(06-20-2024, 09:38 PM)TrumpCard Wrote: Does it seem likely that the battle for Chasiv Yar will follow a path similar to the battle for Bakhmut? I recall Russia kept attacking in the face of enormous troop and equipment losses and some of the commentators criticized that strategy as futile. But ultimately, Russia was able to take the town by making progress in tiny increments over a period of many months. I wonder whether the Ukraine's current position on the high ground, combined with the new firepower from NATO, will help Ukraine achieve a different outcome in Chasiv Yar.Good question! IMO Russia did something very smart in the north-east. I don't think the "world" at large yet realizes how brilliant it was. These days with all the drone reconnaissance it is impossible achieve surprise in an operation the size of the one Russia executed in the Kharkiv area. Ukraine had plenty of warning. They knew Russia appeared to be massing for an attack and what size it could be. Ukraine also knew that they couldn't use "western" weapons to disrupt those preparations inside Russia. Ukraine also knew they were critically short of artillery ammunition.
I would have liked to have been a fly on the wall while the Ukrainian NCA pondered this information. One approach would have been to transfer sufficient troops from the fighting in the "middle Donbas front" to defeat the prospective Russian advance in the north. That was problematic because 1) Ukrainian troops are still not very mobile 2) The situation on the other front was "serious" and the troops really couldn't be spared and (arguably most importantly) 3) Russia didn't actually have to do anything around Kharkiv. If Ukraine acted to meet the threat, Russia had already "won" and lost no troops doing it. In the event Ukraine forced Russia to actually execute the attack and as a result Ukraine lost some valuable territory. Ukraine also had to pull troops from the "other" front to stop the attack. The corresponding "good" effects are 1) Russia suffered disproportionate casualties and 2) The Russian units involved are now fixed in place to hold what they gained. They can't leave or Ukraine will take it all back.
So what does this have to do with Chasiv Yar? Ukraine is attempting to compensate for their lack of numbers (relative to Russia) by using (hopefully) superior firepower. This can cost Russia massive casualties. It can also temporarily slow Russia to a crawl (or slower) around Chasiv Yar. NATO would do the same, except NATO would use its air power to isolate the battlefield and to literally destroy the crawling Russian advance. Ukraine can't do this, or anything close. NATO would also rely on having striking forces in reserve that could counter-attack elsewhere, thereby doing to Russia what Russia did to Ukraine in the north-east. Ukraine unfortunately lacks any reserves at this point. Everything is committed. They can't even threaten a significant attack elsewhere (like in the south) to force Russia to change focus from Chasiv Yar. If Russia is willing to accept the massive casualties over the long time it will take to "crawl" into Chasiv Yar, IMO Ukraine doesn't presently have the firepower to stop them. It could take six months or more, but if nothing else changes Chasiv Yar will fall eventually.
There are some things being done to change the equation. Ukraine's new draft laws will have an effect and will possibly free up enough troops to allow a counter-attack elsewhere that Russia simply cannot ignore. How long this will take is anybodies guess. It is a race. All else remaining the same, if Ukraine can't generate enough offensive combat power to force Russia to divert forces elsewhere, Ukraine loses the war. It is just a question of time.
Another thing being attempted is the regeneration of the Ukrainian air force. Russia can't crawl forward if they can't supply their troops in the Chasiv Yar area. The Ukrainian air force can hopefully make that happen, eventually. Ukraine can't obtain enough ATACMS (or similar) to do an equivalent thing. They don't exist. F-16s can carry 4 MK-84 2000 lb bombs. An ATACMS warhead weighs 472 lbs. Obviously not "apples-to-apples" but it gives a perspective. The F-16 can also do this several times a day and never have to overfly the FEBA. JDAMs will go plenty far enough to mess up the Russian posits. Will Ukraine achieve enough capability to do this, and if so when? Will Chasiv Yar be in Ukrainian hands at that point?
Ukraine is also utilizing long range drone attacks to damage Russian civilian infrastructure (particularly oil refining and storage) and to hamper VKS operations against Ukrainian ground troops. These efforts are important and to some degree effective. The effect on the VKS could become a serious problem for Russia. They have just within the last nine months or so figured out how to meaningfully participate in this war. Ukraine admits they have become a significant problem. Unfortunately these long range attacks are neither frequent enough nor powerful enough to force Russia or the VKS out of the war. They are a "problem" but endurable.
IMO the real question is whether Russia has another force available to open yet another "significant" attack on Ukraine, perhaps in the south. If they do, Ukraine is IMO toast. They just don't have the bodies. In four or more months, they may, but right now they don't. Most "foreign" intelligence agencies don't think Russia has the wherewithal to do it, at least this summer. Let's hope they are right. From this point of view, Ukraine probably hopes Russia keeps banging away at Chasiv Yar. OTOH, the Russians aren't stupid. They know the situation quite well. I bet there is LOTS of internal pressure to stretch Ukraine even thinner and break through someplace NOW, before Ukraine's "new" troops show up.
Of course, there could be internal problems either in the Russian military or society of which we are unaware. Maybe the massive casualties will finally become "just too much". Not prudent to count on this though.
