[Goose]

I think that the "stable reference" thing is what is causing Europe, no longer just Western Europe, to up its defense spending. The underlying issue is how much can they count on us to bail them out, probably not so much now except maybe for airpower. Back in the day when as a very young Officer I arrived in Germany in the early 1960's, we had 3 infantry divisions and 2 armored divisions in Western Europe.  Now what do we have?

First of all, I think this is a great post and very relevant to the US situation in Europe/NATO today. My attempt to literally answer the question revealed (unsurprisingly) that a "straight answer" is difficult to find.  Depending on the "source", I can get numbers of "US military" in Europe. The numbers for that vary between 50,000 and 100,000. However, this counts USAF, USMC, and Navy units that "support" them, like carrier battle groups. These numbers are therefore not very useful. Here is an example
https://www.statista.com/statistics/2229...d-regions/
Another article says we have 100,000 troops in Europe, implying they are "army".
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-...-training/
If true, that would be around 6 "division equivalents".
https://usafacts.org/articles/where-are-...d-and-why/
This article states that the US has 35,188 "troops" permanently stationed in Germany on "permanent" US bases. That includes USAF and undoubtedly tons of logistics troops. The "combat power" of this grouping is ?

Expanding "western" Europe to include Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria the best answer I can come up with is about 2 division equivalents. Answering the question is confounded by the move to "Brigade Combat Teams'. What we seem to be doing in Europe is deploying single Brigade Combat Teams and rotating them frequently. This reduces the length of time the troops are away from home. These brigades are commanded by headquarters that also rotate. Each headquarters seems to be commanding 2 brigades, not the "normal" 3, and it is unclear (to me at least) how supporting elements such as artillery are provided. Note that the headquarters commanding the two brigades may not be from the same "arm" as the brigade they command, and that the brigades themselves may be "heterogeneous" in type.

Some historical articles that cover NATO in the past I found were interesting.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pu.../N2859.pdf
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pu.../R3209.pdf
These historical notes provide perspective on our current situation and for those of us that were around during these times maybe pushes some buttons :-).

I spent lots of time between 1974 and 1978 with various US and German units in Europe. I spent much more time with German units. During the 1970's the US Army in Europe was suffering from the post-Vietnam "morale crisis" and had lots of problems. I have lots of jokes the Germans would tell on that subject. By 1978 it was much better. This was of course after LBJ had reduced the number of divisions in Europe by 2.

We are still attempting project global power, in the Middle East, Asia and Europe.  Unfortunately it is mostly Air and Sea Power. I think the various governments of the many countries making up what I call Europe today, everything West of the Baltic States Poland, Romania line, get that and understand that they will have to do most of the dirty work on the ground if Putin decides to go West. So they either have to up their defense spending or hope somehow Russia assumes a different persona.

But in the end they all will rely on the US Nuclear deterrent to make sure Putin doesn't "go west". They have their own political and economic realities to deal with. At one time, the US, UK, and FRG were on the same page and prepared for a credible "conventional" deterrent. The other European nations "did what they could". Back in 1967 the UK AOTR contained over 53,000 troops permanently stationed in Europe. Today they have 0. In fairness, the Russian "threat" isn't the 2.1 million troops and 175 divisions of that era. Against that, the 5 US divisions in Germany doesn't look as formidable. The 5 US, 3 UK, and 12 FRG divisions weren't going to "win the war". They were a "blocking force" (if you are an optimist) or a tripwire (if you were a pessimist). FWIW in the early 80's, 2 ACR described themselves as a "tripwire that would eventually DIP".
Hopefully you are correct and the European nations will strengthen their ground forces. We are seeing a willingness to spend slightly more money. It is unclear there is a corresponding willingness to expand their forces.

Geopolitically, the pressure on us to defend our allies in the Middle East and Asia and Europe all at the same time is I think considerable, and in response the Army is downsizing. We can't meet out recruiting goals.  Germany is having problems with its recruiting goals.

You are absolutely correct IMO. Many of us remember when the US was committed to having a military force that could fight two full-scale wars and one counter-insurgency simultaneously. That then dropped to one war and one counter-insurgency. Now it is unclear we can even fight one war. IMO the only way any of these nations (US, Germany, UK, etc.) can maintain an adequate "standing army" is to re-institute conscription. We don't have nearly enough money to attract sufficient troops. Being a soldier isn't easy and the deployment tempo with our current military size just grinds down the force. A bigger force can't be bought. Of course, the probability of conscription being re-instituted in any of these countries is zero, Putin or no Putin. I find it humorous (in a perverse way)  when the US Army claims the latest "reorganization" improves combat power when it is obviously just trying to cover the shortfall.

Are Putin, China or North Korea having that same problem?  If you run a dictatorship, or what is one in reality, you can solve the "recruitment" problem fairly easily.

Up to a point, forced mass conscription can indeed provide all the troops you want. You do take a motivation/professionalism hit, but enough quantity can be used to overcome that.

It is no longer 1938 or 1939 where your enemies are thousands of miles of water away with no quick way to get there. 
If we do not stop Putin from taking over the Ukraine, we are just kicking the can down road to the next generation and it will be worse for them.

Absolutely, totally correct. Unfortunately it may not even be a generational delay. Putin is obviously in a hurry. Failure in Ukraine does however have serious adverse consequences for NATO and the world.

IMO the US forces "permanently" stationed in Europe always had two missions. One, the most obvious one, was to deter the Russians from "going west". Failing that, the US forces (along with the rest of NATO active forces) were expected at a minimum to delay the Russians until reinforcements (mostly from the US) arrived. The second, and even more important (but unstated for obvious reasons) was to provide a force that would ensure the US would do what was necessary to defend Europe. The willingness to lose up to 75,000 troops (more or less) was our "bona fides" that we were "all in". That enabled our credibility to be the "stable reference" because we couldn't sudenly just "opt out". This "statement" was also designed to let Russia know that we were serious and convince them there was no path to victory. The US troops were a "hostage force".

Today, the US has many "hostage forces" deployed around the world. The US force (28,000) in Korea is certainly that. It certainly can't stop (or even slow down) the 1.3 million strong North Korean army. It does demonstrate and ensure that if North Korea attacks, we will be "all in". IMO the us can maintain a  "stable reference" for NATO and Europe with less than 5 divisions worth of combat power "permanently" present. The questions are 1) how many troops are a necessary minimum for a "hostage force" and 2) how many troops are necessary to have enough military power to "matter". Right now, I think we are "OK", but barely. It mostly depends on what the other NATO nations think. I find it interesting that Romania repeatedly badgered the US until we sent a relatively small force to Romania "permanently". Our hostage force in place, Romania was fine with that.
https://www.army.mil/article/265582/us_a...in_romania

[Goose]

I think that the "stable reference" thing is what is causing Europe, no longer just Western Europe, to up its defense spending. The underlying issue is how much can they count on us to bail them out, probably not so much now except maybe for airpower. Back in the day when as a very young Officer I arrived in Germany in the early 1960's, we had 3 infantry divisions and 2 armored divisions in Western Europe.  Now what do we have?

First of all, I think this is a great post and very relevant to the US situation in Europe/NATO today. My attempt to literally answer the question revealed (unsurprisingly) that a "straight answer" is difficult to find.  Depending on the "source", I can get numbers of "US military" in Europe. The numbers for that vary between 50,000 and 100,000. However, this counts USAF, USMC, and Navy units that "support" them, like carrier battle groups. These numbers are therefore not very useful. Here is an example
https://www.statista.com/statistics/2229...d-regions/
Another article says we have 100,000 troops in Europe, implying they are "army".
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-...-training/
If true, that would be around 6 "division equivalents".
https://usafacts.org/articles/where-are-...d-and-why/
This article states that the US has 35,188 "troops" permanently stationed in Germany on "permanent" US bases. That includes USAF and undoubtedly tons of logistics troops. The "combat power" of this grouping is ?

Expanding "western" Europe to include Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria the best answer I can come up with is about 2 division equivalents. Answering the question is confounded by the move to "Brigade Combat Teams'. What we seem to be doing in Europe is deploying single Brigade Combat Teams and rotating them frequently. This reduces the length of time the troops are away from home. These brigades are commanded by headquarters that also rotate. Each headquarters seems to be commanding 2 brigades, not the "normal" 3, and it is unclear (to me at least) how supporting elements such as artillery are provided. Note that the headquarters commanding the two brigades may not be from the same "arm" as the brigade they command, and that the brigades themselves may be "heterogeneous" in type.

Some historical articles that cover NATO in the past I found were interesting.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pu.../N2859.pdf
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pu.../R3209.pdf
These historical notes provide perspective on our current situation and for those of us that were around during these times maybe pushes some buttons :-).

I spent lots of time between 1974 and 1978 with various US and German units in Europe. I spent much more time with German units. During the 1970's the US Army in Europe was suffering from the post-Vietnam "morale crisis" and had lots of problems. I have lots of jokes the Germans would tell on that subject. By 1978 it was much better. This was of course after LBJ had reduced the number of divisions in Europe by 2.

We are still attempting project global power, in the Middle East, Asia and Europe.  Unfortunately it is mostly Air and Sea Power. I think the various governments of the many countries making up what I call Europe today, everything West of the Baltic States Poland, Romania line, get that and understand that they will have to do most of the dirty work on the ground if Putin decides to go West. So they either have to up their defense spending or hope somehow Russia assumes a different persona.

But in the end they all will rely on the US Nuclear deterrent to make sure Putin doesn't "go west". They have their own political and economic realities to deal with. At one time, the US, UK, and FRG were on the same page and prepared for a credible "conventional" deterrent. The other European nations "did what they could". Back in 1967 the UK AOTR contained over 53,000 troops permanently stationed in Europe. Today they have 0. In fairness, the Russian "threat" isn't the 2.1 million troops and 175 divisions of that era. Against that, the 5 US divisions in Germany doesn't look as formidable. The 5 US, 3 UK, and 12 FRG divisions weren't going to "win the war". They were a "blocking force" (if you are an optimist) or a tripwire (if you were a pessimist). FWIW in the early 80's, 2 ACR described themselves as a "tripwire that would eventually DIP".
Hopefully you are correct and the European nations will strengthen their ground forces. We are seeing a willingness to spend slightly more money. It is unclear there is a corresponding willingness to expand their forces.

Geopolitically, the pressure on us to defend our allies in the Middle East and Asia and Europe all at the same time is I think considerable, and in response the Army is downsizing. We can't meet out recruiting goals.  Germany is having problems with its recruiting goals.

You are absolutely correct IMO. Many of us remember when the US was committed to having a military force that could fight two full-scale wars and one counter-insurgency simultaneously. That then dropped to one war and one counter-insurgency. Now it is unclear we can even fight one war. IMO the only way any of these nations (US, Germany, UK, etc.) can maintain an adequate "standing army" is to re-institute conscription. We don't have nearly enough money to attract sufficient troops. Being a soldier isn't easy and the deployment tempo with our current military size just grinds down the force. A bigger force can't be bought. Of course, the probability of conscription being re-instituted in any of these countries is zero, Putin or no Putin. I find it humorous (in a perverse way)  when the US Army claims the latest "reorganization" improves combat power when it is obviously just trying to cover the shortfall.

Are Putin, China or North Korea having that same problem?  If you run a dictatorship, or what is one in reality, you can solve the "recruitment" problem fairly easily.

Up to a point, forced mass conscription can indeed provide all the troops you want. You do take a motivation/professionalism hit, but enough quantity can be used to overcome that.

It is no longer 1938 or 1939 where your enemies are thousands of miles of water away with no quick way to get there. 
If we do not stop Putin from taking over the Ukraine, we are just kicking the can down road to the next generation and it will be worse for them.

Absolutely, totally correct. Unfortunately it may not even be a generational delay. Putin is obviously in a hurry. Failure in Ukraine does however have serious adverse consequences for NATO and the world.

IMO the US forces "permanently" stationed in Europe always had two missions. One, the most obvious one, was to deter the Russians from "going west". Failing that, the US forces (along with the rest of NATO active forces) were expected at a minimum to delay the Russians until reinforcements (mostly from the US) arrived. The second, and even more important (but unstated for obvious reasons) was to provide a force that would ensure the US would do what was necessary to defend Europe. The willingness to lose up to 75,000 troops (more or less) was our "bona fides" that we were "all in". That enabled our credibility to be the "stable reference" because we couldn't sudenly just "opt out". This "statement" was also designed to let Russia know that we were serious and convince them there was no path to victory. The US troops were a "hostage force".

Today, the US has many "hostage forces" deployed around the world. The US force (28,000) in Korea is certainly that. It certainly can't stop (or even slow down) the 1.3 million strong North Korean army. It does demonstrate and ensure that if North Korea attacks, we will be "all in". IMO the us can maintain a  "stable reference" for NATO and Europe with less than 5 divisions worth of combat power "permanently" present. The questions are 1) how many troops are a necessary minimum for a "hostage force" and 2) how many troops are necessary to have enough military power to "matter". Right now, I think we are "OK", but barely. It mostly depends on what the other NATO nations think. I find it interesting that Romania repeatedly badgered the US until we sent a relatively small force to Romania "permanently". Our hostage force in place, Romania was fine with that.
https://www.army.mil/article/265582/us_a...in_romania