[gocard14]

Does anyone know if this article is at least reasonabley factual?
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/20...to-crimea/
If true, Russia's ability to defend Crimea from air attacks maybe become limited. The Ukrainians are seemingly becoming very good at taking out the S400. If Russia can't keep their S400 batteries up and functiioning, the F16s may have increased lattitude in terms of what they can do.

The fact that Ukraine has used ATACMS to destroy "several" S-400 and S-300 batteries is well enough documented that IMO it can be taken as a fact. The quantity and location is also very probably accurate. From there, things go downhill pretty fast. The Ukrainians claim the S-400s (and whatever may have been supposed to protect them) did not  destroy a single ATACMS. If this is true, it could be immensely significant. We have no independent confirmation of this.

There are multiple possible causes of the failure. IF the S-400 was operating "normally" and IF the crew was of "typical" skill and were unable to destroy any of the inbound missiles it points to design deficiencies in the S-400. Russia may or may not be able to correct these  deficiencies quickly. If they can't, the implications are obvious and the ability of F-16s to operate inside Crimea (or inside Russia for that matter) is greatly enhanced. The S-400s can be destroyed by ATACMS and the F-16s can utilize that gap to get inside the defended area without loss. A "big deal" if true.

It is also possible these batteries were not yet operational. Why Russia would deploy and thereby expose a battery that wasn't operational yet is anybodies  guess. Maybe the date on the orders was wrong.

It also may be that the battery was operational but concentrating against low angle cruise missile targets/drones and wanted high duty cycle on these low altitude targets. The S-400 was therefore not maintaining surveillance at all altitudes. It is possible it literally didn't "see" the incoming. It is important to remember that the S-400 is designed to be used as part of an IADS where long-range acquisition radars detect the targets and designate them for individual batteries. It isn't being used that way in Ukraine. Each battery is acquiring its own targets. That undoubtedly degrades the effectiveness of the S-400 considerably. The SOPs may need to change.

It is also possible the crews were just not well trained. It may be they were sent to a "quiet" sector to work up and get ready for a move to the "real war" in a couple of months. If so, it didn't work out so well.

According to Newsweek on Sept 21, 2023 Russia had (on paper at least) 96 S-400 systems. https://www.newsweek.com/russia-s400-air...ne-1828058. The article said "Russia's S-400 Air Defense Systems Are Being Cut to Shreds". Those "shreds" still loom pretty large 9 months later. https://www.newsweek.com/how-many-s-400-...ia-1904353. Russia is supposedly down to 56 systems. Nobody (that is talking) really knows.

In reality neither Russia nor Ukraine has ever had an "impenetrable" air defense system precluding the operation of fixed wing aircraft in each other's airspace, particularly at low altitudes. Even if all 56 remaining Russian S-400s were committed to the fight that would be the case. What has been true is that the probability of running into an unexpectedly located SAM is high enough that neither side was willing to chance it. Attrition would be way too high. Once your pilots are dead you have no air force. Neither side has or has ever had a doctrine that their air force kills SAMs. ATACMS helps a lot (the USAF HATES it :-), but the reality is that to survive in a contested environment an air force needs a DEAD plan. SAM systems are vulnerable to attrition too and they don't move nearly as fast or as often as aircraft. They also don't work without radars that are just screaming "hit me". Hopefully the training the F-16 pilots are receiving includes that part of the syllabus.

Russia was fully aware that an IADS that depended entirely on SAM missiles wouldn't work. Geography and the radar horizon dictates this. They poured massive resources and skilled people into making the PVO an effective (arguably in the 1970s the most effective) part of their IADS. Russia developed the GCI to an art form. They can't afford to do that anymore and folded the PVO into the regular air force. What remains is vulnerable, but you have to make a plan to attack it.

The USAF uses stealth to perform the initial attack and it is, dare I say it, a "no brainer" on how we do it. It works. The subsequent air strikes use HARMs to clean up anything that survived somehow. It isn't efficient, but there are so many HARMs flying around nobody is turning on their radars. Ukraine isn't getting any F-35s (or even F-117s). Ukraine is going to have to do it the "old fashioned way". The good news is that there is no PVO to get in the way. The bad news is that the S-400 is a "challenge". Ukraine has ATACMS. That can help a lot, especially if the S-400 can't defend itself against them at all.

Speaking of the F117, I've been a bit surprised there hasn't been more of a push to send those over. 

We retired them over 15 years ago and have about 60ish. I'm sure there is classified stealth tech but at this point we're talking about 40 year old technology, designed in the 70s. I'm sure they're a bear to maintain, but also sure Ukraine would love to learn how for a few squadrons.

[gocard14]

Does anyone know if this article is at least reasonabley factual?
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/20...to-crimea/
If true, Russia's ability to defend Crimea from air attacks maybe become limited. The Ukrainians are seemingly becoming very good at taking out the S400. If Russia can't keep their S400 batteries up and functiioning, the F16s may have increased lattitude in terms of what they can do.

The fact that Ukraine has used ATACMS to destroy "several" S-400 and S-300 batteries is well enough documented that IMO it can be taken as a fact. The quantity and location is also very probably accurate. From there, things go downhill pretty fast. The Ukrainians claim the S-400s (and whatever may have been supposed to protect them) did not  destroy a single ATACMS. If this is true, it could be immensely significant. We have no independent confirmation of this.

There are multiple possible causes of the failure. IF the S-400 was operating "normally" and IF the crew was of "typical" skill and were unable to destroy any of the inbound missiles it points to design deficiencies in the S-400. Russia may or may not be able to correct these  deficiencies quickly. If they can't, the implications are obvious and the ability of F-16s to operate inside Crimea (or inside Russia for that matter) is greatly enhanced. The S-400s can be destroyed by ATACMS and the F-16s can utilize that gap to get inside the defended area without loss. A "big deal" if true.

It is also possible these batteries were not yet operational. Why Russia would deploy and thereby expose a battery that wasn't operational yet is anybodies  guess. Maybe the date on the orders was wrong.

It also may be that the battery was operational but concentrating against low angle cruise missile targets/drones and wanted high duty cycle on these low altitude targets. The S-400 was therefore not maintaining surveillance at all altitudes. It is possible it literally didn't "see" the incoming. It is important to remember that the S-400 is designed to be used as part of an IADS where long-range acquisition radars detect the targets and designate them for individual batteries. It isn't being used that way in Ukraine. Each battery is acquiring its own targets. That undoubtedly degrades the effectiveness of the S-400 considerably. The SOPs may need to change.

It is also possible the crews were just not well trained. It may be they were sent to a "quiet" sector to work up and get ready for a move to the "real war" in a couple of months. If so, it didn't work out so well.

According to Newsweek on Sept 21, 2023 Russia had (on paper at least) 96 S-400 systems. https://www.newsweek.com/russia-s400-air...ne-1828058. The article said "Russia's S-400 Air Defense Systems Are Being Cut to Shreds". Those "shreds" still loom pretty large 9 months later. https://www.newsweek.com/how-many-s-400-...ia-1904353. Russia is supposedly down to 56 systems. Nobody (that is talking) really knows.

In reality neither Russia nor Ukraine has ever had an "impenetrable" air defense system precluding the operation of fixed wing aircraft in each other's airspace, particularly at low altitudes. Even if all 56 remaining Russian S-400s were committed to the fight that would be the case. What has been true is that the probability of running into an unexpectedly located SAM is high enough that neither side was willing to chance it. Attrition would be way too high. Once your pilots are dead you have no air force. Neither side has or has ever had a doctrine that their air force kills SAMs. ATACMS helps a lot (the USAF HATES it :-), but the reality is that to survive in a contested environment an air force needs a DEAD plan. SAM systems are vulnerable to attrition too and they don't move nearly as fast or as often as aircraft. They also don't work without radars that are just screaming "hit me". Hopefully the training the F-16 pilots are receiving includes that part of the syllabus.

Russia was fully aware that an IADS that depended entirely on SAM missiles wouldn't work. Geography and the radar horizon dictates this. They poured massive resources and skilled people into making the PVO an effective (arguably in the 1970s the most effective) part of their IADS. Russia developed the GCI to an art form. They can't afford to do that anymore and folded the PVO into the regular air force. What remains is vulnerable, but you have to make a plan to attack it.

The USAF uses stealth to perform the initial attack and it is, dare I say it, a "no brainer" on how we do it. It works. The subsequent air strikes use HARMs to clean up anything that survived somehow. It isn't efficient, but there are so many HARMs flying around nobody is turning on their radars. Ukraine isn't getting any F-35s (or even F-117s). Ukraine is going to have to do it the "old fashioned way". The good news is that there is no PVO to get in the way. The bad news is that the S-400 is a "challenge". Ukraine has ATACMS. That can help a lot, especially if the S-400 can't defend itself against them at all.

Speaking of the F117, I've been a bit surprised there hasn't been more of a push to send those over. 

We retired them over 15 years ago and have about 60ish. I'm sure there is classified stealth tech but at this point we're talking about 40 year old technology, designed in the 70s. I'm sure they're a bear to maintain, but also sure Ukraine would love to learn how for a few squadrons.