[Goose]

This all makes Estonian's Prime Ministers statements perhaps more meaningful.  We can have all the good intentions, but if you don't have the means to put those intentions in force, you are sort of whistling in the wind.

Amen! Many European nations (particular the smaller ones) simply don't have a big enough GDP to have enough "means" to ever resist Russia on their own.  They can spend their 2% plus more and that still will be true. The larger and more prosperous nations like France and Germany do have the means. They simply believed that after the end of the "cold" war they were "safe" and did not have to worry about a war in Europe ever again, especially when the US would keep any aggressor from inside Europe "under control". This was not a totally crazy idea, and had the big advantage it freed up lots of Government spending to be used for social welfare. The US did the same to some extent.

In 1990 the US Army had 18 active combat divisions and 10 reserve.  Germany from 1980 to 1990 had 12 active combat divisions and a whole bunch of "territorial" brigades in reserve. The German UMT resulted in everybody having military training and being subject to recall. In 2011 the German Army was reduced to 3 divisions and UMT was abolished. Today, all three divisions have trouble with force structure and one of them is a total organizational "bastard child". The US Army today officially fields 10 to 12 active "divisions", although the frequent reorganizations around the "brigade" concept  muddies the waters greatly. These divisions all have attached reserve "augments" that are not actually with the division. The summary way to look at it is that the US army today is 60% of the size it was in 1990 (732,403 troops in 1990, 452,689 in 2023). The German army today is 37% of the size it was in 1990 (495,000 troops + 1.3 million reservists in 1990, 181,672 in 2023). It is interesting to note that in 1990 Germany fielded as many active divisions (and many more reservists) as the US fields today. The US Army in 2024 will be the smallest the US has had since 1939.  The US also has to worry about Asia and the Middle East. GFL if we have to fight the dreaded "land war in Asia".

The "knock on" effects of these reductions was that the manufactures of munitions saw their potential "market" drop considerably. It was considerably worse for Germany. Additionally, the "downsizing" allowed the forces to greatly reduce their purchases for many years as they ran down their existing stocks. Several years of no orders at all put may companies out of business or forced them to downsize radically and merge with others in the same sector. It also made for almost no investment capital availability, as who wants to invest in a very competitive but rapidly shrinking industry. The very large companies had the money to survive. Most smaller ones did not. The "means" isn't gone, but it is minuscule compared to the 1990s even.

Seems to me that the Ukraine - Russian conflict has illustrated one big problem for the West.  The war has burned through munitions of all kinds at a staggering rate.  The Russians seem to never throw anything away and are wheeling out 30 year old tanks, which seems stupid, but if the other side has no useful tanks, it is not so dumb after all.  The situation seems to illustrate that it is best that stockpiles be rebuilt in much larger quantities that in the past. 
He who runs out of ammunition first loses.

Lots of truth here, but there are conflating factors. NATO never has intended to get into artillery duels with Russia on a fixed front. NATO intended to seize command of the air and obliterate Russian artillery (and everybody else :-) on the ground. Russia knew this. Their response was to build a large, integrated air defense system including missiles of all type and the PVO to defend their homeland and troops. In the 1970s NATO could be pretty sure Russia's air defense would fail, but after that things started looking a bit dicey. There were two thrusts against the increasing Russian capability. One was generating lots of EA and anti-radiation SEAD/DEAD capability. The USAF felt they could win with that, but feared it would incur significant losses doing so. The other was stealth. Stealth worked good, so the other efforts atrophied. Air superiority was (and is) still the key to NATO strategy.

NATO absolutely never intended to get into a long infantry war with the Soviet Union. We would lose eventually. They had more troops. NATO intended to utilize maneuver warfare to get in the Russian rear areas, chew up the "B" and "C" divisions waiting there and cut off supplies to the "A" divisions. These "A" divisions were tasked with cutting Europe off from resupply by the US. If it looked like they would succeed before NATO did, we would use tactical nuclear weapons. In any case, we were not going to have a "long" war. Russia wasn't planning one either, because they feared  our air forces would tear them up even if our armies did not. The were going to "go for broke"  and try to get to the French border before we could stop them. If we were stopping them and tearing up their logistics, they would use tactical nuclear weapons. Either way, it wouldn't be a "long" war. Thank God none of this ever happened.

The obvious problem is that things often don't go as planned. That said, the US has "enough" stocks to resupply Ukraine. We just need to do it. We are obviously running down our own stocks, but since we have to be prepared to fight in Asia and the Middle East, not just in Europe, we have a lot of artillery stock. The problem is Ukraine isn't NATO and they can't use their air force to interdict Russian supply lines. We are mismatched to them as an ally. The F-16s are a (somewhat weak and very belated) attempt to "fix" that. Ukraine realized that from day one. For some reason NATO either didn't get it or had to pretend otherwise for political reasons.

We also have LOTS of tanks in reserve storage. So does the EU, although many are in private hands. We don't have the ability to completely refurbish them quickly, but neither does Russia. They use them "as-is". Sometimes it works, mostly it doesn't. Russia doesn't care. They just have to keep the pressure on because they perceive that Ukraine can't "hurt" them enough to matter. If Crimea becomes meaningfully threatened, that changes. Ukraine will lose an infantry slugging match eventually. They need to "change the game". They need artillery to stop Russian advances, but they also need air power and artillery to hurt Russia. Crimea is the place to do that. Otherwise, it is moot what date Ukraine runs out of ammunition (unless one believes Russia will collapse internally in the near term).

[Goose]

This all makes Estonian's Prime Ministers statements perhaps more meaningful.  We can have all the good intentions, but if you don't have the means to put those intentions in force, you are sort of whistling in the wind.

Amen! Many European nations (particular the smaller ones) simply don't have a big enough GDP to have enough "means" to ever resist Russia on their own.  They can spend their 2% plus more and that still will be true. The larger and more prosperous nations like France and Germany do have the means. They simply believed that after the end of the "cold" war they were "safe" and did not have to worry about a war in Europe ever again, especially when the US would keep any aggressor from inside Europe "under control". This was not a totally crazy idea, and had the big advantage it freed up lots of Government spending to be used for social welfare. The US did the same to some extent.

In 1990 the US Army had 18 active combat divisions and 10 reserve.  Germany from 1980 to 1990 had 12 active combat divisions and a whole bunch of "territorial" brigades in reserve. The German UMT resulted in everybody having military training and being subject to recall. In 2011 the German Army was reduced to 3 divisions and UMT was abolished. Today, all three divisions have trouble with force structure and one of them is a total organizational "bastard child". The US Army today officially fields 10 to 12 active "divisions", although the frequent reorganizations around the "brigade" concept  muddies the waters greatly. These divisions all have attached reserve "augments" that are not actually with the division. The summary way to look at it is that the US army today is 60% of the size it was in 1990 (732,403 troops in 1990, 452,689 in 2023). The German army today is 37% of the size it was in 1990 (495,000 troops + 1.3 million reservists in 1990, 181,672 in 2023). It is interesting to note that in 1990 Germany fielded as many active divisions (and many more reservists) as the US fields today. The US Army in 2024 will be the smallest the US has had since 1939.  The US also has to worry about Asia and the Middle East. GFL if we have to fight the dreaded "land war in Asia".

The "knock on" effects of these reductions was that the manufactures of munitions saw their potential "market" drop considerably. It was considerably worse for Germany. Additionally, the "downsizing" allowed the forces to greatly reduce their purchases for many years as they ran down their existing stocks. Several years of no orders at all put may companies out of business or forced them to downsize radically and merge with others in the same sector. It also made for almost no investment capital availability, as who wants to invest in a very competitive but rapidly shrinking industry. The very large companies had the money to survive. Most smaller ones did not. The "means" isn't gone, but it is minuscule compared to the 1990s even.

Seems to me that the Ukraine - Russian conflict has illustrated one big problem for the West.  The war has burned through munitions of all kinds at a staggering rate.  The Russians seem to never throw anything away and are wheeling out 30 year old tanks, which seems stupid, but if the other side has no useful tanks, it is not so dumb after all.  The situation seems to illustrate that it is best that stockpiles be rebuilt in much larger quantities that in the past. 
He who runs out of ammunition first loses.

Lots of truth here, but there are conflating factors. NATO never has intended to get into artillery duels with Russia on a fixed front. NATO intended to seize command of the air and obliterate Russian artillery (and everybody else :-) on the ground. Russia knew this. Their response was to build a large, integrated air defense system including missiles of all type and the PVO to defend their homeland and troops. In the 1970s NATO could be pretty sure Russia's air defense would fail, but after that things started looking a bit dicey. There were two thrusts against the increasing Russian capability. One was generating lots of EA and anti-radiation SEAD/DEAD capability. The USAF felt they could win with that, but feared it would incur significant losses doing so. The other was stealth. Stealth worked good, so the other efforts atrophied. Air superiority was (and is) still the key to NATO strategy.

NATO absolutely never intended to get into a long infantry war with the Soviet Union. We would lose eventually. They had more troops. NATO intended to utilize maneuver warfare to get in the Russian rear areas, chew up the "B" and "C" divisions waiting there and cut off supplies to the "A" divisions. These "A" divisions were tasked with cutting Europe off from resupply by the US. If it looked like they would succeed before NATO did, we would use tactical nuclear weapons. In any case, we were not going to have a "long" war. Russia wasn't planning one either, because they feared  our air forces would tear them up even if our armies did not. The were going to "go for broke"  and try to get to the French border before we could stop them. If we were stopping them and tearing up their logistics, they would use tactical nuclear weapons. Either way, it wouldn't be a "long" war. Thank God none of this ever happened.

The obvious problem is that things often don't go as planned. That said, the US has "enough" stocks to resupply Ukraine. We just need to do it. We are obviously running down our own stocks, but since we have to be prepared to fight in Asia and the Middle East, not just in Europe, we have a lot of artillery stock. The problem is Ukraine isn't NATO and they can't use their air force to interdict Russian supply lines. We are mismatched to them as an ally. The F-16s are a (somewhat weak and very belated) attempt to "fix" that. Ukraine realized that from day one. For some reason NATO either didn't get it or had to pretend otherwise for political reasons.

We also have LOTS of tanks in reserve storage. So does the EU, although many are in private hands. We don't have the ability to completely refurbish them quickly, but neither does Russia. They use them "as-is". Sometimes it works, mostly it doesn't. Russia doesn't care. They just have to keep the pressure on because they perceive that Ukraine can't "hurt" them enough to matter. If Crimea becomes meaningfully threatened, that changes. Ukraine will lose an infantry slugging match eventually. They need to "change the game". They need artillery to stop Russian advances, but they also need air power and artillery to hurt Russia. Crimea is the place to do that. Otherwise, it is moot what date Ukraine runs out of ammunition (unless one believes Russia will collapse internally in the near term).