibility of the USAF to maintain and update the EORBAT. It is also their responsibility to destroy any emitters that can degrade our weapon's accuracy, such as SAM radars. Artillery locating radars are arguably in the same category. GPS jammers are also included in that category. It is unknown as to whether and to what degree they would be doing that. HARMs can do it. Of course, the USAF is not present in Ukraine. That is IMO the issue that has not been addressed by NATO in the Ukraine. What can be done instead? It isn't being answered.

One of the lessons learned in Ukraine is about the continuing importance of old-school unguided artillery shells, the manufacturing of which is only now beginning to pick up in the U.S. and Europe after decades of decline, said Lt. Gen. Esa Pulkkinen, the permanent secretary of Finland’s defense ministry. “They are immune to any type of jamming, and they will go to target regardless of what type of electronic warfare capability there may be,” he said.

Almost true. The literal truth is that the rounds will go to where they were aimed subject to the ballistic accuracy of the weapons. It takes a very large number of artillery rounds guarantee even a non-moving target will be destroyed. Their CEP isn't great. "Dumb" bombs work fine for that too. That is the "NATO equivalent", mostly but not entirely courtesy of the USAF. It is a lot easier to concentrate aircraft than it is to concentrate artillery. That is why NATO hasn't emphasized artillery nearly as much as Russia has.

It is also true that about the time the General's artillery rounds reach their zenith the Firefinders will have a solution that is on the way to counter-battery or air-support assets. The artillery that fired it better be displacing like mad and can't wait around to fire a second salvo. If not, they will rapidly become combat ineffective :-). A whole bunch of artillery has a much bigger footprint that a single tactical missile launcher. Hard to move all of it at once. It also takes much more logistical support. There is no "free lunch".

Precision strike weapons are much more economic in such conditions, if they work. If the target is moving, both types of weapons have a problem. NATO generally wants to be moving :-). A significant problem for both conventional artillery and precision strike weapons is FINDING the target. In Ukraine, it is easier because there isn't much movement, but in a dynamic situation that is a serious issue. Drones make a great contribution to solving this issue.

Another quote from the article:

“We should assume that adaptation will always occur, and the Russians have adapted to a variety of things,” said Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. “The capabilities will be most effective immediately after they are introduced, and adversaries will develop countermeasures over time.”

Right! That is why we must never give them time. Exploit the new capabilities to the absolute max ASAP and force Russia to move back. Once they are moving, keep them at least trying to move. In the middle of the retreat, introduce another new capability. Their poorly trained troops won't be able to retreat in good order while offering meaningful resistance. Give them NO TIME. That is the formula NATO intends to use.

Goose has convinced me that honing in on jamming signals ought to be a no-brainer, and yet...

BC

I am still absolutely mystified as to why this is the case. I am sure people that can use AI and video processing to destroy targets can much more easily home in on a powerful signal operating on a known frequency. Even if the jammers were doing something "clever" (which from the reports we have, sparse though they are, they are not) this is easy to do. Even if they "blink" a lot, drones have the persistence to remain in the area and continue to attack when the signal returns. If the jammer stays off, it continues to exist but is useless. That is a win. Makes no sense to me.

[Goose]

https://www.wsj.com/world/us-weapons-rus..._permalink

Wall Street Journal Article reiterating much of what I can read here from Goose's excellent analysis.  The Russians are learning countermeasures to Western-supplied technology.

Interesting article. It seems to be contradicting previous statements that the SDB inaccuracy problems in the presence of jamming had been remedied by software improvements. Hard to know which is correct. OTOH Ukraine has few aircract that can use them, so it may not matter that much.

I appreciate the quote you cite from the article. However I believe that the press and many of the "talking heads" over interpret the heck out of the data. They want to extract basic "truths" from little evidence. Human nature, but it can be dangerous. I am going to "correct" the quote below :-).

Western military doctrine has long relied on a belief necessity that SPEED, mobility and precision can defeat mass—meaning that well-targeted strikes can cripple a more numerous enemy, reducing the need for massive expenditure on troops, tanks and artillery.

During the Cold War we lacked the ability to maintain an adequate standing army to "match up" with Russia man-to-man. That is still true in a long war. We had to beat them utilizing many fewer highly trained troops. Our expenditures on troops and tanks were indeed massive. We train the heck out of our troops, very much unlike Russia. That costs piles of money. Instead of artillery we spent massive amounts of money on air superiority. Our plan was/is to get inside the enemies decision cycle and move so fast that Russia couldn't react quickly enough to get their superior mass in a place where it could stop us. We had to always "be ready to fight tonight" and expected the war to be a "come as you are" event that would not last long enough for even medium term "lessons learned" to matter. Ukraine is fighting virtually without an Air Force and has no ability to move troops FAST anywhere. Both Ukraine and Russia are engaged in trench warfare. Until recently the VKS was a non-factor. Extrapolating results in Ukraine to evaluate NATO  strategic and tactical planning is therefore highly suspect. Yes, if you run the Wishbone with just the up back and no halfbacks it probably won't work well :-). Both "teams" are doing that. Russia has a bigger OL and just keeps substituting fresh players.

That proposition, however, had not been tested in a major war until Ukraine. The introduction of Western weapons there showed that what may have worked against Saddam Hussein’s army, the Taliban or Islamic State guerrillas won’t necessarily perform against a modern military like Russia’s or China’s.

“We have probably made some bad assumptions because over the last 20 years we were launching precision weapons against people that could not do anything about it,” said retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, a former commander of the U.S. Army in Europe. “Now we are doing it against a peer opponent, and Russia and China do have these capabilities.”

Ukraine is not capable of executing a rapid "Hail Mary" offensive against a weak left flank like we did in the First Gulf war. There is no comparison. Russia had developed tactical GPS jamming that Saddam used briefly in the Second Gulf War. Russia however did not have anywhere near enough of them to make a significant impact when they invaded Ukraine in 2022. It took about a year before the "precision strike" weapons we delivered to Ukraine were severely degraded across most of the battlefield. Ukraine gave Russia time to correct a deficiency in their defense. Russia learned and prioritized building more jammers. Never, ever, ever give Russia time. Ukraine was unable to do this.

Russia still does not, and will never have adequate jamming capability to protect every important target in their country. The "peer" opponent had convoys of troops and supplies at a dead standstill across the Ukrainian landscape for WEEKS at the start of the war. These convoys would have been wiped out by the USAF within two to four hours in a "real" war. The casualties would have been horrendous. Ukraine could do nothing like that.

It is true that the US has not upgraded its existing precision strike weapons to resist GPS jamming. This may be because we did not believe Russia had enough jammers to require us to do so. In the US military it was (and I assume still is) the responsibility of the USAF to maintain and update the EORBAT. It is also their responsibility to destroy any emitters that can degrade our weapon's accuracy, such as SAM radars. Artillery locating radars are arguably in the same category. GPS jammers are also included in that category. It is unknown as to whether and to what degree they would be doing that. HARMs can do it. Of course, the USAF is not present in Ukraine. That is IMO the issue that has not been addressed by NATO in the Ukraine. What can be done instead? It isn't being answered.

One of the lessons learned in Ukraine is about the continuing importance of old-school unguided artillery shells, the manufacturing of which is only now beginning to pick up in the U.S. and Europe after decades of decline, said Lt. Gen. Esa Pulkkinen, the permanent secretary of Finland’s defense ministry. “They are immune to any type of jamming, and they will go to target regardless of what type of electronic warfare capability there may be,” he said.

Almost true. The literal truth is that the rounds will go to where they were aimed subject to the ballistic accuracy of the weapons. It takes a very large number of artillery rounds guarantee even a non-moving target will be destroyed. Their CEP isn't great. "Dumb" bombs work fine for that too. That is the "NATO equivalent", mostly but not entirely courtesy of the USAF. It is a lot easier to concentrate aircraft than it is to concentrate artillery. That is why NATO hasn't emphasized artillery nearly as much as Russia has.

It is also true that about the time the General's artillery rounds reach their zenith the Firefinders will have a solution that is on the way to counter-battery or air-support assets. The artillery that fired it better be displacing like mad and can't wait around to fire a second salvo. If not, they will rapidly become combat ineffective :-). A whole bunch of artillery has a much bigger footprint that a single tactical missile launcher. Hard to move all of it at once. It also takes much more logistical support. There is no "free lunch".

Precision strike weapons are much more economic in such conditions, if they work. If the target is moving, both types of weapons have a problem. NATO generally wants to be moving :-). A significant problem for both conventional artillery and precision strike weapons is FINDING the target. In Ukraine, it is easier because there isn't much movement, but in a dynamic situation that is a serious issue. Drones make a great contribution to solving this issue.

Another quote from the article:

“We should assume that adaptation will always occur, and the Russians have adapted to a variety of things,” said Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. “The capabilities will be most effective immediately after they are introduced, and adversaries will develop countermeasures over time.”

Right! That is why we must never give them time. Exploit the new capabilities to the absolute max ASAP and force Russia to move back. Once they are moving, keep them at least trying to move. In the middle of the retreat, introduce another new capability. Their poorly trained troops won't be able to retreat in good order while offering meaningful resistance. Give them NO TIME. That is the formula NATO intends to use.

Goose has convinced me that honing in on jamming signals ought to be a no-brainer, and yet...

BC

I am still absolutely mystified as to why this is the case. I am sure people that can use AI and video processing to destroy targets can much more easily home in on a powerful signal operating on a known frequency. Even if the jammers were doing something "clever" (which from the reports we have, sparse though they are, they are not) this is easy to do. Even if they "blink" a lot, drones have the persistence to remain in the area and continue to attack when the signal returns. If the jammer stays off, it continues to exist but is useless. That is a win. Makes no sense to me.