[Goose]

Thanks for the article and clarifying a lot of stuff I didn't understand.  Since we apparently have no Weasels any longer, does that mean the the whole concept is destined for the junk pile? Is there an alternative solution?  Can we figure out a way for drones of some type to fill the same mission?

The TL;DR version is this: The USAF had a two-pronged approach to enemy IADS from 1970 to about 1985-86. The "conventional" approach was more and better EA (jammers), more and better anti-radiation missiles, and better ELINT capabilities. A lot of the conventional approach was executed (somewhat unevenly). It "worked" but 1) it could not guarantee absolute protection. There would be losses and nobody knew how bad those losses would be. 2) It was expensive. Replacements would be needed for the EB-66 type aircraft. More "Wild Weasels" would be needed to protect strike packages. Increased automation would be needed, and that too was expensive.

The other approach was the "stealth aircraft" approach. It was a magic bullet. The enemy IADS at one stroke became totally ineffective because they couldn't "see" much and what they could see they couldn't target. The big question was "Does it work?" and by 1985-86 the USAF was confident it did. While some "residual" work went on with the first approach, it was heavily deprecated. The solution was to make the USAF essentially 100% stealth. This approach had other big advantages.  Stealth also basically "won" the air-to-air battle because the enemy would be wiped out in BVR engagements before they knew what hit them. Stealth also didn't require the continued costly spiral development of equipment to counter improvements in enemy radar and missile technology.

Stealth also removed the need for Weasels to take on the high-risk mission of "trolling" for enemy radars to kill them. The YGBSM is indeed a good commentary on the Weasel mission.  As Desert Shield/Desert Storm amply demonstrated carrying 4 HARMS per Weasel wasn't NEAR enough. The F-117s "proved" they didn't need EA. Kosovo later disproved that, but by then it was academic. Thus the end of Weasels. Thus also the end of any special purpose EA in the USAF. They never "liked" it anyway. The ELINT mission survives in the USAF. The USN is in a different situation, so they have the EA-18G, which is the only such assent in US inventory today. Ostensibly, the USAF will "borrow" EA-18G units if they need them. It has been done, but I expect in a "real war" the USN would suddenly be too busy :-). The USN OTOH will loose their dedicated ELINT capability with the final demise of VQ-1 in 2025. The slack is supposedly going to be taken up by a mixture of P-8s and drones. The P-8 has an ESM system, the AN/ALQ-240. It is much better than the ALR-66 the P-3C used, but it is very unlikely (IMO) that the ELINT mission will be high enough priority to actually replace VQ-1. There is a unit in JAX that has the task of preserving the Navy ELINT culture. Good luck with that.

The "100% stealth" plan quite possibly would have been executed had the cold war continued and military spending remained in the 4-5% of GDP range. However, without the "peer" enemy with an continually improving IADS, spending all that money (for either approach) wasn't deemed appropriate by the NCA. The "peace dividend" put paid to 100% stealth, even if it were ever possible. The cost of stealth also escalated greatly due to USAF gross mismanagement and the corporate culture generated by consolidation in the defense industry. It was also not helped by Congress intervening (once again, see TFX) to demand a single stealth platform meet all the needs of all the services. Whether that was possible at reasonable cost is arguable, but it certainly wasn't possible in the absence of clear-eyed "supervision" to ensure the program philosophical goals were being met. That didn't happen. The F-35 is a good airplane, but IMO it is vastly more expensive than it needed to be and not affordable enough to come anywhere near the 100% stealth goal. Once again, the adopted solution did not meet the objectives of the program. Nobody said anything (and "survived" anyway). The Emperor had no clothes, but at least had underwear. That was deemed "good enough".

The USAF eventually figured out that their "magic bullet" wasn't the whole answer if they didn't have enough of them and couldn't get the money to execute the "original" intent. Thus the "two tier" approach we have today with "lots" of 4th generation aircraft and "some" F-35s to lead the strike. The plan is that the F-35 gets well inside the IADS and destroys it, either by the F-35s own kinetic effects or by using "network centric" handoffs to 4th generation aircraft loitering outside the effective IADS range. This approach probably will "work". The Israelis have used it to good effect with their F-35Is. It clearly isn't perfect however. They have lost some 4th generation aircraft to SAM sites that went undetected. They are also not playing the "first team".

There will be no "successor" to the F-35 as such, because the USAF undoubtedly will be switching to autonomous unmanned stealth drones for the next generation "fighter". The development has been underway for a while. It continues now at a much more visible level. Politically, it will be a very hard sell in the USAF, which is run by pilots. It is also going to be very expensive. The B-21 at least was designed with the "high-low" mix well understood. It is a "bomber", but is morphing into a "super F-35" that can "do it all", including ELINT, battle management, and weapons designation/handoff. The pitifully few we will procure (if the program survives) will be great aircraft. Both of them :-).

[Goose]

Thanks for the article and clarifying a lot of stuff I didn't understand.  Since we apparently have no Weasels any longer, does that mean the the whole concept is destined for the junk pile? Is there an alternative solution?  Can we figure out a way for drones of some type to fill the same mission?

The TL;DR version is this: The USAF had a two-pronged approach to enemy IADS from 1970 to about 1985-86. The "conventional" approach was more and better EA (jammers), more and better anti-radiation missiles, and better ELINT capabilities. A lot of the conventional approach was executed (somewhat unevenly). It "worked" but 1) it could not guarantee absolute protection. There would be losses and nobody knew how bad those losses would be. 2) It was expensive. Replacements would be needed for the EB-66 type aircraft. More "Wild Weasels" would be needed to protect strike packages. Increased automation would be needed, and that too was expensive.

The other approach was the "stealth aircraft" approach. It was a magic bullet. The enemy IADS at one stroke became totally ineffective because they couldn't "see" much and what they could see they couldn't target. The big question was "Does it work?" and by 1985-86 the USAF was confident it did. While some "residual" work went on with the first approach, it was heavily deprecated. The solution was to make the USAF essentially 100% stealth. This approach had other big advantages.  Stealth also basically "won" the air-to-air battle because the enemy would be wiped out in BVR engagements before they knew what hit them. Stealth also didn't require the continued costly spiral development of equipment to counter improvements in enemy radar and missile technology.

Stealth also removed the need for Weasels to take on the high-risk mission of "trolling" for enemy radars to kill them. The YGBSM is indeed a good commentary on the Weasel mission.  As Desert Shield/Desert Storm amply demonstrated carrying 4 HARMS per Weasel wasn't NEAR enough. The F-117s "proved" they didn't need EA. Kosovo later disproved that, but by then it was academic. Thus the end of Weasels. Thus also the end of any special purpose EA in the USAF. They never "liked" it anyway. The ELINT mission survives in the USAF. The USN is in a different situation, so they have the EA-18G, which is the only such assent in US inventory today. Ostensibly, the USAF will "borrow" EA-18G units if they need them. It has been done, but I expect in a "real war" the USN would suddenly be too busy :-). The USN OTOH will loose their dedicated ELINT capability with the final demise of VQ-1 in 2025. The slack is supposedly going to be taken up by a mixture of P-8s and drones. The P-8 has an ESM system, the AN/ALQ-240. It is much better than the ALR-66 the P-3C used, but it is very unlikely (IMO) that the ELINT mission will be high enough priority to actually replace VQ-1. There is a unit in JAX that has the task of preserving the Navy ELINT culture. Good luck with that.

The "100% stealth" plan quite possibly would have been executed had the cold war continued and military spending remained in the 4-5% of GDP range. However, without the "peer" enemy with an continually improving IADS, spending all that money (for either approach) wasn't deemed appropriate by the NCA. The "peace dividend" put paid to 100% stealth, even if it were ever possible. The cost of stealth also escalated greatly due to USAF gross mismanagement and the corporate culture generated by consolidation in the defense industry. It was also not helped by Congress intervening (once again, see TFX) to demand a single stealth platform meet all the needs of all the services. Whether that was possible at reasonable cost is arguable, but it certainly wasn't possible in the absence of clear-eyed "supervision" to ensure the program philosophical goals were being met. That didn't happen. The F-35 is a good airplane, but IMO it is vastly more expensive than it needed to be and not affordable enough to come anywhere near the 100% stealth goal. Once again, the adopted solution did not meet the objectives of the program. Nobody said anything (and "survived" anyway). The Emperor had no clothes, but at least had underwear. That was deemed "good enough".

The USAF eventually figured out that their "magic bullet" wasn't the whole answer if they didn't have enough of them and couldn't get the money to execute the "original" intent. Thus the "two tier" approach we have today with "lots" of 4th generation aircraft and "some" F-35s to lead the strike. The plan is that the F-35 gets well inside the IADS and destroys it, either by the F-35s own kinetic effects or by using "network centric" handoffs to 4th generation aircraft loitering outside the effective IADS range. This approach probably will "work". The Israelis have used it to good effect with their F-35Is. It clearly isn't perfect however. They have lost some 4th generation aircraft to SAM sites that went undetected. They are also not playing the "first team".

There will be no "successor" to the F-35 as such, because the USAF undoubtedly will be switching to autonomous unmanned stealth drones for the next generation "fighter". The development has been underway for a while. It continues now at a much more visible level. Politically, it will be a very hard sell in the USAF, which is run by pilots. It is also going to be very expensive. The B-21 at least was designed with the "high-low" mix well understood. It is a "bomber", but is morphing into a "super F-35" that can "do it all", including ELINT, battle management, and weapons designation/handoff. The pitifully few we will procure (if the program survives) will be great aircraft. Both of them :-).